Scenario
You are the risk manager for a local, long-term care facility. Part of your role is to develop processes that fosters an environment that prioritizes patient safety. Conduct a comparative analysis of two of the most widely published briefs from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in recent years – To Err is Human and Crossing the Quality Chasm. According to the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering Medicine (2018), To Err is Human illuminated how tens of thousands of Americans die each year from medical errors and effectively put the issue of patient safety and quality on the radar screen of public and private policymakers. The Quality Chasm report described broader quality issues and defines six aims—care should be safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient and equitable—and 10 rules for care delivery redesign.
Instructions
In a comparative analysis, discuss the significance of each report on recent quality initiatives implemented by entities such as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), and the Joint Commission. Your comparative analysis should also contain an examination of the quantitative data collection methods used in each report. Make a recommendation based on your analysis on how your organization and similar organizations can utilize the findings from the reports to assist in continuous quality improvement of operations and the achievement of organizational goals.
Reference
National Academies of Sciences and Engineering (2018). Crossing the Quality Chasm: The IOM Health Care Quality Initiative. Health and Medicine Division. Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK535657
To err is human: Building a safer health system. (2000). National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/9728
HSA6100CBE Section 01CBE Healthcare Operations Management
Deliverable 4 – Comparative Analysis
Competency
Explain the role and impact of data analytics on decision-making processes in a selected healthcare setting.
Scenario
You are the risk manager for a local, long-term care facility. Part of your role is to develop processes that fosters an environment that prioritizes patient safety. Conduct a comparative analysis of two of the most widely published briefs from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in recent years – To Err is Human and Crossing the Quality Chasm. According to the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering Medicine (2018), To Err is Human illuminated how tens of thousands of Americans die each year from medical errors and effectively put the issue of patient safety and quality on the radar screen of public and private policymakers. The Quality Chasm report described broader quality issues and defines six aims—care should be safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient and equitable—and 10 rules for care delivery redesign.
Instructions
In a comparative analysis, discuss the significance of each report on recent quality initiatives implemented by entities such as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), and the Joint Commission. Your comparative analysis should also contain an examination of the quantitative data collection methods used in each report. Make a recommendation based on your analysis on how your organization and similar organizations can utilize the findings from the reports to assist in continuous quality improvement of operations and the achievement of organizational goals.
Reference
National Academies of Sciences and Engineering (2018). Crossing the Quality Chasm: The IOM Health Care Quality Initiative. Health and Medicine Division. Retrieved from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK535657
To err is human: Building a safer health system. (2000). National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/9728
Resources
· For assistance on completing a comparative analysis, please visit the Rasmussen College Answers page.
Grading rubric
Bottom of Form
image3.png
image1.png
image2.png
,
CONTRIBUTORS
DETAILS
All downloadable National Academies titles are free to be used for personal and/or non-commercial academic use. Users may also freely post links to our titles on this website; non-commercial academic users are encouraged to link to the version on this website rather than distribute a downloaded PDF to ensure that all users are accessing the latest authoritative version of the work. All other uses require written permission. (Request Permission)
This PDF is protected by copyright and owned by the National Academy of Sciences; unless otherwise indicated, the National Academy of Sciences retains copyright to all materials in this PDF with all rights reserved.
Visit the National Academies Press at nap.edu and login or register to get:
– Access to free PDF downloads of thousands of publications
– 10% off the price of print publications
– Email or social media notifications of new titles related to your interests
– Special offers and discounts
SUGGESTED CITATION
BUY THIS BOOK
FIND RELATED TITLES
This PDF is available at http://nap.nationalacademies.org/10027
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century (2001)
360 pages | 6 x 9 | HARDBACK
ISBN 978-0-309-07280-9 | DOI 10.17226/10027
Committee on Quality of Health Care in America; Institute of Medicine
Institute of Medicine. 2001. Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/10027.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Crossing the Quality Chasm
A New Health System for the 21st Century
Committee on Quality of Health Care in America
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS Washington, D.C.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS • 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. • Washington, DC 20418
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.
Support for this project was provided by: the Institute of Medicine; the National Research Council; The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation; the California Health Care Foundation; the Com- monwealth Fund; and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Health Care Financing Admin- istration and Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. The views presented in this report are those of the Institute of Medicine Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America and are not necessarily those of the funding agencies.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Crossing the quality chasm : a new health system for the 21st century / Committee on Quality Health Care in America, Institute of Medicine. p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-309-07280-8 1. Medical care—United States. 2. Health care reform—United States. 3. Medical care—United States—Quality control. I. Institute of Medicine (U.S.). Committee on Quality of Health Care in America. [DNLM: 1. Health Care Reform—methods—United States. 2. Quality of Health Care—United States. WA 540 AA1 C937 2001] RA395.A3 C855 2001 362.1′0973—dc21
2001030775
Additional copies of this report are available for sale from the National Academy Press, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Box 285, Washington, D.C. 20055. Call (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334- 3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area), or visit the NAP’s home page at www.nap.edu. The full text of this report is available at www.nap.edu.
For more information about the Institute of Medicine, visit the IOM home page at: www.iom.edu.
Copyright 2001 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.
The serpent has been a symbol of long life, healing, and knowledge among almost all cultures and religions since the beginning of recorded history. The serpent adopted as a logotype by the Institute of Medicine is a relief carving from ancient Greece, now held by the Staatliche Museen in Berlin.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Shaping the Future for Health
“Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Willing is not enough; we must do.” —Goethe
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences.
The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achieve- ments of engineers. Dr. William A. Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engi- neering.
The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine.
The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sci- ences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Func- tioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. William A. Wulf are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.
National Academy of Sciences National Academy of Engineering Institute of Medicine National Research Council
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
v
COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA
WILLIAM C. RICHARDSON (Chair), President and CEO, W.K. Kellogg Foundation, Battle Creek, MI
DONALD M. BERWICK, President and CEO, Institute for Healthcare Improvement, Boston, MA
J. CRIS BISGARD, Director, Health Services, Delta Air Lines, Inc., Atlanta, GA
LONNIE R. BRISTOW, Former President, American Medical Association, Walnut Creek, CA
CHARLES R. BUCK, Program Leader, Health Care Quality and Strategy Initiatives, General Electric Company, Fairfield, CT
CHRISTINE K. CASSEL, Professor and Chairman, Department of Geriatrics and Adult Development, The Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York, NY
MARK R. CHASSIN, Professor and Chairman, Department of Health Policy, The Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York, NY
MOLLY JOEL COYE, Senior Fellow, Institute for the Future, and President, Health Technology Center, San Francisco, CA
DON E. DETMER, Dennis Gillings Professor of Health Management, University of Cambridge, UK
JEROME H. GROSSMAN, Senior Fellow, Center for Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Boston, MA
BRENT JAMES, Executive Director, Intermountain Health Care Institute for Health Care Delivery Research, Salt Lake City, UT
DAVID McK. LAWRENCE, Chairman and CEO, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., Oakland, CA
LUCIAN L. LEAPE, Adjunct Professor, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA
ARTHUR LEVIN, Director, Center for Medical Consumers, New York, NY RHONDA ROBINSON-BEALE, Executive Medical Director, Managed Care
Management and Clinical Programs, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, Southfield
JOSEPH E. SCHERGER, Associate Dean for Primary Care, University of California, Irvine College of Medicine
ARTHUR SOUTHAM, President and CEO, Health Systems Design, Oakland, CA
MARY WAKEFIELD, Director, Center for Health Policy, Research, and Ethics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA
GAIL L. WARDEN, President and CEO, Henry Ford Health System, Detroit, MI
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
vi
Study Staff
JANET M. CORRIGAN Director, Quality of Health Care in America Project Director, Board on Health Care Services
MOLLA S. DONALDSON, Project Codirector LINDA T. KOHN, Project Codirector SHARI K. MAGUIRE, Research Assistant KELLY C. PIKE, Senior Project Assistant
Auxiliary Staff
ANTHONY BURTON, Administrative Assistant MIKE EDINGTON, Managing Editor JENNIFER CANGCO, Financial Advisor
Consultant/Editor
RONA BRIERE, Briere Associates, Inc.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
vii
Reviewers
The report was reviewed by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments to assist the authors and the Institute of Medicine in making the published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The content of the review comments and the draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. The committee wishes to thank the following individuals for their par- ticipation in the report review process:
TERRY CLEMMER, Intermountain Health Care, Salt Lake City, UT SUSAN EDGMAN-LEVITAN, The Picker Institute, Boston, MA ANN GREINER, Center for Studying Health System Change, Washington, D.C. DAVID LANSKY, The Foundation for Accountability, Portland, OR DAVID MECHANIC, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey,
New Brunswick, NJ L. GORDON MOORE, Brighton Family Medicine, Rochester, NY DAVID G. NATHAN, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute (Emeritus), Boston, MA VINOD K. SAHNEY, Henry Ford Health System, Detroit, MI WILLIAM STEAD, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN EDWARD WAGNER, Group Health Center for Health Studies, Seattle, WA
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
viii REVIEWERS
Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommenda- tions nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by WILLIAM H. DANFORTH, Washington Univer- sity, St. Louis, Missouri, and EDWARD B. PERRIN, University of Washington and VA Puget Sound Health Care System, Seattle, Washington. Appointed by the National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine, they were respon- sible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review com- ments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests entirely with the authoring committee and the institution.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ix
Preface
This is the second and final report of the Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America, which was appointed in 1998 to identify strategies for achieving a substantial improvement in the quality of health care delivered to Americans. The committee’s first report, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System, was released in 1999 and focused on a specific quality concern—patient safety. This second report focuses more broadly on how the health care delivery system can be designed to innovate and improve care.
This report does not recommend specific organizational approaches to achieve the aims set forth. Rather than being an organizational construct, rede- sign refers to a new perspective on the purpose and aims of the health care system, how patients and their clinicians should relate, and how care processes can be designed to optimize responsiveness to patient needs. The principles and guidance for redesign that are offered in this report represent fundamental changes in the way the system meets the needs of the people it serves.
Redesign is not aimed only at the health care organizations and professionals that comprise the delivery system. Change is also required in the structures and processes of the environment in which those organizations and professionals function. Such change includes setting national priorities for improvement, cre- ating better methods for disseminating and applying knowledge to practice, fos- tering the use of information technology in clinical care, creating payment poli- cies that encourage innovation and reward improvement in performance, and enhancing educational programs to strengthen the health care workforce.
The Quality of Health Care in America project is supported largely by the income from an endowment established within the Institute of Medicine by the
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
x PREFACE
Howard Hughes Medical Institute and income from an endowment established for the National Research Council by the W. K. Kellogg Foundation. Generous support was provided by the Commonwealth Fund for a workshop on applying information technology to improve the quality of clinical care, by the Health Care Financing Administration for a workshop aimed at exploring the relationship between payment policy and quality improvement, by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation for a survey of exemplary systems of care, by the California Health Care Foundation for a workshop to explore methods for communicating with the public about quality in health care, and by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality for a workshop on the relationship between patient outcomes and provider volume.
Although the committee takes full responsibility for the content of this re- port, many people have made important contributions. The Subcommittee on Designing the Health System of the 21st Century, under the direction of Donald Berwick, combined a depth of knowledge and creativity to propose a vision on how health care could be delivered in the 21st century. The Subcommittee on Creating an External Environment for Quality, under the direction of J. Cris Bisgard and Molly Joel Coye, provided expert guidance and a wealth of experi- ence on how the external environment could support improved delivery of care. Lastly, the IOM staff, under the direction of Janet Corrigan, have provided excel- lent research, analysis and writing.
Now is the right time for the changes proposed in this report. Technological advances make it possible to accomplish things today that were impossible only a few years ago. Patients, health care professionals, and policy makers are becoming all too painfully aware of the shortcomings of our current care delivery systems and the importance of finding better approaches to meeting the health care needs of all Americans. The committee does not offer a simple prescription, but a vision of what is possible and the path that can be taken. It will not be an easy road, but it will be most worthwhile.
William C. Richardson, Ph.D. Chair March 2001
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
xi
Foreword
This is the second and final report of the Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America. Response to the committee’s first report, To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, has been swift, positive, and ongoing from many health care organizations, practitioners, researchers, and policy makers.
The present report addresses quality-related issues more broadly, providing a strategic direction for redesigning the health care delivery system of the 21st century. Fundamental reform of health care is needed to ensure that all Ameri- cans receive care that is safe, effective, patient centered, timely, efficient, and equitable.
As this report is being released, we are reflecting on the recent loss of a great 20th-century leader in the field of health care quality. Avedis Donabedian, member of the Institute of Medicine, leaves behind a rich body of work on the conceptualization and measurement of quality. His extraordinary intellectual con- tributions will continue to guide efforts to improve quality well into the coming century.
The Quality of Health Care in America project continues the Institute of Medicine’s long-standing focus on quality-of-care issues. The Institute’s Na- tional Roundtable on Health Care Quality has described the variability of the quality of health care in the United States and highlighted the urgent need for improvement. The report Ensuring Quality Cancer Care issued by the Institute’s National Cancer Policy Board, offers the conclusion that there is a wide gulf between ideal cancer care and the reality experienced by many Americans. And a forthcoming report from the Institute’s Committee on the National Quality
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
xii FOREWORD
Report on Health Care Delivery will offer a framework for periodic reporting to the nation on the state of quality of care.
This report reinforces the conviction of these and other concerned groups that we cannot wait any longer to address the serious quality-of-care challenges facing our nation. A comprehensive and strong response is needed now.
Kenneth I. Shine, M.D. President, Institute of Medicine March 2001
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
xiii
Acknowledgments
The Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America first and foremost acknowledges the tremendous contribution by the members of two subcommit- tees, both of which spent many hours working on exceedingly complex issues. Although individual subcommittee members put forth differing perspectives on a variety of issues, there was no disagreement on the ultimate goal of providing the leadership, strategic direction, and analytic tools needed to achieve a substantial improvement in health care quality during the next decade. We take this oppor- tunity to thank each subcommittee member for his or her contribution.
Subcommittee on Creating an Environment for Quality in Health Care: J. Cris Bisgard (Cochair), Delta Air Lines, Inc.; Molly Joel Coye, (Cochair), Institute for the Future; Phyllis C. Borzi, The George Washington University; Charles R. Buck, General Electric Company; Jon Christianson, University of Minnesota; Mary Jane England, Washington Business Group on Health; George J. Isham, HealthPartners; Brent James, Intermountain Health Care; Roz D. Lasker, New York Academy of Medicine; Lucian L. Leape, Harvard School of Public Health; Patricia A. Riley, National Academy of State Health Policy; Gerald M. Shea, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; Gail L. Warden, Henry Ford Health System; and A. Eugene Washington, Univer- sity of California, San Francisco School of Medicine.
Subcommittee on Building the 21st Century Health Care System: Don M. Berwick (Chair), Institute for Healthcare Improvement; Christine K. Cassel, Mount Sinai School of Medicine; Rodney Dueck, HealthSystem Minnesota;
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
xiv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Jerome H. Grossman, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Univer- sity; John E. Kelsch, Consultant in Total Quality; Risa Lavizzo-Mourey, Univer- sity of Pennsylvania; Arthur Levin, Center for Medical Consumers; Eugene C. Nelson, Hitchcock Medical Center; Thomas Nolan, Associates in Process Im- provement; Gail J. Povar, Cameron Medical Group; James L. Reinertsen, CareGroup; Joseph E. Scherger, University of California, Irvine; Stephen M. Shortell, University of California, Berkeley; Mary Wakefield, George Mason University; and Kevin Weiss, Rush Primary Care Institute. Paul Plsek served as an expert consultant to the subcommittee.
In addition, a number of people willingly and generously contributed their time and expertise as the committee and both subcommittees conducted their deliberations.
The planning committee for the Workshop on Using Information Tech- nology to Improve the Quality of Care did an excellent job of organizing the workshop. This committee consisted of E. Andrew Balas, University of Missouri School of Medicine; Don E. Detmer, University of Cambridge; Jerome H. Grossman, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; and Brent James, Intermountain Health Care. The participants in this workshop provided a great deal of useful information that is reflected in this report. These participants were E. Andrew Balas, University of Missouri School of Medicine; David W. Bates, Brigham Internal Medicine Associates; Mark Braunstein, Pa- tient Care Technologies; Charles R. Buck, General Electric Company; Maj. Gen. Paul K. Carlton, Jr., Air Force Medical Operations Agency; David C. Classen, University of Utah; Paul D. Clayton, Intermountain Health Care; Kathryn L. Coltin, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care; Louis H. Diamond, The MEDSTAT Group; J. Michael Fitzmaurice, Agency for Health Care Policy and Research; Janlori Goldman, Georgetown University; Jerome H. Grossman, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; David Gustafson, University of Wisconsin- Madison; Betsy L. Humphreys, U.S. National Library of Medicine; Brent James, Intermountain Health Care; John T. Kelly, AETNA/U.S. Healthcare; David B. Kendall, Progressive Policy Institute; Robert Kolodner, Department of Veterans Affairs; George D. Lundberg, Northwestern University; Robert Mayes, Health Care Financing Administration; Ned McCulloch, IBM, formerly Office of Sena- tor Joseph Lieberman; Elizabeth A. McGlynn, The RAND Corporation; Blackford Middleton, MedicaLogic; Gregg S. Meyer, Agency for Health Care Policy and Research; Arnold Milstein, Pacific Business Group on Health; Donald Moran, The Moran Company; Michael Nerlich, University of Regensburg; William C. Richardson, W. K. Kellogg Foundation; Richard D. Rubin, Foundation for Health Care Quality; Charles Saunders, Healtheon/WebMD; Joseph E. Scherger, Uni- versity of California, Irvine; Kenneth Smithson, VHA, Inc.; William W. Stead, Vanderbilt University; Stuart Sugarman, Mount Sinai/NYU Health; Paul C. Tang,
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xv
Palo Alto Medical Clinic; and Jan H. van Bemmel, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
The technical advisory panel on the Communication of Quality of Care Information organized a successful Workshop on Communicating with the Pub- lic About Quality of Care. This panel consisted of Mary Wakefield (Chair), George Mason University; Robert J. Blendon, Harvard School of Public Health and Kennedy School of Government; Charles R. Buck, General Electric Com- pany; Molly Joel Coye, Institute for the Future; Arthur Levin, Center for Medical Consumers; Lee N. Newcomer, Vivius, Inc., formerly with United HealthCare Corporation; and Richard Sorian, Georgetown University. Participants in the Workshop on Communicating with the Public about Quality of Care pro- vided many useful insights reflected in this report. They included Lisa Aliferis, Dateline NBC; Carol Blakeslee, News Hour with Jim Lehrer; Robert J. Blendon, Harvard School of Public Health and Kennedy School of Government; Charles R. Buck, General Electric Company; Christine Cassel, Mount Sinai School of Medicine; Molly Joel Coye, Institute for the Future; W. Douglas Davidson, Foun- dation for Accountability; Susan Dentzer, News Hour with Jim Lehrer; Mason Essif, HealthWeek Public Television; David Glass, Kaiser-Permanente; Ann Greiner, Center for Studying Health System Change; Madge Kaplan, WGBH Radio; Richard Knox, Boston Globe; Arthur Levin, Center for Medical Consum- ers; Trudy Lieberman, Consumer Reports; Lani Luciano, Money Magazine; Laura Meckler, Associated Press; Duncan Moore, Modern Healthcare; Lee N. New- comer, Vivius, Inc., formerly with United HealthCare Corporation; William Richardson, W.K. Kellogg Foundation; Marty Rosen, New York Daily News; Sabin Russell, San Francisco Chronicle; Stuart Schear, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation; Richard Sorian, Georgetown University; Abigail Trafford, Washington Post; Mary Wakefield, George Mason University; Lawrence Wallack, Portland State University; Michael Weinstein, New York Times; and Ronald Winslow, Wall Street Journal.
The technical advisory panel on the State of Quality in America, through their findings, based on a commissioned paper from Mark Schuster at RAND, provided important input to the committee’s deliberations. The panel included Mark R. Chassin, The Mount Sinai School of Medicine; Arnold Epstein, Harvard School of Public Health; Brent James, Intermountain Health Care; James P. Logerfo, University of Washington, Seattle; Harold Luft, University of Califor- nia, San Francisco; R. Heather Palmer, Harvard School of Public Health; and Kenneth B. Wells, University of California, Los Angeles.
Participants in the one-day Workshop on the Effects of Financing Poli- cies on Quality of Care also provided important input to the committee’s delib- erations. They included Robert Berenson, Health Care Financing Administra-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
xvi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
tion; Don Berwick, Institute for Healthcare Improvement; J. Cris Bisgard, Delta Air Lines, Inc.; Phyllis Borzi, The George Washington University; David Brad- ley, Sentinel Health Partners Inc.; Lonnie Bristow, Former President, American Medical Association; Charles R. Buck, General Electric Company; Kathleen Buto, Health Care Financing Administration; Lawrence Casalino, The University of Chicago; Molly Joel Coye, Institute for the Future; Rick Curtis, Institute for Health Policy Solutions; Charles Cutler, American Association of Health Plans; Geraldine Dallek, Georgetown University; Irene Fraser, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; Jerome H. Grossman, John F. Kennedy School of Govern- ment, Harvard University; Sam Ho, PacifiCare Health Systems; Thomas Hoyer, Health Care Financing Administration; Brent James, Intermountain Health Care; Glenn D. Littenberg, Practicing Gastroenterologist; James Mortimer, Midwest Business Group on Health; Don Nielsen, American Hospital Association; Ann Robinow, Buyers Health Care Action Group; Gerald Shea, AFL–CIO; David Shulkin, DoctorQuality.com; Bruce Taylor, GTE Service Corporation; and Gail R. Wilensky, Project Hope & MedPAC.
Participants in a workshop held to explore the relationship between volume and outcomes made valuable contributions to this study as well. They included Richard Bae, University of California San Francisco; Colin Begg, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center; Donald M. Berwick, Institute for Healthcare Improvement; Bruce Bradley, General Motors; Mark R. Chassin, The Mount Sinai School of Medicine; Steve Clauser, Health Care Financing Admin- istration; Jan De la Mare, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; Suzanne DelBanco, The Leapfrog Group; R. Adams Dudley, University of California, San Francisco; John Eisenberg, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; Irene Fraser, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; Robert Galvin, General Electric Company; Ethan Halm, The Mount Sinai School of Medicine; Edward Hannan, State University of New York, Albany; Norman Hertzer, Cleveland Clinic; Bruce Hillner, Virginia Commonwealth University; Sam Ho, PacifiCare Health Systems; George J. Isham, HealthPartners; Clara Lee, The Mount Sinai School of Medicine; Arthur Levin, Center for Medical Consumers; Arnold Milstein, William M. Mercer, Inc.; Peggy McNamara, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; Don Nielsen, American Hospital Association; Diana Petitti, Kaiser Permanente of Southern California; Joseph Simone, Huntsman Cancer Foundation and Institute; Jane Sisk, Mount Sinai School of Medicine; and Ellen Stovall, National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship.
A steering group that provided invaluable advice and review of the design of the microsystems study included Paul B. Batalden, Dartmouth Medi- cal School; Donald M. Berwick, Institute for Healthcare Improvement; Eugene C. Nelson, Dartmouth Medical Center; Thomas Nolan, Associates in Process Improvement; and Stephen M. Shortell, University of California, Berkeley. The
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xvii
assistance of Susan B. Hassimiller, Project Officer at The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation was critical to the undertaking of this study. The following indi- viduals provided assistance in formulating interview questions and identify- ing study sites: E. Andrew Balas, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Medicine; Connie Davis, Center for Health Studies of the Group Health Coopera- tive of Puget Sound; Joanne Lynn, Center to Improve Care of the Dying; and Charles M. Kilo, Institute for Health Care Improvement. The committee also wishes to thank the individuals at the study sites who gave their time to provide information on their practice settings.
Several other individuals made important contributions to the com- mittee’s work. They include John Demakis and Lynn McQueen, Health Ser- vices Research and Development Service, Department of Veterans Affairs; Joy Grossman, Center for Studying Health System Change; Stephanie Maxwell, the Urban Institute; and Ann Gauthier, Academy for Health Services Research and Health Policy.
Support for this project was provided by the Institute of Medicine, the National Research Council, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (Study of Micro-Systems), the California Health Care Foundation (Workshop on Commu- nicating with the Public about Quality of Care), the Commonwealth Fund (Work- shop on Using Information and Technology to Improve the Quality of Care), and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Health Care Financing Adminis- tration (Workshop on the Effects of Financing Policy on Quality of Care), and Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (Volume/Outcomes Workshop).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
xix
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY . . . . . . . 23 The Quality Gap, 23 Underlying Reasons for Inadequate Quality of Care, 25 Agenda for the Future and Road Map for the Report, 33
2 IMPROVING THE 21ST-CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Six Aims for Improvement, 41 A Vision of Future Care, 54
3 FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Health Care Organizations as Complex Adaptive Systems, 63 Ten Simple Rules for the 21st-Century Health Care System, 66
4 TAKING THE FIRST STEPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 The Value of Organizing Around Priority Conditions, 92 Applications of Priority Conditions, 96 Criteria for Identifying Priority Conditions, 103 Providing the Resources Needed to Initiate Change, 103
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
xx CONTENTS
5 BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Stages of Organizational Development, 112 Key Challenges for the Redesign of Health Care Organizations, 117 Leadership for Managing Change, 137
6 APPLYING EVIDENCE TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY . . . . . . 145 Background, 147 Synthesizing Clinical Evidence, 148 Using Computer-Based Clinical Decision Support Systems, 152 Making Information Available on the Internet, 155 Defining Quality Measures, 157
7 USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 Potential Benefits of Information Technology, 166 Automated Clinical Information, 170 Need for a National Health Information Infrastructure, 176
8 ALIGNING PAYMENT POLICIES WITH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Incentives of Current Payment Methods, 184 Barriers to Quality Improvement in Current Payment
Methods, 191 Adapting Existing Payment Methods to Support Quality
Improvement, 199 Need for a New Approach, 201
9 PREPARING THE WORKFORCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 Clinical Education and Training, 208 Regulation of the Professions, 214 Legal Liability Issues, 218 Research Agenda for the Future Health Care Workforce, 219
APPENDIXES A Report of the Technical Panel on the State of Quality to the Quality of
Health Care in America Committee, 225 B Redesigning Health Care with Insights from the Science of Complex
Adaptive Systems, 309
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Crossing the Quality Chasm
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
1
Executive Summary
The American health care delivery system is in need of fundamental change. Many patients, doctors, nurses, and health care leaders are concerned that the care delivered is not, essentially, the care we should receive (Donelan et al., 1999; Reed and St. Peter, 1997; Shindul-Rothschild et al., 1996; Taylor, 2001). The frustration levels of both patients and clinicians have probably never been higher. Yet the problems remain. Health care today harms too frequently and routinely fails to deliver its potential benefits.
Americans should be able to count on receiving care that meets their needs and is based on the best scientific knowledge. Yet there is strong evidence that this frequently is not the case.1 Crucial reports from disciplined review bodies document the scale and gravity of the problems (Chassin et al., 1998; Institute of Medicine, 1999; Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry, 1998). Quality problems are everywhere, affecting many patients. Between the health care we have and the care we could have lies not just a gap, but a chasm.
The Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America was formed in June 1998 and charged with developing a strategy that would result in a substan- tial improvement in the quality of health care over the next 10 years. In carrying out this charge, the committee commissioned a detailed review of the literature on the quality of care; convened a communications workshop to identify strate- gies for raising the awareness of the general public and key stakeholders of quality concerns; identified environmental forces that encourage or impede ef-
1See Appendix A of this report for a review of the literature on the quality of care.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
2 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
forts to improve quality; developed strategies for fostering greater accountability for quality; and identified important areas of research that should be pursued to facilitate improvements in quality. The committee has focused on the personal health care delivery system, specifically, the provision of preventive, acute, chronic, and end-of-life health care for individuals. Although the committee recognizes the critical role of the public health system in protecting and improv- ing the health of our communities, this issue lies beyond the purview of the present study.
The committee has already spoken to one urgent quality problem—patient safety. In our first report, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System, we concluded that tens of thousands of Americans die each year from errors in their care, and hundreds of thousands suffer or barely escape from nonfatal injuries that a truly high-quality care system would largely prevent (Institute of Medicine, 2000b).
As disturbing as the committee’s report on safety is, it reflects only a small part of the unfolding story of quality in American health care. Other defects are even more widespread and, taken together, detract still further from the health, functioning, dignity, comfort, satisfaction, and resources of Americans. This report addresses these additional quality problems. As the patient safety report was a call for action to make care safer, this report is a call for action to improve the American health care delivery system as a whole, in all its quality dimen- sions, for all Americans.
WHY ACTION IS NEEDED NOW
At no time in the history of medicine has the growth in knowledge and technologies been so profound. Since the first contemporary randomized con- trolled trial was conducted more than 50 years ago, the number of trials con- ducted has grown to nearly 10,000 annually (Chassin, 1998). Between 1993 and 1999, the budget of the National Institutes of Health increased from $10.9 to $15.6 billion, while investments by pharmaceutical firms in research and devel- opment increased from $12 to $24 billion (National Institutes of Health, 2000; Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 2000). Genomics and other new technologies on the horizon offer the promise of further increasing longevity, improving health and functioning, and alleviating pain and suffering. Advances in rehabilitation, cell restoration, and prosthetic devices hold potential for improving the heath and functioning of many with disabilities. Americans are justifiably proud of the great strides that have been made in the health and medical sciences.
As medical science and technology have advanced at a rapid pace, however, the health care delivery system has floundered in its ability to provide consis- tently high-quality care to all Americans. Research on the quality of care reveals
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
a health care system that frequently falls short in its ability to translate knowledge into practice, and to apply new technology safely and appropriately. During the last decade alone, more than 70 publications in leading peer-reviewed journals have documented serious quality shortcomings (see Appendix A). The perfor- mance of the health care system varies considerably. It may be exemplary, but often is not, and millions of Americans fail to receive effective care. If the health care system cannot consistently deliver today’s science and technology, we may conclude that it is even less prepared to respond to the extraordinary scientific advances that will surely emerge during the first half of the 21st century. And finally, more than 40 million Americans remain without health insurance, de- prived of critically important access to basic care (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).
The health care system as currently structured does not, as a whole, make the best use of its resources. There is little doubt that the aging population and increased patient demand for new services, technologies, and drugs are contribut- ing to the steady increase in health care expenditures, but so, too, is waste. Many types of medical errors result in the subsequent need for additional health care services to treat patients who have been harmed (Institute of Medicine, 2000b). A highly fragmented delivery system that largely lacks even rudimentary clinical information capabilities results in poorly designed care processes characterized by unnecessary duplication of services and long waiting times and delays. And there is substantial evidence documenting overuse of many services—services for which the potential risk of harm outweighs the potential benefits (Chassin et al., 1998; Schuster et al., 1998).
What is perhaps most disturbing is the absence of real progress toward restructuring health care systems to address both quality and cost concerns, or toward applying advances in information technology to improve administrative and clinical processes. Despite the efforts of many talented leaders and dedicated professionals, the last quarter of the 20th century might best be described as the “era of Brownian motion in health care.” Mergers, acquisitions, and affiliations have been commonplace within the health plan, hospital, and physician practice sectors (Colby, 1997). Yet all this organizational turmoil has resulted in little change in the way health care is delivered. Some of the new arrangements have failed following disappointing results. Leaders of health care institutions are under extraordinary pressure, trying on the one hand to strategically reposition their organizations for the future, and on the other to respond to today’s chal- lenges, such as reductions in third-party payments (Guterman, 1998), shortfalls in nurse staffing (Egger, 2000), and growing numbers of uninsured patients seeking uncompensated care (Institute of Medicine, 2000a).
For several decades, the needs of the American public have been shifting from predominantly acute, episodic care to care for chronic conditions. Chronic conditions are now the leading cause of illness, disability, and death; they affect almost half of the U.S. population and account for the majority of health care
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
4 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
expenditures (Hoffman et al., 1996; The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996). As the need for community-based acute and long-term care services has grown, the portion of health care resources devoted to hospital care has declined, while that expended on pharmaceuticals has risen dramatically (Copeland, 1999). Yet there remains a dearth of clinical programs with the infrastructure required to provide the full complement of services needed by people with heart disease, diabetes, asthma, and other common chronic conditions (Wagner et al., 1996). The fact that more than 40 percent of people with chronic conditions have more than one such condition argues strongly for more sophisticated mechanisms to communicate and coordinate care (The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996). Yet physician groups, hospitals, and other health care organizations operate as silos, often providing care without the benefit of complete information about the patient’s condition, medical history, services provided in other settings, or medi- cations prescribed by other clinicians. For those without insurance, care is often unobtainable except in emergencies. It is not surprising, then, that studies of patient experience document that the health system for some is a “nightmare to navigate” (Picker Institute and American Hospital Association, 1996).
QUALITY AS A SYSTEM PROPERTY
The committee is confident that Americans can have a health care system of the quality they need, want, and deserve. But we are also confident that this higher level of quality cannot be achieved by further stressing current systems of care. The current care systems cannot do the job. Trying harder will not work. Changing systems of care will.
The committee’s report on patient safety offers a similar conclusion in its narrower realm. Safety flaws are unacceptably common, but the effective rem- edy is not to browbeat the health care workforce by asking them to try harder to give safe care. Members of the health care workforce are already trying hard to do their jobs well. In fact, the courage, hard work, and commitment of doctors, nurses, and others in health care are today the only real means we have of stemming the flood of errors that are latent in our health care systems.
Health care has safety and quality problems because it relies on outmoded systems of work. Poor designs set the workforce up to fail, regardless of how hard they try. If we want safer, higher-quality care, we will need to have rede- signed systems of care, including the use of information technology to support clinical and administrative processes.
Throughout this report, the committee offers a strategy and action plan for building a stronger health system over the coming decade, one that is capable of delivering on the promise of state-of-the-art health care to all Americans. In some areas, achieving this ideal will require crossing a large chasm between today’s system and the possibilities of tomorrow.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
AN AGENDA FOR CROSSING THE CHASM
The need for leadership in health care has never been greater. Transforming the health care system will not be an easy process. But the potential benefits are large as well. Narrowing the quality chasm will make it possible to bring the benefits of medical science and technology to all Americans in every community, and this in turn will mean less pain and suffering, less disability, greater longev- ity, and a more productive workforce. To this end, the committee proposes the following agenda for redesigning the 21st-century health care system:
• That all health care constituencies, including policymakers, purchas- ers, regulators, health professionals, health care trustees and management, and consumers, commit to a national statement of purpose for the health care system as a whole and to a shared agenda of six aims for improvement that can raise the quality of care to unprecedented levels.
• That clinicians and patients, and the health care organizations that support care delivery, adopt a new set of principles to guide the redesign of care processes.
• That the Department of Health and Human Services identify a set of priority conditions upon which to focus initial efforts, provide resources to stimulate innovation, and initiate the change process.
• That health care organizations design and implement more effective organizational support processes to make change in the delivery of care possible.
• That purchasers, regulators, health professions, educational institu- tions, and the Department of Health and Human Services create an environ- ment that fosters and rewards improvement by (1) creating an infrastruc- ture to support evidence-based practice, (2) facilitating the use of information technology, (3) aligning payment incentives, and (4) preparing the workforce to better serve patients in a world of expanding knowledge and rapid change.
The committee recognizes that implementing this agenda will be a complex process and that it will be important to periodically evaluate progress and re- assess strategies for overcoming barriers.
Establishing Aims for the 21st-Century Health Care System
The committee proposes six aims for improvement to address key dimen- sions in which today’s health care system functions at far lower levels than it can and should. Health care should be:
• Safe—avoiding injuries to patients from the care that is intended to help them.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
6 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
• Effective—providing services based on scientific knowledge to all who could benefit and refraining from providing services to those not likely to benefit (avoiding underuse and overuse, respectively).
• Patient-centered—providing care that is respectful of and responsive to individual patient preferences, needs, and values and ensuring that patient values guide all clinical decisions.
• Timely—reducing waits and sometimes harmful delays for both those who receive and those who give care.
• Efficient—avoiding waste, including waste of equipment, supplies, ideas, and energy.
• Equitable—providing care that does not vary in quality because of per- sonal characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, geographic location, and socio- economic status.
A health care system that achieved major gains in these six dimensions would be far better at meeting patient needs. Patients would experience care that was safer, more reliable, more responsive, more integrated, and more available. Patients could count on receiving the full array of preventive, acute, and chronic services from which they are likely to benefit. Such a system would also be better for clinicians and others who would experience the satisfaction of providing care that was more reliable, more responsive to patients, and more coordinated than is the case today.
The entire enterprise of care would ideally be united across these aims by a single, overarching purpose for the American health care system as a whole. For this crucial statement of purpose, the committee endorses and adopts the phrasing of the Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry (1998).
Recommendation 1: All health care organizations, professional groups, and private and public purchasers should adopt as their explicit purpose to continually reduce the burden of illness, injury, and disability, and to improve the health and functioning of the people of the United States.
Recommendation 2: All health care organizations, professional groups, and private and public purchasers should pursue six major aims; specifically, health care should be safe, effective, patient-cen- tered, timely, efficient, and equitable.
Additionally, without ongoing tracking to assess progress in meeting the six aims, policy makers, leaders within the health professions and health organiza- tions, purchasers, and consumers will be unable to determine progress or under- stand where improvement efforts have succeeded and where further work is most needed. The National Quality Report has the potential to play an important role
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7
in continuing to raise the awareness of the American public about the quality-of- care challenges facing the health care system. Public awareness of shortcomings in quality is critical to securing public support for the steps that must be taken to address these concerns.
Recommendation 3: Congress should continue to authorize and appropriate funds for, and the Department of Health and Human Services should move forward expeditiously with the establishment of, monitoring and tracking processes for use in evaluating the progress of the health system in pursuit of the above-cited aims of safety, effectiveness, patient-centeredness, timeliness, efficiency, and equity. The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services should report annually to Congress and the President on the quality of care provided to the American people.
The committee applauds Congress and the Administration for their current efforts to establish a National Quality Report for tracking the quality of care. Ongoing input from the many public- and private-sector associations, profes- sional groups, and others involved in quality measurement and improvement will contribute to the success of these efforts. The establishment of specific goals for each of the six aims could further enhance the usefulness of this monitoring and tracking system as a stimulus for performance improvement. Continued funding for this activity should be ensured, as well as regular reports that communicate progress to all concerned. It should be noted that although this report focuses only on health care for individuals, the above overarching statement of purpose and six aims for improvement are sufficiently robust that they can be applied equally to decisions and evaluations at the population–health level.
Formulating New Rules to Redesign and Improve Care
As discussed earlier, improved performance will depend on new system designs. The committee believes it would be neither useful nor possible for us to specify in detail the design of 21st-century health care delivery systems. Imagi- nation and valuable pluralism abound at the local level in the nation’s health care enterprise. At the same time, we believe local efforts to implement innovation and achieve improvement can benefit from a set of simple rules to guide the redesign of the health care system.
In formulating these rules, the committee has been guided by the belief that care must be delivered by systems that are carefully and consciously designed to provide care that is safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equi- table. Such systems must be designed to serve the needs of patients, and to ensure that they are fully informed, retain control and participate in care delivery whenever possible, and receive care that is respectful of their values and prefer- ences. Such systems must facilitate the application of scientific knowledge to
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
8 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
practice, and provide clinicians with the tools and supports necessary to deliver evidence-based care consistently and safely.
Recommendation 4: Private and public purchasers, health care organizations, clinicians, and patients should work together to rede- sign health care processes in accordance with the following rules:
1. Care based on continuous healing relationships. Patients should receive care whenever they need it and in many forms, not just face-to-face visits. This rule implies that the health care system should be responsive at all times (24 hours a day, every day) and that access to care should be provided over the Internet, by tele- phone, and by other means in addition to face-to-face visits.
2. Customization based on patient needs and values. The system of care should be designed to meet the most common types of needs, but have the capability to respond to individual patient choices and preferences.
3. The patient as the source of control. Patients should be given the necessary information and the opportunity to exercise the de- gree of control they choose over health care decisions that affect them. The health system should be able to accommodate differences in patient preferences and encourage shared decision making.
4. Shared knowledge and the free flow of information. Patients should have unfettered access to their own medical information and to clinical knowledge. Clinicians and patients should communicate effectively and share information.
5. Evidence-based decision making. Patients should receive care based on the best available scientific knowledge. Care should not vary illogically from clinician to clinician or from place to place.
6. Safety as a system property. Patients should be safe from injury caused by the care system. Reducing risk and ensuring safety require greater attention to systems that help prevent and mitigate errors.
7. The need for transparency. The health care system should make information available to patients and their families that al- lows them to make informed decisions when selecting a health plan, hospital, or clinical practice, or choosing among alternative treat- ments. This should include information describing the system’s performance on safety, evidence-based practice, and patient satis- faction.
8. Anticipation of needs. The health system should anticipate patient needs, rather than simply reacting to events.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9
9. Continuous decrease in waste. The health system should not waste resources or patient time.
10. Cooperation among clinicians. Clinicians and institutions should actively collaborate and communicate to ensure an appro- priate exchange of information and coordination of care.
The above rules will lead the redesign effort in the right direction, guiding the innovation required to achieve the aims for improvement outlined earlier. Widespread application of these ten rules, each grounded in both logic and vary- ing degrees of evidence, will represent a new paradigm for health care delivery. As the redesign effort moves forward, it will be important to assess not only progress toward meeting the aims, but also the specific effects attributable to the new rules and to adapt the rules as appropriate.
Design ideas are not enough, however. To initiate the process of change, both an action agenda and resources are needed.
Taking the First Steps
The committee recognizes the enormity of the change that will be required to achieve a substantial improvement in the nation’s health care system. Although steps can be taken immediately to apply the ten rules set forth above to the redesign of health care, widespread application will require commitment to the provision of evidence-based care that is responsive to individual patients’ needs and preferences. Well-designed and well-run systems of care will be required as well. These changes will occur most rapidly in an environment in which public policy and market forces are aligned and in which the change process is sup- ported by an appropriate information technology infrastructure.
To initiate the process of change, the committee believes the health care system must focus greater attention on the development of care processes for the common conditions that afflict many people. A limited number of such condi- tions, about 15 to 25, account for the majority of health care services (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1999; Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, 2000; Ray et al., 2000). Nearly all of these conditions are chronic. By focusing attention on a limited number of common conditions, the committee believes it will be possible to make sizable improvements in the quality of care received by many individuals within the coming decade.
Health care for chronic conditions is very different from care for acute epi- sodic illnesses. Care for the chronically ill needs to be a collaborative, multidisci- plinary process. Effective methods of communication, both among caregivers and between caregivers and patients, are critical to providing high-quality care. Personal health information must accompany patients as they transition from home to clinical office setting to hospital to nursing home and back.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
10 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Carefully designed, evidence-based care processes, supported by automated clinical information and decision support systems, offer the greatest promise of achieving the best outcomes from care for chronic conditions. Some efforts are now under way to synthesize the clinical evidence pertaining to common chronic conditions and to make this information available to consumers and clinicians on the Web and by other means (Lindberg and Humphreys, 1999). In addition, evidence-based practice guidelines have been developed for many chronic condi- tions (Eisenberg, 2000). Yet studies of the quality of care document tremendous variability in practice for many such conditions. Given these variations and the prevalence of chronic conditions, these conditions represent an excellent starting point for efforts to better define optimum care or best practices, and to design care processes to meet patient needs. Moreover, such efforts to improve quality must be supported by payment methods that remove barriers to integrated care and provide strong incentives and rewards for improvement.
To facilitate this process, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality should identify a limited number of priority conditions that affect many people and account for a sizable portion of the national health burden and associated expenditures. In identifying these priority conditions, the agency should consider using the list of conditions identified through the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (2000). According to the most recent survey data, the top 15 priority conditions are cancer, diabetes, emphysema, high cholesterol, HIV/AIDS, hyper- tension, ischemic heart disease, stroke, arthritis, asthma, gall bladder disease, stomach ulcers, back problems, Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias, and depression and anxiety disorders. Health care organizations, clinicians, purchas- ers, and other stakeholders should then work together to (1) organize evidence- based care processes consistent with best practices, (2) organize major prevention programs to target key health risk behaviors associated with the onset or progres- sion of these conditions, (3) develop the information infrastructure needed to support the provision of care and the ongoing measurement of care processes and patient outcomes, and (4) align the incentives inherent in payment and account- ability processes with the goal of quality improvement.
Recommendation 5: The Agency for Healthcare Research and Qual- ity should identify not fewer than 15 priority conditions, taking into account frequency of occurrence, health burden, and resource use. In collaboration with the National Quality Forum, the agency should convene stakeholders, including purchasers, consumers, health care organizations, professional groups, and others, to develop strate- gies, goals, and action plans for achieving substantial improvements in quality in the next 5 years for each of the priority conditions.
Redirecting the health care industry toward the implementation of well- designed care processes for priority conditions will require significant resources.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11
Capital will be required to invest in enhancing organizational capacity, building an information infrastructure, and training multidisciplinary care teams, among other things. The committee believes it is appropriate for the public sector to take the lead in establishing an innovation fund to seed promising projects, but not to shoulder the full burden of the transition. Private-sector organizations, including foundations, purchasers, health care organizations, and others, should also make investments. High priority should be given to projects that are likely to result in making available in the public domain new programs, tools, and technologies that are broadly applicable throughout the health care sector.
Recommendation 6: Congress should establish a Health Care Qual- ity Innovation Fund to support projects targeted at (1) achieving the six aims of safety, effectiveness, patient-centeredness, timeliness, ef- ficiency, and equity; and/or (2) producing substantial improvements in quality for the priority conditions. The fund’s resources should be invested in projects that will produce a public-domain portfolio of programs, tools, and technologies of widespread applicability.
Americans now invest annually $1.1 trillion, or 13.5 percent, of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) in the health care sector (Health Care Financing Administration, 1999). This figure is expected to grow to more than $2 trillion, or 16 percent of GDP, by 2007 (Smith et al., 1998). The committee believes a sizable commitment, on the order of $1 billion over 3 to 5 years, is needed to strongly communicate the need for rapid and significant change in the health care system and to help initiate the transition. Just as a vigorous public commitment has led to the mapping of human DNA, a similar commitment is needed to help the nation’s health care system achieve the aims for improvement outlined above.
Building Organizational Supports for Change
Supporting front-line teams that deliver care are many types of health care organizations. Today, these are hospitals, physician practices, clinics, integrated delivery systems, and health plans, but new forms will unquestionably emerge. Whatever those forms, care that is responsive to patient needs and makes consis- tent use of the best evidence requires far more conscious and careful organization than we find today.
Organizations will need to negotiate successfully six major challenges. The first is to redesign care processes to serve more effectively the needs of the chronically ill for coordinated, seamless care across settings and clinicians and over time. The use of tools to organize and deliver care has lagged far behind biomedical and clinical knowledge. A number of well-understood design prin- ciples, drawn from other industries as well as some of today’s health care organi- zations, could help greatly in improving the care that is provided to patients.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
12 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
A second challenge is making effective use of information technologies to automate clinical information and make it readily accessible to patients and all members of the care team. An improved information infrastructure is needed to establish effective and timely communication among clinicians and between pa- tients and clinicians.
A third challenge is to manage the growing knowledge base and ensure that all those in the health care workforce have the skills they need. Making use of new knowledge requires that health professionals develop new skills or assume new roles. It requires that they use new tools to access and apply the expanding knowledge base. It also requires that training and ongoing licensure and certifi- cation reflect the need for lifelong learning and evaluation of competencies.
A fourth challenge for organizations is coordination of care across patient conditions, services, and settings over time. Excellent information technologies and well-thought-out and -implemented modes of ongoing communication can reduce the need to craft laborious, case-by-case strategies for coordinating patient care.
A fifth challenge is to continually advance the effectiveness of teams. Team practice is common, but the training of health professionals is typically isolated by discipline. Making the necessary changes in roles to improve the work of teams is often slowed or stymied by institutional, labor, and financial structures, and by law and custom.
Finally, all organizations—whether or not health care related—can improve their performance only by incorporating care process and outcome measures into their daily work. Use of such measures makes it possible to understand the degree to which performance is consistent with best practices, and the extent to which patients are being helped.
Recommendation 7: The Agency for Healthcare Research and Qual- ity and private foundations should convene a series of workshops involving representatives from health care and other industries and the research community to identify, adapt, and implement state-of- the-art approaches to addressing the following challenges:
• Redesign of care processes based on best practices • Use of information technologies to improve access to clinical
information and support clinical decision making • Knowledge and skills management • Development of effective teams • Coordination of care across patient conditions, services, and
settings over time • Incorporation of performance and outcome measurements for
improvement and accountability
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13
Establishing a New Environment for Care
To enable the profound changes in health care recommended in this report, the environment of care must also change. The committee believes the current environment often inhibits the changes needed to achieve quality improvement. Two types of environmental change are needed:
• Focus and align the environment toward the six aims for improvement. To effect this set of changes, purchasers and health plans, for example, should eliminate or modify payment practices that fragment the care system, and should establish incentives designed to encourage and reward innovations aimed at im- proving quality. Purchasers and regulators should also create precise streams of accountability and measurement reflecting achievements in the six aims. More- over, efforts should be made to help health care consumers understand the aims, why they are important, and how to interpret the levels of performance of various health care systems.
• Provide, where possible, assets and encouragement for positive change. For example, national funding agencies could promote research on new designs for the care of priority conditions, state and national activities could be under- taken to facilitate the exchange of best practices and shared learning among health care delivery systems, and a national system for monitoring progress to- ward the six aims for improvement could help improvement efforts remain on track.
Such environmental changes need to occur in four major areas: the infra- structure that supports the dissemination and application of new clinical knowl- edge and technologies, the information technology infrastructure, payment poli- cies, and preparation of the health care workforce.
Changes will also be needed in the quality oversight and accountability processes of public and private purchasers. This issue is not addressed here. The IOM will be issuing a separate report on federal quality measurement and im- provement programs in Fall 2002. In addition, the National Quality Forum has an extensive effort under way to develop a national framework for quality measure- ment and accountability and will be issuing a report in Summer 2001.
Applying Evidence to Health Care Delivery
In the current health care system, scientific knowledge about best care is not applied systematically or expeditiously to clinical practice. An average of about 17 years is required for new knowledge generated by randomized controlled trials to be incorporated into practice, and even then application is highly uneven (Balas and Boren, 2000). The extreme variability in practice in clinical areas in
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
14 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
which there is strong scientific evidence and a high degree of expert consensus about best practices indicates that current dissemination efforts fail to reach many clinicians and patients, and that there are insufficient tools and incentives to promote rapid adoption of best practices. The time has come to invest in the creation of a more effective infrastructure for the application of knowledge to health care delivery.
Recommendation 8: The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services should be given the responsibility and neces- sary resources to establish and maintain a comprehensive program aimed at making scientific evidence more useful and accessible to clinicians and patients. In developing this program, the Secretary should work with federal agencies and in collaboration with profes- sional and health care associations, the academic and research com- munities, and the National Quality Forum and other organizations involved in quality measurement and accountability.
It is critical that leadership from the private sector, both professional and other health care leaders and consumer representatives, be involved in all aspects of this effort to ensure its applicability and acceptability to clinicians and pa- tients. The infrastructure developed through this public- and private-sector part- nership should focus initially on priority conditions and include:
• Ongoing analysis and synthesis of the medical evidence • Delineation of specific practice guidelines • Identification of best practices in the design of care processes • Enhanced dissemination efforts to communicate evidence and guidelines
to the general public and professional communities • Development of decision support tools to assist clinicians and patients in
applying the evidence • Establishment of goals for improvement in care processes and outcomes • Development of quality measures for priority conditions
More systematic approaches are needed to analyze and synthesize medical evidence for both clinicians and patients. Far more sophisticated clinical deci- sion support systems will be required to assist clinicians and patients in selecting the best treatment options and delivering safe and effective care. Many promis- ing private- and public-sector activities now under way can serve as excellent models and building blocks for a more expanded effort. In particular, the Co- chrane Collaboration and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s Evidence-Based Practice Centers represent important efforts to synthesize medi- cal evidence. The growth of the Internet has also opened up many new opportu- nities to make evidence more accessible to clinicians and consumers. The efforts of the National Library of Medicine to facilitate access to the medical literature
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15
by both consumers and health care professionals and to design Web sites that organize large amounts of information on particular health needs are particularly promising.
The development of a more effective infrastructure to synthesize and orga- nize evidence around priority conditions would also offer new opportunities to enhance quality measurement and reporting. A stronger and more organized evidence base should facilitate the adoption of best practices, as well as the development of valid and reliable quality measures for priority conditions that could be used for both internal quality improvement and external accountability.
Using Information Technology
Health care delivery has been relatively untouched by the revolution in infor- mation technology that has been transforming nearly every other aspect of soci- ety. The majority of patient and clinician encounters take place for purposes of exchanging clinical information: patients share information with clinicians about their general health, symptoms, and concerns, and clinicians use their knowledge and skills to respond with pertinent medical information, and in many cases reassurance. Yet it is estimated that only a small fraction of physicians offer e- mail interaction, a simple and convenient tool for efficient communication, to their patients (Hoffman, 1997).
The meticulous collection of personal health information throughout a pa- tient’s life can be one of the most important inputs to the provision of proper care. Yet for most individuals, that health information is dispersed in a collection of paper records that are poorly organized and often illegible, and frequently cannot be retrieved in a timely fashion, making it nearly impossible to manage many forms of chronic illness that require frequent monitoring and ongoing patient support.
Although growth in clinical knowledge and technology has been profound, many health care settings lack basic computer systems to provide clinical infor- mation or support clinical decision making. The development and application of more sophisticated information systems is essential to enhance quality and im- prove efficiency.
The Internet has enormous potential to transform health care through infor- mation technology applications in such areas as consumer health, clinical care, administrative and financial transactions, public health, professional education, and biomedical and health services research (National Research Council, 2000). Many of these applications are currently within reach, including remote medical consultation with patients in their homes or offices; consumer and clinician ac- cess to the medical literature; creation of “communities” of patients and clini- cians with shared interests; consumer access to information on health plans, participating providers, eligibility for procedures, and covered drugs in a formu- lary; and videoconferencing among public health officials during emergency
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
16 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
situations. Other applications are more experimental, such as simulation of sur- gical procedures; consultation among providers involving manipulation of digital images; and control of experimental equipment, such as electron microscopes.
The Internet also supports rising interest among consumers in information and convenience in all areas of commerce, including health care. The number of Americans who use the Internet to retrieve health-related information is esti- mated to be about 70 million (Cain et al., 2000). Consumers access health-related Web sites to research an illness or disease; seek information on nutrition and fitness; research drugs and their interactions; and search for doctors, hospitals, and online medical support groups.
The committee believes information technology must play a central role in the redesign of the health care system if a substantial improvement in quality is to be achieved over the coming decade. Automation of clinical, financial, and administrative transactions is essential to improving quality, preventing errors, enhancing consumer confidence in the health system, and improving efficiency.
Central to many information technology applications is the automation of patient-specific clinical information. A fully electronic medical record, including all types of patient information, is not needed to achieve many, if not most, of the benefits of automated clinical data. Sizable benefits can be derived in the near future from automating certain types of data, such as medication orders. Efforts to automate clinical information date back several decades, but progress has been slow (Institute of Medicine, 1991), in part because of the barriers and risks involved. An important constraint is that consumers and policy makers share concerns about the privacy and confidentiality of these data (Cain et al., 2000; Goldman, 1998). The United States also lacks national standards for the capture, storage, communication, processing, and presentation of health information (Work Group on Computerization of Patient Records, 2000).
The challenges of applying information technology to health care should not be underestimated. Health care is undoubtedly one of the most, if not the most, complex sector of the economy. The number of different types of transactions (i.e., patient needs, interactions, and services) is very large. Sizable capital investments and multiyear commitments to building systems will be required. Widespread adoption of many information technology applications will require behavioral adaptations on the part of large numbers of patients, clinicians, and organizations. Yet, the Internet is rapidly transforming many aspects of society, and many health-related processes stand to be reshaped as well.
In the absence of a national commitment and financial support to build a national health information infrastructure, the committee believes that progress on quality improvement will be painfully slow. The automation of clinical, financial, and administrative information and the electronic sharing of such infor- mation among clinicians, patients, and appropriate others within a secure envi- ronment are critical if the 21st-century health care system envisioned by the committee is to be realized.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 17
Recommendation 9: Congress, the executive branch, leaders of health care organizations, public and private purchasers, and health informatics associations and vendors should make a renewed na- tional commitment to building an information infrastructure to sup- port health care delivery, consumer health, quality measurement and improvement, public accountability, clinical and health services research, and clinical education. This commitment should lead to the elimination of most handwritten clinical data by the end of the decade.
Aligning Payment Policies with Quality Improvement
Current payment methods do not adequately encourage or support the provi- sion of quality health care. Although payment is not the only factor that influ- ences provider and patient behavior, it is an important one.
All payment methods affect behavior and quality. For example, fee-for- service payment methods for physicians and hospitals raise concerns about po- tential overuse of services—the provision of services that may not be necessary or may expose the patient to greater potential harm than benefit. On the other hand, capitation and per case payment methods for physicians and hospitals raise questions about potential underuse—the failure to provide services from which the patient would likely benefit. Indeed, no payment method perfectly aligns financial incentives with the goal of quality improvement for all health care decision makers, including clinicians, hospitals, and patients. This is one reason for the widespread interest in blended methods of payment designed to counter the disadvantages of one payment method with the advantages of another.
Too little attention has been paid to the careful analysis and alignment of payment incentives with quality improvement. The current health care environ- ment is replete with examples of payment policies that work against the efforts of clinicians, health care administrators, and others to improve quality. The follow- ing example, presented at an Institute of Medicine workshop on payment and quality held on April 24, 2000,2 illustrates how payment policies can work against the efforts of clinicians, health care administrators, and others to improve quality:
A physician group paid primarily on a fee-for-service basis instituted a new program to improve blood sugar control for diabetic patients. Specifically, pilot studies suggested that tighter diabetic management could decrease hemoglobin A1c levels by 2 percentage points for about 40 percent of all diabetic patients managed by the physician group. Data from two randomized controlled trials demonstrated that better sugar controls should translate into lower rates of retin- opathy, nephropathy, peripheral neurological damage, and heart disease. The
2 This case study has been excerpted from a paper prepared by and presented at the IOM workshop by Brent James, Intermountain Health Care, Salt Lake City, Utah, April 2000.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
18 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
savings in direct health care costs (i.e., reduced visits and hospital episodes) from avoided complications have been estimated to generate a net savings of about $2,000 per patient per year, on average, over 15 years. Across the more than 13,000 diabetic patients managed by the physician group, the project had the potential to generate over $10 million in net savings each year. The project was costly to the medical group in two ways. First, expenses to conduct the project, including extra clinical time for tighter management, fell to the physi- cian group. Second, over time, as diabetic complication rates fell, the project would reduce patient visits and, thus, revenues as well. But the savings from avoided complications would accrue to the insurer or a self-funded purchaser.
The committee believes that all purchasers, both public and private, should care- fully reexamine their payment policies.
Recommendation 10: Private and public purchasers should exam- ine their current payment methods to remove barriers that cur- rently impede quality improvement, and to build in stronger incen- tives for quality enhancement.
Payment methods should:
• Provide fair payment for good clinical management of the types of pa- tients seen. Clinicians should be adequately compensated for taking good care of all types of patients, neither gaining nor losing financially for caring for sicker patients or those with more complicated conditions. The risk of random inci- dence of disease in the population should reside with a larger risk pool, whether that be large groups of providers, health plans, or insurance companies.
• Provide an opportunity for providers to share in the benefits of quality improvement. Rewards should be located close to the level at which the re- engineering and process redesign needed to improve quality are likely to take place.
• Provide the opportunity for consumers and purchasers to recognize qual- ity differences in health care and direct their decisions accordingly. In particular, consumers need to have good information on quality and the ability to use that information as they see fit to meet their needs.
• Align financial incentives with the implementation of care processes based on best practices and the achievement of better patient outcomes. Substantial improvements in quality are most likely to be obtained when providers are highly motivated and rewarded for carefully designing and fine-tuning care processes to achieve increasingly higher levels of safety, effectiveness, patient-centeredness, timeliness, efficiency, and equity.
• Reduce fragmentation of care. Payment methods should not pose a barrier to providers’ ability to coordinate care for patients across settings and over time.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 19
To assist purchasers in the redesign of payment policy based on these funda- mental principles, a vigorous program of pilot testing and evaluating alternative design options should be pursued.
Recommendation 11: The Health Care Financing Administration and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, with input from private payers, health care organizations, and clinicians, should develop a research agenda to identify, pilot test, and evaluate various options for better aligning current payment methods with quality improvement goals.
Examples of possible means of achieving this end include blended methods of payment for providers, multiyear contracts, payment modifications to encour- age use of electronic interaction among clinicians and between clinicians and patients, risk adjustment, bundled payments for priority conditions, and alterna- tive approaches for addressing the capital investments needed to improve quality.
Preparing the Workforce
A major challenge in transitioning to the health care system of the 21st century envisioned by the committee is preparing the workforce to acquire new skills and adopt new ways of relating to patients and each other. At least three approaches can be taken to support the workforce in this transition. One is to redesign the way health professionals are trained to emphasize the aims for improvement set forth earlier, including teaching evidence-based practice and using multidisciplinary approaches. Second is to modify the ways in which health professionals are regulated to facilitate the needed changes in care deliv- ery. Scope-of-practice acts and other workforce regulations need to allow for innovation in the use of all types of clinicians to meet patient needs in the most effective and efficient way possible. Third is to examine how the liability system can constructively support changes in care delivery while remaining part of an overall approach to accountability for health care professionals and organiza- tions. All three approaches are important and require additional study.
Recommendation 12: A multidisciplinary summit of leaders within the health professions should be held to discuss and develop strate- gies for (1) restructuring clinical education to be consistent with the principles of the 21st-century health system throughout the con- tinuum of undergraduate, graduate, and continuing education for medical, nursing, and other professional training programs; and (2) assessing the implications of these changes for provider creden- tialing programs, funding, and sponsorship of education programs for health professionals.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
20 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Recommendation 13: The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality should fund research to evaluate how the current regula- tory and legal systems (1) facilitate or inhibit the changes needed for the 21st-century health care delivery system, and (2) can be modi- fied to support health care professionals and organizations that seek to accomplish the six aims set forth in Chapter 2.
SUMMARY
The changes needed to realize a substantial improvement in health care involve the health care system as a whole. The new rules set forth in this report will affect the role, self-image, and work of front-line doctors, nurses, and all other staff. The needed new infrastructures will challenge today’s health care leaders—both clinical leaders and management. The necessary environmental changes will require the interest and commitment of payers, health plans, govern- ment officials, and regulatory and accrediting bodies. New skills will require new approaches by professional educators. The 21st-century health care system envisioned by the committee—providing care that is evidence-based, patient- centered, and systems-oriented—also implies new roles and responsibilities for patients and their families, who must become more aware, more participative, and more demanding in a care system that should be meeting their needs. And all involved must be united by the overarching purpose of reducing the burden of illness, injury, and disability in our nation.
American health care is beset by serious problems, but they are not intrac- table. Perfect care may be a long way off, but much better care is within our grasp. The committee envisions a system that uses the best knowledge, that is focused intensely on patients, and that works across health care providers and settings. Taking advantage of new information technologies will be an important catalyst to moving us beyond where we are today. The committee believes that achieving such a system is both possible and necessary.
REFERENCES
Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry. 1998. “Quality First: Better Health Care for All Americans.” Online. Available at http://www. hcqualitycommission.gov/final/ [accessed Sept. 9, 2000].
Balas, E. Andrew and Suzanne A. Boren. Managing Clinical Knowledge for Health Care Improve- ment. Yearbook of Medical Informatics National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, MD:65–70, 2000.
Cain, Mary M., Robert Mittman, Jane Sarasohn-Kahn, and Jennifer C. Wayne. Health e-People: The Online Consumer Experience. Oakland, CA: Institute for the Future, California Health Care Foundation, 2000.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 1999. “Chronic Diseases and Their Risk Factors: The Nation’s Leading Causes of Death.” Online. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/statbook/ statbook.htm [accessed Dec. 7, 2000].
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 21
Chassin, Mark R. Is Health Care Ready for Six Sigma Quality? Milbank Quarterly 76(4):575–91, 1998.
Chassin, Mark R., Robert W. Galvin, and the National Roundtable on Health Care Quality. The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality. JAMA 280(11):1000–5, 1998.
Colby, David C. Doctors and their Discontents. Health Affairs 16(6):112–4, 1997. Copeland, C. Prescription Drugs: Issues of Cost, Coverage and Quality. EBRI Issue Brief April(208):
1–21, 1999. Donelan, Karen, Robert J. Blendon, Cathy Schoen, et al. The Cost of Health System Change: Public
Discontent In Five Nations. Health Affairs 18(3):206–16, 1999. Egger, Ed. Nurse Shortage Worse Than You Think, But Sensitivity May Help Retain Nurses. Health
Care Strategic Management 18(5):16–8, 2000. Eisenberg, John M. Quality Research for Quality Healthcare: The Data Connection. Health Services
Research 35:xii–xvii, 2000. Goldman, Janlori. Protecting Privacy To Improve Health Care. Health Affairs 17(6):47–60, 1998. Guterman, Stuart. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997: Will Hospitals Take A Hit On Their PPS
Margins? Health Affairs 17(1):159–66, 1998. Health Care Financing Administration. 1999. “1998 National Health Expenditures. Department of
Health and Human Services. Washington, DC.” Online. Available at http://www.hcfa.gov/ stats/nhe-oact/hilites.htm [accessed Jan. 10, 2000].
Hoffman, A. Take 2 and E-mail Me in the Morning: Doctors Consult Patients Electronically. New York Times. June 3, 1997.
Hoffman, Catherine, Dorothy P. Rice, and Hai-Yen Sung. Persons With Chronic Conditions. Their Prevalence and Costs. JAMA 276(18): 1473–9, 1996.
Institute of Medicine The Computer-Based Patient Record: An Essential Technology for Health Care. Richard S. Dick and Elaine B. Steen, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991.
——— Ensuring Quality Cancer Care. Maria Hewitt and Joseph V. Simone, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999.
——— America’s Health Care Safety Net. Intact but Endangered. Marion E. Lewin and Stuart Altman, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000a.
——— To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donaldson, eds. Washington, D.C: National Academy Press, 2000b.
Lindberg, Donald A. B. and Betsy L. Humphreys. A Time of Change for Medical Informatics in the USA. Yearbook of Medical Informatics National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, MD:53–7, 1999.
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. 2000. “MEPS HC-006R: 1996 Medical Conditions.” Online. Available at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/catlist.htm [accessed Dec. 7, 2000].
National Institutes of Health. 2000. “An Overview.” Online. Available at http://www.nih.gov/about/ NIHoverview.html [accessed Aug. 11, 2000].
National Research Council. Networking Health: Prescriptions for the Internet. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000.
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. 2000. “PhRMA Annual Report, 2000– 2001.” Online. Available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/annual2000/ [ac- cessed Nov. 11, 2000].
Picker Institute and American Hospital Association. Eye on Patients Report. 1996. Ray, G. Thomas, Tracy Lieu, Bruce Fireman, et al. The Cost of Health Conditions in a Health
Maintenance Organization. Medical Care Research and Review 57(1):92–109, 2000. Reed, Marie C. and Robert F. St. Peter Satisfaction and Quality: Patient and Physician Perspec-
tives. Washington, D.C.: Center for Studying Health System Change, 1997. Schuster, Mark A., Elizabeth A. McGlynn, and Robert H Brook. How Good is the Quality of Health
Care in the United States? The Milbank Quarterly 76(4):517–63, 1998.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
22 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Shindul-Rothschild, Judith, Diane Berry, and Ellen Long-Middleton. Where Have All The Nurses Gone? Final Results of Our Patient Care Survey. American Journal of Nursing 96(11):25–39, 1996.
Smith, Sheila, Mark Freeland, Stephen Heffler, et al. The Next Ten Years of Health Spending: What Does The Future Hold? Health Affairs 17(3):128–40, 1998.
Taylor, Humphrey. 2001. “Harris Poll #3, Most People Continue To Think Well Of Their Health Plans.” Online. Available at http://www.harrisblackintl.com/harris_poll/index.asp [accessed Jan. 11, 2001].
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Chronic Care in America: A 21st Century Challenge. Princeton, NJ: The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996. Online. Available at http:// www.rwjf.org/library/chrcare/ [accessed Sept. 19, 2000].
U.S. Census Bureau. Health Insurance Coverage: 1999. Current Population Survey. by Robert J. Mills. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau. September, 2000. Online. Available at: http:// www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthin99.html [accessed Jan. 22, 2001].
Wagner, Edward H., Brian T. Austin, and Michael Von Korff. Organizing Care for Patients with Chronic Illness. Milbank Quarterly 74(4):511–42, 1996.
Work Group on Computerization of Patient Records. Toward a National Health Information Infra- structure: Report of the Work Group on Computerization of Patient Records. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2000.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
23
1
A New Health System for the 21st Century
Fundamental changes are needed in the organization and delivery of health care in the United States. The experiences of patients, their families, and health care clinicians, as well as a large body of evidence on the quality of care, have convinced the Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America that the time for major change has come. This chapter sets forth the evidence; the reasons underlying the inability of the health care system to meet patient needs; and the committee’s framework for a new health system, which serves to structure the remaining chapters of this report.
THE QUALITY GAP
The year 1998 was a watershed in the quest for improvement in the quality of health care (Kizer, 2000). In that year, three major reports detailing serious quality-of-care concerns were issued. The Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) Na- tional Roundtable on Health Care Quality documents three types of quality prob- lems—overuse, underuse, and misuse. The report describes the problem as fol- lows:
The burden of harm conveyed by the collective impact of all of our health care quality problems is staggering. It requires the urgent attention of all the stake- holders: the health care professions, health care policymakers, consumer advo- cates and purchasers of care. The challenge is to bring the full potential benefit of effective health care to all Americans while avoiding unneeded and harmful interventions and eliminating preventable complications of care. Meeting this challenge demands a readiness to think in radically new ways about how to
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
24 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
deliver health care services and how to assess and improve their quality. Our present efforts resemble a team of engineers trying to break the sound barrier by tinkering with a Model T Ford. We need a new vehicle or perhaps, many new vehicles. The only unacceptable alternative is not to change. (Chassin et al., 1998)
The Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality also re- leased a report on quality. That report calls for a national commitment to im- prove quality, concluding: “Exhaustive research documents the fact that today, in America, there is no guarantee that any individual will receive high-quality care for any particular health problem. The health care industry is plagued with overutilization of services, underutilization of services and errors in health care practice” (Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry, 1998).
Finally, the reports of both of these national panels were supported by the results of an extensive literature review conducted by researchers at RAND Cor- poration and encompassing publications in leading peer-reviewed journals be- tween 1993 and mid-1997 (Schuster et al., 1998). The report on those results substantiates the serious and pervasive nature of quality-of-care problems.
In the fall of 1998, the Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America established a Technical Advisory Panel on the State of Quality to review the most recent literature on quality. In collaboration with RAND, the earlier synthesis of the quality literature was updated to include work published between July 1997 and August 1998. The detailed results of this review, now covering 8 years and more than 70 publications, are included in Appendix A. The committee concurs with the findings of the panel that “. . . there is abundant evidence that serious and extensive quality problems exist throughout American medicine resulting in harm to many Americans.”
The literature reviews conducted by RAND encompass studies categorized under the rubric of quality of care. Other reviews that probe more deeply in a specific clinical area (e.g., oncology) or focus on a particular type of quality problem (e.g., errors) provide further evidence of the systemic nature of quality- of-care problems.
One such study, an IOM report examining cancer care, reveals that quality problems occur across all types of cancer care and in all aspects of the process of care (Institute of Medicine, 1999). For example, problems with breast cancer care include underuse of mammography for early cancer detection, lack of adher- ence to standards for diagnosis (such as biopsies and pathology studies), inad- equate patient counseling regarding treatment options, and underuse of radiation therapy and adjuvant chemotherapy following surgery.
In its first report, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System, this committee reviewed the literature on a specific type of quality problem—medical errors. We found about 30 publications published during the last 10 to 12 years
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21st CENTURY 25
substantiating serious and widespread errors in health care delivery that resulted in frequent avoidable injuries to patients (Institute of Medicine, 2000).
These quality problems occur typically not because of a failure of goodwill, knowledge, effort, or resources devoted to health care, but because of fundamen- tal shortcomings in the ways care is organized. The nation’s current health care system often lacks the environment, the processes, and the capabilities needed to ensure that services are safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable.
UNDERLYING REASONS FOR INADEQUATE QUALITY OF CARE
Four key aspects of the current context for health care delivery help explain the quality problems outlined above: the growing complexity of science and technology, the increase in chronic conditions, a poorly organized delivery sys- tem, and constraints on exploiting the revolution in information technology. Each of these factors plays a role, and each exacerbates the effects of the others.
Growing Complexity of Science and Technology
Health care today is characterized by more to know, more to manage, more to watch, more to do, and more people involved in doing it than at any time in the nation’s history. Our current methods of organizing and delivering care are unable to meet the expectations of patients and their families because the science and technologies involved in health care—the knowledge, skills, care interven- tions, devices, and drugs—have advanced more rapidly than our ability to deliver them safely, effectively, and efficiently (The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996).
For more than five decades, investments in biomedical research have in- creased steadily, resulting in an extraordinary expansion of medical knowledge and technology (Blumenthal, 1994). Between 1994 and 1999, the budget of the National Institutes of Health increased from $10.9 to $15.6 billion (National Institutes of Health, 2000), while the investment of pharmaceutical firms in re- search and development increased from about $13.5 to $24 billion (Pharmaceuti- cal Research and Manufacturers of America, 2000). Spending on research and development in the medical device industry, most of which comes from private sources, totaled $8.9 billion in 1998 (The Lewin Group, 2000).
As suggested earlier, quality problems do not generally stem from a lack of knowledge, training, or effort by health professionals. Today, no one clinician can retain all the information necessary for sound, evidence-based practice. No unaided human being can read, recall, and act effectively on the volume of clinically relevant scientific literature. Since the results of the first randomized controlled trial were published more than 50 years ago (Cochrane, 1972; Daniels and Hill, 1952), health care practitioners have been increasingly inundated with
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
26 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
information about what does and does not work to produce good outcomes in health care. Over the last 30 years, the increase in such trials has been stagger- ing—from just over 100 to nearly 10,000 annually. The first 5 years of this 30- year period accounts for only 1 percent of all the articles in the medical literature, while the last 5 years accounts for almost half (49 percent) (Chassin, 1998), and there is no indication that this rate is slowing. Studies on the effectiveness of medical practice have also become increasingly sophisticated, involving complex issues of patient selection and statistical procedures.
As the knowledge base has expanded, so too has the number of drugs, medi- cal devices, and other technological supports. For example, the average number of new drugs approved per year has doubled since the early 1980s, from 19 to 38 (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2000). Between 1990 and 1999, 311 new drugs were approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2000). The cost of pharmaceuticals is the most rapidly growing component of health care expenditures. As clinical science continues to advance, the challenge of managing the use of existing and new pharmaceuticals and health technologies will intensify.
Without substantial changes in the ways health care is delivered, the prob- lems resulting from the growing complexity of health care science and technolo- gies are unlikely to abate; in fact, they will increase. For example, work being done in genomics offers significant promise for disease diagnosis and, eventu- ally, treatment. Engineering advances in miniaturization will place diagnostic, monitoring, and treatment tools directly into the hands of patients as science improves and costs are reduced. And the application of epidemiological knowl- edge to large populations and databases will enable us to understand more and more about the dynamics of wellness and disease.
Increase in Chronic Conditions
One of the consequences of advances in medical science and technology is that people are now living longer. Although health care is by no means the only factor that affects morbidity and mortality, innovations in medical science and technology have contributed greatly to increases in life expectancy. The average American born today can expect to live more than 76 years (National Center for Health Statistics, 2000). Roughly 1 additional year has been added to life expect- ancy every 5 years since 1965.
Because of changing mortality patterns, those age 65 and over constitute an increasingly large number and proportion of the U.S. population. Today, this age group accounts for approximately 1 in 8 persons, or 13 percent of the population (National Center for Health Statistics, 1999). In 2030, when the large baby boom cohort has entered old age, 1 in 5 persons (20 percent) is expected to be in this age group. These demographic changes have important implications for the organi- zation of the health care delivery system, but we have yet to address them in any
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21st CENTURY 27
serious way. One consequence of the aging of the population is an increase in the incidence and prevalence of chronic conditions.
Chronic conditions, defined as illnesses that last longer than 3 months and are not self-limiting, are now the leading cause of illness, disability, and death in this country, and affect almost half of the U.S. population (Hoffman et al., 1996). About 100 million Americans have one or more chronic conditions, and this number is estimated to grow to 134 million by 2020 (The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996). About 1 in 6 Americans is limited in daily activities in some way as a result of a chronic condition (The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996). Disabling chronic conditions affect all age groups; about two-thirds of those with such conditions are under age 65.
The majority of health care resources are now devoted to the treatment of chronic disease. In 1990, the direct medical costs for persons with chronic conditions was $425 billion, nearly 70 percent of all personal health care expen- ditures (The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996). The indirect costs—lost productivity due to premature death or inability to work—added another $234 billion to this figure.
Providing state-of-the-art health care to a population in which chronic condi- tions predominate is complicated by the fact that many of those afflicted have comorbid conditions. About 44 percent of those with a chronic illness have more than one such condition, and the likelihood of having two or more chronic condi- tions increases steadily with age. In 1987, annual medical costs per person were more than twice as high for those with one chronic condition ($1,829) as com- pared with those with acute conditions only ($817) (The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996). Annual medical costs per person increase much more for those with more than one chronic condition ($4,672).
Unlike much acute episodic care, effective care of the chronically ill is a collaborative process, involving the definition of clinical problems in terms that both patients and providers understand; joint development of a care plan with goals, targets, and implementation strategies; provision of self-management train- ing and support services; and active, sustained follow-up using visits, telephone calls, e-mail, and Web-based monitoring and decision support programs (Von Korff et al., 1997). Much of the care provided to the chronically ill is given by patients and their families. Activities performed range from the provision of basic support care to active monitoring and management (e.g., self blood glucose monitoring by diabetics, use of peak flow meters by asthmatics). Although some degree of collaborative management is essential to achieve desired outcomes for many chronic conditions, patients vary a great deal in the amount of information they want to receive on their condition and their desire to participate in treatment decisions (Strull et al., 1984). Nonetheless, the collaboration involved in much of the care provided to the chronically ill adds another layer of complexity to the delivery of health care to this growing segment of the population.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
28 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Poorly Organized Delivery System
The current health care delivery system is highly decentralized. In a survey of physicians practicing in community settings, nearly 40 percent were in one- physician practices, and more than four of five practiced in settings with fewer than ten physicians (American Medical Association, 1998). Hospital consolida- tion is occurring in many markets; of the more than 5,000 community hospitals, 3,556 belong to some form of network or system (American Hospital Associa- tion, 2000). The formation of physician organizations is occurring much more slowly, however (Kohn, 2000).
The prevailing model of health care delivery is complicated, comprising layers of processes and handoffs that patients and families find bewildering and clinicians view as wasteful. Patients in a 1996 Picker Survey reported that the health care system is a “nightmare to navigate”—that it feels less like a system than a confusing, expensive, unreliable, and often impersonal disarray (Picker Institute and American Hospital Association, 1996). Care delivery processes are often overly complex, requiring steps and handoffs that slow down the care process and decrease rather than improve safety. These processes waste re- sources; leave unaccountable gaps in coverage; result in the loss of information; and fail to build on the strengths of all health professionals involved to ensure that care is timely, safe, and appropriate.
In a population increasingly afflicted by chronic conditions, the health care delivery system is poorly organized to provide care to those with such conditions. In a review of the literature on chronic care, Wagner et al. (1996) identified five elements required to improve patient outcomes for the chronically ill:
• Evidence-based, planned care. The literature is replete with evidence of the failure to provide care consistent with well-established guidelines for com- mon chronic conditions such as hypertension (Stockwell et al., 1994), asthma (Legorreta et al., 1998; Starfield et al., 1994), and diabetes (Kenny et al., 1993). Successful chronic care programs tend to be ones that incorporate guidelines and protocols explicitly into practice.
• Reorganization of practices to meet the needs of patients who require more time, a broad array of resources, and closer follow-up. Such reorganiza- tion generally involves the delivery of care through a multidisciplinary team, the careful allocation of tasks among the team members, and the ongoing manage- ment of patient contact (appointments, follow-up) (Wagner et al., 1996).
• Systematic attention to patients’ need for information and behavioral change. A review of 400 articles, randomized trials, and observational studies of self-management support interventions (Center for Advancement of Health, 1996), revealed substantial evidence that programs providing counseling, educa- tion, information feedback, and other supports to patients with common chronic conditions are associated with improved outcomes (Brown, 1990; DeBusk et al., 1994; Mullen et al., 1987).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21st CENTURY 29
• Ready access to necessary clinical expertise. Specialized clinical knowl- edge and expertise are important to improved outcomes. Evidence suggests that there are numerous ways to enhance access to such knowledge and expertise, including education of patients and primary care providers (Inui et al., 1976; Sawicki et al., 1993; Soumerai and Avorn, 1990), referrals to specialists, various consultation processes (e.g., teleconferencing, hot line to specialists) (Vinicor et al., 1987), collaborative care models whereby primary care providers and special- ists practice together (Katon et al., 1995; McCulloch et al., 1994), and computer decision support systems (Barton and Schoenbaum, 1990; Litzelman et al., 1993; McDonald et al., 1988).
• Supportive information systems. Patient registries have been used effec- tively in many settings to issue reminders for preventive care and necessary follow-up, and to provide feedback to the provider practice on patient compliance and service use (Glanz and Scholl, 1982; Johnston et al., 1994; Macharia et al., 1992; Mugford et al., 1991; Stason et al., 1994). Mechanisms for sharing clinical and other information among all members of the care team, ranging from patient- carried medical records (Dickey and Petitti, 1992; Turner et al., 1990) to auto- mated patient records, can also improve care.
Thus the American health care system does not have well-organized pro- grams to provide the full complement of services needed by people with such chronic conditions as heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and asthma. Nor do we have mechanisms to coordinate the full range of services needed by those with multiple serious illnesses. And our current health system has only a rudimentary ability to collect and share patient information.
A growing body of evidence for some procedures and conditions suggests that higher volume is associated with better outcomes (Hewitt, 2000). We know little about the underlying factors that produce this relationship (e.g., more effec- tive care processes, better processes for incorporating knowledge into practice, provider skill, effective multidisciplinary team, access to specialized resources). But the results are consistent with the conclusion that the growing complexity of health care necessitates more sophisticated and carefully designed care processes.
The application of engineering concepts to the design of care processes is a critical first step in improving patient safety. Yet few health care organizations have applied the lessons learned by other high-risk industries that have led to very low rates of injury. These lessons include organized approaches to collect- ing data on errors and analyzing their causes, minimizing reliance on human memory, and standardizing routine aspects of care processes (Chassin, 1998; Institute of Medicine, 2000). Patient safety emerges from systems that are skill- fully designed to prevent harm (Cook, 1998). Although many, often simple, steps could be taken now and without great cost, knowledge about such actions has neither been disseminated among health care institutions nor widely imple- mented, probably because there are often no real penalties for failing to do so and
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
30 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
no real rewards for effective improvements. Although Americans have come to expect high-technology care, they do not demand safety and reliability with the same insistence.
For the most part, health care organizations are only beginning to apply information technology to manage and improve patient care. A great deal of medical information is stored on paper. Communication among clinicians and with patients does not generally make use of the Internet or other contemporary information technology. Hospitals and physician groups operate independently of one another, often providing care without the benefit of complete information on the patient’s condition or medical history, services provided in other settings, or medications prescribed by other providers.
Our attempts to deliver today’s technologies with today’s medical produc- tion capabilities are the medical equivalent of manufacturing microprocessors in a vacuum tube factory. The costs of waste, poor quality, and inefficiency are enormous. If the current delivery system is unable to utilize today’s technologies effectively, it will be even less able to carry the weight of tomorrow’s technolo- gies and an aging population, raising the specter of even more variability in quality, more errors, less responsiveness, and greater costs associated with waste and poor quality.
The challenge before us is to move from today’s highly decentralized, cot- tage industry to one that is capable of providing primary and preventive care, caring for the chronically ill, and coping with acute and catastrophic events. To meet this challenge, there must be a commitment to organizing services around common patient needs and applying information technology and engineering concepts to the design of care processes.
Constraints on Exploiting the Revolution in Information Technology
The advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web has placed us on the threshold of a change that is reshaping virtually all aspects of society, including health care delivery. The Internet supports a rising tide of consumerism, with greater demands for information and convenience in all areas of commerce. And Internet services are becoming cheaper and easier to access.
Four of ten U.S. households had Internet access as of August 2000 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000), and it is predicted that 90 percent will have access by 2010 or before (Rosenberg, 1999). Large increases in Internet access have occurred among most groups of Americans, regardless of income, educa- tion, race or ethnicity, location, age, or gender (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000). Nonetheless, a “digital divide” remains, especially for the disabled and for African Americans and Hispanics.
Large numbers of patients are turning to the Internet for health care informa- tion and advice. An estimated 70 million Americans seek health information online (Cain et al., 2000). It is estimated that there are 10,000 or more health-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21st CENTURY 31
related Web sites (Benton Foundation, 1999), allowing consumers to search for information on specific diseases and treatments, evaluate health plans and clini- cians, pose questions to care providers, manage chronic conditions, participate in discussion groups, assess existing health risks, and purchase health-related prod- ucts (National Research Council, 2000). There is however, much variability in the accuracy and completeness of health information found on the Web (Biermann et al., 1999).
The effect of these trends on health care will be a fundamental transforma- tion in the ways services are organized and delivered and clinicians and patients interact. Individuals are making many of their own decisions about diagnosis and treatment. Increasingly, they are also bringing information to their physicians to obtain help in interpreting or judging its value for themselves.
To better understand how information technology can contribute to improv- ing quality, the Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America held a workshop in September 1999 at which participants identified five key areas in which information technology could contribute to an improved health care deliv- ery system:
• Access to the medical knowledge-base. Through use of the Web, it should be possible to help both providers and consumers gain better access to clinical evidence.
• Computer-aided decision support systems. Embedding knowledge in tools and training clinicians to use those tools to augment their own skills and experi- ence can facilitate the consistent application of the expanding science base to patient care.
• Collection and sharing of clinical information. The automation of pa- tient-specific clinical information is essential for many types of computer-aided decision support systems. Automation of clinical data offers the potential to improve coordination of care across clinicians and settings, which is critical to the effective management of chronic conditions.
• Reduction in errors. Information technology can contribute to a reduc- tion in errors by standardizing and automating certain decisions and by aiding in the identification of possible errors, such as potential adverse drug interactions, before they occur.
• Enhanced patient and clinician communication. Information technology can change the way individuals receive care and interact with their clinicians. Instead of a $65 office visit and a half-day off work, a 2-minute e-mail communi- cation could meet many patients’ needs more responsively and at lower cost. Similarly, patients would be able to go online and obtain test results, inform their clinicians about how they are doing, send pictures and data, participate in interac- tive care management services, receive after-care instructions, and participate in support groups. Appropriately structured e-mail communication between patient
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
32 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
and provider could also permit continuous monitoring of clinical conditions, especially for patients with chronic conditions that require self-management.
A recent report by the National Research Council of The National Acad- emies, Networking Health, also concludes that “the Internet has great potential to improve Americans’ health by enhancing communications and improving access to information for care providers, patients, health plan administrators, public health officials, biomedical researchers, and other health professionals” (National Research Council, 2000). In recent years, some applications have become com- monplace, such as online searching for health information by patients and provid- ers. Others, such as remote and virtual surgery and simulations of surgical procedures, are in early stages of development.
Although opportunities to improve access, quality, and service abound, the health care industry has been slow to invest in information technology. In 1996, the industry spent only $543 per worker on information technology, compared, for example, with $12,666 spent by securities brokers, and ranked 38th out of 53 industries surveyed (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999). In a recent survey of 30 health plans, it was found that all had established Web sites to allow patients to obtain certain types of information and interact with the organization (e.g., online provider directory, search formulary, ability to query member services or file a complaint), and about one-half had the capability to conduct some types of transactions online (e.g., enrollment, referral processing, claims submission) (First Consulting Group, 2000). But none had automated entire service functions, such as online medical management, which would require significant changes in busi- ness strategy, involve many employees and/or partners, and entail sizable capital investments.
There are many technical, organizational, behavioral, and public policy chal- lenges to greater use of information technology. Technical challenges include ensuring the security of personally identifiable information; making persistent, reliable broadband connectivity available to many locations, including rural clin- ics and patients’ homes; establishing processes for authentication of the source and recipient of information; and making tools available for locating information of interest and for determining the quality of retrieved information (National Research Council, 2000).
Over the long run, however, organizational challenges may play the greatest role in constraining the adoption of various types of Internet applications. The diverse and highly decentralized structure of the health care industry, as dis- cussed above, makes the business models for new applications complex and difficult, resulting in slow adoption of even highly successful pioneering applica- tions. Efforts to introduce new applications also encounter resistance from health care professionals for a variety of reasons, including uncertainties about how such applications will alter relationships among and between clinicians, patients, and health care organizations (National Research Council, 2000).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21st CENTURY 33
Numerous public policy, payment, and legal issues also must be resolved. Many applications in the public health arena (e.g., videoconferencing during emergency situations, collection of information from local and state public health departments, incident reporting and disease surveillance) are within technical reach at relatively low cost, but are not widely used because of a lack of targeted public-sector funding and organizational barriers (e.g., shortage of adequately trained personnel). Fee-for-service payment, the most common method of pay- ment for physicians, does not compensate clinicians for time spent on e-mail communication. State-based professional licensing requirements and restrictions on practice have stymied widespread use of other applications, such as remote medical consultations. Online access to and transfer of clinical information has also been slow to evolve, in part because of concerns about privacy and confiden- tiality. Chapter 7 reviews in greater detail the use of information technology to improve the quality of health care and some of the barriers to its more widespread adoption.
AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE AND ROAD MAP FOR THE REPORT
Throughout the course of its work, the committee has been cognizant of the fact that the health care system has been in a rapid state of flux for more than 10 years and that this situation is likely to continue. Over the last decade, the primary impetus for change has been a desire to slow the rate of inflation of health care costs. During the coming decades, cost pressures will remain, but the health care system will also be shaped dramatically by broader forces transform- ing society in general, most notably the growth of the Internet and changing population needs for chronic care.
There is little doubt that the health care enterprise has been slow to change. Research documenting safety and quality concerns has been mounting for over a decade. Successful quality improvement initiatives are very slow to spread, and rarely adopted on a widespread basis. For these reasons, the committee believes that a more intense and far-reaching effort will be needed. Substantial improve- ment in quality over the coming decade can be achieved only by engaging the support of patients, clinicians, governing boards and managers of health care organizations, private and public purchasers, state and federal policy makers, regulators, researchers, and others. Change is needed at all levels, including the clinician and patient relationship; the structure, management, and operation of health care organizations; the purchasing and financing of health care; the regula- tory and liability environment; and others.
This report offers general principles, not a detailed blueprint, for the building of a new system. In part, the committee cannot foresee all the new organizations, forces, technologies, needs, and relationships that will develop even in the early years of the 21st century. More than that, however, the committee has come to
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
34 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
believe that a framework for a new health system should be based on systems that can organize themselves to achieve a shared purpose by adhering to a few well- thought-out general rules, adapting to local circumstances, and then examining their own performance (see Chapter 3 and Appendix B). In reshaping health care, local adaptation, innovation, and initiative will be essential ingredients for suc- cess.
With these precepts in mind, the committee proposes the following agenda designed to bridge the quality gap:
• That all health care constituencies, including policymakers, purchasers, regulators, health professionals, health care trustees and management, and con- sumers, commit to a national statement of purpose for the heath care system as a whole and to a shared agenda of six aims for improvement that can raise the quality of care to unprecedented levels.
• That clinicians and patients, and the health care organizations that support care delivery, adopt a new set of principles to guide the redesign of care pro- cesses.
• That the Department of Health and Human Services identify a set of priority conditions upon which to focus initial efforts, provide resources to stimu- late innovation, and initiate the change process.
• That health care organizations design and implement more effective orga- nization support processes to make change in the delivery of care possible.
• That purchasers, regulators, health professions, educational institutions, and the Department of Health and Human Services create an environment that fosters and rewards improvement by (1) creating an infrastructure to support evidence-based practice, (2) facilitating the use of information technology, (3) aligning payment incentives, and (4) preparing the workforce to better serve patients in a world of expanding knowledge and rapid change.
The succeeding chapters of this report detail in turn the elements of this agenda. Specifically, the report:
• Sets performance expectations or aims for improvement for the 21st- century health care system (Chapter 2).
• Explores the implications of these performance expectations for the inter- actions between patients and clinicians, and develops some simple rules to guide the actions of all stakeholders (Chapter 3).
• Encourages all stakeholders to focus immediate attention on the develop- ment of state-of-the-art care processes for common conditions, and calls for the establishment of a $1 billion innovation fund that can be used to invest in enhanc- ing organizational capacity, building an information infrastructure, and training multidisciplinary teams, among other things (Chapter 4).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21st CENTURY 35
• Addresses the importance of building more effective organizational struc- tures to (1) redesign care processes; (2) use information technologies; (3) man- age knowledge and skills; (4) coordinate care across patient conditions, services, and settings over time; (5) develop effective teams, and (6) implement perfor- mance and outcome measurement for improvement and accountability (Chap- ter 5).
• Identifies critical steps that must be taken to support evidence-based prac- tice, including making evidence more useful and accessible to support the clinical decisions of clinicians and patients, and constructing quality measures for im- provement and accountability (Chapter 6).
• Explains why a more sophisticated information infrastructure is necessary to improve quality, and calls for a renewed national initiative to build such an infrastructure (Chapter 7).
• Illustrates some of the ways current payment policies impede efforts to improve quality, and explains the importance of better aligning payment incen- tives to encourage innovations and reward enhancements in quality (Chapter 8).
• Addresses critical issues related to the culture, education, and training of a health professional workforce prepared to succeed in the 21st-century delivery system (Chapter 9).
The committee’s recommendations in these areas are presented in the re- spective chapters, highlighted in bold print.
In sum, health care is plagued today by a serious quality gap. The current health care delivery system is not robust enough to apply medical knowledge and technology consistently in ways that are safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable. As we strive to close this gap, we must seek health care solutions that are patient-centered, that is, humane and respectful of the needs and preferences of individuals. And, most important, we must build a 21st century health care system that is more equitable and meets the needs of all Americans without regard to race, ethnicity, place of residence, or socioeconomic status, including the nearly 43 million people who currently lack health insurance (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).
REFERENCES
Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry. 1998. “Qual- ity First: Better Health Care for All Americans.” Online. Available at http://www. hcqualitycommission.gov/final/ [accessed Sept. 9, 2000].
American Hospital Association. Resource Center Fact Sheet. Fast Facts on U.S. Hospitals. Hospital Statistics, 2000. Chicago, IL: Health Forum – An American Hospital Association Company, 2000.
American Medical Association. Socioeconomic Characteristics of Medical Practice: 1997/98. Chi- cago, Illinois: American Medical Association, 1998. Page 21.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
36 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Barton, Mary B. and Stephen C. Schoenbaum. Improving Influenza Vaccination Performance in an HMO Setting: The Use of Computer-Generated Reminders and Peer Comparison Feedback. American Journal of Public Health 80(5):534–6, 1990.
Benton Foundation. 1999. “Networking for Better Care: Health Care in the Information Age.” Online. Available at http://www.benton.org/Library/health/ [accessed Sept. 18, 2000].
Biermann, J. Sybil, Gregory J. Golladay, Mary Lou V. H. Greenfield, and Laurence H. Baker. Evaluation of Cancer Information on the Internet. Cancer 86(3):381–90, 1999.
Blumenthal, David. Growing Pains for New Academic/Industry Relationships. Health Affairs 13(3): 176–93, 1994.
Brown, Sharon A. Studies of Educational Interventions and outcomes in Diabetic Adults: A Meta- Analysis Revisited. Patient Education and Counseling 16:189–215, 1990.
Cain, Mary M., Robert Mittman, Jane Sarasohn-Kahn, and Jennifer C. Wayne. Health e-People: The Online Consumer Experience. Oakland, CA: Institute for the Future, California Health Care Foundation, 2000.
Center for Advancement of Health. Indexed Bibliography of Behavioral Interventions of Chronic Disease. Washington, D.C., 1996.
Chassin, Mark R. Is Health Care Ready for Six Sigma Quality? Milbank Quarterly 76(4):575–91, 1998.
Chassin, Mark R., Robert W. Galvin, and the National Roundtable on Health Care Quality. The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality. JAMA 280(11):1000–5, 1998.
Cochrane, A. L. Effectiveness and Efficiency, Random Reflections on Health Services. The Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust, 1972.
Cook, Richard I. Two Years Before the Mast: Learning How to Learn About Safety. 1998. Invited presentation. Annenberg Conference, “Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing Errors in Health Care,” Rancho Mirage, CA November 8–10, 1998.
Daniels, Marc and A. Bradford Hill. Chemotherapy of Pulmonary Tuberculosis in Young Adults. An Analysis of the Combined Results of Three Medical Research Council Trials. BMJ 31:1162– 8, 1952.
DeBusk, Robert F., Nancy Houston Miller, H. Robert Superko, et al. A Case-Management System for Coronary Risk Factor Modification after Acute Myocardial Infarction. Ann Int Med 120: 721–9, 1994.
Dickey, Larry L. and Diana Petitti. A Patient-Held Minirecord to Promote Adult Preventive Care. J Fam Pract 34(4):457–63, 1992.
First Consulting Group. Health Systems on the E-Health Path: A Survey of Scottsdale Institute Members. Long Beach, CA: FCG, 2000. [email protected].
Glanz, Karen and Theresa O. Scholl. Intervention Strategies to Improve Adherence among Hyper- tensives: Review and Recommendations. Patient Counselling and Health Education 4(1):14– 28, 1982.
Hewitt, Maria for the Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America and the National Cancer Policy Board. Interpreting the Volume-Outcome Relationship in the Context of Health Care Quality. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Medicine, National Academy Press, 2000. Online. Available at http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10005.html [accessed Jan. 29, 2001].
Hoffman, Catherine, Dorothy P. Rice, and Hai-Yen Sung. Persons With Chronic Conditions. Their Prevalence and Costs. JAMA 276(18): 1473–9, 1996.
Institute of Medicine. Ensuring Quality Cancer Care. Maria Hewitt and Joseph V. Simone, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999.
———. To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donaldson, eds. Washington, D.C: National Academy Press, 2000.
Inui, Thomas S., Edward L. Yourtee, and John W. Williamson. Improved Outcomes in Hypertension After Physician Tutorials: A Controlled Trial. Ann Int Med 84:646–51, 1976.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21st CENTURY 37
Johnston, Mary E., Karl B. Langton, R. Brian Haynes, and Alix Mathieu. Effects of Computer-Based Clinical Decision Support Systems on Clinician Performance and Patient Outcome: A Critical Appraisal of Research. Ann Int Med 120:135–42, 1994.
Katon, Wayne, Michael Von Korff, Edward Lin, et al. Collaborative Management to Achieve Treat- ment Guidelines: Impact on Depression in Primary Care. JAMA 273(13):1026–31, 1995.
Kenny, Susan J., Philip J. Smith, Merilyn G. Goldschmid, et al. Survey of Physician Practice Behav- iors Related to Diabetes Mellitus in the U.S.: Physician Adherence to Consensus Recommen- dations. Diabetes Care 16(11):1507–10, 1993.
Kizer, Kenneth W. The National Quality Forum Enters the Game. International Journal for Quality in Health Care 12(2):85–7, 2000.
Kohn, Linda T. Organizing and Managing Care in a Changing Health System. Health Services Research 35(Part I):37–52, 2000.
Legorreta, Antonio P., Jennifer Christian-Herman, Richard D. O’Connor, et al. Compliance With National Asthma Management Guidelines and Specialty Care: A Health Maintenance Organi- zation Experience. Arch Int Med 158:457–64, 1998.
Litzelman, Debra K., Robert S. Dittus, Michael E. Miller, and William M. Tierney. Requiring Physi- cians to Respond to Computerized Reminders Improves Their Compliance with Preventive Care Protocols. J Gen Intern Med 8:311–7, 1993.
Macharia, William M., Gladys Leon, Brian H. Rowe, et al. An Overview of Interventions to Improve Compliance with Appointment Keeping for Medical Services. JAMA 267(13):1813–7, 1992.
McCulloch, David K., Russell E. Glasgow, Sarah E. Hampson, and Ed Wagner. A Systematic Ap- proach to Diabetes Management in the Post-DCCT Era. Diabetes Care 17(7):765–9, 1994.
McDonald, Clement J., Lonnie Blevins, William M. Tierney, and Douglas K. Martin. The Regenstrief Medical Records. MD Computing 5(5):34–47, 1988.
Mugford, Miranda, Philip Banfield, and Moira O’Hanlon. Effects of Feedback of Information on Clinical Practice: A Review. BMJ 303:398–402, 1991.
Mullen, Patricia D., Elizabeth A. Laville, Andrea K. Biddle, and Kate Lorig. Efficacy of Psycho- educational Interventions on Pain, Depression, and Disability in People with Arthritis: A Meta-Analysis. Journal of Rheumatology 14(suppl 15):33–9, 1987.
National Center for Health Statistics. Health, United States, 1999. With Health and Aging Chartbook. Hyattsville, MD: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999.
——— Health, United States, 2000. With Adolescent Health Chartbook. Hyattsville, MD: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000.
National Institutes of Health. 2000. “An Overview.” Online. Available at http://www.nih.gov/about/ NIHoverview.html [accessed Aug. 11, 2000].
National Research Council. Networking Health: Prescriptions for the Internet. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000.
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. 2000. “PhRMA Annual Report, 2000– 2001.” Online. Available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/annual2000/ [accessed Nov. 11, 2000].
Picker Institute and American Hospital Association. Eye on Patients Report. 1996. Rosenberg, Matt. Popularity of Internet Won’t Peak for Years: Not until today’s middle-schoolers
reach adulthood will the technology really take off. Puget Sound Business Journal. May 24, 1999. Online. Available at http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/1999/05/24/focus9.html [accessed Jan. 22. 2001].
Sawicki, Peter T., Ingrid Muhlhauser, Ulrike Didjurgeit, and Michael Berger. Improvement of Hy- pertension Care by a Structured Treatment and Teaching Programme. Journal of Human Hypertension 7:571–3, 1993.
Schuster, Mark A., Elizabeth A. McGlynn, and Robert H Brook. How Good is the Quality of Health Care in the United States? The Milbank Quarterly 76(4):517–63, 1998.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
38 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Soumerai, Stephen B. and Jerry Avorn. Principles of Educational Outreach (‘Academic Detailing’) to Improve Clinical Decision Making. JAMA 263(4):549–55, 1990.
Starfield, Barbara, Neil R. Powe, Jonathan R. Weiner, et al. Costs vs. Quality in Different Types of Primary Care Settings. JAMA 272(24):1903–8, 1994.
Stason, William B., Donald S. Shepard, H. Mitchell Perry, Jr., et al. Effectiveness and Costs of Veterans Affairs Hypertension Clinic. Medical Care 32(12):1197–215, 1994.
Stockwell, David H., Shantha Madhavan, Hillel Cohen, Geoffrey Gibson, and Michael H. Alderman. The Determinants of Hypertension Awareness, Treatment, and Control in an Insured Popula- tion. American Journal of Public Health 84(11):1768–74, 1994.
Strull, William M., Bernard Lo, and Gerald Charles. Do Patients Want to Participate in Medical Decision Making? JAMA 252(21):2990–4, 1984.
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. Prescription Drug Trends – A Chartbook. Menlo Park, CA: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2000.
The Lewin Group, Inc. Outlook for Medical Technology Innovation: Will Patients Get the Care They Need. Report #1: The State of the Industry. Washington, DC: Health Insurance Manufacturers Association, 2000.
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Chronic Care in America: A 21st Century Challenge. Princeton, NJ: The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996. Online. Available at http:// www.rwjf.org/library/chrcare/ [accessed Sept. 19, 2000].
Turner, Robert C., Leo E. Waivers, and Kevin O’Brien. The Effect of Patient-Carried Reminder Cards on the Performance of Health Maintenance Measures. Arch Int Med 150:645–7, 1990.
U.S. Census Bureau. Health Insurance Coverage: 1999. Current Population Survey. by Robert J. Mills. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau. September, 2000. Online. Available at: http:// www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthin99.html [accessed Jan. 22, 2001].
U.S. Department of Commerce. The Emerging Digital Economy II. Washington DC: Economic Statistics Administration, Office of Policy Development, 1999. Online. Available at: http:// www.ecommerce.gov/eds/report.html [accessed Sept. 19, 2000].
———. Falling Through the Net: Toward Digital Inclusion. A Report on American’s Access to Technology Tools. Washington DC: Economics and Statistics Administration; National Tele- communications and Information Administration, 2000. Online. Available at: http:// www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/digitaldivide/ [accessed Sept. 19, 2000].
U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Figure 3-2: Mean Approval Times for New Drugs, 1987–1999. 2000 Pharmaceutical Industry Profile. Washington DC: Pharmaceutical Research and Manu- facturing Association, 2000.
Vinicor, Frank, Stuart J. Cohen, Steven A. Mazzuca, et al. DIABEDS: A randomized trial of the effects of physician and/or patient education on diabetes patient outcomes. Journal of Chronic Diseases 40:234–56, 1987.
Von Korff, Michael, Jessie Gruman, Judith Schaefer, Susan J. Curry, and Edward H. Wagner. Collaborative Management of Chronic Illness. Ann Int Med 127(12):1097–102, 1997.
Wagner, Edward H., Brian T. Austin, and Michael Von Korff. Organizing Care for Patients with Chronic Illness. Milbank Quarterly 74(4):511–42, 1996.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
39
2
Improving the 21st-Century Health Care System
As discussed in Chapter 1, the American health care system is in need of major restructuring. This will not be an easy task, but the potential benefits are great. To cross the divide between today’s system and the possibilities of tomor- row, strong leadership and clear direction will be necessary. As a statement of purpose for the health care system as a whole, the committee endorses and adopts the phrasing of the Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry (1998).
Recommendation 1: All health care organizations, professional groups, and private and public purchasers should adopt as their explicit purpose to continually reduce the burden of illness, injury, and disability, and to improve the health and functioning of the people of the United States.
It is helpful to translate this general statement into a more specific agenda for improvement—a list of performance characteristics that, if addressed and im- proved, would lead to better achievement of that overarching purpose. To this end, the committee proposes six specific aims for improvement. Health care should be:
• Safe—avoiding injuries to patients from the care that is intended to help them.
• Effective—providing services based on scientific knowledge to all who could benefit and refraining from providing services to those not likely to benefit (avoiding underuse and overuse).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
40 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
• Patient-centered—providing care that is respectful of and responsive to individual patient preferences, needs, and values and ensuring that patient values guide all clinical decisions.
• Timely—reducing waits and sometimes harmful delays for both those who receive and those who give care.
• Efficient—avoiding waste, in particular waste of equipment, supplies, ideas, and energy.
• Equitable—providing care that does not vary in quality because of per- sonal characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, geographic location, and socio- economic status.
Recommendation 2: All health care organizations, professional groups, and private and public purchasers should pursue six major aims; specifically, health care should be safe, effective, patient-cen- tered, timely, efficient, and equitable.
The committee believes substantial improvements in safety, effectiveness, patient-centeredness, timeliness, efficiency, and equity are achievable throughout the health care sector. This opportunity for improvement is not confined to any sector, form of payment, type of organization, or clinical discipline. Problems in health care quality affect all Americans today, and all can benefit from a rededi- cation to improving quality, regardless of where they receive their care.
The committee applauds the Administration and Congress for their current efforts to establish a mechanism for tracking the quality of care. Title IX of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 299 et seq.; Agency for Healthcare Re- search and Quality Part A) provides support for the development of a National Quality Report, which is currently ongoing. Section 913(a)(2) of the act states: “Beginning in fiscal year 2003, the Secretary, acting through the Director, shall submit to Congress an annual report on national trends in the quality of health care provided to the American people.”
Recommendation 3: Congress should continue to authorize and appropriate funds for, and the Department of Health and Human Services should move forward expeditiously with the establishment of, monitoring and tracking processes for use in evaluating the progress of the health system in pursuit of the above-cited aims of safety, effectiveness, patient-centeredness, timeliness, efficiency, and equity. The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services should report annually to Congress and the President on the quality of care provided to the American people.
Without ongoing tracking of quality to assess the country’s progress in meet- ing the aims set forth in this chapter, interested parties—including patients, health care practitioners, policy makers, educators, and purchasers—cannot identify
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
IMPROVING THE 21st-CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 41
progress or understand where improvement efforts are most needed. Continued funding for this activity should be ensured.
SIX AIMS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Over the course of a lifetime, individuals have numerous encounters with the health system. Fortunately, many of these encounters are effective and result in good outcomes, but such is not always the case. The following scenario, based on the composite experience of a number of patients, illustrates some of the serious problems facing patients and clinicians, problems that persist despite the widespread dedication of clinicians to providing high-quality care.
Ms. Martinez, January 2000
Ms. Martinez, a divorced working mother in her early 50s with two children in junior high school, was new in town and had to choose an insurance plan. She had difficulty knowing which plan to select for her family, but she chose City- Care because its cost was comparable to that of other options, and it had pediat- ric as well as adult practices nearby.
Once she had joined CityCare, she was asked to choose a primary care physi- cian. After receiving some recommendations from a neighbor and several co- workers, she called several of the offices to sign up. The first two she called were not accepting new patients. Although she knew nothing about the practice she finally found, she assumed it would be adequate.
Juggling repairs on their new apartment, finding the best route to work, getting the children’s immunization records sent by mail, and making other arrange- ments to get them into a new school, Ms. Martinez delayed calling her new doctor’s office for several months. When she called for an appointment, she was told that the first available nonurgent appointment was in 2 months; she hoped she would not run out of her blood pressure medication in the interim.
When she went for her first appointment, she was asked to complete a patient history form in the waiting room. She had difficulty remembering dates and significant past events and doses of her medications. After waiting for an hour, she met with Dr. McGonagle and had a physical exam. Although her breast exam appeared to be normal, Dr. McGonagle noted that she was due for a mammogram.
Ms. Martinez called a site listed in her provider directory and was given an appointment for a mammogram in 6 weeks. The staff suggested that she ar- range to have her old films mailed to her. Somehow, the films were never sent, and distracted by other concerns, she forgot to follow up.
A week after the mammogram, she received a call from Dr. McGonagle’s office notifying her of an abnormal finding and saying that she should make an ap-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
42 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
pointment with a surgeon for a biopsy. The first opening with the surgeon was 9 weeks later. By now, she was very anxious. She hated even to think about having cancer in her body, especially because an older sister had died of the disease. For weeks she did not sleep, wondering what would happen to her children if she were debilitated or to her job if she had to have surgery and lengthy treatment. She was reluctant to call her mother, who was likely to imagine the worst, and did not know her new coworkers well enough to confide in them.
After numerous calls, she was finally able to track down her old mammograms. It turned out that a possible abnormal finding had been circled the previous year, but neither she nor her primary care physician had ever been notified.
Finally, Ms. Martinez had her appointment with the surgeon, and his office scheduled her for a biopsy. The biopsy showed that she had a fairly unusual form of cancer, and there was concern that it might have spread to her lymph nodes. She felt terrified, angry, sad, and helpless all at once, but needed to decide what kind of surgery to have. It was a difficult decision because only one small trial comparing lumpectomy and mastectomy for this type of breast cancer had been conducted. She finally decided on a mastectomy.
Before she could have surgery, Ms. Martinez needed to have bone and abdomi- nal scans to rule out metastases to her bones or liver. When she arrived at the hospital for surgery, however, some of this important laboratory information was missing. The staff called and hours later finally tracked down the results of her scans, but for a while it looked as though she would have to reschedule the surgery.
During her mastectomy, several positive lymph nodes were found. This meant she had to see the surgeon, an oncologist, and a radiologist, as well as her primary care physician, to decide on the next steps. At last it was decided that she would have radiation therapy and chemotherapy. She was given the phone number for the American Cancer Society. Before 6 months had gone by, Ms. Martinez found another lump, this time under her arm. Cancer had spread to her lung as well. She was given more radiation, then more chemotherapy. Wherever she went for care, the walls were drab, the chairs uncomfortable, and sometimes she would wait hours for a scheduled appointment.
During her numerous procedures and tests, Ms. Martinez experienced many acts of consideration, empathy, and technical expertise for which she was grate- ful. Yet for Ms. Martinez, who had excellent health insurance and was seen by well-trained and capable clinicians, the system did not work and did not meet her needs. Her care failed on several accounts.
First, it was not safe. Neither she nor her previous primary care doctor had been notified of an abnormal finding on her earlier mammogram. As a result, at least a year elapsed before the abnormality was addressed. Ms. Martinez was never confident that those directing her care had all the information about her previous care and its results. Prior to her surgery, critical laboratory information
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
IMPROVING THE 21st-CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 43
was missing. She was repeatedly required to tell her story, which became longer and more complex as time passed. No one at the hospital followed her course of illness after her discharge.
Second, Ms. Martinez’s care was not effective. She suffered preventable, long-lasting disability—and could have lost her life. It was not clear that her follow-up care consistently used the most up-to-date protocols. She needed consistent, reliable information, based on the best science available. Yet treat- ments tried and proven futile in one admission would be recommended in the next as if they were fresh ideas.
Third, her care was not timely. Repeated, extensive delays occurred between tests and follow-up care, delays that are not at all atypical in today’s health system.
Fourth, her care was not patient-centered. She had little assistance or infor- mation to help her understand the implications of choices about her surgery, radiation therapy, or chemotherapy. Although office and hospital staff focused on immediate medical problems, her discomfort, fear, and uncertainty were never addressed, and she was offered few resources to help her.
Finally, her care was not efficient because much of its complexity and ex- pense came from treating a tumor at a later stage than should have occurred.
Many other individuals experience systems of care that often do not work. This is true even for patients with excellent insurance, in fine institutions, cared for by conscientious and well-trained clinicians. Common, too, is frequent in- ability of patients to make their needs understood, to be treated with respect and compassion, to learn what to expect about their health condition and treatment, and to have caregivers and institutions they can trust. These patients tell stories of fragmented care in which relevant information is lost, overlooked, or ignored; of wasted resources; of frustrated efforts to obtain timely access to services; and of lost opportunities. When clinicians and their families and those steeped in health management become patients, they, too, find that there appears to be no one who can make the systems function safely and effectively (Berwick, 1996, 1999; Khan, 2000; Singer, 2000).
In this chapter, the committee puts forth six specific aims for improvement: health care should be safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equi- table. These specific aims are intended to aid in achieving the overarching purpose stated in Recommendation 1 above. These aims are not new; they are familiar and have been valued, arguably for decades, among health care profes- sionals, patients, policy makers, and communities. Yet American health care fails far too often with respect to these aims, despite its enormous cost and the dedication and good efforts of millions of American health care workers. After careful consideration, the committee has concluded that fundamental changes are necessary if our current health system is to achieve these aims. In its current forms, habits, and environment, American health care is incapable of providing the public with the quality health care it expects and deserves.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
44 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
The call for such improvement is not an indictment of physicians, nurses, or, indeed, any of the people who give or lead care. The committee asserts, without reservation, that our health care can and should be far better than it is today, but it would be futile to seek that improvement by further burdening an overstressed health care workforce or by exhorting committed professionals to try harder. Instead, the improvements outlined here will require significant changes in the ways health care is organized, in the accessibility and usefulness of clinical evidence, in the environment of payment, and in other incentives that set the context for delivery of care. A redesigned care system can offer the health care workforce what it wants—a better opportunity to provide high-quality care.
The ultimate test of the quality of a health care system is whether it helps the people it intends to help. This rather simple statement, as expanded upon in the following detailed discussion of the six aims for improvement set forth earlier, represents a major shift in thinking about the purpose of health care—a shift in attention from what is done to patients to what is accomplished for them. The IOM has defined quality as “the degree to which health care services for individu- als and populations increase the likelihood of desired outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge” (Institute of Medicine, 1990). The com- mittee believes the health care system should define safety, effectiveness, pa- tient-centeredness, timeliness, efficiency, and equity using measures determined by the outcomes patients desire, although clinicians should not be asked to com- promise their ethical values. Desirable personal health outcomes include im- provement (and prevention of deterioration) of health status and health-related quality of life, and management of physical and psychological symptoms. Desir- able outcomes also include attention to interpersonal aspects of care, such as patients’ concerns and expectations, their sense of dignity, their participation in decision making, and in some cases reduced burden on family and caregivers and spiritual well-being.
Such outcomes can be described at both the individual level (e.g., improve- ment in individual health status) and the population level (e.g., reduced aggregate burden of illness and injury in a population). The committee recognizes that the health of the public could be greatly improved by attention to and investment in a variety of areas, such as reducing violence and substance abuse and improving nutrition and transportation safety. This report, however, is focused specifically on the improvement of health care services to individuals. For this reason, we describe the six aims for improvement from the perspective of the individual’s— usually a patient’s—experience.
Safety
Patients should not be harmed by the care that is intended to help them, nor should harm come to those who work in health care. The earlier report by this committee, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System (Institute of
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
IMPROVING THE 21st-CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 45
Medicine, 2000b), addresses patient safety in detail. It defines patient safety as freedom from accidental injury. Although not all errors cause injury, accidental injury can be due to error, defined by the IOM (adapted from Reason, 1990) as either (1) the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or (2) use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim. In health care these errors include, for example, administering the wrong drug or dosage to a patient, diagnosing pneumonia when the patient has congestive heart failure, and failing to operate when the obvious (as opposed to ambiguous) signs of appendicitis are present. Processes also should not harm patients through inadvertent exposure to chemicals, foreign bodies, trauma, or infectious agents.
The health care environment should be safe for all patients, in all of its processes, all the time. This standard of safety implies that organizations should not have different, lower standards of care on nights and weekends or during times of organizational change. In a safe system, patients need to tell caregivers something only once. To be safe, care must be seamless—supporting the ability of interdependent people and technologies to perform as a unified whole, espe- cially at points of transition between and among caregivers, across sites of care, and through time. It is in inadequate handoffs that safety often fails first. Specifi- cally, in a safe system, information is not lost, inaccessible, or forgotten in tran- sitions. Knowledge about patients—such as their allergies, their medications, their diagnostic and treatment plans, and their specific needs—is available, with appropriate assurances of confidentiality, to all who need to know it, regardless of where and when they become involved in the process of giving care.
Ensuring patient safety also requires that patients be informed and partici- pate as fully as they wish and are able. Patients and their families should not be excluded from learning about uncertainty, risks, and treatment choices. The committee believes an informed patient is a safer patient.
When complications occur, caregivers are ethically obligated to fully inform the patient of the event and its causes, assist recovery, and take appropriate action to prevent recurrences. For example, the Code of Ethics (E8.12) of the American Medical Association states, “It is a fundamental ethical requirement that a physi- cian should at all times deal honestly and openly with patients . . . . Situations occasionally occur in which a patient suffers significant medical complications that may have resulted from the physician’s mistake or judgment. In these situations, the physician is ethically required to inform the patient of all the facts necessary to ensure understanding of what has occurred” (American Medical Association, 2000).
In many cases, the best window on the safety and quality of care is through the eyes of the patient. For example, the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute in Boston, Massachusetts, includes patients on their review committees. Other approaches include inviting patients and health care workers to comment on the performance of the health system as they experience it, not solely for the purpose of generating
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
46 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
satisfaction ratings, but also as a core way of learning about the system’s perfor- mance and how to improve it.
Although Americans continue to trust health care clinicians, including doc- tors and nurses (The Gallup Organization, 2000; The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2000), the committee is concerned about Americans’ remarkably low level of confidence in the health care system overall. For example, in July 2000, only four in ten Americans surveyed for one poll reported having a lot or a great deal of confidence in “the medical system,” though it is not clear who or what kinds of settings were encompassed by their answers (Chambers, 2000). Of the 15 major industries included in the poll, the medical system ranked in the bottom half along with public schools, television and print news, and big busi- ness; poll participants reported having greater confidence in banks, the President, and the police. A Harris Poll conducted at the end of 1999 found that only 39 percent of respondents reported having a great deal of confidence in the “people in charge of running medicine” (Taylor, 1999). In 1998, The American Customer Satisfaction Index placed hospitals between the U.S. Postal Service and the Inter- nal Revenue Service in customer satisfaction (Lieber, 1998).
One important route to restoring trust is through a commitment to transpar- ency by all health care systems. Organizations and clinicians that act as though they have nothing to hide become more trustworthy. The health care system should seek to earn renewed trust not by hiding its defects, but by revealing them, along with making a relentless commitment to improve. The transition to open- ness is a difficult one for our often-beleaguered health care organizations, but it is a journey worth making. In the longer run, access to information can inspire trust among patients and caregivers that the system is working effectively to advance health. Such trust involves patient confidence both that those who are respon- sible for care have the information they need—regardless of where that informa- tion was generated—and that those organizations and caregivers will act in patients’ best interests and actively seek to advance their health.
Achieving a higher level of safety is an essential first step in improving the quality of care overall. Improving safety will in turn require systematic efforts from a broad array of stakeholders, including a commitment of clear and sus- tained leadership at the executive and board levels of organizations; a greatly changed culture of health care in which errors are tracked, analyzed, and inter- preted for improvement rather than blame; extensive research on the factors leading to injury; and new systems of care designed to prevent error and mini- mize harm (Institute of Medicine, 2000b).
Effectiveness
Effectiveness refers to care that is based on the use of systematically ac- quired evidence to determine whether an intervention, such as a preventive ser- vice, diagnostic test, or therapy, produces better outcomes than alternatives—
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
IMPROVING THE 21st-CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 47
including the alternative of doing nothing. Evidence-based practice requires that those who give care consistently avoid both underuse of effective care and over- use of ineffective care that is more likely to harm than help the patient (Chassin, 1997).
To say that a health care intervention is effective implies an evidence base. Such evidence-based practice has been defined by Sackett and colleagues and is adapted here (Sackett et al., 1996): evidence-based practice is the integration of best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient values. Best research evidence refers to clinically relevant research, often from the basic sciences of medicine, but especially from patient-centered clinical research into the accuracy and precision of diagnostic tests (including the clinical examination); the power of predictive markers; and the efficacy and safety of therapeutic, rehabilitative, and preventive regimens. Clinical expertise means the ability to use clinical skills and past experience to rapidly identify each patient’s unique health state and diagnosis, individual risks and benefits of potential interventions, and per- sonal values and expectations. Patient values refers to the unique preferences, concerns, and expectations that are brought by each patient to a clinical encounter and must be integrated into clinical decisions if the patient is to be served.
Effective care should ensure use of the available, relevant science base. Evidence comes from four main types of research: laboratory experiments, clini- cal trials, epidemiological research, and outcomes research, including analyses of systematically acquired and properly studied case reports involving one or a population of patients (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000). Laboratory experiments—usually on cells or tissues in laboratory animals—are conducted to determine the cause of a disease or how a drug or treatment works. Randomized clinical trials compare outcomes among patients who are randomly assigned to control or treatment groups; other clinical trials compare populations that may be assigned by nonrandom methods. Epidemiological research exam- ines the natural course of disease in particular groups of people; the relationships between people and their health habits, lifestyles, and environment; and risk factors for certain diseases. Outcomes research uses information about how well treatments work in everyday practice settings. The findings of this research sometimes serve as the basis for clinical practice guidelines.
Although the concept of evidence-based practice has come to be regarded by some as implying rigid (even mindless) adherence to the evidence drawn from randomized controlled trials (Grahame-Smith, 1995; The Lancet, 1995), we mean it here to encompass the use of best available clinical evidence from systematic research of many designs and integration of that evidence with clinical exper- tise—the proficiency and judgment that are acquired through experience and applied with knowledge about individual patients and consideration of their pri- orities and values. The committee is well aware that for many aspects of health care, scant or no evidence of either effectiveness or ineffectiveness exists. In other areas, evidence may be available only for certain patient groups or for the
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
48 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
treatment of patients who do not have coexisting health problems. Thus, it is clearly not possible to base all care on sound scientific evidence, and certainly not exclusively on randomized controlled trials, which narrowly define study popula- tions and exclude or control for factors that are inevitably relevant in real-world care settings. Nonetheless, the committee believes health care organizations and professionals could do a far better job than they do today in determining the most appropriate therapies on the basis of the strength of the scientific evidence; the stakes involved; clinical judgment; and, especially where the evidence is equivo- cal, shared patient and clinician decision making. In the ideal system of the future, the knowledge base about effective care and its use in health care settings will constantly expand through improved methods of accessing, summarizing, and assessing information and making it available at the point of care for the patient.
Knowing which services are likely to be effective also requires that health care systems continuously monitor the results of the care they provide and use that information to improve care for all patients. At a minimum, health care practitioners and organizations could be far more reflective and systematic than is generally the case today in studying their own patterns of care and outcomes, a vision that Codman (1914) had nearly a century ago when he recommended that all surgeons and hospitals carefully follow their patients after discharge from the hospital to learn whether the treatment they had received had been helpful.
Patient-Centeredness
This aim focuses on the patient’s experience of illness and health care and on the systems that work or fail to work to meet individual patients’ needs. Similar terms are person-centered, consumer-centered, personalized, and individualized. Like these terms, patient-centered encompasses qualities of compassion, empa- thy, and responsiveness to the needs, values, and expressed preferences of the individual patient.
Patients and their families are now better educated and informed about their health care than ever before. As noted earlier, the explosive growth in the use of the Internet by Americans of all ages (National Public Radio Online, 2000) includes intense interest in health information (Brown, 1998; Cyber Dialogue, 2000). In an October 1998 survey of Internet users, 27 percent of female and 15 percent of male Internet users said that they accessed medical information weekly or daily (Eysenbach et al., 1999; Georgia Tech Research Corporation, 1998). Increasingly, individuals make many of their own decisions about diagnosis and treatment and bring information to their physicians with the expectation of help in interpreting or judging its value for themselves. These new health care con- sumers represent new opportunities for responding to patient needs and reestab- lishing clinician–patient relationships that are at the heart of good health care.
Many patients have expressed frustration with their inability to participate in
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
IMPROVING THE 21st-CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 49
decision making, to obtain information they need, to be heard, and to participate in systems of care that are responsive to their needs. The Picker Institute in Boston, Massachusetts, has been tracking patients’ experiences in hospitals, clin- ics, and other settings since 1988 (Cleary et al., 1991; Picker Institute and Ameri- can Hospital Association, 1996). In a 1999 report, patients said that, for the most part, doctors, nurses, and medical staff were courteous, and that as patients they were treated with respect and received attention to their basic physical needs. They also reported, however, that hospital discharge often meant an abrupt tran- sition without information on how they should care for themselves, when to resume activities, what side effects of medications should be monitored, or how to have their questions answered. Above all, patients cited difficulty in obtaining the information they wanted, whether in hospitals, clinics, or doctors’ offices. In the scenario presented earlier, little consideration was given to satisfying Ms. Martinez’ preferences or to ensuring that she had sufficient information to make informed decisions.
The evidence bears out these perceptions. The right of patients to be in- formed decision makers is well accepted, but not always well implemented. An analysis of audiotaped encounters between patients and their primary care physi- cians or general and orthopedic surgeons revealed that overall, only 9 percent met the authors’ definition of completely informed decision making (Braddock et al., 1999). In another study of physician–patient interaction during visits to general internal medicine specialists, physicians listened to patients’ concerns for an average of about 18 seconds before interrupting (Beckman and Frankel, 1984).
Gerteis et al. (1993) have identified several dimensions of patient-centered care: (1) respect for patients’ values, preferences, and expressed needs; (2) coordination and integration of care; (3) information, communication, and education; (4) physical comfort; (5) emotional support—relieving fear and anxi- ety; and (6) involvement of family and friends. Each dimension is briefly discussed below.
• Respect for patients’ values, preferences, and expressed needs. Patient- centered care responds precisely to each patient’s wants, needs, and preferences. It gives patients abundant opportunities to be informed and involved in medical decision making, and guides and supports those providing care in attending to their patients’ physical and emotional needs, and maintaining or improving their quality of life to the extent possible. Patient-centered care is highly customized and incorporates cultural competence. Some patients wish to avoid risk; others may choose a risky intervention despite a relatively low likelihood of benefit. Patients’ preferences are likely to change over time and to depend on the clinical problems in question; therefore, the enterprise of shared decision making is a dynamic one, changing as patients and circumstances change.
• Coordination and integration of care. Because of the special vulnerabil- ity that accompanies illness or injury, coordination of care takes on special im-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
50 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
portance. Many patients depend on those who provide care to coordinate ser- vices—whether tests, consultations, or procedures—to ensure that accurate and timely information reaches those who need it at the appropriate time. Patient- centered care addresses the need to manage smooth transitions from one setting to another or from a health care to a self-care setting.
• Information, communication, and education. With respect to their health, people tend to want to know (1) what is wrong (diagnosis) or how to stay well, (2) what is likely to happen and how it will affect them (prognosis), and (3) what can be done to change or manage their prognosis. They need answers that are accurate and in a language they understand. Patients are diverse in the way they prefer to interact with caregivers: some seek ongoing personal face-to-face relationships; others prefer to interact with the health care system only when unavoidable and with no substantial interpersonal relationship, being comfortable with e-mail and other Web-based communication technologies. Common to all such interactions is the desire for trustworthy information (often from an indi- vidual clinician) that is attentive, responsive, and tailored to an individual’s needs.
• Physical comfort. Among the committee’s more disturbing findings is the frequency with which patients experience pain, shortness of breath, or some other discomfort. Especially at the end of life, they need not undergo such suffering. Sadly, many patients fail to receive state-of-the-art pain relief or respiratory management (Ingham and Foley, 1998; SUPPORT Principal Investi- gators, 1995). Attention to physical comfort implies timely, tailored, and expert management of such symptoms.
• Emotional support—relieving fear and anxiety. Suffering is more than just physical pain and other distressing symptoms; it also encompasses signifi- cant emotional and spiritual dimensions (Byock, 1998; Cassell, 1991). Patient- centered care attends to the anxiety that accompanies all injury and illness, whether due to uncertainty, fear of pain, disability or disfigurement, loneliness, financial impact, or the effect of illness on one’s family.
• Involvement of family and friends. This dimension of patient-centered care focuses on accommodating family and friends on whom patients may rely, involving them as appropriate in decision making, supporting them as caregivers, making them welcome and comfortable in the care delivery setting, and recogniz- ing their needs and contributions.
Health care should cure when possible, but always help to relieve suffer- ing—both are encompassed by the notion of a healing relationship (Crawshaw et al., 1995; Quill, 1983). To accomplish these goals, both technical care and interpersonal interactions should be shaped to meet the needs and preferences of individual patients (Tressolini and The Pew-Fetzer Task Force, 1994; Veatch, 1991). Because patients are highly variable in their preferences, clinicians cannot assume that they alone can make the best decisions for their patients (Balint, 1993; Barry et al., 1995; Brock, 1991; Emanuel and Emanuel, 1992; Szasz and
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
IMPROVING THE 21st-CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 51
Hollender, 1956; Wagner et al., 1995). Patients increasingly want to obtain information and to be involved in decision making (Deber et al., 1996; Degner and Russell, 1988; Guadagnoli and Ward, 1998; Mansell et al., 2000; Mazur and Hickam, 1997). Moreover, meeting the aim of patient-centeredness can improve the outcomes patients desire (Brown, 1990; DeBusk et al., 1994; Linden and Chambers, 1994; Mullen et al., 1987), at least in part, by increasing their partici- pation in decision making (Greenfield et al., 1985, 1988; Kaplan et al., 1989; Mahler and Kulik, 1991; Orth et al., 1987; Stewart, 1995).
As with communication styles, patients differ in their views about how ac- tive they wish to be in decision making. In some cases, patients want a large role, and in other cases they may delegate most decision making to a clinician. The goal of patient-centeredness is to customize care to the specific needs and cir- cumstances of each individual, that is, to modify the care to respond to the person, not the person to the care.
Timeliness
Timeliness is an important characteristic of any service and is a legitimate and valued focus of improvement in health care and other industries (Fishman, 1999; Fung and Magretta, 1998; Goldsmith, 1989; Kenagy et al., 1999; Maister, 1984; Roach, 1991; Sirkin and Stalk, 1990; van Biema and Greenwald, 1997; Womack et al., 1991). However, long waits are the norm in most doctors’ offices, in emergency rooms, on the telephone, in responses to inquiries, in spe- cialty care, on gurneys in hallways waiting for procedures, and awaiting test results, both in institutions and in the community. In addition to emotional distress, physical harm may result, for example, from a delay in diagnosis or treatment that results in preventable complications. The long waits for appoint- ments described in the scenario presented earlier, which are common today, may have resulted in a much more advanced diagnosis for Ms. Martinez. Lack of timeliness also signals a lack of attention to flow and a lack of respect for the patient that are not tolerated in consumer-centered systems in other service indus- tries. It suggests that care has not been designed with the welfare of the patient at the center.
Waits also plague those who give care. Surgeons know that operations rarely start on time; doctors and nurses wait “on hold” as they try to track down vital information, and delays and barriers involved in referrals eat up the time and energy of both referring doctors and consulting specialists. In the earlier sce- nario, Ms. Martinez’ surgery was nearly cancelled because important information that should have been in her record was missing, and staff spent valuable time finding it and rearranging schedules to avoid having to cancel the operation.
Any high-quality process should flow smoothly. Delays should occur rarely. Waiting times should be continually reduced for both patients and those who give care. Much waiting today appears to result from the presumption that certain
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
52 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
kinds of face-to-face encounters are required for patients to receive the help or interaction they require. Health systems must develop multiple ways of respond- ing to patients’ needs beyond patient visits, including the use of the Internet. Reducing waiting time does not have to increase expense. Experience has shown repeatedly that in many areas, improving access reduces costs in health care (Barry-Walker, 2000; Cohn et al., 1997; Fuss et al., 1998; Stewart et al., 1997; Tidikis and Strasen, 1994; Tunick et al., 1997) and in other industries (Heskett et al., 1997). Promising work in health care has begun to result in reduced delays by decreasing cycle time and by applying lessons from other industries on continu- ous rather than batch production (Nolan et al., 1996). These approaches are described further in Chapter 7.
Efficiency
In an efficient health care system, resources are used to get the best value for the money spent (Palmer and Torgerson, 1999). The opposite of efficiency is waste, the use of resources without benefit to the patients a system is intended to help. There are at least two ways to improve efficiency: (1) reduce quality waste, and (2) reduce administrative or production costs.
Not all but many types of quality improvements result in lower resource use. This is true for improvements in effectiveness that result from reductions in overuse. It is also true for most improvements in safety, which result in fewer injuries. Quality waste from both overuse (see Appendix A) and errors (Institute of Medicine, 2000b) is abundant in health care and contributes to excess costs.
Some researchers have attempted to quantify administrative costs that con- stitute waste (Woolhandler and Himmelstein, 1997; Woolhandler et al., 1993). Others have identified waste in the work of smaller health care units and sought systematically to reduce such waste through a variety of strategies, including eliminating processes that are not useful (such as tests), multiple entries (such as clerical reentry of physicians’ prescriptions and laboratory orders), classifica- tions that add complexity without adding value (such as types of appointments and job classifications), and layers of control (such as approvals and sign-offs). Waste can also be reduced by recycling and appropriate reuse of resources (such as data and water) and by wise substitutions (Kain et al., 1999; Klein et al., 2000; Langley et al., 1996; Luck and Peabody, 2000; Poplin, 2000; Skillman et al., 2000; Walczak, 2000; Zairi et al., 1999). Other approaches rely on matching supply to demand and using sampling for measurement instead of measuring 100 percent of events. Several of these approaches are described in greater detail in Chapter 7.
Because of the high levels of waste in the current system, the committee sees no immediate conflict in the simultaneous pursuit of lower costs through effi- ciency and better patient experiences through safety, effectiveness, patient-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
IMPROVING THE 21st-CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 53
centeredness, and timeliness. There is little doubt that current resources can be spent more wisely to pursue the aims set forth in this chapter.
Equity
This chapter began with a statement of purpose for the health system: “to continually reduce the burden of illness, injury, and disability, and to improve the health and functioning of the people of the United States.” The aim of equity is to secure these benefits for all the people of the United States. This aim has two dimensions: equity at the level of the population and equity at the level of the individual. At the population level, the goal of a health care system is to improve health status and to do so in a manner that reduces health disparities among particular subgroups. Equity in care implies universal access, a promise that has yet to be either made or kept. Lack of health insurance has a profound effect on access to appropriate services, and is directly associated with poor functioning, increased morbidity, and increased mortality (American College of Physicians– American Society of Internal Medicine, 2000; Baker et al., 2000; Franks et al., 1993; Haas and Goldman, 1994; Hafner-Eaton, 1993; Kasper et al., 2000). Insti- tutions and health professionals that deliver uncompensated care to uninsured or underserved patients are at risk financially (Institute of Medicine, 2000a), and evidence suggests that the provision of uncompensated care is declining (Cun- ningham et al., 1999; Mann et al., 1997). The committee believes lack of access to care is a very powerful barrier to quality.
With regard to equity in care giving, all individuals rightly expect to be treated fairly by social institutions, including health care organizations. The availability of care and quality of services should be based on individuals’ par- ticular needs and not on personal characteristics unrelated to the patient’s condi- tion or to the reason for seeking care. In particular, the quality of care should not differ because of such characteristics as gender, race, age, ethnicity, income, education, disability, sexual orientation, or location of residence (Ayanian et al., 1999; Canto et al., 2000; Fiscella et al., 2000; Freeman and Payne, 2000; Kahn et al., 1994; Pearson et al., 1992; Philbin and DiSalvo, 1998; Ross et al., 2000; Yergan et al., 1987).
Conflicts Among the Aims
For the most part, the six aims are complementary and synergistic. At times, however, there will be tensions among them. Health care institutions, clinicians, and patients will sometimes need to work together to balance competing or conflicting objectives. Two examples are the potential conflict between the aims of patient-centeredness and effectiveness, and the need to balance the aim of equity as applied to the population with achievement of the other aims at the level of the individual.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
54 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Some readers might question whether a commitment to evidence-based care conflicts with an emphasis on patient-centered care. We emphasize that the commitment to patient-centered care is not intended to imply that clinicians have an obligation to provide unnecessary services merely because patients request them. All unneeded services have the potential to cause harm. For example, false-positive results on a test can lead to a cascade of testing and psychological distress. Because unnecessary services can do harm and offer no benefit, ethical principles dictate that a physician not recommend or prescribe requested treat- ment that is of no known benefit—whether, for example, the request is for antibi- otics, diagnostic tests, or a wide variety of invasive procedures.
A VISION OF FUTURE CARE
The six aims for improvement described in this chapter define the tasks ahead for the health care system, for organizations, and for clinical practices that wish to contribute to the overarching social purpose set forth at the beginning of this chapter. These aims can lead us all to fundamentally better care. Having presented earlier in this chapter a scenario in which almost everything went wrong, we conclude the chapter with a scenario depicting care as it could be if the six aims were realized:
Maureen Waters, January 2002
Maureen Waters, a single working mother with teenage children, was new in town. When the family moved to Southcity, she had to select an insurance plan. She chose CityCare because its cost was comparable to that of other options, and it was associated with a major university-affiliated hospital.
When Ms. Waters joined CityCare, she was asked to choose a primary care physician. After talking with her neighbors and coworkers, she was pleased to confirm some of what she had learned from having online access to profiles and to information on office hours, credentials, patient satisfaction, and outcomes for each physician and group.
Again online, using a secure site, she chose a physician, completed background and health risk appraisal information for herself and her children, and never again had to supply this information. An hour later, her choice of a physician was confirmed by the plan. She also received a reply from her new physician’s office that, on the basis of her health risk appraisal, she should made an ap- pointment to meet with her primary care physician, have her hypertension as- sessed, and obtain medication refills. The reply also included information about blood tests that should be done before her first appointment.
Because she was due for a breast exam and mammogram, a referral to a breast care center was attached to the reply. Also online, she was able to schedule a
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
IMPROVING THE 21st-CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 55
time convenient for her (Sunday afternoon) at one of several locations in South- city.
Since the information for the appointment had already been completed, she went directly to a breast care center, where the exam and mammogram were completed without delay. Before leaving, she learned that a lump discovered during the breast exam had been confirmed by mammogram and sonography, and that she should have a biopsy to determine the nature of the finding. The radiographic results were available to her as digital images that could be e- mailed to her physician.
Because her health profile included hypertension, Ms. Waters needed to see her primary care physician to evaluate her hypertension control and discuss next steps before any further treatment that might include surgery could occur. Dr. Fine had an open scheduling system that allowed Ms. Waters to be seen the next morning.
Dr. Fine explained that although the breast lump was the first issue on the agenda, she was still concerned about Ms. Waters’ other health issues and her preventive care. The doctor therefore suggested that Ms. Waters return after blood work had been done, using the same online open scheduling system that had made it easy for her to be seen that day. Ms. Waters was reassured not only by the process, but also, as a newcomer to the city, by Dr. Fine’s concern about her well-being and role as her advocate, especially because of her concerns about the upcoming biopsy and what it might mean.
During the visit, Dr. Fine was able to give Ms. Waters profiles of surgeons, describe their interpersonal as well as technical skills, and coach her about questions or issues she might want to explore. Ms. Waters also had received information from the groups about their research efforts and the protocols they used. While she was in the primary care office, the staff arranged for her to have the biopsy done early that week by the surgeon she had selected. In a small room containing a computer, she consulted the CHESS database, a National Library of Medicine database for consumers, and Cancerfacts.com for informa- tion about treatment options, the meaning of test results, rates of recurrence, side effects, resources available to her locally, and the names of support groups. She forwarded to her own computer information that she wanted to read and follow up on later and took with her the addresses of several of the Web sites.
The biopsy showed an early-stage cancer. Ms. Waters was able to see her physician the next day to learn about and discuss her options for treatment. She was linked with other patients who had faced similar choices. She immediately began plans for treatment, which was completed without delay.
Throughout this process, Ms. Waters had information available to her in several ways. Although her style was to read as much as she could and ask when she was confused, she spoke with other women who were most comfortable accept- ing what their doctor recommended in terms of treatment, but sought resources for rehabilitation and advice about managing the side effects of their therapy.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
56 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
When she felt the need to do so, she spoke with or e-mailed Dr. Fine. At other times she spoke with the nurse practitioner who worked with Dr. Fine. Through- out this process, she could examine her own records, including test results. Ms. Waters had no paperwork to complete, no duplicative questions, and no trouble reaching professionals when she had concerns or questions.
REFERENCES
Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry. 1998. “Qual- ity First: Better Health Care for All Americans.” Online. Available at http://www. hcqualitycommission.gov/final/ [accessed Sept. 9, 2000].
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. 2000. “Now You Have a Diagnosis: What’s Next? Using Health Care Information to Help Make Treatment Decisions.” Online. Available at http:/ /www.ahrq.gov/consumer/diaginfo.htm [accessed Dec. 5, 2000].
American College of Physicians–American Society of Internal Medicine. 2000. “No Health Insur- ance? It’s Enough to Make You Sick – Scientific Research Linking the Lack of Health Cover- age to Poor Health.” Online. Available at http://www.acponline.org/uninsured/lack-contents.htm [accessed Dec. 6, 2000].
American Medical Association. E-8.12 Patient Information. Code of Medical Ethics. Current Opin- ions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs. Chicago, IL: American Medical Associa- tion, 2000.
Ayanian, John Z., Joel S. Weissman, Scott Chasan-Taber, and Arnold M. Epstein. Quality of Care by Race and Gender for Congestive Heart Failure and Pneumonia. Medical Care 37(12):1260–9, 1999.
Baker, David W., Martin F. Shapiro, and Claudia L. Schur. Health Insurance and Access to Care for Symptomatic Conditions. Arch Int Med 160(9):1269–74, 2000.
Balint, Enid. The Doctor, the Patient, and the Group: Balint Revisited. New York, NY: Routledge, 1993.
Barry, Michael J., Floyd J. Fowler, Jr., Albert G. Mulley, Jr., et al. Patient Reactions to a Program Designed to Facilitate Patient Participation in Treatment Decisions for Benign Prostatic Hyper- plasia. Medical Care 33(8):771–82, 1995.
Barry-Walker, Jean. The Impact of Systems Redesign on Staff, Patient, and Financial Outcomes. J Nurs Adm 30(2):77–89, 2000.
Beckman, Howard B. and Richard M. Frankel. The Effect of Physician Behavior on the Collection of Information. Ann Int Med 101:692–6, 1984.
Berwick, Donald M. Quality Comes Home. Ann Int Med 125(10):839–43, 1996. ———. Escape Fire. Plenary Address, Institute for Healthcare Improvement Annual Forum. 1999. Braddock, Clarence H. III, Kelly A. Edwards, Nicole M. Hasenberg, et al. Informed Decision Mak-
ing in Outpatient Practice: Time to Get Back to Basics. JAMA 282(24):2313–20, 1999. Brock, Dan W. The Ideal of Shared Decision Making Between Physicians and Patients. Kennedy Inst
Ethics J 1(1):28–47, 1991. Brown, M. The HealthMed Retrievers: Profiles of Consumers Using Online Health and Medical
Information. New York, NY: Cyber dialogue, 1998. Cited in Ferguson, Tom. Digital Doctor- ing Opportunities and Challenges in Electronic Patient-Physician Communication. JAMA 280:1361–2, 1998.
Brown, Sharon A. Studies of Educational Interventions and Outcomes in Diabetic Adults: A Meta- Analysis Revisited. Patient Education and Counseling 16:189–215, 1990.
Byock, Ira. Dying Well: The Prospect for Growth at the End of Life. New York, NY: Riverhead Books, 1998.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
IMPROVING THE 21st-CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 57
Canto, John G., Jeroan J. Allison, Catarina I. Kiefe, et al. Relation of Race and Sex to the Use of Reperfusion Therapy in Medicare Beneficiaries with Acute Myocardial Infarction. N EngI J Med 342(15):1094–100, 2000.
Cassell, Eric J. The Nature of Suffering: The Goals of Medicine. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Chambers, Chris. 2000. “Gallup News Service. Military Number One in Public Confidence, HMOs Last. Poll Releases, July 10, 2000.” Online. Available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/ pr000710.asp [accessed July 13, 2000].
Chassin, Mark R. Assessing Strategies for Quality Improvement. Health Affairs 16(3):151–61, 1997. Cleary, Paul D., Susan Edgman-Levitan, Marc Roberts, et al. Patients Evaluate their Hospital Care:
A National Survey. Health Affairs 10:254–67, 1991. Codman, Ernest A. The Product of a Hospital. Surgery, Gynecology and Obstetrics 18:491–6, 1914. Cohn, Lawrence H., Donna Rosborough, and John Fernandez. Reducing Costs and Length of Stay
and Improving Efficiency and Quality of Care in Cardiac Surgery. Ann Thorac Surg 64(6 Suppl):S58–60; discussion S80–2, 1997.
Crawshaw, Ralph, David E. Rogers, Edmund D. Pellegrino, et al. Patient–Physician Covenant. JAMA 273(19):1553, 1995.
Cunningham, Peter J., Joy M. Grossman, Robert F. St. Peter, and Cara S. Lesser. Managed Care and Physicians’ Provision of Charity Care. JAMA 282(12):1087–92, 1999.
Cyber Dialogue. 2000. “Cybercitizen Health.” Online. Available at http://www.cyberdialogue.com/ solutions/strategy/industry/cch.html [accessed Dec. 5, 2000].
Deber, Raisa B., Nancy Kraetschmer, and Jane Irvine. What Role Do Patients Wish to Play in Treatment Decision Making? Arch Int Med 156:1414–20, 1996.
DeBusk, Robert F., Nancy Houston Miller, H. Robert Superko, et al. A Case-Management System for Coronary Risk Factor Modification after Acute Myocardial Infarction. Ann Int Med 120:721–9, 1994.
Degner, Lesley F. and Catherine Aquino Russell. Preferences for Treatment Control Among Adults with Cancer. Research in Nursing & Health 11:367–74, 1988.
Emanuel, Ezekiel J. and Linda L. Emanuel. Four Models of the Physician–Patient Relationship. JAMA 267(16):2221–6, 1992.
Eysenbach, Gunther, Eun Ryoung Sa, and Thomas L. Diepgen. Shopping Around the Internet Today and Tomorrow: Towards the Millennium of Cybermedicine. BMJ 319:1294, 1999.
Fiscella, Kevin, Peter Franks, Marthe R. Gold, and Carolyn M. Clancy. Inequality in Quality. Ad- dressing Socioeconomic, Racial, and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care. JAMA 283(19):2579– 84, 2000.
Fishman, Charles. This is a Marketing Revolution. Fast Company 24:204, 1999. Franks, Peter, Carolyn M. Clancy, and Marthe R. Gold. Health Insurance and Mortality: Evidence
From a National Cohort. JAMA 270(6):737–41, 1993. Freeman, Harold P. and Richard Payne. Racial Injustice in Health Care. N EngI J Med 342(14):1045–
7, 2000. Fung, Victor and Joan Magretta. Fast, Global, and Entrepreneurial: Supply Chain Management,
Hong Kong style. An interview with Victor Fung. Harvard Business Review 76:102–14, 187, 1998.
Fuss, Mae Ann, Yvonne E. Bryan, Kim S. Hitchings, et al. Measuring Critical Care Redesign: Impact on Satisfaction and Quality. Nursing Administration Quarterly 23:1–14, 1998.
Georgia Tech Research Corporation. 1998. “GVU’s Tenth WWW User Survey.” Online. Available at http://www.cc.gatech.edu/gvu/user_surveys/survey-1998-10/graphs/use/q109.htm [accessed Dec. 5, 2000].
Gerteis, Margaret, Susan Edgman-Levitan, and Jennifer Daley. Through the Patient’s Eyes. Under- standing and Promoting Patient-centered Care. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1993.
Goldsmith, Jeff. A Radical Prescription for Hospitals. Harvard Business Review 67(3):104–11, 1989.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
58 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Grahame-Smith, David. Evidence Based Medicine: Socratic Dissent. BMJ 310:1126–7, 1995. Greenfield, Sheldon, Sherrie H. Kaplan, and John E. Ware, Jr. Expanding Patient Involvement in
Care: Effects on Patient Outcomes. Ann Int Med 102:520–8, 1985. Greenfield, Sheldon, Sherrie H. Kaplan, John E. Ware, Jr., et al. Patients’ Participation in Medical
Care: Effects on Blood Sugar Control and Quality of Life in Diabetes. J Gen Intern Med 3:448–57, 1988.
Guadagnoli, Edward and Patricia Ward. Patient Participation in Decision-making. Social Science & Medicine 47(3):329–39, 1998.
Haas, Jennifer S. and Lee Goldman. Acutely Injured Patients with Trauma in Massachusetts: Differ- ences in Care and Mortality, by Insurance Status. American Journal of Public Health 84(10):1605–8, 1994.
Hafner-Eaton, Chris. Physician Utilization Disparities Between the Uninsured and Insured. Com- parisons of the Chronically Ill, Acutely Ill, and Well Nonelderly Populations. JAMA 269(6):787–92, 1993.
Heskett, James L., W. Earl Sasser, Leonard A. Schlesinger, et al. The Service Profit Chain: How Leading Companies Link Profit and Grown to Loyalty, Satisfaction and Value. New York, NY: Free Press, 1997.
Ingham, Jane M. and Kathleen M. Foley. Pain and the Barriers to Its Relief at the End of Life: A Lesson for Improving End of Life Care. The Hospice Journal 13(1–2):89–100, 1998.
Institute of Medicine Medicare: A Strategy for Quality Assurance. Volume I. K. N. Lohr, ed. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1990.
——— America’s Health Care Safety Net. Intact but Endangered. Marion E. Lewin and Stuart Altman, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000a.
——— To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donaldson, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000b.
Kahn, Katherine L., Marjorie L. Pearson, Ellen R. Harrison, et al. Health Care for Black and Poor Hospitalized Medicare Patients. JAMA 271(15):1169–74, 1994.
Kain, Z. N., A. Fasulo, and S. Rimar. Establishment of a Pediatric Surgery Center: Increasing Anesthetic Efficiency. J Clin Anesth 11(7):540–4, 1999.
Kaplan, Sherrie H., Sheldon Greenfield, and John E. Ware, Jr. Assessing the Effects of Physician– Patient Interactions on Outcomes of Chronic Disease. Medical Care 27(3, Supplement):S110– 27, 1989.
Kasper, Judith D., Terence A. Giovannini, and Catherine Hoffman. Gaining and Losing Health Insurance: Strengthening the Evidence for Effects on Access to Care and Health Outcomes. Medical Care Research and Review 57(3):298–318, 2000.
Kenagy, John W., Donald M. Berwick, and Miles F. Shore. Service Quality in Health Care. JAMA 281(7):661–5, 1999.
Khan, Muhammad Asim. Patient–Doctor. Ann Int Med 133(3):233–5, 2000. Klein, Ben J., Richard T. Radecki, Michael P. Foris, et al. Bridging the Gap Between Science and
Practice in Managing Low Back Pain. A Comprehensive Spine Care System in a Health Main- tenance Organization Setting. Spine 25(6):738–40, 2000.
Langley, Gerald J., Kevin M. Nolan, Thomas W. Nolan, et al. The Improvement Guide. A Practical Approach to Enhancing Organizational Performance. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1996.
Lieber, Ronald B. Now Are You Satisfied? The 1998 American Customer Satisfaction Index. For- tune 137(3):161+Smart Managing, 1998.
Linden, Wolfgang and Laura Chambers. Clinical Effectiveness of Non-Drug Treatment for Hyper- tension: A Meta-Analysis. Annals of Behavioral Medicine 16 (1):35–45, 1994.
Luck, J. and J. W. Peabody. Improving the Public Sector: Can Reengineering Identify How to Boost Efficiency and Effectiveness at a VA Medical Center? Health Care Manage Rev 25(2):34–44, 2000.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
IMPROVING THE 21st-CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 59
Mahler, Heike I. M. and James A. Kulik. Health Care Involvement Preferences and Social-Emo- tional Recovery of Male Coronary-Artery-Bypass Patients. Health Psychology 10(6):399–408, 1991.
Maister, David H. The Psychology of Waiting Lines. Case No. 9-684-064. Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Publishing, 1984.
Mann, Joyce M., Glenn A. Melnick, Anil Bamezai, and Jack Zwanziger. A Profile of Uncompen- sated Hospital Care, 1983–1995. A Look at Who Provides the Most Uncompensated Care and What Effect Market Conditions Have on Care for the Poor. Health Affairs 16(4):223–32, 1997.
Mansell, Dorcas, Roy M. Poses, Lewis Kazis, and Corey A. Duefield. Clinical Factors That Influ- ence Patients’ Desire for Participation in Decisions About Illness. Arch Int Med 160:2991–6, 2000.
Mazur, Dennis J. and David H. Hickam. Patients’ Preferences for Risk Disclosure and Role in Decision Making for Invasive Medical Procedures. J Gen Intern Med 12:114–7, 1997.
Mullen, Patricia D., Elizabeth A. Laville, Andrea K. Biddle, and Kate Lorig. Efficacy of Psycho- educational Interventions on Pain, Depression, and Disability in People with Arthritis: A Meta-Analysis. Journal of Rheumatology 14(suppl 15):33–9, 1987.
National Public Radio Online. 2000. “Survey Shows Widespread Enthusiasm for High Technology. Poll by National Public Radio, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.” Online. Available at http://www.npr.org/programs/specials/ poll/technology [accessed Apr. 5, 2000].
Nolan, Thomas W., Marie W. Schall, Donald M. Berwick, et al. Reducing Delays and Waiting Times Throughout the Healthcare System. Boston, MA: Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 1996.
Orth, James E., Stiles William B., Scherwitz Larry, et al. Patient Exposition and Provider Explana- tion in Routine Interviews and Hypertensive Patients’ Blood Pressure Control. Health Psychol- ogy 6(1):29–42, 1987.
Palmer, Stephen and David J. Torgerson. Definition of Efficiency. BMJ 318:1136, 1999. Pearson, Marjorie L., Katherine L. Kahn, Ellen R. Harrison, et al. Differences in Quality of Care for
Hospitalized Elderly Men and Women. JAMA 268(14):1883–9, 1992. Philbin, E. F. and T. G. DiSalvo. Influence of Race and Gender on Care Process, Resource Use, and
Hospital-Based Outcomes in Congestive Heart Failure. American Journal of Cardiology 82(1): 76–81, 1998.
Picker Institute and American Hospital Association. Eye on Patients Report. 1996. Poplin, Caroline. Productivity in Primary Care: Work Smarter, Not Harder. Arch Int Med 160(9):
1231–3, 2000. Quill, Timothy E. Partnerships in Patient Care: A Contractual Approach. Ann Int Med 98(2):228–34,
1983. Reason, James. Human Error. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Roach, Stephen S. Services Under Siege—The Restructuring Imperative. Harvard Business Review
69:82–91, 1991. Ross, Nancy A., Michael C. Wolfson, James R. Dunn, et al. Relation Between Income Inequality and
Mortality in Canada and in the United States: Cross Sectional Assessment Using Census Data and Vital Statistics. BMJ 320:898–902, 2000.
Sackett, David L., William M. C. Rosenberg, J. A. Muir Gray, et al. Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t. BMJ 312:71–2, 1996.
Singer, Sara J. What’s Not to Like About HMOs: A Managed Care Maven Struggles with an HMO Runaround at a Vulnerable Time. Health Affairs 19(4):206–9, 2000.
Sirkin, Harold and George Stalk, Jr. Fix the Process, Not the Problem. Harvard Business Review 68:26–33, 1990.
Skillman, J. J., C. Paras, M. Rosen, et al. Improving Cost Efficiency on a Vascular Surgery Service. Am J Surg 179(3):197–200, 2000.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
60 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Stewart, Michael G., Edward J. Hillman, Donald T. Donovan, and Sarper H. Tanli. The Effects of a Practice Guideline on Endoscopic Sinus Surgery at an Academic Center. American Journal of Rhinology 11(2):161–5, 1997.
Stewart, Moira A. Effective Physician–Patient Communication and Health Outcomes: A Review. Can Med Assoc J 152(9):1423–33, 1995.
SUPPORT Principal Investigators. A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT). JAMA 274(20):1591–8, 1995.
Szasz, Thomas S. and Marc H. Hollender. The Basic Models of the Doctor-Patient Relationship. Arch Int Med 97:585–92, 1956.
Taylor, Humphrey. 1999. “Harris Poll #9: For the Second Year Running, There Has Been a Dra- matic Increase in Confidence in Leadership of Nation’s Major Institutions.” Online. Available at http://www.harrisblackintl.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=32 [accessed July 13, 2000].
The Gallup Organization. 2000. “Gallup Poll Topics: A–Z. Honesty/Ethics in Professions.” Online. Available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/indhnsty_ethcs.asp [accessed July 12, 2000].
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. 2000. “Kaiser/Harvard National Survey of Americans’ View on Managed Care.” Online. Available at http://www.kff.org/content/archive/1328/ mcaretopb.html [accessed July 6, 2000].
The Lancet. Evidence-Based Medicine, In Its Place (editorial). The Lancet 346:785, 1995. Tidikis, Frank and Leann Strasen. Patient-Focused Care Units Improve Services and Financial Out-
comes. Healthcare Financial Management 48:38–44, 1994. Tressolini, Carol P. and The Pew-Fetzer Task Force. Health Professional Education and Relation-
ship-Centered Care. San Francisco, CA: Pew Health Professions Commission, 1994. Tunick, P. A., S. Etkin, A. Horrocks, et al. Reengineering a cardiovascular surgery service. Joint
Commission Journal on Quality Improvement 23(4):203–16, 1997. van Biema, Michael and Bruce C. Greenwald. Managing Our Way to Higher Service-sector Produc-
tivity. Harvard Business Review 75:87–95, 1997. Veatch, Robert M. The Patient-Physician Relation. The Patient as Partner, Part 2. Indianapolis, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1991. Wagner, Edward H., Paul Barrett, Michael J. Barry, et al. The Effect of a Shared Decisionmaking
Program on Rates of Surgery for Beningn Prostatic Hyperplasia. Pilot Results. Medical Care 33(8):765–70, 1995.
Walczak, Steven. Redesigning the Medical Office for Improved Efficiency: An Object-Oriented Event-Driven Messaging System. J Med Syst 24(1):29–37, 2000.
Womack, James P., Daniel T Jones, and Daniel Roos. The Machine That Changed the World. New York, NY: Harpercollins, 1991.
Woolhandler, Steffie and David U. Himmelstein. Costs of Care and Administration at For-Profit and Other Hospitals in the United States. N EngI J Med 336(11):769–74, 1997. Erratum in N Engl J Med 337:1783, 1997.
Woolhandler, Steffie, David U. Himmelstein, and James P. Lewontin. Administrative Costs in U.S. Hospitals. N EngI J Med 329(6):400–3, 1993.
Yergan, J., A. B. Flood, J. P. LoGerfo, and P. Diehr. Relationship Between Patient Race and the Intensity of Hospital Services. Medical Care 25(7):592–603, 1987.
Zairi, M., J. Whymark, and M. Cooke. Best Practice Organisational Effectiveness in NHS Trusts. Allington NHS Trust Case Study. J Manag Med 13(4–5):298–307, 1999.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
61
3
Formulating New Rules to Redesign and Improve Care
Achieving the aims described in Chapter 2 will require profound changes, beginning with a new framework to guide those who undertake those changes. This chapter describes ten new rules to guide the transition to a health system that better meets patients’ needs.
Recommendation 4: Private and public purchasers, health care organizations, clinicians, and patients should work together to rede- sign health care processes in accordance with the following rules:
1. Care based on continuous healing relationships. Patients should receive care whenever they need it and in many forms, not just face-to-face visits. This rule implies that the health care system should be responsive at all times (24 hours a day, every day) and that access to care should be provided over the Internet, by tele- phone, and by other means in addition to face-to-face visits.
2. Customization based on patient needs and values. The system of care should be designed to meet the most common types of needs, but have the capability to respond to individual patient choices and preferences.
3. The patient as the source of control. Patients should be given the necessary information and the opportunity to exercise the de- gree of control they choose over health care decisions that affect them. The health system should be able to accommodate differences in patient preferences and encourage shared decision making.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
62 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
4. Shared knowledge and the free flow of information. Patients should have unfettered access to their own medical information and to clinical knowledge. Clinicians and patients should communicate effectively and share information.
5. Evidence-based decision making. Patients should receive care based on the best available scientific knowledge. Care should not vary illogically from clinician to clinician or from place to place.
6. Safety as a system property. Patients should be safe from injury caused by the care system. Reducing risk and ensuring safety require greater attention to systems that help prevent and mitigate errors.
7. The need for transparency. The health care system should make information available to patients and their families that al- lows them to make informed decisions when selecting a health plan, hospital, or clinical practice, or choosing among alternative treat- ments. This should include information describing the system’s per- formance on safety, evidence-based practice, and patient satisfac- tion.
8. Anticipation of needs. The health system should anticipate patient needs, rather than simply reacting to events.
9. Continuous decrease in waste. The health system should not waste resources or patient time.
10. Cooperation among clinicians. Clinicians and institutions should actively collaborate and communicate to ensure an appro- priate exchange of information and coordination of care.
These ten rules translate readily into a set of new patient expectations for health care (see Box 3-1). The committee believes these new expectations are consistent with and reinforce the steps that must be taken to achieve a significant improvement in quality. We also believe they are consistent with the kind of care most clinicians strive to provide each day, but without the support of well-de- signed care systems and absent an environment that nurtures innovation and excellence.
To create a new health care system that more closely matches the purpose and aims described in Chapter 2, it will be necessary, first, to examine old as- sumptions to understand why they have led to our current ineffective health care systems, and second, to consciously craft new operating assumptions embodied in the rules set forth above. As a guide in formulating its agenda for change, the committee used as a framework recent work in understanding complex adaptive systems (Kauffman, 1995; Stacey, 1996; Waldrop, 1992; Weick, 1995; Zimmer- man et al., 1998) and its application to what have become known as “learning organizations” (Senge, 1990) (see Appendix B for an introduction to this field).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE 63
BOX 3-1 What Patients Should Expect from Their Health Care
1. Beyond patient visits: You will have the care you need when you need it . . . whenever you need it. You will find help in many forms, not just in face-to-face visits. You will find help on the Internet, on the telephone, from many sources, by many routes, in the form you want it.
2. Individualization: You will be known and respected as an individual. Your choices and preferences will be sought and honored. The usual system of care will meet most of your needs. When your needs are special, the care will adapt to meet you on your own terms.
3. Control: The care system will take control only if and when you freely give permission.
4. Information: You can know what you wish to know, when you wish to know it. Your medical record is yours to keep, to read, and to understand. The rule is: “Nothing about you without you.”
5. Science: You will have care based on the best available scientific knowledge. The system promises you excellence as its standard. Your care will not vary illogically from doctor to doctor or from place to place. The system will promise you all the care that can help you, and will help you avoid care that cannot help you.
6. Safety: Errors in care will not harm you. You will be safe in the care system. 7. Transparency: Your care will be confidential, but the care system will not keep
secrets from you. You can know whatever you wish to know about the care that affects you and your loved ones.
8. Anticipation: Your care will anticipate your needs and will help you find the help you need. You will experience proactive help, not just reactions, to help you restore and maintain your health.
9. Value: Your care will not waste your time or money. You will benefit from constant innovations, which will increase the value of care to you.
10. Cooperation: Those who provide care will cooperate and coordinate their work fully with each other and with you. The walls between professions and institutions will crumble, so that your experiences will become seamless. You will never feel lost.
Following a brief review of this work, we describe in greater detail the ten rules outlined above.
HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS AS COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS
A health care system can be defined as a set of connected or interdependent parts or agents—including caregivers and patients—bound by a common purpose and acting on their knowledge. Health care is complex because of the great
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
64 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
number of interconnections within and among small care systems. For example, office practices and critical care units in hospitals are linked to other units (such as laboratories and emergency departments) and are often embedded in even larger “umbrella” organizations such as hospitals, health plans, and integrated delivery systems.
Health care systems are adaptive because unlike mechanical systems, they are composed of individuals—patients and clinicians who have the capacity to learn and change as a result of experience. Their actions in delivering health care are not always predictable, and tend to change both their local and larger environ- ments. The unpredictability of behavior in complex adaptive systems can be seen as contributing to huge variation in the delivery of health care. If such a system is to improve its performance—that is, improve the quality of care it provides— some of these actions need to be specified to the extent possible so they are predictable with a high level of reliability. Other actions are not specifiable because their relationship to outcomes is not well understood (see Figure B-1 in Appendix B).
The task for clinicians and managers, then, is not to treat all situations alike, but to understand when specification and standardization are appropriate and when they are not. The challenge of improving quality lies in understanding that in situations lacking high levels of certainty and clinical agreement, flexibility that results in variation based on patient needs is appropriate. The converse, overspecification, can result in too many handoffs, unnecessary steps, and a lack of the ability to customize.
On the other hand, variation should be minimal in situations in which the levels of certainty and clinical agreement are high and the science base is consis- tent. In health care today, many processes are underspecified and understandard- ized. Many irrational variations in practice cannot be justified as better meeting patients’ needs, and they represent lost opportunities for benefit.
A surprising finding from research on complex adaptive systems is that relatively simple rules can lead to complex, innovative system behavior. An understanding of complex adaptive behavior has been advanced by studies of biological systems, such as the flocking of birds or schooling of fish to avoid predators. These studies and computer models have confirmed that a few simple rules can guide complex behavior toward a goal. Such systems move toward their goals by having (1) a common purpose (in this case, avoiding predators); (2) internal motivation (surviving another day); and (3) some simple rules that guide individual behavior (keeping up with the group, moving toward the center of mass of the group, and avoiding collisions). Two more familiar examples of simple rules that have given rise to great variety and complexity in social systems are the Ten Commandments and the Bill of Rights, both of which have been interpreted flexibly but remain remarkably robust over time. Good rules describe how the system should function, but do not need to specify this functioning in detail. This insight can help inform the work of redesigning health care as well.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE 65
Two particular social systems functioning today illustrate the diverse, cre- ative, and complex actions that can arise from shared aims and general directions (what some writers in the field call a “good enough vision”). The first example is the Internet, which was built to share research data electronically using agreed- upon transfer protocols and conventions. Its explosive growth and adaptation since that time could not have been foreseen, controlled, or designed in detail because the complexity was too great, and individuals who might have wished to do so were unavoidably bound by their old experience. A few simple rules were enough for a functional complex system to emerge on its own.
A second example, the credit card company Visa International, illustrates the power of a few simple rules. As members of a for-profit corporation, banks that issue Visa cards agree to the graphic layout of the card and a common clearing- house that allows any card to be used anywhere worldwide. Its members are otherwise free to compete intensively on all other aspects of business. This design has resulted in huge growth worldwide despite different currencies, cus- toms, and banking systems.
The committee believes these important lessons about simple rules for com- plex adaptive systems can be applied to health care systems as well. In redesign- ing health care, the building blocks are the simple processes that make up the work of small systems of care and their interconnections.
Two preconditions are required to build a new health system that can achieve the aims set forth in Chapter 2: common purpose and simple rules. First, those in the system need a common purpose that builds on the good intentions and internal motivations of the people within the health care community. The statement of purpose and aims set forth in Chapter 2 lay out a common purpose for the health system.
Second, a new set of simple rules is needed to guide behavior in the 21st- century health care system. Identifying these rules is a key task in describing a health care system capable of dramatic changes in quality. To this end, the committee proposes a new set of simple rules to guide behavior in the 21st- century health care system. Each rule is contrasted with the current approach and associated assumption it supercedes. The descriptions of the approaches that are used today are not intended to be pejorative, but to capture common practices and contrast these with the committee’s vision for the future. The descriptions of today’s approaches should be easily recognizable by current clinicians and others in health care. The 21st-century rules we propose, on the other hand, will not be obvious to many of today’s clinicians, leaders, or health care consumers. Rather, they represent the precepts the committee believes should guide the behavior and underlie the actions of health care professionals and others as they design new care systems. The committee believes such a change in the ways that patients and their families, clinicians, and others in health care organizations interact with the health care system can produce major improvements in the quality of care. We believe these rules provide broad latitude for innovative thinking that can move
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
66 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
the health care system in the direction of being safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable.
Several cautions are in order, however. First, as is in the nature of complex adaptive systems, the rules are interrelated and are, therefore, intended to be applied as a set rather than viewed as a menu of choices. Second, to take any one rule to its extreme is likely to lead to a caricature of the intended performance. This is also true of the descriptions of today’s approaches, which do not capture many of the good practices currently found in health care. The rules and descrip- tions are strong, but common sense must apply to their interpretation. Third, the rules provide guidance applicable to most clinical interactions, but they do not cover every possible clinical decision. Fourth, as with the six aims, rules will occasionally conflict with one another. The responsibility of the clinician is to try to resolve or mediate these conflicts most appropriately for a given patient at a particular time. In some cases, however, conflict among rules will remain. Not- withstanding, tension among rules is a property of a complex adaptive system that can represent an area of creativity and growth.
The rules do not need to be highly specific; as in any complex adaptive system, the workforce will translate the rules into wise local actions. But they do have to be powerful and logically related to the aims. Further, they should feel like changes from prevailing approaches.
TEN SIMPLE RULES FOR THE 21ST-CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
Table 3-1 summarizes ten simple rules for the 21st-century health care sys- tem. In the following subsections, each rule is described and contrasted with the corresponding current approach. There is not in all cases a strong evidence base indicating that following a rule would result in better patient and population outcomes. Where such evidence is available, it is cited; where it is not, this is indicated, and the rationale for the committee’s espousal of the rule is provided.
Rule 1: Care Based on Continuous Healing Relationships
In the 21st-century health care system, care should be organized and paid for so that all types of health care interactions that improve information transfer and strengthen the healing relationship are encouraged. What patients want and need from their care is relief from suffering and uncertainty—knowledge about what is wrong, what is likely to happen, and what can be done to change or manage that outcome. Sometimes, such relief can be provided only in a face-to-face visit. But many needs can and should be met through other forms of care, all centered on a relationship with the clinician. The current system often requires a visit as the only legitimate format for care, and more important, as the only form of professional work that is compensated and measured in the health care world as
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE 67
“productivity.” Under this new rule, care would be available through many new modes of communication, and would be accessible to patients exactly when they need it, any day at any time, not just between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. weekdays. The Internet is likely to be a major platform for such communication.
Face-to-face visits will likely continue to be an important form of clinician and patient interaction; for many people, some direct human contact is critical to establish and maintain a strong healing relationship. Face-to-face visits also allow the clinician to physically examine the patient and observe the patient’s demeanor. But in many cases, face-to-face visits are not wanted by either clini- cian or patient, nor are they truly needed. Substituting other forms of care, such as electronic communication, for some face-to-face visits presents an opportunity not only to improve care—make it safer, more effective, patient-centered, and timely—but also to make it more efficient.
Through the judicious use of electronic and other forms of communication, it may also be possible to make more clinician time available to improve the quality of the face-to-face visits that do occur. In today’s health care system, necessary face-to-face visits are often delayed or rushed. There may be insufficient time during the visit to understand the psychological underpinnings of symptoms or their relationship to other ongoing health problems. And there may be little time to provide the patient and family with information about a health condition and
TABLE 3-1 Simple Rules for the 21st-Century Health Care System
Current Approach New Rule
Care is based primarily on visits. Care is based on continuous healing relationships.
Professional autonomy drives variability. Care is customized according to patient needs and values.
Professionals control care. The patient is the source of control.
Information is a record. Knowledge is shared and information flows freely.
Decision making is based on training and Decision making is evidence-based. experience.
Do no harm is an individual responsibility. Safety is a system property.
Secrecy is necessary. Transparency is necessary.
The system reacts to needs. Needs are anticipated.
Cost reduction is sought. Waste is continuously decreased.
Preference is given to professional roles over Cooperation among clinicians is a priority. the system.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
68 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
adequate emotional support for the pain, loneliness, and grief that may accom- pany the illness (Branch, 2000).
The new rule asserts that the product of health care is not visits or “encoun- ters” but healing relationships that allow patients to obtain the trustworthy infor- mation and support they need. A focus on the healing relationship emphasizes that this transfer of trustworthy information is the core product of health care, not something tacked onto a health care visit. In the 21st-century health care system, interaction should be understood in a fundamentally different way. Interaction is not the price of care; it is care (Berwick, 1999). A patient with a question represents an opportunity, not a burden. Time spent in building patients’ skills in self-care is not a way of shifting care; it is care. And access to information is not desirable because it allows care to be completed more quickly or supports com- pliance; it is care.
The new rule calls for continuous access (24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Three points are critical to understanding how this could be achieved by the 21st-century health care system. First, as suggested above, “access” does not necessarily mean face-to-face contact with a health care professional. Sec- ond, such access would not be a matter of extending the current system; rather, it would involve fundamental redesign, attention to human factors, and respect for the limits of human beings. Third, with information technology, continuous access is possible in health care just as it has become increasingly possible in so many other venues of American society through new forms of electronic commu- nication.
A continuous flow of interactions can span evenings, nights, and weekends if information systems make scheduling, access to medical records, e-mail, and the like available directly to patients. Such interactions would also be more individu- alized, patient-centered, and timely than much of today’s care. Much can be learned in this regard from the financial services industry. Just as banking cus- tomers have been freed from using teller lines that were open only from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on weekdays, information technology can liberate patient care from the confines of the face-to-face visit. The knowledge and technology now exist to provide many alternatives to visits, including self-care that is strongly sup- ported and unequivocally encouraged (Hart, 1995; Lorig et al., 1993, 1999; Von Korff et al., 1997; Wagner et al., 1996); group visits for patients with like needs, with or without professionals being involved (Beck et al., 1997; Kane and Sands, 1998); use of the Internet for access to scientific information and well-managed discussion groups; and e-mail communication between patients and clinicians (Jadad, 1999; Plsek, 1999; Simon et al., 2000).
We emphasize that this rule cannot be accommodated by the current system working three shifts, nor does it mean that ambulatory settings would never close. Hospitals today rely on back-up double shifts for nursing staff and very long hours for resident physicians, an approach that ignores a large body of work on the effects of fatigue on human performance (Galinsky et al., 1993; Pilcher and
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE 69
Huffcutt, 1996; Samkoff and Jacques, 1991; Sawin and Scerbo, 1995). Through the application of sound design concepts (discussed in Chapter 5), a continuous- access system can be safer and more effective (Espinosa and Nolan, 2000; Womack and Jones, 1996; Womack et al., 1991).
Box 3-2 presents a scenario that illustrates this new rule.
Rule 2: Customization Based on Patient Needs and Values
In the current health system, autonomy of clinical decision making is a fundamental value. However, a system that holds to this value fails to make the best use of scientific knowledge. Variations in approaches today often reflect different local and individual styles of practice and training that may or may not be consistent with the current evidence base. The new rule states that variations in treatment should be based primarily on differing patient needs and preferences.
Doctors and other clinicians stand to gain a great deal from this change in perspective. The volume of scientific medical literature today far outpaces the capacity of any clinician—whether medical, nursing, or other health profes- sional—to remain up to date. Weed (2000) has pointed out that to ask an indi- vidual practitioner to rely on his or her memory to store and retrieve all the facts relevant to patient care is like asking a travel agent to memorize airline schedules. Information technology can assist by combining probabilities and indicating the likelihood of benefit from myriad possible diagnostic and treatment approaches. The clinician’s brain should be used only when less expensive, creative, and resourceful capacities are insufficient.
BOX 3-2 New Rule 1: Care Based on Continuous Healing Relationships
Henry L. is 24 years old and newly identified as HIV positive. He has an apart- ment in an urban area. Henry e-mails Dr. Sosa at 6:45 a.m.: “I am worried that a rash that just appeared on my left wrist is related to HIV status and may be an early sign that my disease is getting worse. What do you think? I have checked out the computer database, talked to some friends in my HIV chat room, and am still confused.” Dr. Sosa replies at 8:00 a.m. that she would like to have a high-resolu- tion, two-way interactive video–computer visit with Henry at 8:50 a.m. to look at the rash and talk with him.
At 8:50, this video–computer visit takes place. Dr. Sosa examines the rash (using high-resolution optics) and compares it with other dermatological images stored in a database. She prescribes a topical ointment, offers reassurance, and asks Henry to contact her in 3 days for a progress report. She asks whether he has any other questions and whether he has given any more thought to joining a support group.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
70 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
The new rule implies that patient values drive variability. Patients differ because of variations in personality, nationality, and ethnicity, and in the beliefs and expectations associated with various religions and cultures (Carrese and Rhodes, 1995; Carrillo et al., 1999; Lavizzo-Mourey, 1996; Smith, 1998). Clini- cians can recognize such variations by sharing with patients the best available information about alternative ways to treat a given condition, what is known about the likely effects of treatment, and the uncertainty associated with different alternatives when applied to the patient’s individual circumstances. For example, patients with prostate disease of a given severity have a choice among prostatec- tomy, other treatments, and watchful waiting. Some men weigh the possibility of adverse side effects from surgery more heavily than others, and this influences their choice of treatment. Other men weigh the likelihood of recurrence more heavily. Similarly, menopausal women may choose whether to take hormone replacement therapy based in part on how concerned they are about its risks as compared with its benefits. For patients with angina, there may be choices among bypass surgery, angioplasty, or medication. All such choices may be influenced by the extent to which patients are bothered by symptoms, as well as their willingness to risk unfavorable outcomes. Both are highly individual judg- ments for which patients need good information to make a decision and support after informed choices have been made (Barry et al., 1995; Mort, 1996; Wagner et al., 1995).
Rule 3: The Patient as the Source of Control
In the current system, control over decisions, access, and information is typically in the hands of caregivers and is ceded to patients only when caregivers choose to do so. For example, patients are often required to obtain permission to see their own medical records, to have visitors, or to participate in treatment decisions. A common practice today is that control over the time, type, and location of care and the information needed to make such decisions resides with professionals. The corresponding new rule asserts that, except in unusual cir- cumstances, control should reside with patients.
This rule represents a significant change in how many clinicians would approach patient care, but it is very consistent with the direction in which the clinician–patient relationship has been evolving (Bastian and Richards, 1999; Harrison, 2000) and with widely understood concepts of informed consent (Tay- lor, 2000). In recent decades, there has been a steady transition from authoritar- ian models of care to approaches that encourage greater patient access to infor- mation and input into decision making, but this transition is far from complete (Emanuel and Emanuel, 1992). The latter approaches correspond to a growing scientific literature in which it is shown that informed patients participating ac- tively in decisions about their own care appear to have better outcomes, lower costs, and higher functional status than those held to more passive roles (Gifford
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE 71
et al., 1998; Lorig et al., 1993, 1999; Superio-Cabuslay et al., 1996; Von Korff et al., 1998). Of 21 studies published between 1983 and 1993 that measured whether the quality of physician–patient communication affected patient health outcomes for conditions such as breast cancer, diabetes, peptic ulcer disease, hypertension, and headaches, 16 reported positive outcomes, 4 reported positive (but not sig- nificant) results, and 1 was inconclusive (Stewart, 1995).
A recent review of the literature (Guadagnoli and Ward, 1998) reveals that most patients want to be involved in treatment decisions and to know about available alternatives. In a study of more than 400 elderly veterans offered an invasive medical intervention (Mazur and Hickam, 1997), almost all (93.4 per- cent) wanted their physician to provide them with information about risks. In examining risk disclosure, Degner and Russell (1988) found in a small study of cancer patients that virtually all preferred a “shared control model.” Similarly, among 300 patients presented with vignettes about decision making, the large majority wanted to be involved and supported in the decision-making process (Deber et al., 1996). Yet, physicians typically underestimate the extent to which patients want information about their care (Strull et al., 1984). Even today, patients rarely receive adequate information for informed decision making (Brad- dock et al., 1999), despite strong legal underpinnings and professional acknowl- edgment of its importance.
This new rule is not intended to imply, however, that patients should be forced to share decision making, only that they should be able to exercise the degree of control they wish. Indeed, patients vary in the extent to which they want to be involved in decision making. Arora and McHorney (2000) found that 69 percent of patients with chronic disease (hypertension, diabetes, myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, and depression) preferred to delegate their medical decisions to their physicians. These and other researchers have found that the likelihood of preferring an active role increases with level of education, but decreases significantly with age (Stiggelbout and Kiebert, 1997). Evidence indicates further that patient preferences may be related to the nature of the decisions to be made, the type of illness, and its severity (Mansell et al., 2000). A 1989 study revealed, for example, that interest in shared decision making de- clined with increased severity of illness (Ende et al., 1989).
Work by Kaplan and others on patient empowerment (Greenfield et al., 1985, 1988; Kaplan et al., 1989) has demonstrated that it takes time for patients to be included as partners and that in many cases they need to be coached to assume such a role. In settings where this has occurred, however, research has demon- strated the value of the approach. Kaplan et al. (1989) found that patients who had been coached to ask questions during office visits reported fewer functional limitations and had better control of blood sugar and blood pressure than did patients in the control group. Investigators using interactive video to help pa- tients with decision making reported that in a prospective cohort study, patients rated the program very positively in helping them make informed choices about
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
72 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
surgical intervention for benign prostatic hypertrophy (Barry et al., 1995; Wagner et al., 1995).
Accomplishing the goal of shared decision making does not necessarily require a high-technology approach. Virginia Mason Medical Center in Seattle, Washington, for example, provides patients with a short form called “Doc Talk” to help them prepare for a visit to their doctor. By reviewing the list of suggested topics before the visit and making notes for themselves, patients are encouraged to ensure that their concerns are addressed (Doc Talk, 1999). A group of Austra- lian investigators used a similar approach with cancer patients and concluded that a question prompt sheet is a simple, inexpensive, and effective means of promot- ing the asking of questions by cancer patients (Brown et al., 1999).
As noted earlier, patients are increasingly able to use the Internet and other interactive technologies to help them make informed decisions about their medi- cal treatment. Examples of such information include (1) patients’ access to their own health records, including laboratory results and diagnostic images; (2) inter- active systems for shared decision making (Barry et al., 1995; Wagner et al., 1995) to help patients understand treatment options and the level of medical uncertainty of each, and integrate their own lifestyles and personal beliefs into their decision making; and (3) direct access by patients to information about clinical trials (such as the National Cancer Institute’s PDQ database of clinical trials), the clinical research literature, and well-prepared syntheses.
Rule 4: Shared Knowledge and the Free Flow of Information
Transfer of information—both scientific and personal—is a key form of care. In the 21st-century health care system, patients should have access to both types of information without restriction, delay, or the need for anyone else’s permission.
Under the current approach, in which the patient visit is the organizing principle, the record is an artifact of that visit. Information is treated as retrospec- tive, archival, passive, and inert. It is used as a record of what has happened or as a tool to defend or prosecute a lawsuit. There is often some barrier to knowledge transfer—whether requiring that the patient call for an appointment or obtain permission—that increases cost without adding value and fails to meet the patient’s need.
The new rule represents a change in this view of the nature of health care information. It treats information as interactive, real-time, and prospective, and holds that information is key to the patient–clinician relationship. This rule is related to Rule 1, which states that care should be understood as a healing rela- tionship that rests primarily on the transfer of knowledge through face-to-face visits and various forms of electronic communication. Information is not inert; rather the transfer of knowledge is care. Patients’ unrestricted access to their health-related information is a key implication of Rule 4. Ensuring such access
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE 73
can help make information part of a healing relationship. Patients should also be able to see an audit log, that is, a list of all others who have seen their identifiable data.
Several debates have revolved around issues related to patient access to health information. The question of who owns that information remains a diffi- cult and unsettled question (Institute of Medicine, 1994; Waller and Alcantara, 1998). The clinician or organization (such as a hospital) that creates the record has an obligation to protect it from, for example, destruction, tampering, or disclosure. In many states, patients have the right to access or obtain copies of their records, and they sometimes have the right to correct the information. Gen- erally, however, legislation and practice severely limit the conditions (and some- times impose very high costs for violating those limits) under which these rights are granted. Even where patients have a clear legal right to access their records, the reluctance of some health care organizations and practices may make access- ing or obtaining copies of one’s records very difficult in reality.
Although patients should have unfettered access to their records and should be able to add comments regarding, for example, their accuracy, the committee believes patients should not be allowed to alter, block access to, or delete infor- mation entered in their records by clinicians or others. Medical records are legal as well as patient-care documents. Ensuring that health information is accurate and complete is critical to its use for patient care, research and quality improve- ment, and legal and financial accountability.
Beyond the generally acknowledged right of a patient to know his or her diagnosis and treatment, patients are sometimes given a summary of their care to help them in their self-care. In the current system, patients who request access to their personal medical information are generally given paper copies of either abbreviated or complete versions of their records (Chambers, 1998; Fischbach et al., 1980; Giglio et al., 1978; Shenkin and Warner, 1973; Weed, 1981). Medical records tend to be large, cumbersome, filled with medical jargon, poorly orga- nized, dispersed among many record holders, incomplete, inaccurate, and/or out of date. Paper records make tracking and understanding longitudinal data and their relationship to various interventions quite difficult (Weed, 1991). Informa- tion about the results of care, patient preferences, and patients’ own contributions to their health and health care is sparse or nonexistent.
With the advent of Internet-based applications, it is now possible for medical records to be held physically or digitally in a variety of locations, and to be accessed in whole or in part by the patient or anyone to whom he or she grants permission for purposes of reading only or for reading and entering information (Eysenbach, 2000; Larkin, 1999). It is also possible to store patient records on “smart” cards (Schoenfelt, 1998)—wallet-sized cards with embedded chips that can be accessed with a card reader. Other applications include storage of digital images (such as x-rays) on CD-ROM for patients to keep (Mehta et al., 1999).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
74 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Relatively little is known about patients’ preferences and reactions with regard to having access to their records, but studies have generally shown posi- tive results. Michael and Bordley (1982) found that a majority of patients they surveyed desired access to their medical records. Other studies have revealed that patients appreciate being given all details or a summary of their care (Bronson et al., 1986; Giglio et al., 1978; Gittens, 1986). For example, a pilot study of shared records for people with mental illness revealed enthusiastic acceptance by both patients and health staff (Essex et al., 1990).
Little is known about the extent to which patients understand the information in their medical records. In one study, chronically ill patients who had access to their records reported understanding about half or more of the information they contained (Gittens, 1986). In a study of stroke patients, those having access to their complete medical record reported understanding more about their condition than did control patients who had been given only relevant descriptive medical information (Banet and Felchlia, 1997).
There is some evidence indicating that giving patients greater access to clinical information and their own personal health information improves the pro- cess of care and health outcomes:
• Smokers who had access to their medical records were more likely to state that smoking was a major health concern than were control patients who did not have such access. After 6 months, significantly more patients in the former group had quit smoking (65 percent) compared with those in the latter (29 percent) (Bronson and O’Meara, 1986).
• College students who were given information from their medical record were more likely than controls to increase their adherence to treatment advice (Giglio et al., 1978).
• Elderly patients whose medical records were shared with them were more likely to know their medical problems and treatments (although not more likely to adhere to medication regimens) (Bronson et al., 1986).
• In Australia, Liaw et al. (1998) gave a small set of patients with chronic problems (29 experimental and 22 controls) a computer-generated health record. They found that doing so was practical and well received, and led to positive trends in improved awareness of issues, health promotion, and disease manage- ment.
• Patients with chronic medical conditions who received copies of the progress notes in their medical records reported significant increases in overall physical function and overall health status, greater satisfaction with their care, and more interest in seeing their medical records than patients in a control group who did not receive this information (Maly et al., 1999).
• In a randomized controlled trial of women attending an antenatal clinic, those given their entire record (experimental group) as opposed to a summary
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE 75
card (control group) were more likely to report feeling “in control” during preg- nancy, less likely to report feeling anxious and helpless, and more likely to have information on their records explained to them (Homer et al., 1999).
One exception to the above findings is a recent randomized control trial of 650 cancer patients. In that study, no differences in outcomes (i.e., global health status, emotional functioning, cognitive functioning, or satisfaction) were found between the experimental group, which received a supplementary record de- signed to improve communication, and the control group (Drury et al., 2000).
Patients’ full access to their records could, of course, have unwanted effects unless new ways to help them use and learn from the information are devised. Patients may misunderstand or be frightened by such information, as a clinician’s being unsure of a diagnosis and wanting to rule out a serious condition. Clini- cians’ concerns about patients seeing their records could also result in the prepa- ration of “shadow records” for the clinician’s own use or in omission of informa- tion from the record, thus compromising care by others who are unaware of the omitted information. It is unclear, moreover, whether patient access to medical records would increase or decrease liability exposure. These and other unin- tended consequences deserve serious consideration. The committee believes, however, that such circumstances will be the exception rather than the rule (Golodetz et al., 1976) and are not sufficient reason to impede all patients’ access to their records. The potential benefits of such access are illustrated in Box 3-3, which describes a practice that uses patients’ access to their health information in an interactive context.
BOX 3-3 Rule 4: Shared Knowledge and the Free Flow of Information
Mary Chao is a nurse practitioner who works with patients newly diagnosed with diabetes. She explains, “People learn by experience—the more ways they experience something, the better they will learn and retain it. I give each new patient a diary. I tell them, ‘Don’t worry about anything. Just write down your meals and blood sugars. At the next visit we will look at it.’ Pretty soon they are drawing connections between what they are eating and their blood sugars.”
Mary relates that even patients who have little formal education are active par- ticipants. One patient describes his self-management as being like an athlete in training. Most of her elderly patients who have had trouble keeping their blood sugar under control for decades now successfully monitor and manage their dia- betes using their own clinical information, which they generate routinely and is available to them and their clinician in graph, chart, and other forms at the patients’ own Web sites.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
76 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Rule 5: Evidence-Based Decision Making
In today’s health system, it is widely believed that the best care for individu- als is based on the training and experience of professionals. The new rule, on the other hand, could be stated: The best care results from the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence and knowledge of patient values by well-trained, experienced clinicians.
At their best, health care services match knowledge and need. When care does not match knowledge, it may fail to help—either by omission (failing to do what would help) or by waste (doing what cannot help). The health system today is too tolerant of mismatches between knowledge and action; that is, it is too accepting of both omission and waste. As a result, care is too often unreliable, advice and answers are inconsistent, and clinical practice varies without well- founded rationale. The new rule calls for standardization around best practices as appropriate for a given patient or the subpopulation to which a patient belongs. Such evidence-based decision making can free clinicians to make choices that science cannot guide—decisions based on relationship; observation; and the other senses, including touch.
What the new rule calls for is the use of systematically acquired knowledge in all its forms for decision making. The rule does not require that all decisions be based on the results of randomized controlled trials because such results are not always available and because other forms of knowledge exist, such as that derived from epidemiological and population-based data. Neither does the new rule discount clinician experience or the integration of information about a pa- tient’s special circumstances. Rather, it argues that all of these sources of knowl- edge are relevant and valuable when choosing how to apply evidence. The latter process involves four steps that require training and experience (with organiza- tional and other supports): (1) formulation of a clear clinical question, (2) search for the relevant information from the best possible sources, (3) evaluation of the evidence for its validity and usefulness, and (4) implementation of those findings (Davidoff, 1999).
An emphasis on the use of systematically acquired knowledge derives from a field of study known as evidence-based medicine or, more broadly, evidence- based practice, which evolved during the last decade (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992; Muir Gray, 1997; Risdale, 1995; Sackett et al., 2000). The approach often involves systematic examinations of clinical questions that includes a comprehensive review of the literature, standard methods of present- ing data, and emphasis on the validity of the research methods. Individual studies are assessed and scored on the basis of their design and execution, including, for example, the selection of patients, the size of the study, and how confounding variables were accounted for (Cook et al., 1997; Lohr and Carey, 1999). Evi- dence-based practice is described in greater detail in Chapter 6.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE 77
The availability of systematic reviews and the resulting clinical guidelines for practicing clinicians (O’Connor et al., 1999) is an essential adjunct to prac- tice. A growing body of evidence demonstrates that the use of clinical practice guidelines with other supportive tools, such as reminder systems, can improve patient care (Cabana et al., 1999; East et al., 1999; Morris, 1993; Thomsen et al., 1994; Wells et al., 2000). Despite the best of intentions, clinicians cannot be expected to process unaided all the details, strengths, and limitations of scientific evidence under normal conditions of practice in which the number of variables to be considered is great, but resources, including time, are severely limited (Weed, 1999).
The commitment to standardizing to excellence—using the best available information—does not begin with a slavish adherence to simplistic practice guide- lines. With today’s information systems, protocols can incorporate variations based on the individual patient’s condition, such as kidney function and the presence of other chronic problems. An example is adult respiratory distress symptom, an extremely serious condition that in the late 1970s resulted in death for nearly 90 percent of intensive care unit (ICU) patients for whom it was diagnosed. A group of investigators at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City was able to generate computer-generated guidelines for concurrent management of the many complex physiological parameters involved in treating this illness, which had resulted in several thousand separate instructions (Thomsen et al., 1994). The new system of computer-generated protocols adapted continuously to the patient’s condition. ICU staff were required to take actions in response to the guidelines, accepting or rejecting the instructions on the basis of their judgment. With use, the instructions become more accurate, and the ICU staff came to trust them more. As a result, in 1991 the ICU reported an unprecedented survival rate for the disease of 45 percent (Suchyta et al., 1991). More recently, other inves- tigators have reported using such clinical algorithms to achieve survival rates as high as 75 percent (East et al., 1999; Lewandowski et al., 1997).
A commitment to evidence-based practice may appear to conflict with Rule 3, according to which patient values should drive variability. A simplistic way of stating the tension between the two is: The patient is always right, but sometimes the doctor knows best. When a patient seeks inappropriate health care services, the challenge for clinicians is to find ways of reducing this conflict and, to the extent possible, resolving it, guided always by efforts to understand and respond to patient needs. If a conflict cannot be resolved through counseling, the clinician should refuse to provide nonbeneficial services. If a patient decides not to accept services that are likely be beneficial, the clinician needs to ensure that the patient understands the implications of his or her choice and support the patient in that choice.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
78 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Rule 6: Safety as a System Property
Patients are injured frequently because of poor system designs. For this reason, a means of accountability that relies on blaming individuals stands little or no chance of achieving significant improvements. The health care system must be able to deliver appropriate care, reliably and without error. The assump- tion underlying the current rule can be stated as: Careful and competent profes- sionals do not, or should not, make errors. If errors occur, the current rule assumes that the problem must be due to a lack of competence or carelessness. It would follow that the best response to error would be to ensure that individuals are trained better, are alerted to the need to attend to safety and follow rules, are motivated to be careful, and are punished if they err.
The assumption underlying the new rule is quite different. This rule might be stated as: Threats to patient safety are the end result of complex causes such as faulty equipment; system design; and the interplay of human factors, including fatigue, limitations on memory, and distraction. The way to improve safety is to learn about causes of error and use this knowledge to design systems of care so as to prevent error when possible, to make visible those errors that do occur (so they can be intercepted), and to mitigate the harm done when an error does reach the patient. Put simply, in the new health care system, procedures, job designs, equipment, communication, and information technology should be configured to respect human factors and to make errors less common and less harmful when they do occur.
Health care is composed of a large set of interacting systems—paramedic, emergency, ambulatory, inpatient, and home health care; testing and imaging laboratories; pharmacies; and so forth—that are connected in loosely coupled but intricate networks of individuals, teams, procedures, regulations, communica- tions, equipment, and devices. These systems function within such diverse and diffuse management, accountability, and information structures that the overall term health system is today a misnomer. Further, despite contractual relation- ships with insurers, many physicians are so tenuously connected to organizations that they do not view themselves as part of a system of care (Freidson, 1975; Pauly, 1980). In these and many other ways, the distinct cultures of medicine (and other health professions) add to its idiosyncrasy among high-risk industries. Nevertheless, experience in other high-risk industries has provided well-under- stood methods for improving safety.
Patient safety emerges from safe designs used in systems that incorporate an understanding of human factors. Such an approach can improve performance, prevent harm when error does occur, help systems recover from error, and miti- gate further harm. Knowledge about human factors must be applied in designing tasks, processes, equipment, rules, and environments. Safety also requires lead- ership—by governing boards and corporate executives and by leaders of clinical
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE 79
groups embedded in larger organizations. To create safety systems requires that clinical leaders and managers use and continually contribute to the best knowl- edge about safe designs for tasks, equipment, processes, rules, and environments.
The biggest challenge to moving toward a safer health system is changing the culture from one of blaming individuals for errors to one in which errors are treated not as personal failures, but as opportunities to improve the system and prevent harm. One of the most important barriers to increasing patient safety is a lack of awareness of the extent to which errors occur daily in all health care settings and organizations. In today’s health systems, the vast majority of errors are not reported because personnel fear they will be punished.
The committee’s earlier report (Institute of Medicine, 2000) recommends that health care organizations and the professionals affiliated with them make continually improved patient safety a declared and serious aim by establishing patient safety programs with a defined executive responsibility. That report further recommends that patient safety programs: (1) provide strong, clear, and visible attention to safety; (2) implement nonpunitive systems for reporting and analyzing errors within their organizations; (3) incorporate well-understood safety principles, such as standardizing and simplifying equipment, supplies, and pro- cesses; and (4) establish interdisciplinary team training programs, such as those involving simulation, that incorporate training designed to improve and maintain skills, as well as improve communication among team members. Chapter 5 of this report examines some design principles that organizations can apply to im- prove safety.
Rule 7: Need for Transparency
The health care system should be uncompromising in its defense of patient confidentiality, a matter of great national concern. But the pursuit of confidenti- ality is not a reason for hiding the system’s performance from those who depend on the system for care. This new rule calls for health systems to be accountable to the public; to do their work openly; to make their results known to the public and professionals alike; and to build trust through disclosure, even of the sys- tems’ own problems.
At times, today’s health care system appears to put a premium on secrecy. Although it is critical to safeguard patient confidentiality, poorly designed poli- cies and procedures that limit the sharing of information may be perceived by patients as a series of closed doors, locked cabinets, and private meetings. In the current system, concern about the burden of reporting and oversight, litigation, and blame has generated conflict and mistrust and cast transparency in its most negative light, resulting in resistance to disclosure of all kinds.
In the future health care system, the rule should be: Have no secrets. Make all information flow freely so that anyone involved in the system, including pa- tients and families, can make the most informed choices and know at any time
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
80 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
whatever facts may be relevant to a patient’s decision making. This new rule is expected to supplement trust in the good training and intentions of health care professionals with trust based on good information and well-designed systems of care.
Although changes in the tort system may be desirable, improving the health care system cannot wait for such change to occur. Some organizations have successfully implemented programs of increased transparency despite the liabil- ity risk (Peterkin, 1990). Indeed, some evidence shows that open disclosure of errors may decrease the likelihood of malpractice loss (Kraman and Hamm, 1999; Pietro et al., 2000; Witman et al., 1990; Wu, 1999).
In the future health care system envisioned by the committee, transparency is the route to accountability—the identification of who is responsible both finan- cially and clinically for the actions of health care organizations and individuals. The committee believes trust will improve in a health care system that poses few barriers to the flow of information, including aggregate (non-personally identifi- able) research data and information about the quality of care. A health care system that operates under a rule of transparency will be more patient-centered and safer because patients will be able to recognize outdated and wrong informa- tion and to share in information that affects their care, such as the results of laboratory tests, medications being taken, and the correct doses.
Rule 8: Anticipation of Needs
Under the current approach, health care resources are marshaled when they are needed. The system works largely in a reactive mode, awaiting complications and underinvesting in prevention. The new system would not wait for trouble. It would use patient registries to track patients and draw them into care. It would use predictive models to anticipate demand and allocate its resources according to those predictions, thereby smoothing workflow. The corresponding 21st- century rule would state: Organize health care to predict and anticipate needs based on knowledge of patients, local conditions, and a thorough knowledge of the natural history of illness. A system that adopted this new rule would be more patient-centered and more effective. It would make and use better predictions about the flow of need and demand, allowing for anticipation of the needs of both individuals and the patient population at risk. Box 3-4 illustrates the new rule and the current approach.
Scenarios similar to the current approach described in Box 3-4 are common today. Crises for older persons occur because anticipatory management of mul- tiple problems is rare. When care hinges on scheduled office visits or emergency room visits, anticipatory management that can prevent acute hospitalization is difficult. Under the new rule, anticipation could include more and better linkages among care teams, linkages among health systems and community resources, and more frequent communication with patients through telephone consultations and
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE 81
community services. Notable efforts to adopt this approach in the United States include the innovative On Lok Senior Health Services, first organized in San Francisco’s Chinatown, and its replications in the Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) (Eng et al., 1997; Rich, 1999). Such programs of care for frail elderly persons in the community have brought together resources likely to be needed by many elderly patients. Other countries, including the United King- dom and Finland, have also focused on such linkages designed to anticipate patient needs (The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, 1999).
Rule 9: Waste Continuously Decreased
The current system tries to conserve resources through restrictions and bud- get limits, withholding services and creating queues to drive costs down. This is
BOX 3-4 Rule 8: Anticipation of Needs
Current Approach: React to Needs Pearl Clayton is 86 years old. She has been widowed for 5 years and lives
alone. She has recently shown signs of forgetfulness and has had two recent falls, one of which resulted in a fractured wrist. Her adult daughter and son-in-law would like her to go to a doctor and get a thorough evaluation, particularly of her forget- fulness. They procrastinate and do not get around to taking her. It is difficult to get any advice over the telephone. Finally, Pearl falls, fractures her hip, and is hospi- talized. Her fall is related to a combination of over-the-counter sleeping pills and the use of alcohol, begun during a prolonged period of grief after she became widowed.
During her hospitalization, she suffers hypertension and grand mal seizures during which she aspirates; she develops severe pneumonia and spends 2 weeks intubated in an intensive care unit. At the end of this time, her broken hip finally can be repaired, but she has become so frail and confused that she cannot be transferred home and must go to a nursing home. During her time at the nursing home, her family, caregivers, and those in the hospital where she has periodic acute admissions have no guidance about the use of life-sustaining measures.
New Rule: Anticipation of Needs Under the new rule, anticipatory management results in a mental status evalu-
ation and home visits that make it possible to identify Pearl’s problems in time to prevent the fall that would have led to her hip fracture. Even if the hip fracture had not been completely prevented, clinicians would have had available to them a complete and accurate medical history during Pearl’s hospitalization so that those caring for her would have known to anticipate withdrawal symptoms from her med- ication and alcohol use. She would have received appropriate medical manage- ment, avoided aspiration and intubation, and recovered sufficiently to return to her own home.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
82 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
a destructive, short-term approach. A more modern approach would build on a better understanding of the nature of waste itself, identifying expenditures of all types that add no value—unused supplies, rework and redundancy, unhelpful inspection, lost ideas, and unused information—and systematically eliminating that waste. The United States spends over 50 percent more per person on health care than many other Western nations. Yet it does not appear that these vast expenditures are buying reliable levels of quality. The care in some places for some conditions is superb, but such is not the case everywhere, for all people, all the time.
Many of the problems with the current health care system are related to the belief that reducing expenditures alone will increase value. The current rule appears to be: The value of our health care investment is increased by cost reductions, often by rationing services. As a result, systems attempt to continue what they are doing with fewer resources, for example, by stretching staff over larger and larger numbers of tasks and patients. Other efforts to reduce costs have led to arbitrary limits on services such as lengths of stay in a hospital; the kinds of settings that are allowed for care; and the numbers of encounters, such as home health visits.
The committee believes this is not the route to improved value. The new rule states that increased value will not be derived by stressing the current system, that is, by asking people to work harder, faster, and longer, and while doing so, not to make (or admit to) any errors. Rather, increased value will result from systemati- cally developed strategies that focus on the aims of the health care system out- lined in Chapter 2—safety, effectiveness, patient-centeredness, timeliness, effi- ciency, and equity—and reduce all forms of waste by eliminating activities or resources that do not add value (Dresser, 1997; Langley et al., 1996; Saphir, 1999). Waste has been described as comprising seven types: (1) overuse of services (see Appendix A); (2) waiting (for example, for a laboratory test to be performed or for its results); (3) transportation (for example, requiring a patient to go to another site or floor for care); (4) processing (more steps than are needed to accomplish results); (5) stock (using more materials than are needed, maintaining unused materials in inventory or unused workforce skills); (6) motion (wasting both energy and time); and (7) defects in production. The latter type of waste has its counterpart in health care delivery in the form of mistakes in execution or lack of proficiency in performing a procedure such that the patient does not receive full benefit.
Many smart cost reductions are achievable as the side effects of improving the process of care. Health care systems need to build on the experience of other industries and the reports that have begun to appear in the literature from groups able to demonstrate gains in efficiency and quality of care and reduced waste and costs (Barry-Walker, 2000; Cohn et al., 1997; Fuss et al., 1998; Stewart et al., 1997; Tidikis and Strasen, 1994; Tunick et al., 1997).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE 83
The committee does not intend to imply that all types of quality improve- ment efforts will result in reduced waste or cost or that only cost-reducing quality improvement efforts should be undertaken. Underuse of health services as a result of barriers to access (e.g., lack of insurance) or provision of care inconsis- tent with the evidence base (e.g., failure to prescribe beta blockers when indicated following an acute myocardial infarction) is also a serious quality problem that must be addressed by the 21st-century health system.
Rule 10: Cooperation Among Clinicians
In the current system, care is taken to protect professional prerogatives and separate roles. The current system shows too little cooperation and teamwork. Instead, each discipline and type of organization tends to defend its authority at the expense of the total system’s function—a problem known as suboptimization. Patients suffer through lost continuity, redundancy, excess costs, and miscommu- nication. Patients and families commonly report that caregivers appear not to coordinate their work, or even to know what others are doing. Suboptimization is seen, for example, in operating rooms that must maintain multiple different surgi- cal tray setups for different doctors performing the same procedure. Each doctor gets what he or she wants, but at the cost of introducing enormous complexity and possible error into the system. In the new system, people will understand the advantage of high levels of cooperation, coordination, and standardization to guarantee excellence, continuity, and reliability.
The current approach focuses on role definition, certification and licensure, or doing one’s own work as the top priority, rather than helping others do their work. It is the basis of professional self-esteem and status and a criterion of competence. That approach also, however, makes defined roles preeminent rather than meeting patients’ needs. It lets the role “trump” the system, and the system suffers as a consequence.
Under the new rule, cooperation in patient care is more important than pro- fessional prerogatives and roles. The new rule emphasizes a focus on good communication among members of a team, using all the expertise and knowledge of team members and, where appropriate, sensibly extending roles to meet pa- tients’ needs (Bulger, 2000). This topic is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
REFERENCES
Arora, Neeraj K. and Colleen A. McHorney. Patient Preferences for Medical Decision Making: Who Really Wants to Participate? Medical Care 38(3):325–41, 2000.
Banet, Gerald A. and Mark A. Felchlia. The Potential Utility of a Shared Medical Record in A “First- Time” Stroke Population. Journal of Vascular Nursing 15(1):29–33, 1997.
Barry, Michael J., Floyd J. Fowler, Jr., Albert G. Mulley, Jr., et al. Patient Reactions to a Program Designed to Facilitate Patient Participation in Treatment Decisions for Benign Prostatic Hyper- plasia. Medical Care 33(8):771–82, 1995.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
84 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Barry-Walker, Jean. The Impact of Systems Redesign on Staff, Patient, and Financial Outcomes. J Nurs Adm 30(2):77–89, 2000.
Bastian, Hilda and Tessa Richards. Australia’s Consumer Champion. BMJ 319:730, 1999. Beck, Arne, John Scott, Patrick Williams, et al. A Randomized Trial of Group Outpatient Visits for
Chronically Ill Older HMO Members: The Cooperative Health Care Clinic. J Am Geriatr Soc 45:543–9, 1997.
Berwick, Donald M. Escape Fire. Plenary Address, Institute for Healthcare Improvement Annual Forum. 1999.
Braddock, Clarence H. III, Kelly A. Edwards, Nicole M. Hasenberg, et al. Informed Decision Mak- ing in Outpatient Practice: Time to Get Back to Basics. JAMA 282(24):2313–20, 1999.
Branch, William T. Is the Therapeutic Nature of the Patient–Physician Relationship Being Under- mined? A Primary Care Physician's Perspective. Arch Int Med 160:2257-60, 2000.
Bronson, David L., Michael C. Costanza, and Henry M. Tufo. Using Medical Records for Older Patient Education in Ambulatory Practice. Medical Care 24(4):332–9, 1986.
Bronson, David L. and Kathrine O’Meara. The Impact of Shared Medical Records on Smoking Awareness and Behavior in Ambulatory Care. J Gen Intern Med 1:34–7, 1986.
Brown, R., P. N. Butow, M. J. Boyer, and M. H. N. Tattersall. Promoting Patient Participation in the Cancer Consultation: Evaluation of a Prompt Sheet and Coaching in Question-Asking. British Journal of Cancer 80(1/2):242–8, 1999.
Bulger, Roger J. The Quest for the Therapeutic Organization. JAMA 283(18):2431–3, 2000. Cabana, Michael D., Cynthia S. Rand, Neil R. Powe, et al. Why Don’t Physicians Follow Clinical
Practice Guidelines? A Framework for Improvement. JAMA 282(15):1458–65, 1999. Carrese, Joseph A. and Lorna A. Rhodes. Western Bioethics on the Navajo Reservation: Benefit or
Harm? JAMA 274(10):826–9, 1995. Carrillo, J. Emilo, Alexander R. Green, and Joseph R. Betancourt. Cross-Cultural Primary Care: A
Patient-based Approach. Ann Int Med 130:829–34, 1999. Chambers, Jo. Terminally Ill Patients Treated in the Community Should Keep a Copy of their
Records. BMJ 317:283, 1998. Cohn, Lawrence H., Donna Rosborough, and John Fernandez. Reducing Costs and Length of Stay
and Improving Efficiency and Quality of Care in Cardiac Surgery. Ann Thorac Surg 64(6 Suppl):S58–60; discussion S80–2, 1997.
Cook, Deborah J., Cynthia D. Mulrow, and R. Brian Haynes. Systematic Reviews: Synthesis of Best Evidence for Clinical Decisions. Ann Int Med 126(5):376–80, 1997.
Davidoff, Frank. In the Teeth of the Evidence. The Curious Case of Evidence-Based Medicine. The Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine 66(2):75–83, 1999.
Deber, Raisa B., Nancy Kraetschmer, and Jane Irvine. What Role Do Patients Wish to Play in Treatment Decision Making? Arch Int Med 156:1414–20, 1996.
Degner, Lesley F. and Catherine Aquino Russell. Preferences for Treatment Control Among Adults with Cancer. Research in Nursing & Health 11:367–74, 1988.
Doc Talk. 1999. Reproduced by permission of Virginia Mason Medical Center. Dresser, Ric. A Pragmatic Look at Hospital Reengineering. Successful Reengineering Requires the
Right Leadership. Health Progress 78:44–7, 1997. Drury, Mark, Patricia Yudkin, Jean Harcourt, et al. Patients with Cancer Holding their own Records:
A Randomised Controlled Trial. British Journal of General Practice 50:105–10, 2000. East, Thomas D., Laura K. Heermann, Richard L. Bradshaw, et al. Efficacy of Computerized Deci-
sion Support for Mechanical Ventilation: Results of a Prospective Multi-Center Randomized Trial. Proc AMIA Symp 251–5, 1999.
Emanuel, Ezekiel J. and Linda L. Emanuel. Four Models of the Physician–Patient Relationship. JAMA 267(16):2221–6, 1992.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE 85
Ende, Jack, Lewis Kazis, Arlene Ash, and Mark A. Moskowitz. Measuring Patients’ Desire for Autonomy: Decision Making and Information-Seeking Preferences Among Medical Patients. J Gen Intern Med 4:23–30, 1989.
Eng, C., J. Pedulla, G. P. Eleazer, et al. Program of All-inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE): An Innovative Model of Integrated Geriatric Care and Financing. J Am Geriatr Soc 45(2):223–32, 1997.
Espinosa, James A. and Thomas W. Nolan. Reducing Errors Made by Emergency Physicians in Interpreting Radiographs: Longitudinal Study. BMJ 320:737–40, 2000.
Essex, B., R. Doig, and J. Renshaw. Pilot Study of Records of Shared Care for People with Mental Illnesses. BMJ 300:1442–6, 1990.
Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group. Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teach- ing the Practice of Medicine. JAMA 268(17):2420–5, 1992.
Eysenbach, Gunther. Consumer Health Informatics. BMJ 320:1713–6, 2000. Fischbach, Ruth L., Antonia Sionelo-Bayog, Annette Needle, and Thomas L. Delbanco. The Patient
and Practitioner as Co-authors of the Medical Record. Patient Counselling and Health Educa- tion:1–5, 1980.
Freidson, Eliot. Doctoring Together: A Study of Professional Social Control. New York, NY: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Inc., 1975.
Fuss, Mae Ann, Yvonne E. Bryan, Kim S. Hitchings, et al. Measuring Critical Care Redesign: Impact on Satisfaction and Quality. Nursing Administration Quarterly 23:1–14, 1998.
Galinsky, Traci L, Roger R. Rosa, Joel S. Warm, and William N. Dember. Psychophysical Determi- nants of Stress in Sustained Attention. Human Factors 35(4):603–14, 1993.
Gifford, A. L., Laurent D. D., V. M. Gonzales, et al. Pilot Randomized Trial of Education to Improve Self-Management Skills of Men With Symptomatic HIV/AIDS. J Acquir Immune Defic Syndr Hum Retrovirol 18(2):136–44, 1998.
Giglio, Richard J., B. Spears, David Rumpf, and Nancy Eddy. Encouraging Behavior Changes by Use of Client-Held Health Records. Medical Care 16(9):757–64, 1978.
Gittens, Mary. Patients’ Access to Their Records. Journal of the Royal College of General Practitio- ners:290, 1986.
Golodetz, Arnold, Johanna Ruess, and Raymond L. Milhous. The Right to Know: Giving the Patient his Medical Record. Arch Phys Med Rehabil 57:78–81, 1976.
Greenfield, Sheldon, Sherrie H. Kaplan, and John E. Ware, Jr. Expanding Patient Involvement in Care: Effects on Patient Outcomes. Ann Int Med 102:520–8, 1985.
Greenfield, Sheldon, Sherrie H. Kaplan, John E. Ware, Jr., et al. Patients’ Participation in Medical Care: Effects on Blood Sugar Control and Quality of Life in Diabetes. J Gen Intern Med 3:448–57, 1988.
Guadagnoli, Edward and Patricia Ward. Patient Participation in Decision-making. Social Science & Medicine 47(3):329–39, 1998.
Harrison, Ailsa. Choice is a Gift from the Patient to the Doctor, Not the Other Way Around. BMJ 320:874, 2000.
Hart, Julian Tudor. Clinical and Economic Consequences of Patients as Producers. Journal of Public Health Medicine 17(4):383–6, 1995.
Homer, Caroline S., Gregory K. Davis, and Louise S. Everitt. The Introduction of a Woman-Held Record Into a Hospital Antenatal Clinic: The Bring Your Own Records Study. Aust NZ J Obstet Gynaecol Feb;39(1):54–7, 1999.
Institute of Medicine. Health Data in the Information Age: Use, Disclosure, and Privacy. M. S. Donaldson and K. N. Lohr, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994.
———. To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donaldson, eds. Washington, D.C: National Academy Press, 2000.
Jadad, Alejandro R. Promoting Partnerships: Challenges for the Internet Age. BMJ 319:761–4, 1999.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
86 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Kane, Beverley and Daniel Z. Sands. Guidelines for the Clinical Use of Electronic Mail with Pa- tients. J Am Med Inform Assoc 5:104–11, 1998.
Kaplan, Sherrie H., Sheldon Greenfield, and John E. Ware, Jr. Assessing the Effects of Physician– Patient Interactions on Outcomes of Chronic Disease. Medical Care 27(3, Supplement):S110– 27, 1989.
Kauffman, S. At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complex- ity. New York, NY: Oxford University, 1995.
Kraman, Steve S. and G. Hamm. Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May be the Best Policy. Ann Int Med 131(12):963–7, 1999.
Langley, Gerald J., Kevin M. Nolan, Thomas W. Nolan, et al. The Improvement Guide. A Practical Approach to Enhancing Organizational Performance. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1996.
Larkin, Howard. Permanent Record: Allowing patients to post their own medical records on the Internet is becoming big business. American Medical News:21–2, 1999.
Lavizzo-Mourey, Risa J. Cultural Competence: Essential Measurement of Quality for Managed Care Organizations. Ann Int Med 124(10):919–21, 1996.
Lewandowski, K., R. Rossaint, D. Pappert, et al. High Survival Rate in 122 ARDS Patients Managed According to a Clinical Algorithm Including Extracorporeal Membrane Oxygenation. Intensive Care Med 23:819–35, 1997.
Liaw, S. Teng, Anthony J. Radford, and Ian Maddocks. The Impact of a Computer Generated Patient Held Health Record. Australian Family Physician 27(suppl 1):S39–43, 1998.
Lohr, Kathleen N. and Tomothy S. Carey. Assessing “Best Evidence:” Issues in Grading the Quality of Studies for Systematic Reviews. Journal on Quality Improvement 25(9):470–9, 1999.
Lorig, Kate R., Peter D. Mazonson, and Halsted R. Holman. Evidence Suggesting that Health Educa- tion for Self Management in Chronic Arthritis has Sustained Health Benefits While Reducing Health Care Costs. Arthritis Rheumatism 36(4):439–46, 1993.
Lorig, Kate R., David S. Sobel, Anita L. Steward, et al. Evidence Suggesting that a Chronic Disease Self-Management Program Can Improve Health Status While Reducing Hospitalization: A Randomized Trial. Medical Care 37(1):5–14, 1999.
Maly, Rose C., Linda B. Bourque, and Rita F. Engelhardt. A Randomized Controlled Trial of Facili- tating Information Giving to Patients with Chronic Medical Conditions. J Fam Pract 48(5):356– 63, 1999.
Mansell, Dorcas, Roy M. Poses, Lewis Kazis, and Corey A. Duefield. Clinical Factors That Influ- ence Patients’ Desire for Participation in Decisions About Illness. Arch Int Med 160:2991–6, 2000.
Mazur, Dennis J. and David H. Hickam. Patients’ Preferences for Risk Disclosure and Role in Decision Making for Invasive Medical Procedures. J Gen Intern Med 12:114–7, 1997.
Mehta, Amit, Keith Dreyer, and James Thrall. Enhancing Availability of the Electronic Image Record for Patients and Caregivers During Follow-Up Care. Journal of Digital Imagining 12(2, Suppl 1):78–80, 1999.
Michael, Max and Clay Bordley. Do Patients Want Access to Their Medical Records? Medical Care 20(4):432–5, 1982.
Morris, Alan H. Protocol Management of Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome. New Horizons 1(4):593–602, 1993.
Mort, Elizabeth A. Clinical Decision-Making in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty: Hormone Re- placement Therapy as an Example. J Fam Pract 42(2):147–51, 1996.
Muir Gray, J A. Evidence-based Healthcare: How to Make Health Policy and Management Deci- sions. New York, NY: Churchill Livingstone, 1997.
O’Connor, Annette M., Alaa Rostom, Fiset Valerie, et al. Decision Aids for Patients Facing Health Treatment or Screening Decisions: Systematic Review. BMJ 319:731–4, 1999.
Pauly, Mark V. Doctors and their Workshops. Chicago, IL: NBER, 1980.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
FORMULATING NEW RULES TO REDESIGN AND IMPROVE CARE 87
Peterkin, Allan. Guidelines Covering Disclosure of Errors Now in Place at Montreal Hospital. Can Med Assoc J 142(9):984–5, 1990.
Pietro, Daniel A., Linda J. Shyavitz, Smith Richard A., et al. Detecting and Reporting Medical Errors: Why the Dilemma? BMJ 320:794–6, 2000.
Pilcher, June J. and Allen I. Huffcutt. Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Performance: A Meta- Analysis. Sleep 19(4):318–26, 1996.
Plsek, Paul. Innovative Thinking for the Improvement of Medical Systems. Ann Int Med 131:438– 44, 1999.
Rich, Michael L. The PACE Model: Description and Impressions of a Capitated Model of Long- Term Care for the Elderly. The Care Management Journal 1(1):62–70, 1999.
Risdale, Leone. Evidence Based General Practice. Philadelphia, PA: W.B. Saunders Co., 1995. Sackett, David L., Sharon E. Straus, W. Scott Richardson, et al. Evidence-Based Medicine: How to
Practice & Teach EBM. 2nd edition. London, England: Churchill Livingstone, 2000. Samkoff, Judith S. and C. H. M. Jacques. A Review of Studies Concerning Effects of Sleep Depriva-
tion and Fatigue on Residents’ Performance. Academic Medicine 66(11):687–93, 1991. Saphir, Ann. Study Questions Home Efficiency. Nursing Homes Could Cut Costs by More Than a
Third and Maintain Productivity, Study Says. Modern Healthcare 29:52, 1999. Sawin, David A. and Mark W. Scerbo. Effects of Instruction Type and Boredom Proneness in
Vigilance: Implications for Boredom and Workload. Human Factors 37(4):752–65, 1995. Schoenfelt, Suzanne. New Possiblilities for Patient Information Storage in a Technological Age.
Journal of AHIMA 69(8):50–4, 1998. Senge, Peter M. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. New
York, NY: Doubleday/Currency, 1990. Shenkin, Budd N. and David C. Warner. Sounding Board. Giving the Patient His Medical Record:
A Proposal to Improve the System. N EngI J Med 289(13):688–92, 1973. Simon, Gregory E., Michael VonKorff, Carolyn Rutter, and Edward Wagner. Randomised Trial of
Monitoring , Feedback, and Management of Care by Telephone to Improve Treatment of De- pression in Primary Care. BMJ 320:550–4, 2000.
Smith, Linda S. Concept Analysis: Cultural Competence. Journal of Cultural Diversity 5(1):4–10, 1998.
Stacey, Ralph D. Complexity and Creativity in Organizations. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 1996.
Stewart, Michael G., Edward J. Hillman, Donald T. Donovan, and Sarper H. Tanli. The Effects of a Practice Guideline on Endoscopic Sinus Surgery at an Academic Center. American Journal of Rhinology 11(2):161–5, 1997.
Stewart, Moira A. Effective Physician–Patient Communication and Health Outcomes: A Review. Can Med Assoc J 152(9):1423–33, 1995.
Stiggelbout, Anne M. and Gwendoline M. Kiebert. A Role for the Sick Role. Patient Preferences Regarding Information and Participation in Clinical Decision-making. Can Med Assoc J 157(4): 383–9, 1997.
Strull, William M., Bernard Lo, and Gerald Charles. Do Patients Want to Participate in Medical Decision Making? JAMA 252(21):2990–4, 1984.
Suchyta, Mary R., Terry P. Clemmer, James F. Orme, Jr., et al. Increased Survival of ARDS Patients with Severe Hypoxemia (ECMO Criteria). Chest 99(4):951–5, 1991.
Superio-Cabuslay, E., M. M. Ward, and Kate R. Lorig. Patient Education Interventions in Osteoar- thritis and Rheumatoid Arthritis: A Meta-Analytic Comparison with Nonsteroidal Antiinflam- matory Drug Treatment. Arthritis Care Res 9(4):292–301, 1996.
Taylor, Ian. Some Patients Are Happy for Doctors to Make Decisions. BMJ 320:58, 2000.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
88 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the National Research and Development Center for Welfare and Health STAKES and The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities. Quality Management in Social Welfare and Health Care for the 21st Century, National Recom- mendations. Sarrijärvi, Finland: Gummerus, 1999.
Thomsen, George E., Donna Pope, Thomas D. East, et al. Clinical Performance of a Rule-Based Decision Support System for Mechanical Ventilation of ARDS patients. Proc Annu Symp Comput Appl Med Care:339–43, 1994.
Tidikis, Frank and Leann Strasen. Patient-Focused Care Units Improve Services and Financial Out- comes. Healthcare Financial Management 48:38–44, 1994.
Tunick, P. A., S. Etkin, A. Horrocks, et al. Reengineering a cardiovascular surgery service. Joint Commission Journal on Quality Improvement 23(4):203–16, 1997.
Von Korff, Michael, Jessie Gruman, Judith Schaefer, Susan J. Curry, and Edward H. Wagner. Col- laborative Management of Chronic Illness. Ann Int Med 127(12):1097–102, 1997.
Von Korff, Michael, J. E. Moore, Kate R. Lorig, et al. A Randomized Trial of a Lay Person-Led Self- Management Group Intervention for Back Pain Patients in Primary Care. Spine 23(23):2608– 51, 1998.
Wagner, Edward H., Brian T. Austin, and Michael Von Korff. Organizing Care for Patients with Chronic Illness. Milbank Quarterly 74(4):511–42, 1996.
Wagner, Edward H., Paul Barrett, Michael J. Barry, et al. The Effect of a Shared Decisionmaking Program on Rates of Surgery for Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia. Pilot Results. Medical Care 33(8):765–70, 1995.
Waldrop, Malcom M. Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1992.
Waller, Adele A. and Oscar L. Alcantara. Ownership of Health Information in the Information Age. Journal of AHIMA 69(3):28–38, 1998.
Weed, Lawrence L. Physicians of the Future. N EngI J Med 304(15):903–7, 1981. ———. Knowledge Coupling: New Premises and New Tools for Medical Care and Education. New
York, NY: Springer-Verlag, 1991. ———. Clinical Judgment Revisited. Methods of Information in Medicine 38:279–86, 1999. ———. April 2000. Personal communication: telephone conversation. Weick, Karl E. Sensemaking in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995. Wells, Kenneth B., Cathy Sherbourne, Michael Schoenbaum, et al. Impact of Disseminating Quality
Improvement Programs for Depression in Managed Primary Care: A Randomized Controlled Trial. JAMA 283(2):212–20, 2000.
Witman, Amy B., Deric M. Park, and Steven B. Hardin. How Do Patients Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes? Arch Int Med 156:2565–9, 1990.
Womack, James P. and Daniel T. Jones. Lean Thinking: Banish Waste and Create Wealth in Your Corporation. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
Womack, James P., Daniel T Jones, and Daniel. Roos. The Machine That Changed the World. New York, NY: Harpercollins, 1991.
Wu, Albert. Handling Hospital Errors: Is Disclosure the Best Defense? Ann Int Med 131(12):970–2, 1999.
Zimmerman, Brenda J., Curt Lindberg, and Paul E. Plsek. Edgeware: Complexity Resources for Healthcare Leaders. Irving, TX: VHA Inc., 1998.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
89
4
Taking the First Steps
The committee recognizes the enormity of the change that is required to achieve substantial improvements in the six major aims set forth in Chapter 2— that health care be safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equi- table. The ten simple rules described in Chapter 3, designed to help guide the actions of clinicians, patients, and others in ways that will lead to such improve- ments, also characterize a fundamental cultural transformation taking place today in the health care sector. This nascent cultural transformation embodies a more explicit commitment to evidence-based practice and patient-centered care, and reflects recognition of the importance of well-designed systems of care.
To achieve the six aims, there must also be a very strong commitment to redesign. The current system will not work. New information technology should be embraced and new systems of care developed. Methods of payment must be modified to encourage and reward quality care. This chapter provides an ap- proach for achieving better alignment of the evidence base, the organization of care, information, payment methods, and quality measurement around patients’ health care needs.
Common chronic conditions should serve as a starting point for the restruc- turing of health care delivery because, as noted in Chapter 1, chronic conditions are now the leading cause of illness, disability, and death in the United States, affecting almost half of the population and accounting for the majority of health care resources used (Hoffman et al., 1996). Chronic conditions affect people of all ages. Although older people are more likely to have a chronic condition, people over age 65 account for only one-quarter of those living in the community with such a condition (The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
90 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Today’s health care system is not well designed to meet the needs of patients with common chronic conditions. Some patients receive good-quality care that is well coordinated, with good communication among the various clinicians in- volved. For too many others, however, care for even a single condition is frag- mented across many clinicians and settings with little coordination or communi- cation, and some needs remain undetected and/or unmet.
Given the magnitude of the change that is required, the committee believes that leadership at the national level is required to initiate the process of change by taking two important steps. First, a short list of priority conditions should be promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services, and all health care stakeholders should then focus attention on making substantial progress toward the establishment of state-of-the-art processes for these conditions in the next 5 years. Second, resources should be provided to seed innovative projects at the delivery system level, especially those projects that have a high likelihood of producing knowledge and tools that can be applied on a widespread basis through- out the health care sector.
The committee believes such a focus on specific common clinical conditions is the best way to achieve the substantial improvement in quality that is required. Such conditions represent the needs around which patients have the greatest interaction with the system and make the most choices about cost and quality (and other issues). This is also the level at which care processes can be designed and refined. Thus, priority conditions offer the best opportunity for undertaking the development of the evidence base for practice; the reorganization of care; the development of supportive information technologies; and the design and refine- ment of quality measures and reporting processes, as well as payment incentives and rewards.
Recommendation 5: The Agency for Healthcare Research and Qual- ity should identify not fewer than 15 priority conditions, taking into account frequency of occurrence, health burden, and resource use. In collaboration with the National Quality Forum, the agency should convene stakeholders, including purchasers, consumers, health care organizations, professional groups, and others, to develop strate- gies, goals, and action plans for achieving substantial improvements in quality in the next 5 years for each of the priority conditions.
Identifying priority conditions represents a starting point to support the orga- nization of care, bring the evidence base into practice, develop information tech- nology and infrastructure to support care, and develop mechanisms to measure and pay for quality care. Instead of defining care by where it is delivered or who delivers it, the system should be designed to optimize care for patients’ needs across the entire continuum of care in the most effective and efficient way possible.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
TAKING THE FIRST STEPS 91
In identifying priority conditions, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) should consider using the list of conditions identified through the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), a nationally representative house- hold survey of health care use, expenditures, sources of payment, and insurance coverage conducted by AHRQ and the National Center for Health Statistics that includes information on health conditions (Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, 2000). MEPS identifies 15 “priority conditions” based on their prevalence, ex- pense, or policy relevance: cancer, diabetes, emphysema, high cholesterol, HIV/ AIDS, hypertension, ischemic heart disease, stroke, arthritis, asthma, gall bladder disease, stomach ulcers, back problems, Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias, and depression and anxiety disorders.
The action plan for each priority condition should include strategies for designing and maintaining evidence-based processes; promoting primary, sec- ondary and tertiary prevention; building the necessary information technology infrastructure to support delivery and coordination of care, system design and ongoing management, payment, and accountability; and aligning the incentives inherent in payment and accountability processes with the goals of quality im- provement. AHRQ should also ensure that each action plan is supported by key stakeholders. In identifying and convening stakeholders, AHRQ should work with the National Quality Forum, a public–private partnership charged with de- velopment of a comprehensive quality measurement and public reporting strat- egy. Input should also be obtained from organizations that have made significant efforts to improve quality, such as the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, the Quality Center at the Bureau of Primary Health Care in the Health Resources Services Administration, the Veterans Health Administration, local delivery sys- tems, and others.
Since the identification of priority conditions is a starting point toward achieving the six aims, AHRQ should conduct this work expeditiously. The number of priority conditions identified should grow over time to eventually cover the majority (e.g., 80 percent) of the care provided to patients.
Recommendation 6: Congress should establish a Health Care Qual- ity Innovation Fund to support projects targeted at (1) achieving the six aims of safety, effectiveness, patient-centeredness, timeliness, ef- ficiency, and equity; and/or (2) producing substantial improvements in quality for the priority conditions. The fund’s resources should be invested in projects that will produce a public-domain portfolio of programs, tools, and technologies of widespread applicability.
Policies, incentives, tools, and technologies will be needed to support the changes required to achieve the six aims and redesign the health care system in accordance with the new rules set forth in Chapter 3. The formation of an innovation fund is one mechanism that can be used to seed projects aimed at redesigning care and developing programs to support the other recommendations
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
92 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
presented in this report. For example, purchasers and delivery systems should work together to develop innovative programs that integrate the new rules for patient–clinician relationships (Chapter 3) and to redesign care processes for the priority conditions, making best use of information technology and engineering design concepts (Chapters 5 and 7). There must be a strong commitment to evaluating the impact and cost-effectiveness of innovative programs, and to the rapid diffusion of programs proven successful throughout the field. Although an innovation fund should support projects related to the priority conditions, it could also support other redesign projects, especially those relating to greater use of information technology.
The committee is not recommending a specific dollar amount for the pro- posed fund, but believes a sizable commitment, on the order of $1 billion over 3 to 5 years, is necessary given the magnitude of change needed. Just as a vigorous public commitment and an expenditure of approximately $1 billion over a 4-year period has led to the mapping of the human genome, a similar commitment is needed to retool the health care delivery system, or society will never reap the full value of the trillion dollars spent annually on health care services.
THE VALUE OF ORGANIZING AROUND PRIORITY CONDITIONS
Identifying priority conditions can benefit all those involved in using, deliv- ering, planning, or paying for health care. Patients and their families today must try to navigate a fragmented, complex health care system with insufficient infor- mation and an unclear understanding of how to find the best-quality care for their specific needs. Similarly, health professionals face pressures to improve quality and measurable outcomes without having systems in place that can help them easily identify the best practices for a given case or means of arranging for follow-up on a patient’s needs across the entire continuum of care. Purchasers appear to focus more on cost than on quality, but have little outcome or quality information available to them. They may be willing to buy on the basis of quality, but see a health system that produces care inefficiently and is character- ized by errors (or “defects”) that would not be tolerated in their own industries. Regulators struggle with how best to provide oversight in a rapidly changing environment. Many people have an interest in ensuring quality care, but do not have a framework or tools for doing so.
A focus on priority conditions can align the efforts of diverse participants in the health care system, offer a meaningful level of organization to patients, and provide a starting point on which health care professionals and organizations can focus their efforts. Improved alignment between patient needs and the ways care is organized, delivered, measured, and paid for is important because fragmenta- tion and misalignment in the current system inhibit systematic quality improve- ment. For example, patients need information, support, and reassurance to man-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
TAKING THE FIRST STEPS 93
age a chronic condition independently on a day-to-day basis and to recognize when help is needed from a clinician. However, the current health care system is organized around acute care needs. It does not facilitate the flow of information over time; offers little recognition or reward for coordinating care; and pays mainly for face-to-face (office) visits, not for information and/or reassurance that may be needed at other times. The aims described in Chapter 2 cannot be achieved without better alignment of organization, payment, and measurement with patients’ needs.
A focus on specific conditions may also be more meaningful to patients. Prior research suggests that when people have a health care need, they are inter- ested in comprehensive sets of services provided to people with similar condi- tions (Cleary and Edgman-Levitan, 1997; Fennell and Flood, 1998). Instead of describing their health experiences with one service or one provider, patients describe an episode of care (Cleary and Edgman-Levitan, 1997). For example, a patient who has had a heart attack will describe all components of his or her care, including the emergency room, medical service, surgical service, specialty physi- cian office visit, generalist physician office visit, and rehabilitation care. Al- though the performance of each individual unit is important, simply aggregating the individual units is not sufficient for understanding the quality of health care provided when care involves many people and facilities, as is often the case today (Fennell and Flood, 1998). Additionally, people want information about people “like themselves.” That is, they are seeking information that will tell them how well a health plan or clinical group cares for others with similar conditions (Cleary and Edgman-Levitan, 1997). An approach that facilitates the measure- ment and release of information around specific conditions can provide patients with such information. Also, with appropriately designed incentives and support systems, such an approach can provide an organizing framework for care so that providers have the flexibility to match services along the entire continuum of care to the needs of a specific patient and support continuous care relationships.
Defining care processes around specific conditions can also establish a suit- able level of focus for significant quality improvement in health care. To achieve such improvement, it will be necessary to develop information about the pro- cesses and outcomes of care for specific population groups (Friedman, 1995). Meaningful groupings are required because the quality of care for one set of conditions cannot be generalized to patients with different conditions (Brook et al., 1996). The tasks of examining processes of care, linking those processes to outcomes for populations, comparing the effectiveness of alternative approaches, bringing the evidence base into practice, forming the teams that deliver complex care, and accurately adjusting for differences among patients to permit valid comparisons are difficult to accomplish simply by looking at patients in general. Rather, these tasks can best be accomplished for people with comparable needs. Once care has been defined around people’s needs, meeting those needs becomes the ultimate target for these basic steps of quality improvement.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
94 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
It is expected that most priority conditions will be strongly related to chronic conditions. As discussed in Chapter 1, care for people with chronic conditions represents an increasing portion of health care resources in the United States. Four chronic conditions (cardiovascular disease, cancer, chronic obstructive pul- monary disease, and diabetes) account for almost three-quarters of all deaths in the United States (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1999). Compared with people with acute conditions, the annual medical costs per person were more than double for people with one chronic condition and almost six times higher for people with two or more chronic conditions1 (The Robert Wood Johnson Founda- tion, 1996). A study in one health maintenance organization found that 38 percent of enrollees had at least one chronic condition, and their costs averaged twice those of people with no chronic condition (Fishman et al., 1997). A study at another health maintenance organization found that 78 percent of direct medi- cal costs were attributable to just 25 acute and chronic conditions and that three cardiovascular conditions (ischemic heart disease, hypertension, and congestive heart failure) accounted for 17 percent of those costs (Ray et al., 2000). It has been estimated that the top 1 percent of spenders account for 30 percent of health spending, whereas the bottom 50 percent account for only 3 percent of spending (Berk and Monheit, 1992). Given this concentration, the majority of health services utilized can potentially be associated with a definable list of conditions.
Yet the health care system is not well designed to meet the needs of the chronically ill. The current delivery system responds primarily to acute and urgent health problems, emphasizing diagnosis, ruling out serious conditions, and relieving symptoms (Wagner et al., 1996b). Those with chronic conditions are better served by a systematic approach that emphasizes self-management, care planning with a multidisciplinary team, and ongoing assessment and follow- up (Wagner et al., 1996a). As noted in Chapter 1, successful chronic disease management programs:
• Use a protocol or plan that provides an explicit statement of what needs to be done for patients, at what intervals, and by whom, and that considers the needs of all patients with specific clinical features and how their needs can be met. The care plan is a tool that links the multiple visits and contacts that characterize care for chronic illness.
• Redesign practice to incorporate regular patient contact, collection of critical data on health and disease status, and strategies to meet the educational and psychosocial needs of patients who may need to make lifestyle and other changes to manage their disease. Regular follow-up is a hallmark of the design of successful programs.
1Direct medical costs included hospital care, physician services, dental services, other professional services, home health care, prescriptions, medical equipment, emergency services, and nursing home care.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
TAKING THE FIRST STEPS 95
• Include a strong focus on patient information and self-management so patients and their families acquire skills in self-management and can make needed lifestyle changes. Structured self-management and behavioral change programs improve patient outcomes.
• Ensure the availability of specialized expertise to the primary care prac- tices that frequently have responsibility for managing patients with chronic ill- ness. The traditional mechanism for accessing expertise is through a consultation or referral, which runs the risk of fragmenting care. Alternative approaches for making expertise available include teams with specialized knowledge (e.g., a diabetologist and nurse specialist working with general practitioners who care for diabetic patients); collaborative care arrangements (e.g., where specialists and generalists manage patients together); and, eventually, well-designed computer decision support systems.
• Rely on having good information about patients, their care, and outcomes in order to improve outcomes. Registries inform providers which patients have certain conditions to permit proactive clinical management. Use of reminder systems supports patient participation in explicit plans of care.
Wagner (2000) also notes the implications of such a model for how teams of clinicians work together. Successful teams should bring in new disciplines in medicine, but also nonmedical personnel. Establishment of care plans, good patient involvement, and a strong information base permit members of a care team to work together beyond organizational and practice boundaries.
Although good coordination and communication are essential for all care, they are especially important for chronic care. Patients may move through many settings of care, from home, to clinician office, to hospital, to nursing home, and back. Patients and their families often provide a sizable proportion of routine care, including the administration of medications, performance of some diagnos- tic tests, and compliance with physical therapy and nutritional plans. While the current health care system is built around visits, people with chronic illness need flexible models that provide more time and alternative contacts with the system. Although there are many basic, simple techniques that can be employed today (e.g., telephone follow-up rather than e-mail, or reminder systems that use flags on a chart rather than computerized reminder systems), the committee believes these simple techniques have been available for many years and have not been sufficient to achieve broad-based quality improvements. While any type of progress is welcome, at some point the health care system will need to embrace more automated methods and greater use of information technology to make significant progress.
Unfortunately, there are very few well-tested integrated models of chronic care management (Wagner et al., 1996a). While research may focus on specific components of care, it is more difficult to understand the interrelationship be- tween the components and the influence of the organizational environment. For
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
96 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
example, the Diabetes Control and Complications Trial demonstrated how to improve clinical management of patients with insulin-dependent diabetes. But the trial required special skills of both patients and clinicians, services that many insurance policies do not cover, and delivery of care by patient-centered teams (Lasker, 1993).
APPLICATIONS OF PRIORITY CONDITIONS
Figure 4-1 illustrates the multiple ways in which the priority conditions, once identified, can be applied. First, they can be used to synthesize the evidence base and delineate practice guidelines. This application is closely linked to and should guide the organization of care and coordination of care around patient needs. The priority conditions can also be applied in developing information systems, reduc- ing suboptimization in payment for services, and simplifying the measurement
FIGURE 4-1 Applications of priority conditions.
Synthesize the evidence and delineate practice
guidelines
Organize and coordinate care around patient
needs (consistent with
the evidence base)
Provide a common base
for the development of
iinformation technology
Reduce suboptimization
in payment
Simplify quality measurement, evaluation of performance, and feedback
Identify priority conditions
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
TAKING THE FIRST STEPS 97
and evaluation of care. Each of these applications is described below. Although some applications may occur more quickly than others, Figure 4-1 is not meant to imply a linear order to their accomplishment. Rather, the priority conditions can be used for any of these applications as soon as they have been identified.
Synthesize the Evidence Base and Delineate Practice Guidelines
The identification of priority conditions provides a framework for synthesiz- ing the evidence, developing practice guidelines, and delineating best practices for clinical care. There is a significant lag between the discovery of better forms of treatment and their incorporation into actual care. The identification of prior- ity conditions supports a well-thought-out organization of information to im- prove its accessibility and utility for both patients and health professionals (see Chapter 6). Identification of these conditions can guide the prioritization of issues for analysis and synthesis of evidence, delineation of practice guidelines, and development and application of automated decision support tools. It can also provide direction for stronger dissemination efforts aimed at communicating this information to clinicians and consumers. Even in clinical areas characterized by strong evidence and general consensus on practice, variability in practice sug- gests that current dissemination efforts could be improved. The Internet offers the opportunity to achieve such improvement by reaching sizable proportions of both consumers and clinicians in a timely manner.
One of the strongest examples of synthesizing the evidence base and apply- ing it to clinical care is offered by the Veterans Health Administration (VHA). The VHA’s Quality Enhancement Research Initiative (QUERI) is a quality im- provement program that focuses on eight priority conditions: chronic heart fail- ure, diabetes, HIV/AIDS, ischemic heart disease, mental health (depression and schizophrenia), spinal cord injury, stroke, and substance abuse (Demakis et al., 2000). These conditions were selected on the basis of the number of veterans affected, the burden of illness, and known health risks among the veteran popula- tion. Specific conditions were selected as the focus in the belief that quality improvement is most likely to occur when viewed in the context of the overall care of a patient and population, rather than the individual components of care (Demakis and McQueen, 2000).
The process implemented at the VHA involves defining best practices by reviewing currently available information and literature. For some conditions, such as diabetes, a great deal of information is available; for others, the informa- tion must be developed by a planning team. Once the evidence has been re- viewed and best practice defined, the latter is compared with current practice to identify gaps in performance. Policies, procedures, and programs are then devel- oped to organize care around the best practice, which also guides the evaluation of impact and feedback to enable learning from experience and continuously improving care. Thus, best practice affects how care is delivered, but evaluation
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
98 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
of its impact also informs the continued development of best practice. The process used by the VHA also emphasizes the broad dissemination of informa- tion about best practice throughout their system, from large academic centers to smaller, community-based centers.
The VHA’s approach is consistent with the concept of focusing on priority conditions in that it provides a framework for organizing and continually updat- ing the evidence base, bringing it to the direct delivery of care, and evaluating its effect on improving care for patients. Synthesis and application of the evidence base, therefore, forces the reexamination of how care is organized to affect qual- ity. By examining where current practice departs from the evidence base and best practice, suggestions for improving care may emerge that can direct changes in provider actions, patient responsibilities, or organizational approaches. It would be difficult to use this multifaceted, comprehensive care approach except at the level of a specific condition.
Organize and Coordinate Care Around Patient Needs
The primary purpose of identifying priority conditions is to facilitate the organization of care around the patient’s perspective and needs rather than, as in the current system, around types of professionals and organizations. For ex- ample, the current system may require patients to travel to multiple locations to receive care (usually Monday through Friday, between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.) instead of using modern technologies to facilitate access even for patients with mobility problems or those living in rural areas. Most hospitals are organized around physician specialties (such as thoracic surgery or internal medicine), not around common clinical needs of patients, which may cross departmental bound- aries. (An example is diabetes care, which may require general medicine, endo- crinology, ophthalmology, and vascular services.) Organizing care around prior- ity conditions emphasizes meeting the needs of patients with those conditions, regardless of who provides their care or where. Attention must be paid to how care is coordinated across settings and provider types. A surgical procedure may be performed perfectly, but if there is inadequate postoperative care, follow-up care, home care, or other supports, the patient may encounter complications that compromise the quality of the episode of care. It is also important to recognize that patients may have to manage multiple conditions simultaneously, because they either have more than one chronic condition or have one chronic condition and an unrelated acute event. Indeed, there is evidence that patients actively receiving care for one chronic condition may not receive treatment for other, unrelated conditions (Redelmeier et al., 1998). Thus, one of the challenges of designing care around specific conditions is to avoid defining patients solely by their disease or condition.
There are several mechanisms for coordinating care across priority condi- tions. First, coordination could be performed by a health professional acting as a
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
TAKING THE FIRST STEPS 99
liaison across patients’ multiple needs, ensuring the exchange of information and any necessary follow-up2 (Bodenheimer et al., 1999). This individual could be a physician, nurse, case manager, or other type of professional working in the care delivery system. Second, some consumers might choose to actively coordinate their own care. This is a growing possibility as consumers and patients have access to more health information and are able to make use of the evidence base and practice guidelines for their specific conditions. Third, as information tech- nology becomes more sophisticated, computer algorithms can be used to coordi- nate many activities, for example, sending reminders of needed follow-up or identifying missing information, such as test results. Finally, coordination could occur through a combination of all these methods, involving a health profes- sional, the patient, and technological support.
Various approaches in practice today offer insight that can be applied in organizing care around specific conditions or types of needs, including disease management programs and centers of excellence. Each is briefly reviewed below.
Disease Management Programs
Multiple definitions of disease management programs have been put forth (Blumenthal and Buntin, 1998; Ellrodt et al., 1997; Homer, 1997). In general, they describe a systematic and comprehensive approach to improving the man- agement of a condition. This approach involves improving coordination of care and controlling costs through the integration of components across the entire delivery system and the application of appropriate tools (e.g., guidelines, proto- cols, information systems) specifically designed for the population in question.
Disease management programs share some of the features envisioned for organization around priority conditions as described above, but also differ in important ways. The two are similar in that disease management represents a systematic approach to designing care, uses multidisciplinary teams to deliver care, and potentially includes services across the entire continuum of care. How- ever, disease management programs differ in that they are frequently perceived primarily as a method for controlling costs (Bodenheimer, 2000; Homer, 1997; Ketner, 1999). They are often applied only to the most severely ill patients (generally categorized by historical costs) instead of to the entire population with a specific condition (Hunter, 2000; Ketner, 1999). This means not all patients with a condition are able to benefit from such programs. Although the programs are developed to improve care for patients, patients may not have much say in whether they receive care through such programs. Finally, there are no clear
2It should be noted that this discussion of coordination of care is not meant to imply support for or opposition to a gate-keeping function used by many groups to ensure appropriate access. Coordina- tion can be provided with or without a gate-keeping role.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
100 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
definitions of what is included or excluded from such programs, making it diffi- cult to compare their effectiveness in treating similar populations.
One of the main concerns associated with disease management programs is the potential for fragmenting care, especially if the patient’s primary care physi- cian is not involved in the program. Again, this concern highlights the impor- tance of coordination across conditions and the need to design such coordination systematically into care processes. Primary care models offer one approach to coordination, in which the primary care practitioner is both provider and coordi- nator of care. Alternatively, programs can be designed specifically to include or link an individual’s primary care practitioners in care planning and assessment. The committee does not recommend one approach over another, but emphasizes the importance of designing coordination into care to avoid fragmentation.
Centers of Excellence
There is a growing body of evidence on the relationship between volume of service and outcomes. The IOM conducted a workshop in May 2000 to explore the volume–outcome relationship (Hewitt, 2000). A systematic review of the literature conducted for the workshop encompassed 88 studies concerning eight conditions and procedures.3 This review led to the conclusion that for a wide variety of procedures, higher volume (by either the hospital or physician) is associated with better health outcomes. Statistically significant associations be- tween higher volume and better outcomes were found in 79 percent of studies of hospital volume and 77 percent of studies of physician volume. None of the studies showed a negative effect of volume.
The Health Care Financing Administration has pursued Centers of Excel- lence as a way of operationalizing the volume–outcome relationship. Centers of Excellence are hospitals and physician groups that meet high quality standards, for which they are paid a single bundled fee for all services related to specific, complex procedures (Health Care Financing Administration, 1999). Evaluation of the experience with cardiac surgery has indicated that the approach can offer cost savings without compromising quality, measured as mortality rates (Crom- well et al., 1997). Although developed as a payment policy, the approach bears some similarity to organizing around priority conditions in that it gives health care organizations and professionals the flexibility to organize care appropriately for a specific population group. The approach is dissimilar in that it is focused primarily on selected complex procedures with a strong emphasis on costs, rather than being solely a quality-driven strategy (Cromwell et al., 1997; Health Care Financing Administration, 1999).
3Coronary artery bypass graft surgery, pediatric cardiac surgery, carotid endarterectomy, abdomi- nal aortic aneurysm repair, cancer surgery, percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty, acute myocardial infarction, and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
TAKING THE FIRST STEPS 101
Provide a Common Base for the Development of Information Technology
Priority conditions can provide a framework for the development of an infor- mation infrastructure that is aligned around the clinical conditions frequently faced by patients. The absence of well-designed care processes is currently an impediment to the development and application of effective information technol- ogy systems. To be most useful, information technology must be designed to support the work of the care team. Consciously and skillfully designed care processes for priority conditions are an important step in establishing a founda- tion from which to design supportive information technology applications.
Common information technology systems are needed to effectively measure outcomes and processes of care and to provide benchmarks for continuous im- provement. Currently, each provider group may implement its own information system, but incompatibilities inhibit communication among the many people caring for an individual patient. Priority conditions can provide a focus for the development of standards and terminology for use in managing and using infor- mation technology to improve care for patients. Best practices can help define standard information needs and guide the development of information technolo- gies that can be used to implement best practices (e.g., decision support systems).
A significantly enhanced information infrastructure is critical to achieving the aims set forth in Chapter 2 and the other potential applications of the priority conditions. Synthesizing the evidence base, linking it to clinical practice, and making it accessible to a variety of potential users will require good information systems and, most likely, greater use of the Internet. Greater use of the Internet and telemedicine should in turn facilitate access to clinical expertise and support care for patients in their own communities, especially in rural areas. Better flows of information are also necessary to improve the ways care is organized and coordinated, especially across settings and over time. Using payment methods to reward quality will require stronger information systems to track costs and link them to processes of care. Finally, measurement and evaluation cannot be ad- vanced without better technology for data collection and management (see Chap- ter 7 for further discussion on using information technology).
Reduce Suboptimization in Payment
A major barrier to quality improvement is the lack of reward that character- izes the most common payment methods used today (see Chapter 8). The current payment system often reinforces fragmentation by paying separately according to the setting of care and provider type, and by not giving providers the flexibility needed to customize care for individual patients. Furthermore, common payment methods can inhibit quality improvement to the extent that organizations that improve certain aspects of quality (e.g., by reducing readmission rates or office visits) can experience a reduction in their revenues, which serves as a disincen- tive for continuous improvement.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
102 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Priority conditions offer a framework for linking payment with patient needs and for designing incentives to reward quality. Alternative payment methods (e.g., fee for service or capitation) could be adapted to facilitate the delivery of care around priority conditions, consistent with the evidence base. Priority con- ditions could also provide a framework for purchasers to use in assessing the value of their purchases. See Chapter 8 for a detailed discussion on the relation- ship between payment and quality improvement.
Simplify Quality Measurement, Evaluation of Performance, and Feedback
Priority conditions improve the feasibility of quality measurement by offer- ing a framework for the development of standards to guide the necessary data collection. At present, quality measurement for external accountability tends to focus on institutions or discrete services; there is little comparative information available for patients seeking specific care or physicians referring care. For example, a patient can obtain information on mammogram rates, but will find little information on methods of treatment or outcomes for breast care programs. Priority conditions can offer a framework for the development of core measures that address both processes and outcomes of care.
Part of the difficulty involved in obtaining such information is due to meth- odological barriers in measurement. The services of an individual physician are usually too small a unit for measurement of many aspects of clinical care pro- cesses and outcomes (Hofer et al., 1999). Even the typically sized medical group may be too small to provide reliable information on outcomes. Health plans may aggregate information, but clinicians are often affiliated with multiple plans. The delineation of priority conditions, the organization of services around these con- ditions, and the development of core sets of measures may help overcome some of these barriers to measurement.
Public- and private-sector oversight organizations are already organizing some of their activities around particular conditions. For example, the Founda- tion for Accountability has developed population- or condition-specific quality measurement guides related to adult asthma, alcohol misuse, breast cancer, dia- betes, health status under age 65, and major depressive disorders (Foundation for Accountability, 1999a) and continues to work on quality measurement and con- sumer reporting approaches in the areas of child and adolescent health, coronary artery disease, end of life, and HIV/AIDS (Foundation for Accountability, 1999b). The Foundation’s model organizes comparative information about quality perfor- mance into five categories based on how consumers think about their care: the basics, staying healthy, getting better, living with illness, and changing needs.
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (2000) has identified five specific areas for the development of indicators to assess hospital care: acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, pneumonia, surgical procedures and complications, and pregnancy and related conditions. Accredita-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
TAKING THE FIRST STEPS 103
tion by the National Committee for Quality Assurance includes measures related to how well a health plan cares for people when they have a chronic illness in such areas as cardiovascular disease, cancer, asthma, pneumonia and influenza, and diabetes (National Committee for Quality Assurance, 1999). Peer Review Organizations focus their national quality improvement efforts on six clinical priority areas: acute myocardial infarction, breast cancer, diabetes, heart failure, pneumonia, and stroke (Health Care Financing Administration, 2000). Finally, the National Quality Forum is developing a comprehensive quality measurement and reporting strategy that will address priorities for quality measurement that are consistent with the national aims for quality improvement in health care set forth in this report (National Quality Forum for Health Care Quality Measurement and Reporting, 2000).
CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING PRIORITY CONDITIONS
Various criteria can be used to identify the priority conditions. Two IOM committees have suggested criteria for setting priorities among conditions: one committee focused on how to set priorities for guideline development, the other on how to set priorities for technology assessment. The common criteria from both processes included prevalence, burden of illness, cost, variability in prac- tice, and the potential to improve outcomes or reduce costs (Institute of Medicine, 1992, 1995).
As noted earlier, this committee suggests starting with the priority conditions identified in the MEPS. Some are long-term life-threatening conditions, such as cancer, diabetes, emphysema, high cholesterol, HIV/AIDS, hypertension, is- chemic heart disease, and stroke. Others, such as arthritis, asthma, gall bladder disease, stomach ulcers, and back problems of any kind, are categorized as chronic manageable conditions. The list also includes Alzheimer’s disease, depression, and anxiety disorders. MEPS obtains a larger sample size for seven of the conditions—hypertension, ischemic heart disease, asthma, diabetes, stroke, em- physema, and arthritis—to make population estimates. Although other sources are also available, the advantage of starting with the MEPS listing is its represen- tative population sample, as opposed to claims data that rely on services having been used.
PROVIDING THE RESOURCES NEEDED TO INITIATE CHANGE
The health care system in the United States needs significant redesign. Given the magnitude of the change required, the innovation fund recommended earlier is needed to seed projects that can help apply the concepts described in this report. A Health Care Quality Innovation Fund should finance the demonstration
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
104 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
and evaluation of programs designed to implement the types of changes recom- mended in this report. Although a specific agenda should be established, the areas of interest for funding should address one or more of the issues covered in this report: techniques for implementing the rules for redesigning care set forth in Chapter 3, applying evidence to health care delivery, using information tech- nology, aligning payment policies for quality, and preparing the workforce.
Emphasis should be placed on funding projects that will integrate the result- ing innovations into processes of care. The goal is not simply to fund “good ideas,” but rather to fund the implementation of good ideas in real-life settings, focusing on innovations that have a good likelihood of broad applicability to other sites. Evaluations will need to be carefully structured to be able to assess the programmatic features that contributed to a project’s successful implementa- tion, including how technical, cultural, and economic factors were addressed. Barriers encountered should also be identified, as well as how they were over- come or whether they presented too great an obstacle.
Funding may be provided to individual local health care organizations, pri- vate partnerships (e.g., those between purchasers and delivery systems), or pub- lic–private partnerships (e.g., those among delivery systems, local public health agencies, and consumer groups). Possible projects may relate to the direct deliv- ery of health care for a specific population or to the development of an infrastruc- ture that facilitates needed change (e.g., approaches for sharing data).
A portion of the Health Care Quality Innovation Fund should be set aside to provide resources to answer critical research questions. Implementation and evaluation of innovative projects are important, but some areas may require additional understanding to guide demonstrations and their implementation. For example, the change to using relative value units as a payment approach for physicians was legislated in 1989 for implementation in 1992, following about 10 years of research, testing, and evaluation (Hsaio and Stason, 1979). Possible areas requiring additional organizational research include understanding how financial and other types of incentives relate to organizational setting, how phy- sician and nonphysician members of the care team can optimally interact and complement each other, what components and interactions of systems of care are most important for improving quality, and how to organize care for people with chronic conditions.
The committee views public support as important for catalyzing the needed changes for several reasons. First, a commitment of funds over several years can ensure a sustained and stable funding source. Projects funded by health care organizations through operating revenues represent a valuable contribution, but the stability and level of funding can be unpredictable, and perhaps unsustain- able, in a rapidly changing marketplace.
Second, public support can provide partial funding for the up-front costs that health care organizations face in undertaking the changes recommended in this report. Organizations should be prepared to support the continuing costs of any
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
TAKING THE FIRST STEPS 105
initiatives, but public funding for some portion of up-front costs can be a valuable resource for an organization that is interested, willing, and ready to redesign the delivery of health care to improve quality. Thus, the Health Care Quality Innova- tion Fund represents a public–private approach to change, with the public sector providing seed money and the private sector using operating revenue to fund some of the up-front costs and any ongoing costs.
Third, rather than trying to identify large programs aimed at reforming the entire system, smaller applied projects of varying size and focus should be per- mitted to flourish. Public funding for a mix of projects would permit midcourse corrections to be made as greater understanding is gained on what types of projects work or fail. Use of public seed money can also require an objective evaluation of demonstration projects and public access to the tools and tech- niques used. Rather than remaining in the private domain, the information be- comes a public good for use by all to learn how to improve health care quality.
Research and demonstrations for organizational redesign in health care occur today in both the private and public sectors, although the level of effort appears to be modest given the size of the task ahead. In the private sector, one of the main sources of funds for organizational design research is foundations. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation has sponsored the Changes in Health Care Financing and Organization Program since 1988. It has provided over $50 million to stimulate research into new strategies in the financing and organization of health care and the impact of changes in the delivery system on quality, access, and costs. The program funds research, policy analysis, demonstrations, and evalua- tions to provide timely information to policy makers, purchasers, providers, and researchers.
Some health care organizations also devote a portion of their revenues to research and development projects. For example, Kaiser-Permanente has con- ducted work on risk adjustment methods for payment policy; Group Health Co- operative of Puget Sound has conducted extensive work on improving care for populations with chronic illness; and Intermountain Health Care in Salt Lake City has developed data systems for evaluating and improving process of care. Organizational design research is also being conducted at universities across the country.
On the public side, the primary source of funds for organizational design research is AHRQ. The Center for Organization and Delivery Studies was cre- ated in 1996 to provide leadership for research on health care markets, delivery systems and organizations (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000a). The Integrated Delivery System Research Network is a new model of field-based research that partners health services researchers with large health care systems to develop and disseminate evidence on data and measurement systems and orga- nizational best practices (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000b). Approximately $4 million has been allocated over a 3-year period. Other AHRQ projects also contribute to innovation in health care delivery, such as work in
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
106 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
medical informatics and patient safety. Other investments in organizational rede- sign in the public sector include those of the VHA, whose Quality Enhancement Research Initiative effort was described earlier in this chapter, and the Health Care Financing Administration’s Office of Research and Development, funded at approximately $55 million in fiscal year 2001 (a decline of 11 percent from the prior year) (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2000a). A portion of those funds supports projects that are consistent with redesigning health care delivery, including work related to competitive pricing, coordinated care for the chronically ill, and Centers of Excellence.
A great many resources are devoted to technological innovation in health care in the areas of pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and biotechnology. Invest- ment in research and development was estimated at almost $36 billion in 1995, or about 3.5 percent of total health care spending (Neumann and Sandberg, 1998). Over $30 billion has been invested each year since 1993. Just over half of the investments were made in the private sector; the remainder of the spending was in the public sector, primarily the National Institutes of Health.
Although such investments have produced great advances in technological innovation, however, they have produced little innovation in the organization and delivery of care. The irony is that the current health care system cannot ensure that the new technologies are delivered effectively, efficiently, and safely to the people that can most appropriately benefit from them. This dilemma will likely worsen in the future with expected advances in genome research, tissue reengineering, pharmacogenetics, and other areas.
As noted earlier, the committee has not recommended a specific amount for a Health Care Quality Innovation Fund, but believes that an amount on the order of $1 billion over 3 to 5 years is needed. This amount represents one-quarter of 1 percent of the almost $400 billion the federal government currently spends on health care. By comparison, the top ten funded diseases at the National Institutes of Health were funded at $3.6 billion just for the year 1996 (Gross et al., 1999), while approximately $1 billion was devoted to the human genome project over the last 4 years (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2000b). There is no central source for determining the extent of public and private investments in innovation in health care organization and delivery; however, the public- and private-sector initiatives identified above may total $100 million annually. This is far short of the amount needed for the magnitude of changes required and far less than the $36 billion expended annually for technology research.
The following are examples of the types of projects that might be supported through the recommended fund.4
4These examples draw on some of the approaches to redesign being pursued by clinical leaders who were interviewed as part of an Institute of Medicine study aimed at identifying exemplary practices (Donaldson and Mohr, 2000).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
TAKING THE FIRST STEPS 107
Example 1—Using Information Technology to Improve the Timeliness of Ser- vices in a Hospital Emergency Department
An emergency department sought to redesign the process of care by reduc- ing the time required to provide complete care to a patient—the cycle time. Reducing cycle times improves both patient satisfaction and productivity. The staff identified key processes of care, such as x-ray cycle time, time between arrival at the emergency department and seeing a physician, and time needed to get a patient admitted to a bed. They introduced the concept of parallel process- ing and designed algorithms to permit the simultaneous performance of multi- ple tasks. Additionally, they developed their own tracking system (since noth- ing acceptable for the purpose was available from vendors) to track where patients are in the process of care, as well as the status of the system, in 15- minute increments (almost real time). A touch screen informs staff instantly of any problems in specific care processes so they can intervene quickly. These efforts have reduced total cycle time for less urgent patients from 92 to 47 minutes, time between arrival and seeing a physician from 32 to 18 minutes, time between decision to admit and getting the patient to the floor from 210 to 60 minutes, and x-ray cycle time from 92 to 32 minutes. If supported by an innovation fund, this project would share its algorithms and tracking system, along with pitfalls encountered during the redesign, so that the improved pro- cess would be disseminated to other emergency departments.
Example 2—A Partnership to Improve Chronic Care A hospital, two small primary care practices, and an endocrinologist decid-
ed to collaborate on the development of a state-of-the-art diabetic care program. They began by reviewing the practice guidelines and agreeing on the key ele- ments of preventive, acute, and chronic care. In an attempt to identify best practices, they visited two of the leading diabetic care programs. They then reached agreement on the key elements of a care process, and on the quality measures to be collected and used in assessing the care process and patient outcomes. They also worked to establish an interactive patient education pro- gram, which could be used online or viewed on video in the office. A diabetic care team was formed, consisting of two primary care physicians, a nurse prac- titioner, and an endocrinologist. Relying heavily on e-mail, they were able to establish procedures for ongoing communication and management of diabetic patients.
Example 3—Reorganizing Staff for Patient-Centered Primary Care A primary care center with multiple offices served 270,000 patients with
110 full-time equivalents (FTEs). The center had a 55-day waiting period for appointments, resulting in packed schedules for staff, a chaotic office environ- ment, an overused urgent care clinic, and unhappy patients. The center decided to develop an open-access system so that patients could get an appointment either the same day they called or the next day, with their own physician when- ever possible. Under the old system, patients calling for appointments would be sorted according to need: wellness care, acute illness, or chronic care. This approach was ineffective because patients might have two or three needs simul-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
108 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
taneously; thus, they would make multiple appointments to meet different needs or go to the urgent care clinic, which further stressed the system.
In the redesigned system, the staff was organized into 15 teams, each with 7 to 9 physicians and nurse practitioners; the urgent care clinic was closed, and that staff was reassigned to the regular offices. Patients were no longer catego- rized according to the nurse’s or receptionist’s assessment of their need, but were seen based on their own perception of need. Whereas the number of visits was expected to increase because of “patients’ insatiable demands,” the total number of patient visits declined by 7 percent, and the no-show rate went from 20 percent to being “too small to show up in the statistics.” Patients could meet all their needs in one visit with their regular doctor (rather than in one visit to the urgent care clinic and another visit to their regular doctor). The rate of patients able to see their own physician increased from 47 to 75 percent. The provision of preventive services also increased. Additionally, fewer patient charts were lost because they were pulled the day the patients came in, and with fewer lost charts, clinicians were more likely to have the information they need- ed when seeing a patient. Overall costs decreased because of fewer visits and the closure of the urgent care clinic. Additionally, the center thought it would be necessary to hire additional staff, but when the operational system was im- proved, this was not the case, so cost increases were avoided. If such a project were funded by an innovation fund, the primary care center would share its tools for appointment scheduling and staffing design.
The above examples illustrate the range and depth of redesign efforts that should occur. Because such efforts can be disruptive to current operations and take extended periods of time to accomplish, health care professionals and orga- nizations need extra support and incentive to undertake them. An innovation fund should support the implementation of projects that could not otherwise be conducted during the routine course of business because they would be too dis- ruptive for the patients and staff. As suggested in Example 1 above, use of a new information technology can be quite disruptive to the provision of services and staff functioning. In some cases, redesign may be so fundamental that temporary closure of a service may be required. For example, in another case that was part of an IOM study of exemplary practices (Donaldson and Mohr, 2000), one medi- cal group had to close its offices for a short period of time to make the changes they deemed necessary. Few health care professionals and organizations can undertake such drastic steps to substantially reorganize their care processes with- out special (and temporary) assistance. Additional examples of reengineering and redesign projects are provided in Chapter 5.
REFERENCES
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. 2000a. “Overview: Center for Organization and De- livery Studies.” Online. Available at http://www.ahrq.gov/about/cods/codsover.htm [accessed Jan. 29, 2001].
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
TAKING THE FIRST STEPS 109
———. 2000b. “Integrated Delivery System Research Network (ISDRN): Field Partnerships to Conduct and Use Research, Fact Sheet. AHRQ Publication No. 01-P004.” Online. Available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/idsrn.htm [accessed Jan. 29, 2001].
Berk, Marc L. and Alan C. Monheit. The Concentration of Health Expenditures: An Update. Health Affairs 11(4):145–9, 1992.
Blumenthal, David and Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin. Carve Outs: Definition, Experience, and Choice Among Candidate Conditions. American Journal of Managed Care 4(Suppl):SP45–57, 1998.
Bodenheimer, Thomas. Disease Management in the American Market. BMJ 320:563–6, 2000. Bodenheimer, Thomas, Bernard Lo, and Lawrence Casalino. Primary Care Physicians Should Be
Coordinators, Not Gatekeepers. JAMA 281(21):2045–9, 1999. Brook, Robert H., Elizabeth A. McGlynn, and Paul D. Cleary. Part 2: Measuring Quality of Care. N
EngI J Med 335(13):966–70, 1996. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 1999. “Chronic Diseases and Their Risk Factors: The
Nation’s Leading Causes of Death.” Online. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/statbook/ statbook.htm [accessed Dec. 7, 2000].
Cleary, Paul D. and Susan Edgman-Levitan. Health Care Quality: Incorporating Consumer Perspec- tives. JAMA 278(19):1608–12, 1997.
Cromwell, Jerry, Debra A. Dayhoff, and Armen H. Thoumaian. Cost Savings and Physician Re- sponses to Global Bundled Payments for Medicare Heart Bypass Surgery. Health Care Financ- ing Review 19(1):41–57, 1997.
Demakis, John G. and Lynn McQueen, July 11, 2000. Office of Health Services Research and Development Services, Veterans Administration. Personal communication: telephone conver- sation.
Demakis, John G., Lynn McQueen, Kenneth W. Kizer, and John R. Feussner. Quality Enhancement Research Initiative (QUERI): A collaboration between research and clinical practice. Medical Care 38(6, Suppl 1):I17–25, 2000.
Donaldson, Molla S. and Julie J. Mohr. Exploring Innovation and Quality Improvement in Health Care Micro-Systems: A Cross-Case Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Medicine, Na- tional Academy Press, 2000.
Ellrodt, Gray, Deborah J. Cook, Jean Lee, et al. Evidence-Based Disease Management. JAMA 278(20):1687–92, 1997.
Fennell, Mary L. and Ann B. Flood. Key Challenges in Studying Organizational Issues in Delivery of Healthcare to Older Americans. Health Services Research 33(June;Part II):424–33, 1998.
Fishman, Paul, Michael Von Korff, Paula Lozano, and Julia Hecht. Chronic Care Costs In Managed Care. The first single-plan comparison of chronic care costs shows why cost-effective clinical approaches are critical to managed care success. Health Affairs 16(3):239–47, 1997.
Foundation for Accountability. Accountability Action 3(2), 1999a. ———. 1999b. “Foundation for Accountability (FACCT) homepage.” Online. Available at http://
www.facct.org [accessed Dec. 7, 2000]. Friedman, Maria A. Issues in Measuring and Improving Health Care Quality. Health Care Financing
Review 16(4):1–13, 1995. Gross, Cary P., Gerard F. Anderson, and Neil R. Powe. The Relation between Funding by the
National Institutes of Health and the Burden of Disease. N EngI J Med 340(24):1881–7, 1999. Health Care Financing Administration. 1999. “Fact Sheet: Medicare’s Prudent Purchasing Initia-
tive.” Online. Available at http://www.hcfa.gov/facts/fsprud.htm [accessed Dec. 7, 2000]. ———. 2000. “Peer Review Organizations (PROs). Medicare’s Health Care Quality Improvement
Program v5–2.” Online. Available at http://www.hcfa.gov/quality/5b1.htm [accessed Dec. 7, 2000].
Hewitt, Maria for the Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America and the National Cancer Policy Board. Interpreting the Volume–Outcome Relationship in the Context of Health Care Quality. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Medicine, National Academy Press, 2000. Online. Available at http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10005.html [accessed Jan. 29, 2001].
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
110 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Hofer, Timothy P., Rodney A. Hayward, Sheldon Greenfield, et al. The Unreliability of Individual Physician “Report Cards” for Assessing the Costs and Quality of Care of a Chronic Disease. JAMA 281(22):2098–105, 1999.
Hoffman, Catherine, Dorothy P. Rice, and Hai-Yen Sung. Persons with Chronic Conditions. Their Prevalence and Costs. JAMA 276(18): 1473–9, 1996.
Homer, Charles J. Asthma Disease Management. N EngI J Med 337(20):1461–3, 1997. Hsaio, W. C. and W. B. Stason. Toward Developing a Relative Value Scale for Medical and Surgical
Services. Health Care Financing Review 1(23):23–38, 1979. Hunter, David J. Disease Management: Has it a Future? BMJ 320:530, 2000. Institute of Medicine Setting Priorities for Health Technologies Assessment: A Model Process.
Molla S. Donaldson and Harold C. Sox, Jr., Eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992.
———. Setting Priorities for Clinical Practice Guidelines. Marilyn J. Field, ed. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995.
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. 2000. “ORYX: The Next Evolu- tion in Accreditation. Questions and Answers about the Joint Commission’s Planned Integra- tion of Performance Measures into the Accreditation Process.” Online. Available at http:// www.jcaho.org/perfmeas/oryx%5Fqa.html [accessed Dec. 7, 2000].
Ketner, Lisa. Population Management Takes Disease Management to the Next Level. Healthcare Financial Management 53(8):36–9, 1999.
Lasker, Roz D. The Diabetes Control and Complications Trial, Implications for Policy and Practice. N EngI J Med 329(14):1035–6, 1993.
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. 2000. “MEPS HC-006R: 1996 Medical Conditions.” Online. Available at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/catlist.htm [accessed Dec. 7, 2000].
National Committee for Quality Assurance. 1999. “NCQA Releases Final HEDIS 2000 Measures; Focus is on Heart Disease, Asthma, Women’s Health.” Online. Available at http://www. ncqa.org/Pages/Communications/news/H2KFINREL.html [accessed Dec. 7, 2000].
National Quality Forum for Health Care Quality Measurement and Reporting. 2000. “National Qual- ity Forum Mission.” Online. Available at http://www.qualityforum.org/mission/home.htm [ac- cessed Dec. 7, 2000].
Neumann, Peter J. and Eileen A. Sandberg. Trends in Health Care R&D and Technology Innovation. Health Affairs 17(6):111–9, 1998.
Ray, G. Thomas, Tracy Lieu, Bruce Fireman, et al. The Cost of Health Conditions in a Health Maintenance Organization. Medical Care Research and Review 57(1):92–109, 2000.
Redelmeier, Donald A., Siew H. Tan, and Gillian L. Booth. The Treatment of Unrelated Disorders in Patients with Chronic Medical Diseases. N EngI J Med 338(21):1516–20, 1998.
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Chronic Care in America: A 21st Century Challenge. Princeton, NJ: The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1996. Online. Available at http:// www.rwjf.org/library/chrcare/ [accessed Sept. 19, 2000].
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 2000a. “Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Request, Health Care Financing Administration.” Online. Available at http://www.hcfa.gov/testimony/2000/ 000208.htm [accessed Jan. 29, 2001].
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health National Human Genome Research Institute. 2000b. “FY 2001 Budget.” Online. Available at http://www. nhgri.nih.gov/NEWS/fy2001.pdf [accessed Dec. 7, 2000].
Wagner, Edward H. The Role of Patient Care Teams in Chronic Disease Management. BMJ 320:569– 72, 2000.
Wagner, Edward H., Brian T. Austin, and Michael Von Korff. Improving Outcomes in Chronic Illness. Managed Care Quarterly 42(2):12–25, 1996a.
———. Organizing Care for Patients with Chronic Illness. Milbank Quarterly 74(4):511–42, 1996b.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
111
5
Building Organizational Supports for Change
Between front-line clinical care teams and the health care environment lies an array of health care organizations, including hospitals, managed care organi- zations, medical groups, multispeciality clinics, integrated delivery systems, and others. Leaders of today’s health care organizations face a daunting challenge in redesigning the organization and delivery of care to meet the aims set forth in this report. They face pressures from employees and medical staff, as well as from the local community, including residents, business and service organizations, regulators, and other agencies. It is difficult enough to balance the needs of those many constituencies under ordinary circumstances. It is especially difficult when one is trying to change routine processes and procedures to alter how people conduct their everyday work, individually and collectively.
This chapter describes a general process of organizational development and then offers a set of tools and techniques, drawing heavily from engineering con- cepts, as a starting point for identifying how organizations might redesign care. Chapter 3 offered a set of rules that would redesign the nature of interactions between a clinician and a patient to improve the quality of care. This chapter describes how organizations can redesign care to systematically improve the quality of care for patients. This is not an exhaustive list of possible approaches, but a sampling of techniques used in other fields that might have applicability in health care. The broad areas discussed in this chapter apply to all health care organizations; the specific tools and techniques used would need to be adapted to an organization’s local environment and patients.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
112 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Recommendation 7: The Agency for Healthcare Research and Qual- ity and private foundations should convene a series of workshops involving representatives from health care and other industries and the research community to identify, adapt, and implement state-of- the-art approaches to addressing the following challenges:
• Redesign of care processes based on best practices • Use of information technologies to improve access to clinical
information and support clinical decision making • Knowledge and skills management • Development of effective teams • Coordination of care across patient conditions, services, and
settings over time • Incorporation of performance and outcome measurements for
improvement and accountability
To achieve the six aims identified in Chapter 2, board members, chief execu- tive officers, chief information officers, chief financial officers, and clinical man- agers of all types of health care organizations will need to take steps to redesign care processes. The recommended series of workshops is intended to serve multiple purposes: (1) to help communicate the recommendations and findings of this report and engage leaders and managers of health care organizations in the pursuit of the aims, (2) to provide knowledge and tools that will be helpful to these individuals, and (3) to encourage the development of formal and informal networks of individuals involved in innovation and improvement.
STAGES OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The design of health care organizations can be conceptualized as progressing through three stages of development to a final stage that embodies the committee’s vision for the 21st-century health care system, as represented by the six aims set forth in Chapter 2 (see Table 5-1). Although settings and practices vary, the committee believes much of the health sector has been working at Stages 2 and 3 over the last decade or more. As knowledge and technologies continue to ad- vance and the complexity of care delivery grows, the evolution to Stage 4 will require that Stage 3 organizations accelerate efforts to redesign their approaches to interacting with patients, organizing services, providing training, and utilizing the health care workforce.
Stage 1
Stage 1 is characterized by a highly fragmented delivery system, with physi- cians, hospitals, and other health care organizations functioning autonomously.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 113
The scope of practice for many physicians is very broad. Patients rely on physi- cian training, experience, and good intentions for guidance. Individual clinicians do their best to stay abreast of the literature and rely on their own practice experience to make the best decisions for their patients. Journals, conferences, and informal consultation with peers are the usual means of staying current. Information technology tools are almost entirely absent. Norman (1988) has characterized this approach to work as based on “knowledge in the head,” with heavy dependence on learning and memory. The patient’s role tends to be pas- sive, with care being organized for the benefit of the professional and/or institu- tion.
Stage 2
Stage 2 is characterized by the formation of well-defined referral networks, greater use of informal mechanisms to increase patient involvement in clinical decision making, and the formation of loosely structured multidisciplinary teams. For the most part, health care is organized around areas of physician specializa- tion and institutional settings. Patients have more access to health information through print, video, and Internet-based materials than in Stage 1, and more formal mechanisms exist for patient input. However, these tend to be generic mechanisms, such as consent forms and satisfaction surveys. Patients have infor- mal mechanisms for input on their care.
Most health data are paper based. Little patient information is shared among settings or practices; the result is often gaps, redundancy of data gathering, and a lack of relevant information. In this stage, institutions and specialty groups, for example, try to help practitioners apply science to practice by developing tools for knowledge management, such as practice guidelines.
Stage 3
In Stage 3, care is still organized in a way that is oriented to the interests of professionals and institutions, but there is some movement toward a patient- centered system and recognition that individual patients differ in their prefer- ences and needs. Team practice is common, but changes in roles are often slowed or stymied by institutional, labor, and financial structures, as well as by law and custom. Some training for team practice occurs, but that training is typically fragmented and isolated by health discipline, such as medicine, nursing, or physi- cal therapy.
Clinicians and managers recognize the increasing complexity of health care and the opportunities presented by information technology. Some real-time deci- sion support tools are available, but information technology capability is modest, and stand-alone applications are the rule. Computer-based applications for labo- ratory data, ordering of medications, and records of patient encounters typically
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
114
T A
B L
E 5
-1 S
ta ge
s of
E vo
lu ti
on o
f th
e D
es ig
n of
H ea
lt h
O rg
an iz
at io
ns
S ta
ge T
he P
at ie
nt E
xp er
ie nc
e K
no w
le dg
e an
d S
ki ll
s M
an ag
em en
t C
ar e
D el
iv er
y
1 •
T he
p hy
si ci
an d
et er
m in
es w
ha t
is i
n th
e •
T he
re i
s he
av y
re li
an ce
o n
hu m
an m
em or
y •
In di
vi du
al p
hy si
ci an
s cr
af t
so lu
ti on
s fo
r be
st i
nt er
es t
of t
he p
at ie
nt a
nd c
on tr
ol s
an d
kn ow
le dg
e w
it ho
ut s
ig ni
fi ca
nt r
ea l-
in di
vi du
al p
at ie
nt s.
ca re
. T
he p
at ie
nt ’s
r ol
e te
nd s
to b
e ti
m e
ai ds
a nd
t oo
ls .
I nf
or m
at io
n pa
ss iv
e, w
it h
ca re
b ei
ng o
rg an
iz ed
f or
t he
te ch
no lo
gy i
s al
m os
t en
ti re
ly a
bs en
t. be
ne fi
t of
t he
p ro
fe ss
io na
l an
d/ or
in st
it ut
io n.
2 •
M em
be rs
o f
th e
pr of
e s si
on a l
t e a
m •
C li
ni c i
a n s
ha ve
s om
e pr
ot oc
ol s
a n d
• R
e c og
ni ti
on o
f th
e va
ri a b
il it
y in
t re
a t m
en t
in fo
rm a l
ly s
ha re
c on
tr ol
a m
on g
kn ow
le dg
e a s
si st
a n c e
a va
il a b
le ,
bu t
st il
l m
ay l
e a d
to i
nt e r
e s t
in p
ro to
c o ls
a nd
th em
se lv
e s ,
bu t
ph ys
ic ia
n a u
to no
m y
re ly
o n
m em
or y
a n d
ba si
c kn
ow le
dg e
gu id
e l in
e s .
pr e d
om in
a t e s
. C
a r e
is o
rg a n
iz e d
f or
t he
m an
ag em
en t
to ol
s (j
ou rn
a l s,
c on
fe re
nc e s
, •
T ra
di ti
on a l
p ro
fe ss
io na
l ro
le s
de fi
ne be
ne fi
t of
t he
p ro
fe ss
io na
l a n
d/ or
c o ns
ul ta
ti on
w it
h pe
e r s,
g e n
e r a l
I nt
e r ne
t w
or ki
ng r
e l a t
io ns
hi ps
. in
st it
ut io
n. in
fo rm
a t io
n si
te s)
. V
e r y
li tt
le i
nf or
m a t
io n
• P
a t ie
nt s
ha ve
i nf
or m
a l m
e c ha
ni sm
s fo
r te
c h no
lo gy
i s
in u
se .
in pu
t on
t he
ir c
a r e .
te c h
no lo
gy i
s in
u se
. •
P a t
ie nt
s re
c e iv
e so
m e
in fo
rm a t
io n
fr om
c l in
ic ia
ns (
ge ne
ra ll
y st
oc k
pr in
t m
a t e r
ia l
a n d
ve rb
a l i
nf or
m a t
io n)
.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
115 3
• F
or m
al m
ec ha
ni sm
s fo
r pa
ti en
t in
pu t
• C
li ni
ci an
s an
d pa
ti en
ts h
av e
re ad
y ac
ce ss
• T
he p
ro fe
ss io
na l
te am
f or
m al
ly s
ha re
s ex
is t.
to c
li ni
ca l
kn ow
le dg
e.
T he
re i
s ro
le s
an d
re sp
on si
bi li
ti es
a m
on g
it s
• C
ar e
is o
rg an
iz ed
f or
t he
b en
ef it
o f
th e
si gn
if ic
an t
re li
an ce
o n
be st
p ra
ct ic
es ,
m em
be rs
. T
he p
hy si
ci an
a s
re sp
on si
bl e
pr of
es si
on al
a nd
/o r
in st
it ut
io n,
b ut
t he
re gu
id el
in es
, an
d di
se as
e m
an ag
em en
t le
ad er
e m
er ge
s.
P ra
ct ic
es r
ec og
ni ze
t he
is s
om e
m ov
em en
t to
w ar
d a
pa ti
en t-
pa th
w ay
s fo
r cl
in ic
ia ns
a nd
p at
ie nt
s. ne
ed f
or c
ha ng
in g
pr of
es si
on al
r ol
es ,
bu t
ce nt
er ed
s ys
te m
. S
om e
re al
-t im
e de
ci si
on su
pp or
t to
ol s
ar e
ch an
ge i
s sl
ow ed
o r
st ym
ie d
by av
ai la
bl e,
b ut
i nf
or m
at io
n te
ch no
lo gy
in st
it ut
io na
l an
d fi
na nc
ia l
st ru
ct ur
es ,
la w
, ca
pa bi
li ty
i s
m od
es t.
an d
cu st
om .
• S
om e
tr ai
ni ng
f or
t ea
m p
ra ct
ic e
oc cu
rs .
• A
s m
al l
nu m
be r
of p
ra ct
ic es
a pp
ly s
ys te
m de
si gn
p ri
nc ip
le s
an d
in co
rp or
at e
in fo
rm at
io n
sy st
em s
in t
he ir
d ai
ly w
or k.
• M
an y
co nd
it io
ns a
re m
an ag
ed t
hr ou
gh sp
ec ia
l ca
re m
an ag
em en
t pr
og ra
m s.
4 •
C ar
e pr
oc es
se s
an d
tr an
sa ct
io ns
a re
b as
ed •
T he
e nv
ir on
m en
t is
r ic
h in
c li
ni ca
l •
T he
d el
iv er
y of
s er
vi ce
s is
c oo
rd in
at ed
on t
he n
ew r
ul es
s et
f or
th i
n C
ha pt
er 3
. in
fo rm
at io
n fo
r pa
ti en
ts a
nd ac
ro ss
p ra
ct ic
es ,
se tt
in gs
, an
d pa
ti en
t C
ar e
is p
at ie
nt -c
en te
re d,
w it
h pa
ti en
t an
d cl
in ic
ia ns
. co
nd it
io ns
o ve
r ti
m e.
I nf
or m
at io
n fa
m il
y be
in g
pa rt
o f
th e
he al
th c
ar e
te am
. •
A ut
om at
ed d
ec is
io n
su pp
or t
sy st
em s
te ch
no lo
gy i
s us
ed a
s th
e ba
si c
bu il
di ng
P at
ie nt
s ha
ve a
cc es
s to
a s
m uc
h in
co rp
or at
in g
pa ti
en t-
sp ec
if ic
d at
a ar
e bl
oc k
fo r
m ak
in g
sy st
em s
w or
k, t
ra ck
in g
in fo
rm at
io n
as t
he y
w is
h to
h av
e an
d us
ed a
t th
e po
in t
of p
at ie
nt c
ar e.
pe rf
or m
an ce
, an
d in
cr ea
si ng
l ea
rn in
g. op
po rt
un it
ie s
to e
xe rc
is e
a s m
uc h
c o nt
ro l
• S
ki ll
d e v
e l op
m en
t, t
ra in
in g,
a nd
P ra
c t ic
e s u
se m
e a su
re s
a n d
in fo
rm a t
io n
ov e r
t he
ir c
a r e
a s t
he y
de si
re .
le a d
e r sh
ip s
up po
rt t
he m
ul ti
di sc
ip li
na ry
a b ou
t ou
tc om
e s a
nd i
nf or
m a t
io n
ch a r
a c te
r of
c li
ni c a
l pr
a c ti
c e .
te c h
no lo
gy t
o c o
nt in
ua ll
y re
fi ne
a dv
an c e
d e n
gi ne
e r in
g pr
in c i
pl e s
a nd
t o
im pr
ov e
th e i
r c a
re p
ro c e
ss e s
. T
he h
e a lt
h w
or kf
or c e
i s
us e d
e ff
ic ie
nt ly
a nd
f le
xi bl
y to
i m
pl em
en t
c h a n
ge .
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
116 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
cannot exchange data at all or are not based on common definitions. Practice groups—particularly those that are community based—typically lack informa- tion systems to make such decision support tools available at the point of patient care, or to integrate guidelines with information about specific patients. Clinical leaders recognize the need for what has been called “knowledge in the world” (Norman, 1988)—information that is retrievable when needed, replaces the need for detailed memory recall, and is continuously updated on the basis of new information. More organized groups rely on best practices, guidelines, and dis- ease management pathways for clinicians and patients, but these are not inte- grated with workflow.
Stage 4
Stage 4 is the health care system of the 21st century envisioned by the committee. This system supports continued improvement in the six aims of safety, effectiveness, patient-centeredness, timeliness, efficiency, and equity. Health care organizations in this stage have the characteristics of other high- performing organizations. They draw on the experiences of other sectors and adapt tools to the unique characteristics of the health care field.
Patients have the opportunity to exercise as much or as little control over treatment decisions as they choose (as long as their preferences fall within the boundaries of evidence-based practice). Services are coordinated across prac- tices, settings, and patient conditions over time using increasingly sophisticated information systems.
Whatever their form, health care organizations can be characterized as “learn- ing organizations” (Senge, 1990) that explicitly measure their performance along a variety of dimensions, including outcomes of care, and use that information to change or redesign and continually improve their work using advanced engineer- ing principles. They make efficient and flexible use of the health workforce to implement change, matching and enhancing skill levels to enable less expensive professionals and patients to do progressively more sophisticated tasks (Christen- sen et al., 2000).
The committee does not advocate any particular organizational forms for the 21st-century health care system. The forms that emerge might comprise corpo- rate management and ownership structures, strategic alliances, and other contrac- tual arrangements (“virtual” organizations) (COR Healthcare Resources, 2000; Robinson and Casalino, 1996; Shortell et al., 2000a). New information and delivery structures might be located in a particular city or region or might be the basis for collaborative networks or consortia (COR Health LLC, 2000). What- ever the organizational arrangement, it should promote innovation and quality improvement. Every organization should be held accountable to its patients, the populations it serves, and the public for its clinical and financial performance.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 117
In some respects, such as economies of scale, workforce training and deploy- ment, and access to capital, larger organizations will have a comparative advan- tage. In other cases, small systems will evolve to take on functions now per- formed by larger organizations. The use of intranet- or Internet-based applications and information systems may enable the development of an infrastructure to accomplish certain functions. New forms might include, for example, Web- based knowledge servers or broker-mediated, consumer-directed health care pur- chasing programs.
KEY CHALLENGES FOR THE REDESIGN OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS
Health care services need to be organized and financed in ways that make sense to patients and clinicians and that foster coordination of care and collabora- tive work. They should be based on sound design principles and make use of information technologies that can integrate data for multiple uses (Kibbe and Bard, 1997a; Rosenstein, 1997). Whatever their form, organizations will need to meet six challenges, see Figure 5-1, that cut across different health conditions, types of care (such as preventive, acute, or chronic), and care settings:
• redesigning care processes; • making effective use of information technologies; • managing clinical knowledge and skills; • developing effective teams; • coordinating care across patient conditions, services, and settings over
time; and • incorporating performance and outcome measurements for improvement
and accountability.
The following discussion of these six challenges includes excerpts from interviews with clinical leaders conducted as a part of an IOM study aimed at identifying exemplary practices (Donaldson and Mohr, 2000).
Redesigning Care Processes
I try to help people understand that we can “work smarter.” You can feel rotten about how you are practicing. I tell them, “You are right—and it’s going to get worse.” But change is possible. We don’t need a billion-dollar solution.
We need a billion $1 solutions. You have to create the will to change. There’s the will to change, then execution.—Hospital-based endoscopy unit
Like any complex system, health care organizations require sophisticated tools and building blocks that allow them to function with purpose, direction, and high
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
118 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
reliability. Effective and reliable care processes—whether registering patients who come to the emergency room, ensuring complete immunizations for chil- dren, managing medication administration, ensuring that accurate laboratory tests are completed and returned to the requesting clinician, or ensuring that discharge from hospital to home after a disabling injury is safe and well coordinated—can be created only by using well-understood engineering principles. Not only must care processes be reliable, but they must also be focused on creating a relation- ship with a caregiver that meets the expectations of both the patient and the family. Redesign can transform the use of capital and human resources to achieve these ends.
Redesign may well challenge existing practices, data structures, roles, and management practices, and it results in continuing change. It involves conceptu-
FIGURE 5-1 Making change possible.
CARE SYSTEM
Supportive payment and regulatory environment
Organizations that facilitate the work of patient- centered teams
High performing patient-centered teams
Outcomes • Safe • Effective • Efficient • Personalized • Timely • Equitable
REDESIGN IMPERATIVES: SIX CHALLENGES
• Redesigned care processes • Effective use of information technologies • Knowledge and skills management • Development of effective teams • Coordination of care across patient conditions, services,
and settings over time • Use of performance and outcome measurement for
continuous quality improvement and accountability
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 119
alizing, mapping, testing, refining, and continuing to improve the many processes of health care. Redesign aimed at increasing an organization’s agility in respond- ing to changing demand may be accomplished through a variety of approaches, such as simplifying, standardizing, reducing waste, and implementing methods of continuous flow (Bennis and Mische, 1995; Goldsmith, 1998).
Students of organizational theory have learned a great deal through careful examination of the work of organizations that use very complex and often haz- ardous technologies. The committee’s earlier report, To Err Is Human, outlines the achievements of several manufacturing companies and the U.S. Navy’s air- craft carriers in using replicable strategies to achieve great consistency and reli- ability (Institute of Medicine, 2000). Other world-class businesses, notably those that have received the prestigious Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award, have embraced many of the tenets of quality improvement described by Deming, Juran, and others (Anderson et al., 1994), which include the need to improve constantly the system of production and services. Yet few health care organiza- tions have developed successful models of production that reliably deliver basic effective services, much less today’s increasingly advanced and complex tech- nologies. Nor have most been able to continually assess and meet changing patient requirements and expectations.
Some health care organizations have dedicated considerable energy and re- sources to changing the way they deliver care. Although these organizations have recognized the need for leadership to provide the necessary commitment to and investment in change, they have also recognized that change needs to come from the bottom up as front-line health care teams recognize opportunities for redesigning care processes and acquire the skill to implement those new ap- proaches successfully (National Committee for Quality Health Care, 1999; Wash- ington Business Group on Health, 1998). Many other organizations have taken steps toward redesigning processes, but have found replication and deployment difficult or short-lived (Blumenthal and Kilo, 1998; Shortell et al., 1998). The committee recognizes these efforts and the difficulties that stem from, among other things, restructuring and economic pressure, misaligned incentives, profes- sional entrenchment, competing priorities, organizational inertia, and lack of adequate information systems (Shortell et al., 1998).
A growing body of literature in health care indicates that well-designed care processes result in better quality (Desai et al., 1997; Griffin and Kinmouth, 1998). Some have argued that health care is not amenable to quality improvement ap- proaches derived from other industries because inputs (patients) are so variable; outputs, such as health-related outcomes, so ill-defined; and the need for expert judgment and improvisation so demanding. Similar arguments have been made, but not substantiated, in other service industries and by those in the specialized departments (e.g., legal) of manufacturing industries that have subsequently ex- perienced success in embracing principles of quality improvement (Galvin, 1998).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
120 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Fortunately, useful redesign principles that are now used widely in other indus- tries can be (and in some cases have been) adapted to health care.
Engineering principles have been widely applied by other industries and in some health care organizations to design processes that improve quality and safety (Collins and Porras, 1997; Donaldson and Mohr, 2000; Hodgetts, 1998; Kegan, 1994; Peters and Waterman, 1982). The following subsections describe five such principles and their use by health care professionals to improve pa- tients’ experiences and safety, the flow of care processes, and coordination and communication among health professionals and with patients (Langley et al., 1996).
System Design Using the 80/20 Principle
The nurse assesses the patient demographics, risk factors, support available, medication, lifestyle, and barriers to making changes. The first visit is usually 45 minutes to an hour long. Preventive screening visits are done yearly—assess vital signs, behavior, willingness to make changes. We take retinal photos, which are sent directly to the ophthalmologist, instead of sending the patient there. We learned that we need to risk stratify and fit the level of services to the level of risk. Services are less or more intense based on risk. We use protocols to identify risk level: primary—those with diabetes, secondary—those with diabetes and any other risk factors, tertiary—those who have already had a stroke, myocardial infarction, or renal failure.—Diabetic management group
This engineering principle can be restated: Design for the usual, but recog- nize and plan for the unusual. Process design should be explicit for the usual case—for 80 percent of the work. For the remaining 20 percent, contingency plans should be assembled as needed. This concept is useful both for designing systems of care and as an approach to acculturating new trainees. Also referred to as the Pareto Principle, the 80/20 principle is based on the recognition that a small number of causes (20 percent) is responsible for a large percentage (80 percent) of an effect (Juran, 1989; Transit Cooperative Research Program, 1995). In health care, for example, 20 percent of patients in a defined population may account for 80 percent of the work and incur 80 percent of costs. Similarly, 20 percent (or fewer) of common diagnoses may account for 80 percent of patients’ health problems.
A fundamental approach in health care has been to build care systems to accommodate all possible occurrences. This approach is cumbersome and often the source of delays when, for example, laboratory tests are done in case a rare disease is present, or certain procedures must be followed in case an unusual event should happen. System design based on the 80/20 approach exploits the existence of routine work, often a large proportion of the total work load, that is involved in an assortment of patient problems. One determines what work is
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 121
routine and designs a simple, standard, and low-cost process for performing this work efficiently and reliably. This leaves the more complex work to be per- formed employing processes that appropriately use higher-skilled personnel or more advanced technologies.
In accordance with this principle, approaches to planning care are designed to reflect the different sorts of clinical problems encountered in practice. Level 1 represents the most predictable needs. In a pediatric practice, well-child health supervision, immunization, and middle-ear infections represent a large portion of the work and very predictable needs. In an obstetrics–gynecology practice, pre- natal care and contraceptive counseling are examples of Level 1. In adult pri- mary care, examples include management of hypertension, acute sprains, low back pain, and sinusitis. For newly diagnosed patients with asthma, instruction in the use of an inhaler is an example of predictable work. The more predictable the work, the more it makes sense to standardize care so that it can be performed by a variety of workers in a consistent fashion.
When needs are predictable, standardization encompasses the key dimen- sions of work that should be performed the same way each time using a defined process and is a key element of the principle of mass customization discussed later in this section. For example, variation in the care of patients with commu- nity-acquired pneumonia can be reduced by identifying and standardizing the key dimensions of care. Standardization may involve very complex or very simple technologies and processes. An example of the latter is a nursing assistant stamp- ing on a patient’s chart, “Immunization up to date?” and circling “Yes” or “No” for a clinician to see as he or she enters the exam room. Focused standardization often entails simplifying processes. For example, instead of each clinician on staff having a different protocol, clinicians might agree to use a single chemo- therapy protocol for most patients, or a single dose, route, or frequency for a commonly administered medication. Although it might be permissible to use other protocols, clinicians would have to agree to evaluate the outcomes for patients under both the standard and nonstandard protocols to determine which was best (Institute of Medicine, 2000). In another example, Duke University’s pediatric emergency department uses a color-coded tape to measure a child’s length and an approximate weight range. Color-coded supplies (e.g., IV tubing, airway masks, syringes) correspond to the four weight ranges. Standardizing equipment for each color zone ensures that dosages and equipment are appropri- ate and safe for children in that range (Glymph, 2000).
Level 2 represents health care needs of medium predictability. At this level, it is important for practice settings to triage patients accurately to determine their needs. Examples are patients with chronic illnesses, such as asthma or diabetes, whose condition is not under control and who need special services to help them. Some patients might best be served by group visits with a diabetic counselor, others might need individual support, and others might need hospitalization. Appropriate triage based on needs could include working out a care plan with
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
122 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
patients in terms of exercise, weight loss, and insulin control and providing them with materials and resources to help them meet their objectives.
Level 3 represents patients with rare or complex health care health condi- tions for which special resources must be assembled. In such cases, applying excellent listening skills, assembling resources, and managing the clinician– patient relationship are especially important. Examples are a patient with an infectious disease that is rare and difficult to identify, or the need to assemble a multidisciplinary team for health supervision of children with special needs, such as those with cystic fibrosis, meningomyelocele, or craniofacial syndromes (Carey, 1992).
The assembling of these resources can sometimes be accomplished within a single office practice. In other cases, a relationship with another system—an- other critical care unit or an individual such as a subspecialist, for example—may be required. Recent evidence indicates that for ambulatory care, nurses and nurse practitioners can manage a substantial proportion of the work (Mundinger et al., 2000; Shum et al., 2000). The remaining 20 percent of the work would corre- spond to the third level, which requires the most highly trained practitioners.
Design for Safety
When lab results are returned by e-mail, they come back by provider, and I can attach them to the patient’s chart. When I open the patient record, the “desk- top” flags alert me to abnormal results.—Primary care practice
The doctor–patient relationship is important, but perhaps more important is how much [doctors] can rely on the system not to let [the patient] slip through the cracks. —Primary care practice
The prevention, detection, and mitigation of harm occur in learning environ- ments, not in environments of blame and reprisal. Designing systems for safety requires specific, clear, and consistent efforts to develop a work culture that encourages reporting of errors and hazardous conditions, as well as communica- tion among staff about safety concerns. Such learning also requires attention to effective knowledge transfer, including the systematic acquisition, dissemina- tion, and incorporation of ideas, methods, and evidence that may have been developed elsewhere (Institute of Medicine, 2000). As described in detail in the committee’s earlier report, To Err Is Human (Institute of Medicine, 2000), de- signing health care processes for safety involves a three-part strategy: (1) design- ing systems to prevent errors, (2) designing procedures to make errors visible when they do occur, and (3) designing procedures that can mitigate the harm to patients from errors that are not detected or intercepted (Nolan, 2000).
Designing systems to prevent errors includes designing jobs for safety, avoid- ing reliance on memory and vigilance, and simplifying and standardizing key processes (such as using checklists and protocols). Designing jobs for safety
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 123
means attending to the effects of work hours, workloads, staffing ratios, appropri- ate training, sources of distraction and their relationship to fatigue and reduced alertness, and sleep deprivation, as well as providing appropriate training. Avoid- ing reliance on memory and vigilance can be accomplished in simple ways, such as instituting reminder systems and color coding, eliminating look-alike and sound-alike products, wisely using checklists and protocols, and employing more complex automated systems that may prevent many errors (though they may also introduce new sources of error). Simplification and standardization are key principles not only in delivering effective services, but also in making them safer. For example, standardization of data displays so that all are expressed in the same units, of equipment so that on–off switches are in consistent locations, of the location of supplies and equipment, of order forms, and of prescribing conven- tions can prevent many errors (Institute of Medicine, 2000).
Designing procedures to make errors visible can also improve safety. Al- though human beings will always make errors, procedures can be designed so that many errors are identified before they result in harm to patients. For ex- ample, pharmaceutical software can alert the prescriber to an incorrect dose or potential interaction with another medication (Institute of Medicine, 2000).
Designing procedures that can mitigate harm from errors is a third means of improving patient safety. Examples of this strategy are having antidotes and up- to-date information available to clinicians; having equipment that is designed to default to the least harmful mode; and ensuring that teams are trained in effective recovery from crises, such as unexpected complications during operative proce- dures (Institute of Medicine, 2000).
Mass Customization
Mass customization involves combining the uniqueness of customized prod- ucts and services with the efficiencies of mass production. In manufacturing, this strategy has been developed as a way to give customers exactly what they want in a way that is feasible from a business standpoint—that is, quickly, at an accept- able cost, and without added complexity (Pine et al., 1995).
With reference to the three levels of predictability discussed earlier, mass customization is the design approach to Level 2 (patients with moderate levels of predictability of needs). Patients can often be grouped according to their need for a common set of services. For example, many medical conditions are defined in terms of their grade or degree of severity (e.g., cancer staging), degree of control achieved (e.g., controlled or uncontrolled hypertension), or level of risk (e.g., high- or low-risk pregnancy and the Glasgow trauma scale). With good informa- tion about the past needs and preferences of patients, it is often possible to standardize processes of care within a given stratum. It is possible to predict fairly accurately, for example, what proportion of patients will choose a variety of options, such as a group versus individual visit for management of a condition.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
124 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
In a non-health care example, hotels such as the Ritz Carlton keep track of their customers’ preferences so they can be offered appropriate services (Gilmore and Pine, 1997).
Yet patients thus grouped are not identical, and the health system should be responsive to differences in their preferences and special needs. Mass customi- zation involves attempting to standardize the common set of services needed by many patients while customizing or tailoring other aspects of those services to respond to individual preferences and needs. In the computer world, Internet sites can cater to “segments of one” by efficiently providing each customer with products that match his or her preferences (Leibovich, 2000). Likewise, the use of independent modules means that computer products can be assembled into different forms quickly and inexpensively (Feitzinger and Lee, 1997). Gateway is an example of a retail computer company that uses modules (such as varying amounts of memory or hard drive capacity) in mass customizing its products for the consumer. This use of modules for mass customization can be applied to the health care arena, for example to patients with congestive heart failure who need acute care. Modules for admission to a hospital or nursing home, for family education, and for rehabilitation can be drawn on and combined for individual patients. Another example is the steps in patient care, which can be thought of as a series of modules, such as (1) prescribing a medication, (2) assessing and encouraging adherence to therapy, and (3) monitoring patient outcomes. In these examples, the 80/20 approach also applies; that is, for each module, the set of options should be appropriate for 80 percent of patients.
In applying the principle of mass customization, differentiation is the last step—in industry, an example is manufacturing all products in the same way up to the addition of the product color. A health care example is having standardized instructions for patients with a given health problem, but writing in further infor- mation for those with additional health conditions.
Continuous Flow
When a patient calls to make an appointment, our philosophy is: If your doctor is here today, you will see your doctor.—Primary care practice
We have bedside registration in the emergency department. Each room re- ceives a portable computer rolled in on a cart. Computer orders for lab and pharmacy are entered from the bedside.—Emergency department
Each morning we make rounds on all 34 intensive care patients. The discussion includes pointed, patient-oriented reports, social as well as medical needs. All such issues can be dealt with and work begun at once.—Intensive care unit
If a patient calls in with a breast lump, she is usually seen within a day or so. First she sees her primary care provider, then she is sent to us for a mammo- gram—usually an ultrasound as well. We can do what we think should be done
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 125
right then—a biopsy and surgery if needed. Usually everything is done within 1 or 2 days.—Breast care center
Volume has dramatically increased here. We have had to change the way we work. Although most ERs have 12-hour shifts, we shortened the shifts to 9 hours. We have a system where there is “virtual on-call.” Physicians have agreed in advance that if our tracking system shows that the cycle time from the arrival of a patient to being seen by a doctor is past a specific threshold, they will stay longer, even if more help is there or on its way.—Emergency depart- ment
Continuous flow, sometimes referred to as “a batch size of one,” is an impor- tant design concept in which the system is designed to match demand so there is no aggregation of persons or units during processing. It represents the theoretical optimum for any production or service delivery system. In health care, application of this principle involves examining current assumptions about patient demand and redesigning the care process to better correspond to the characteristics of the demand curve (Murray and Tantau, 1998; Nolan et al., 1996).
If clinicians and managers assume that patient demand is insatiable, health care systems and individual practitioners must find ways to manage this demand. Management of demand generally entails using barriers, such as waiting, to dis- suade some people from seeking services or reducing the need to use resources that could be used elsewhere, or both. Alternatively, if the assumption is that patient demand is steady, predictable, and reasonable, then continuous flow is a more appropriate and effective solution. Some of the most advanced examples of continuous flow have been pioneered by office practices that use “open-access” scheduling (Grandinetti, 2000; Murray, 2000; Terry, 2000). Most scheduling systems rely on distinguishing between urgent and nonurgent requests for ap- pointments; the result is often waits of 2 weeks for a nonurgent appointment and several months for a physical examination. As a result, many patients do not keep their appointments (Bowman et al., 1996; Festinger et al., 1995). In an open-access system, office staff do not triage patients who call for an appoint- ment on the basis of whether they believe those patients need to be seen that day. Patients can schedule an appointment and be seen the same day, if they wish, by their doctor (or nurse practitioner) if that individual is in. Continuous flow does not, however, mean that patients must be fit into a lock-step process. If they prefer to wait or schedule an appointment for the future, they are always free to do so.
To implement such a program and match demand with resources requires that a practice first deal with its backlog of future appointments. Once it has implemented an open-access process, the practice will have only one scheduling system for all patients. Practices that have implemented open access report that they are able to see as many or more patients as before; that they finish the day on time and with personnel less exhausted; and that they are providing more appro-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
126 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
priate—effective, patient-centered, timely, and probably safer—care (Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2000).
Under a system of continuous flow, as opposed to batch flow, practitioners dictate notes, take care of other tasks after a patient’s visit, and respond to tele- phone messages as they occur or as patients are seen, rather than “batching” such tasks to be addressed at the end of the day. In the case of telephone messages, for example, batching often results in repeated calls by patients who are not certain their message has been received, repeated calls to patients who may be on their way home from work by the time the message is returned, delays in managing medications or in providing information about laboratory tests and instructions for self-care, and sometimes greater anxiety and suffering.
Production Planning
We reorganized into teams 2 years ago. An MD, RN, and Medical Assistant form a team. We have six or seven teams; each team sees a panel of 1200 patients. Each team sees patients for a 4 1/2-hour block of time per day. The morning starts with a 30-minute meeting to review appointments that are sched- uled for the day. Then the compressed clinic day. Then time for charting each afternoon. We have practice management time that is scheduled every week. Patients are not scheduled for that time. That time is for reviewing data, col- lecting data. It’s funny, but you can see almost the same number of patients during a compressed clinical day as during a full day. The teams are staggered throughout the day so that we can be open from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. The number of teams is scheduled to match times when patient demand is the greatest.—Pri- mary care practice
Production planning has been used in other industries to find the best way to allocate staff, equipment, and other resources to meet the needs of customers, as well as to reduce costs. Application of the principle depends on a detailed understanding of work processes, specifically, the identification of repetitive patterns of work.
Although the needs of patients and the work required to meet those needs will vary from day to day, all clinical practices have a natural rhythm defined by a period—for example, a week—after which the nature of the work repeats. One method of production planning involves the use of a repetitive master schedule to make the best use of resources in meeting patient needs. Creating such a sched- ule necessitates defining the work to be done, assembling a team suited to per- form the work, understanding the time period within which the work repeats, and making work assignments based on the standard time period. If a master sched- ule can be built for a typical week, it can be used with minor adjustments for any week. The repetitive master schedule serves a variety of purposes. Its primary purpose is to match resources to the needs of patients, but it also provides a
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 127
method for understanding complex systems and designing better production pro- cesses.
Summary
The reengineering principles described in this section—system design using the 80/20 approach, design for safety, mass customization, continuous flow, and production planning—are used by other industries, and, as indicated in the ac- companying quotations, by teams across a range of health care settings that include ambulatory office practices, hospital units, emergency departments, and hospices. Such engineering principles illustrate what is meant by focusing at a system level. They enable health care teams to organize their resources effec- tively to better meet patient needs, and make medical practice more satisfying without driving up costs. Such deliberate crafting of systems of care results not in impersonal, one-size-fits-all care processes. Rather, it makes care safer, en- ables standardization where appropriate, and at the same time results in situations that meet the unique needs of each patient.
Making Effective Use of Information Technologies
Spending 1 hour each day online, I send 800–900 e-mails each month. In my former visit-based model, I would see 400–500 patients each month. Now I see 200 patients each month, in unhurried and more time intensive visits, but I communicate with over 1,000 patients each month. I feel less stressed and my patients receive better care.—Primary care practice
Chapter 7 examines in detail the potential role of information technology in improving quality. Information technology can reduce errors and harm from errors (Bates et al., 1998; Raschke et al., 1998), make up-to-date evidence and decision support systems available at the point of patient care (Berner et al., 1999; Classen, 1998; Evans et al., 1998; Hunt et al., 1998), support research (Blumenthal, 1997), help make quality measurement timely and accurate (Schneider et al., 1999), improve coordination among clinicians, and increase accountability for performance (Blumenthal, 1997; National Committee for Qual- ity Assurance, 2000).
Increasingly, secure Internet and intranet applications are making it possible for clinicians and patients to communicate with one another more easily, for up- to-date evidence about what works to become increasingly accessible, and for clinical data to be shared in a timely fashion (Cushman and Detmer, 1998; Sci- ence Panel on Interactive Communication and Health, 1999). Some organiza- tions have begun to implement Internet applications for their patients for such purposes as obtaining health information, communicating with one another, read- ing information about physicians and staff, and viewing schedules for health education classes (Kaiser Permanente Online, 2000).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
128 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Information technology can provide laboratory results and other findings, as well as tools that help clinicians apply the health literature when making diag- noses and deciding among therapeutic approaches. The validity of the informa- tion used for such decision making is obviously critical. Also important is a user interface that matches clinical workflow, cognitive style, and the time constraints of clinical practice (Kibbe and Bard, 1997b), a need that can be addressed by vendors, experts in medical informatics, and usability experts. The widespread adoption of Web-based browsers to interface with data systems has influenced medical informatics, increasing the likelihood of its acceptance and use in health care settings.
Systems that can access and combine data from many sources should be able to evolve with the uses to which they are put, the changing demands of the health care environment, and advances in technology. Such systems should be able to access all patient data wherever clinical decisions are made. They should be able to access the evidence base and decision supports, such as clinical practice guide- lines. They should provide efficient means of entering orders and retrieving results. They should help practitioners coordinate activities whether they occur in the inpatient, outpatient, home, or other settings.
A handful of health care organizations have made impressive gains in auto- mating clinical information—for example, the health systems of the Department of Veterans Affairs and Intermountain Health Care (in Salt Lake City, Utah)— but overall progress has been slow. Barriers to moving forward include the many policy (e.g., privacy concerns), technical (e.g., data standards), financial (e.g., capital requirements), and human factors (e.g., clinician acceptance) consider- ations discussed in Chapter 7.
Managing Clinical Knowledge and Skills
We have an intranet throughout the system that enables physicians to see the latest guidelines and recommendations about screening and to find out where each of their patients is in this care process.—Health plan–based breast care center
Our protocols for brain edema were going well. However, new literature emerged. One of the neurosurgeons recommended that we revamp the proto- cols to incorporate the new findings. He gathered the evidence, and the first protocol was designed by a team headed by a unit nurse. The protocol was soon standardized, and ownership was created at the physician and nurse level.— Intensive care unit
All surgeons who join the staff, regardless of seniority, start by assisting, then being assisted in 150 cases before being left on their own. If we are not com- pletely confident they have mastered the technique, supervision is extended to another 100 cases. The secret of success is in everyone using the same tech- nique. It decreases complications and is more cost-effective.—Small hospital specializing in two procedures
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 129
If the Respiratory Therapist notes an abnormal lab value, he or she is comfort- able not just taking a blood sample and reporting it, but managing it. The technicians are caregivers. Expectations have changed. They [adjust] therapy to within physiological parameters. They are cross-trained so that they can take on nursing tasks, for example, starting IVs when needed. When fully trained and confident, they may tell an admitting doc that a patient is not ready to have a ventilator tube removed.—Intensive care unit
A key challenge for organizations, requiring a range of competencies, is translating the evidence base into practice. The competencies involved include tracking and disseminating new information, managing the clinical change that helps incorporate new information into practice, and ensuring that health care professionals have the skills they need to make use of new knowledge. All such competencies are interrelated. New information and technologies may require new skills. And new technologies, such as simulation, may enhance skills, such as those involved in performing surgical procedures or managing crises.
As described in greater detail in Chapter 6, the flood of new information that is relevant to practice can no longer be managed adequately by individual clini- cians trying to keep up with the literature and attending conferences or lectures (Davis et al., 1999; Weed, 1999). One new approach to timely management of information involves including clinical librarians as a part of clinical care teams, for example, on morning rounds or on call, to note questions and search the literature for the best and most relevant information (Davidoff and Florance, 2000). Another response is to create easily accessible systematic reviews of the literature, using well-understood criteria for determining the strength of evidence and the generalizability of findings. Such systematic reviews, though important, are only the first stage, however, in disseminating the flow of new knowledge and translating it for use with individual patients. First, clinicians need evidence- based guidelines that make clear which steps are well founded and which are based on expert consensus (Institute of Medicine, 1992). These efforts may occur within practices or larger institutions, or may be developed by external entities such as specialty groups, independent organizations established for the purpose, or governmental groups. Whatever the source of such guidelines, any group that uses them needs to understand their validity and ensure that they are kept up to date.
Ensuring that new knowledge is incorporated into practice also requires a thorough understanding of how change is managed most effectively in health care, including the barriers to and facilitators of change. Knowledge about why guidelines are or are not used is accumulating, and experts now better understand the circumstances in which such strategies as education, administrative changes, incentives, penalties, feedback, and social marketing are likely to be effective (Greco and Eisenberg, 1993; Grol, 1997; Oxman et al., 1995; Solberg et al., 2000; Wensing et al., 1998) and why the translation of research findings to date has been characterized as “slow and haphazard” (Grol and Grimshaw, 1999).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
130 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
One strategy for successfully managing change is to design guidelines and implementation processes so that it is easier to apply the best evidence than not to do so. This strategy begins with a systematic review of the evidence, but attends to the creation of clinical guidelines or protocols that match the logic and flow of care. Implementing this strategy also requires agreement on the part of clinicians that they will use the new guidelines and protocols, as well as the resources needed to redesign care processes (despite such resources often being scarce) so that the guidelines and protocols will become an integral and efficiently designed element of the care process.
Health care requires complex, sophisticated judgments and psychomotor skills, perhaps at a level unmatched in any other field. Other industries test judgment and psychomotor skills. In aviation, for example, simulations are used to assess competence and to help pilots improve their judgment and skills. Medi- cine has traditionally relied on cognitive testing of knowledge, not of judgment or skills. The field also relies on privileges granted by hospitals using various levels of rigor to assess professionals’ skills, but such mechanisms do not include test- ing to ensure that those skills are current and have not deteriorated.
Making use of new knowledge may require that health professionals develop new skills or that their roles change. New skills might include basic technical proficiency, for example, in executing a procedure, using equipment, and inter- preting data from new tests and devices. Managing new knowledge may also require the use of new psychosocial skills to elicit behavior change in patients and colleagues. Other new skills might include designing data collection efforts and managing and interpreting quality-of-care information. Finally, incorporat- ing new knowledge requires skilled leadership to engage the participation of health professionals in collaborative teams. Leaders need to devote explicit attention to ensuring that the most appropriate individuals are trained in, maintain competence in, and are supported in their new tasks.
Developing Effective Teams
There has been a radical change since we introduced teams. You can see it even where they hang out. Before the docs were together, the nurses together, etc. But now the team hangs out with the team. At the morning meetings, you may see the medical assistants providing the leadership. The medical director calls it the “fast break”—three people on the floor and anybody can finish the play.—Primary care practice
[The doctors] are worried about managing clinical conditions. They work un- der pressure and stress and try to find a way to control it. They all claim that “my patients are sicker.” I reply, “Give me your sickest patients—those with congestive heart failure, the ones on coumadin, patients with diabetes, hyper- tension, the old, sick people, anyone who seems to require more than the aver- age resources and time.” When they ask why I would say this, I reply, “Be-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 131
cause I will enlist help, resources—clinical pathways, care managers.” We provide these resources to the practice and should never charge [or penalize] the doctors for this help. Doctors have not learned yet how to enhance the team with other kinds of providers—health education, behavioral medicine, physical therapy, pharmacy.—Primary care practice
Organized work groups, or multidisciplinary teams, have become a common way to organize health care, and considerable attention has been focused on their value and functioning. Such teams are found in primary care practice, in the focused care of patients with chronic conditions, in critical acute care (the inten- sive care unit, trauma units, operating rooms), and in geriatrics and care at the end of life. In such settings, smooth team functioning is needed because of the increasing complexity of care, the demands of new technology, and the need to coordinate multiple patient needs (Fried et al., 2000). Nonphysician team mem- bers may increase efficiency (e.g., drawing blood, giving immunizations); substi- tute for physicians (e.g., care for patients with simple, well-defined problems); and complement physicians (Starfield, 1992) by filling roles that physicians may not perform well or may be reluctant to undertake, such as counseling about behavior change or performing highly technical diagnostic tests. Such distribu- tions of roles and tasks change dramatically over time. Many tasks, such as monitoring and adjusting equipment for an ill newborn after hospital discharge, have been taken over by family members and patients themselves (Hart, 1995; Lorig et al., 1993, 1999; Von Korff et al., 1997).
An IOM study of small work teams at the front lines of patient care (Donald- son and Mohr, 2000) included asking practitioners and staff who worked together on a daily basis about that experience. Respondents cited the importance of collaborative work both for clinical care and for improvement efforts. They emphasized the need to base quality improvement work within the team and to recognize the contributions that all members of the group could make, with various individuals taking leadership roles for specific improvement activities. They also described new or expanded roles and the need for coaching and train- ing new members of the team in their work relationships.
Effective working teams must be created and maintained. Yet members of teams are typically trained in separate disciplines and educational programs, leaving them unprepared to enter practice in complex collaborative settings. They may not appreciate each other’s strengths or recognize weaknesses except in crises, and they may not have been trained together to use established or new technologies (Institute of Medicine, 2000). An enormous amount of knowledge has been accumulated about team creation and management, including effective communication among team members (Fried et al., 2000). In commercial avia- tion, for example, emphasis is placed on crew resource management because of its importance to airline safety, and communication among flight personnel has become a special focus of proficiency checks by certified examiners (e.g., during simulated emergencies).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
132 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Considerable research has gone into identifying the characteristics of effec- tive teams (Fried et al., 2000). These characteristics include (1) team makeup, such as having the appropriate size and composition and the ability to reduce negative effects of status differences between, for example, physicians and nurses; (2) team processes, such as communication structures, conflict management, and leadership that emphasizes excellence and conveys clear goals and expectations; (3) the nature of the team’s tasks, such as matching roles and training to the level of complexity and promoting cohesiveness when work is highly interdependent; and (4) the environmental context, such as obtaining needed resources and estab- lishing appropriate rewards. Effective teams have a culture that fosters openness, collaboration, teamwork, and learning from mistakes. Shortell et al. (1994) have demonstrated a significant relationship between better interaction among team members in intensive care units and decreased risk-adjusted length of stay. Such interaction includes the dimensions of culture, leadership, communication, coor- dination, problem solving, and conflict management.
Research on team interactions has also demonstrated that teams often fall short of the expectations of their clinical leaders, members, and administrative managers (Pearson and Jones, 1994). One reason is that medical education emphasizes hierarchy and the importance of assuming individual responsibility for decision making. An emphasis on personal accountability comes at the price of losing the contribution of others who may bring added insight and relevant information, whatever their formal credentials. Acculturation to medical roles makes it difficult for members of a team to point out or admit to safety problems and thereby prevent harm. Indeed, challenges to those in positions of power and authority by nurses, physicians in training, and others is notoriously difficult and discouraged (Helmreich, 2000; Institute of Medicine, 2000). Avoiding overt hostility over a slip or lapse and acknowledging shared knowledge and profi- ciency when recovering from unexpected patient events (Helmreich, 2000) are examples of how strong collaborative working relationships can improve patient safety.
In health care environments characterized by uncertainty, instability, and variability (such as operating rooms and intensive care units), high levels of stress are common (Mark and Hagenmueller, 1994; Perrow, 1967). Other envi- ronments do not have the level of instability and uncertainty associated with critical care units and operating suites, yet the complexity of patients’ needs still necessitates highly effective coordination of resources across a spectrum of set- tings, disciplines, and the community. An example is the care of frail elderly patients, in which the ability to coordinate care and assemble effectively func- tioning health care teams is paramount, and flexibility in role functioning may be key.
In Chapter 3, new rule 10 emphasizes the importance of collaboration for effective team functioning. What is sometimes thought to be collaboration, how- ever, may in fact be uncoordinated or sequential action rather than collaborative
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 133
work. That is, the work of each individual may be efficient from the perspective of his or her own tasks, but overall the efforts are suboptimal and do not serve the needs of patients. An example of suboptimization may occur when an elderly woman breaks her hip and comes to the emergency department. She may spend several hours receiving x-rays and being stabilized and will certainly need to be admitted. At the end of this time, someone may call to notify the nursing staff that the patient is being admitted, and several hours more may elapse while admission orders are written and the patient’s room is made available. When emergency department and floor staff collaborate, notification is given immedi- ately after the patient arrives in the emergency department so that the admission process can begin, and the patient can go from the emergency department directly to her hospital room, where she will be much more comfortable. In such cases and in many others, running parallel processes reduces delays and improves outcomes (Nugent et al., 1999).
Coordinating Care Across Patient Conditions, Services, and Settings Over Time
That is fundamental to what is important to me—that the focus be on the indi- vidual—a complex person—and you try to do the best you can for them. It seems odd to say, but that is what is fun. We did focus groups with families and learned key things that are important: (1) the organization and delivery of care, (2) shared medical decision making, (3) treating each person as an individual, and (4) attending to those who care for and love the dying person. The building blocks to accomplish this are information and education of the patient and family, coordination, and continuity.—Hospice
Another key challenge for organizations is coordination (or clinical integra- tion) of work across services that are complementary, such as emergency re- sponse units, emergency departments, and operating suites, or across primary care practices, specialty practices, and laboratories to which patients are referred. Clinical integration can be defined as “the extent to which patient care services are coordinated across people, functions, activities, and sites over time so as to maximize the value of services delivered to patients” (Shortell et al., 2000a). In particular, coordination encompasses a set of practitioner behaviors and informa- tion systems intended to bring together health services, patient needs, and streams of information to facilitate the aims of care set forth in Chapter 2. For example, coordination may involve ensuring that treating physicians are informed about diagnostic results, therapies attempted during an earlier hospital admission, and the effectiveness of those efforts. Coordination may involve nurse case managers transmitting information to both primary and specialty care practitioners about a patient’s unmet needs. Such coordination may be facilitated as well by proce- dures for engaging community resources (such as social and public health ser-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
134 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
vices) and other sites of care (such as hospice or home care) when and as appropriate.
Coordination of care across clinicians and settings has been shown to result in greater efficiency and better clinical outcomes (Aiken et al., 1997; Gittell et al., 2000; Knaus et al., 1986; Shortell et al., 1994, 2000a, 2000b). Optimizing care for a patient with a complex chronic condition is challenging enough, but opti- mizing care for patients with several chronic conditions and acute episodes, as well as meeting health maintenance needs, represents an extraordinary challenge for today’s health care systems (MacLean et al., 2000; Shortell et al., 2000a). The challenges arise at many organizational levels and across the full range of tasks, including the design, dissemination, implementation, and modification of care processes and the payment for these tasks. What is important to patients and their families is that effective systems for transferring patient-related information be in place so that the information is accurate and available when needed. Patients and their families need to know who is responsible for decisions and can answer questions, and to be assured that gaps in responsibility will not occur.
Some problems—such as substance abuse, AIDS, and domestic violence— are so interrelated that they appear to require a comprehensive rather than prob- lem-by-problem approach (Shortell et al., 2000a). Other problems require as- sembling and making the best use of an array of resources, such as the numerous federal programs that might be involved in obtaining and paying for a wheelchair for a child with special needs. In any case, if care is to move beyond single solutions crafted by individual clinicians (as in the Stage 1 delivery of care described earlier in this chapter), it will require an accurate understanding of patient needs so that standard processes can be provided and individual solutions crafted as appropriate. Newly developed infrastructures, information technolo- gies, and well-thought-out and -implemented modes of communication can re- duce the need to craft laborious, case-by-case strategies for coordinating patient care. A variety of other mechanisms can improve coordination, such as involving a combination of individuals (e.g., clinicians, members of multidisciplinary teams, care managers), along with patients and their families.
Some patients and their families become so expert in their condition that they choose to coordinate care for themselves or a family member. Those who do so are likely to need new skills in accessing information and new technologies for structuring and conveying information to others who are involved in their care. For example, patients can contribute to flow sheets, respond to questions about changes in health status, or upload data from micromonitoring devices worn on the body or from home monitoring devices. Not all patients or their families (or perhaps even most) will choose or be able to become central actors in coordinat- ing their own care, however. In such cases, appropriate mechanisms within the delivery system must be available to meet this responsibility.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 135
One means of improving coordination is based on what are sometimes called clinical pathways. These blueprints for care set forth a set of services needed for patients with a given health problem and the sequence in which they should take place. For some conditions, a set of clearly identified processes should occur. In complex adaptive systems such as health care, however, few patient care pro- cesses are linear (such as the transition from hospital to nursing home). Rather, most organizational processes are reciprocal and interdependent (Thompson, 1967), and coordination requires the design of procedures that are responsive both to variations among individual patients and to unexpected occurrences.
Incorporating Performance and Outcome Measurements for Improvement and Accountability
We have a Clinical Roadmap team for breast cancer screening. The team has formulated four criteria for success that include process and outcome measures. They are (1) the proportion of women in our population who have received care in the last 2 years; (2) the number of women who came to the screening pro- gram when invited; (3) the number of women in the program who develop a late stage disease; and (4) survey responses during the time of enrollment in the program. These criteria give us specific as well as broad measures of suc- cess.—Breast care center
We have a clinical “instrument panel.” We measure cycle time, patient satis- faction, phone calls (incoming and outgoing), proportion reaching treatment goals for hypertension, operating costs per visit, proportion of patients seeing their provider of choice, available appointments, team morale, practice size, and proportion of pap smears in eligible women.—Primary care practice
The main outcome measure is risk adjusted mortality. We compare ourselves quarterly to similar institutions for observed versus predicted mortality on one axis and resource consumption on the other. Using 50 percent random sam- pling, we track mortality, admission and discharge rates, length of stay, number of patients readmitted to the ICU, and reintubation rates. This helps us know if changes that affect efficiency are affecting quality of care. Although our ad- missions are up, length of stay is down significantly, and our reintubation rate is very low.—Critical care unit
Although we generally think of individuals as learning and enhancing their capabilities, it is also possible to think of an organization as learning—increasing its competence and responsiveness and improving its work (Davies and Nutley, 2000). The committee believes moving toward the health system of the 21st century will require that health care organizations successfully address the chal- lenge of becoming learning organizations. A decade ago, Senge and others (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Senge, 1990) described such organizations as those that can learn quickly and accurately about their environment and translate this learning to the work they do. This idea has been incorporated in the work of
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
136 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
many companies, most outside of health care—such as 3M, Boeing, the Cadillac Division of General Motors, Fedex, Motorola, and Xerox—whose drive to re- duce defects and improve quality and customer service has been recognized by the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2000b).
In Senge’s terminology, “single-loop” learning results in incremental im- provements in existing practice. In health care it might involve efforts to de- crease waiting time for follow-up appointments for patients who have an abnor- mal laboratory test result. Another feature of learning organizations is their reexamination of mental models or assumptions on which they base their work, giving rise to “double-loop” learning. An example of double-loop learning is rethinking and reorganizing all ancillary and specialty medical services for women in a breast care center to eliminate any waiting between reporting of abnormal mammographic findings, definitive diagnosis, and therapy.
A critical feature of learning organizations is the ability to be aware of their own “behavior.” In organizational terms, this means having data that allow the organization to track what has happened and what needs to happen—in other words, to assess its performance and use that information to improve. The committee is convinced that a major tool for accomplishing this critical function is the investment in and use of an effective information infrastructure to develop a balanced set of measures on, for example, clinical and financial performance, patient health outcomes, and satisfaction with care (Nelson et al., 1996). It is important that such measures be balanced—that they include a variety of mea- sures so that when changes are made in processes, such as to increase efficiency, other outcomes, such as patient health, are not adversely affected.
Clinical practices that participated in the IOM study of exemplary practices (Donaldson and Mohr, 2000) described how routine measurement has become part of their production process. Ideally, such measures can be aggregated for external reporting, whether to support contract discussions or to help patients make choices about where and from whom to seek care. Building measurement into the production process can counter the perception on the part of many health care leaders that reporting is a burden. Such a perception results when organiza- tions must respond to numerous demands from external groups for quality mea- sures, especially if those measures lack specificity or relevance to the clinical teams that must generate them.
Measures need not involve expensive, large-scale, long-term evaluation projects to be useful. New methods that use sampling and small-scale rapid-cycle testing, modification, and retesting are proving useful in dynamic settings such as patient care units (Berwick, 1996; Langley et al., 1996). As other world-class businesses have learned, including American industry giants (Walton and Dem- ing, 1986), attention to improving quality includes continuous monitoring, often based on small samples of events, that can provide organizations with timely data at the front lines to manage the processes of concern (James, 1989; Rainey et al.,
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 137
1998; Scholtes, 1988). In the IOM study of exemplary practices, several health care teams described their use of such methods to manage their care processes (Donaldson and Mohr, 2000).
It’s an incredible relief to try small changes on a small scale. It’s so simple it’s brilliant. We had been managing indigent diabetic patients for years and didn’t think we could do any better. The providers believed that these people are so hard. But the patients responded to the changes we made. You have to craft something that is doable. You have to look for the simplicity in complex things.—Diabetic management group for underserved minorities
We have embraced the concept of “real-time tracking.” We have developed a “radar screen” that has 8 simultaneous processes continuously monitored. We get information on the census in the ER, the status of the patients, the x-ray cycle, etc. We know where in the process not only the patient is, but where the system is. Each process measured is summarized on the screen by graphs. All we have to do to obtain data is touch the screen. The graphs are equipped with goal lines that are based on customer satisfaction, for example waiting time.— Community based emergency department
The key word to describe a micro-system is homeostasis. A micro-system is always changing and adapting, just like the human body. We have identified the “pathophysiology” of a micro-system. It is powerful, yet very predictable. Think about two downstream processes, x-ray cycle time and getting patients to the floor. If the downstream [processes] get out of control, there are predictable changes in the system. Occupancy in the ER goes up, the number of new patients seen in the ER goes down, the number of free beds in the ER goes down, and the cycle time between a patient’s arrival to a bed goes up. Eventu- ally, every measurement goes up. When we obtain three consecutive 15-minute intervals going the wrong way, we realize that something needs to be done.— Community based Emergency Department.
LEADERSHIP FOR MANAGING CHANGE
The role of leaders is to define and communicate the purpose of the organi- zation clearly and establish the work of practice teams as being of highest strate- gic importance. Leaders must be responsible for creating and articulating the organization’s vision and goals, listening to the needs and aspirations of those working on the front lines, providing direction, creating incentives for change, aligning and integrating improvement efforts, and creating a supportive environ- ment and a culture of continuous improvement that encourage and enable suc- cess.
Learning organizations need leadership at many levels that can provide clear strategic and sustained direction and a coherent set of values and incentives to guide group and individual actions. The first criterion of performance excellence for health care organizations listed by the Baldrige National Quality Program is
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
138 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
the provision of “a patient focus, clear and visible values, and high expectations” by the organization’s senior leaders (National Institute of Standards and Technol- ogy, 2000a). Indeed, strong management leadership in hospitals is positively associated with greater clinical involvement in quality improvement (Weiner et al., 1996, 1997).
Leaders of health care organizations may need to provide an environment for innovation that allows for new and more flexible roles and responsibilities for health care workers; and supports the accomplishments of innovators despite regulatory, legal, financial, and sometimes interprofessional conflict (Donaldson and Mohr, 2000). Leaders need to provide such an environment because the learning, adaptation, and incorporation of best practices needed to effect engi- neering changes requires energy that is scarce in a demanding and rapidly chang- ing environment.
At the level of front-line teams, leaders should encourage the members of the team to engage in deliberate inquiry—using their own observations and ideas to improve safety and quality. The individual who serves as leader may not be constant over time or across innovative efforts, or be associated with a particular discipline, such as medicine. What is important is for the leader to understand how units relate to each other—a form of systems thinking—and to facilitate the transfer of learning across units and practices.
Leaders of health care organizations must fill a number of specific roles. First, they must identify and prioritize community health needs and support the organization’s ability to meet these needs. Addressing community needs might involve collaboration with other community or health care organizations and the creation of new services. Examples include providing CPR training for a major employer and identifying and alerting the community to patterns of injury, such as the number of children with head injuries from bicycle accidents, or a newly appearing occupational illness. Other examples include addressing the more complex needs for coordinated local social and health services presented by low- income ill elderly individuals or the need for more accessible substance abuse treatment facilities. Leaders of organizations can support accountability to indi- vidual patients while also assuming responsibility for accountability to public bodies and the community at large for the populations they serve.
Second, leaders can help obtain resources and respond to changes in the health care environment, which have been rapid and unrelenting. Leaders must ensure that their organization has the ability to change. Yet many leaders now view their role as shielding and protecting the organization from environmental pressures that may require them to change. Leadership should support innova- tion and provide a forum so that individuals can continuously learn from each other. Organizations must invest in innovation and redesign.
Third, and perhaps the most difficult leadership role, is to optimize the performance of teams that provide various services in pursuit of a shared set of
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 139
aims. In any complex organization, there is danger in supporting some clinical services (perhaps those that are most profitable) to the detriment of the whole system. Leaders must strive to align the strategic priorities of their organization, its resources (financial and human), and support mechanisms (e.g., information systems). Balancing these elements can be extremely difficult and requires lead- ers to have a performance measurement capability that includes measures of safety, effectiveness, patient-centeredness, timeliness, efficiency, and equity.
Fourth, leaders can support reward and recognition systems that are consis- tent with and supportive of the new rules set forth in Chapter 3 and that facilitate coordination of work across sets of services as necessary. Organizations should support an environment in which incentives to provide effective care are not distorted before they reach caregivers. An example of distortion is a payment system based solely on the numbers of home care visits made by a visiting nurse per day. This sort of productivity measure prevents nurses from focusing on patient needs. A system based on effectively caring for a given number of patients recognizes that a predictable mix of needs will occur over a period of time, and can encourage small teams to organize themselves to meet those needs. Such decision making can be very difficult, especially in the current economic environment and payment system (see Chapter 8).
Fifth, leaders need to invest in their workforce to help them achieve their full potential, both individually and as a team, in serving their patients. The resulting interpersonal and technical competence can produce the synergies and improved outcomes that emerge from collaborative work.
Although the leadership roles described are not novel, the orientation toward facilitating the work of health care teams represents a fundamental shift in per- spective. The new rules set forth in Chapter 3 and the engineering principles described in this chapter will require strong and visible leadership with corre- sponding reward structures. All organizations must overcome their inherent resistance to change. It is role of leaders to surmount these barriers by visibly promoting the need for improvement, becoming role models for the required new behaviors, providing the necessary resources, and aligning recognition and re- ward systems in support of improvement goals. Leadership’s role in promoting innovation, gathering feedback, and recognizing progress is essential to success- ful and sustained improvement.
Finally, leaders must recognize the interdependence of changes at all levels of the organization—individual, group or team, organizational, and interorganiza- tional—in addressing the six challenges discussed in this chapter. For example, providing additional training in error correction or technical skill development to individuals without recognizing that they work as part of a team will have little impact. Similarly, working to develop more effective teams without recognizing that they are part of a complex organization with frequently misaligned incen- tives will have little effect on improving quality. Likewise, trying to redesign organizational structures and incentives and revise organizational cultures with-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
140 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
out taking into account the specific needs of teams and individuals is likely to be an exercise in frustration. And attempting to make changes at any of these levels without recognizing the larger interorganizational networks that include other providers, payers, and legal and regulatory bodies (as discussed in subsequent chapters) is likely to result in the waste of well-intended plans and energy.
REFERENCES
Aiken, L. H., J. Sochalski, and E. T. Lake. Studying Outcomes of Organizational Change in Health Services. Medical Care 35(11 Suppl):NS6–18, 1997.
Anderson, John C., Manus Rungtusanatham, and Roger G. Schroeder. A Theory of Quality Manage- ment Underlying the Deming Management Method. Academy of Management Review 19(3): 472–509, 1994.
Argyris, Chris and Donald A. Schön. Organizational Learning. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1978.
Bates, David W., Lucian L. Leape, David J. Cullen, et al. Effect of Computerized Physician Order Entry and a Team Intervention on Prevention of Serious Medication Errors. JAMA 280(15): 1311–6, 1998.
Bennis, Warren and Michael Mische. The 21st Century Organization: Reinventing Through Reengi- neering. San Diego, CA: Pfeiffer & Company, 1995.
Berner, Eta S., Richard S. Maisiak, C. Glenn Cobbs, and O. D. Taunton. Effects of a Decision Support System on Physicians' Diagnostic Performance. J Am Med Inform Assoc 6(5):420–7, 1999.
Berwick, Donald M. A Primer on Leading the Improvement of Systems. BMJ 312:619–22, 1996. Blumenthal, David. The Future of Quality Measurement and Management in a Transforming Health
Care System. JAMA 278(19):1622–5, 1997. Blumenthal, David and Charles M. Kilo. A Report Card on Continuous Quality Improvement.
Milbank Quarterly 76(4):625–48, 1998. Bowman, R. J. C., H. J. B. Bennet, C. A. Houston, et al. Waiting Times For and Attendance at
Paediatric Ophthalmology Outpatient Appointments. BMJ 313:1244, 1996. Carey, J. C. Health Supervision and Anticipatory Guidance for Children with Genetic Disorders
(including specific recommendations for trisomy 21, trisomy 18, and neurofibromatosis I). Pediatr Clin North Am 39(1):25–53, 1992.
Christensen, Clayton M., Richard Bohmer, and John Kenagy. Will Disruptive Innovations Cure Health Care? Harvard Business Review September/October:102–12, 2000.
Classen, David C. Clinical Decision Support Systems to Improve Clinical Practice and Quality of Care. JAMA 280(15):1360–1, 1998.
Collins, James C. and Jerry I. Porras. Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies. New York, NY: Harperbusiness, 1997.
COR Health LLC. Collaboratives Are the Hot Ticket to Success with Performance Improvement Initiatives. COR Clinical Excellence 1:1–3, 2000.
COR Healthcare Resources. It Takes a Network to Manage the Full Continuum of Stroke Care. Medical Management Network 8(3):1–7, 2000.
Cushman, F. Reid and Don E. Detmer. 1998. “Information Policy for the U.S. Health Sector: Engi- neering, Political Economy, and Ethics.” Online. Available at http://www.milbank.org/art/ intro.html [accessed Dec. 1, 2000].
Davidoff, Frank and Valerie Florance. The Informationist: A New Health Profession? Ann Int Med 132(12):996–8, 2000.
Davies, Huw T. O. and Sandra M. Nutley. Developing Learning Organisations in the New NHS. BMJ 320:998–1001, 2000.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 141
Davis, David A., Mary Ann Thomson, Nick Freemantle, et al. Impact of Formal Continuing Medical Education. Do Conferences, Workshops, Rounds, and Other Traditional Continuing Education Activities Change Physician Behavior or Health Care Outcomes? JAMA 282(9):867–74, 1999.
Desai, J., P. J. O’Connor, D. B. Bishop, et al. Variation in Process and Outcomes of Diabetes Care in HMO Owned and Controlled Clinics. Proceedings, CDC Diabetes Trans. Conference. At- lanta, GA: 1997.
Donaldson, Molla S. and Julie J. Mohr. Exploring Innovation and Quality Improvement in Health Care Micro-Systems: A Cross-Case Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Medicine, Na- tional Academy Press, 2000.
Evans, R. Scott, Stanley L. Pestotnik, David C. Classen, et al. A Computer-Assisted Management Program for Antibiotics and Other Antiinfective Agents. N EngI J Med 338(4):232–8, 1998.
Feitzinger, Edward and Hau L. Lee. Mass Customization at Hewlett-Packard: The Power of Post- ponement. Harvard Business Review Jan/Feb:116–21, 1997.
Festinger, D. S., R. J. Lamb, M. R. Kountz, et al. Pretreatment Dropout as a Function of Treatment Delay and Client Variables. Addictive Behaviors 20(1):111–5, 1995.
Fried, Bruce J., Sharon Topping, and Thomas G. Rundall. Groups and Teams in Health Services Organizations (Chapter 6). Health Care Management. Organization and Design and Behav- ior. 4th edition S. M. Shortell and A. D. Kaluzny, eds. Albany, NY: Delmar, 2000.
Galvin, Robert W., personal communication. Washington, D.C.: Meeting of the National Roundtable on Health Care Quality, 1998.
Gilmore, James H. and B. Joseph Pine, II. The Four Faces of Mass Customization. Harvard Business Review Jan/Feb:91–101, 1997.
Gittell, J. H., K. M. Fairfield, B. Bierbaum, et al. Impact of Relational Coordination on Quality of Care, Postoperative Pain and Functioning, and Length of Stay: A Nine-Hospital Study of Sur- gical Patients. Medical Care 38(8):807–19, 2000.
Glymph, Minnie. 2000. “Keeping Our Patients Safe . . . in the Pediatric Emergency Department.” Online. Available at http://www2.md.duke.edu/news/inside/000710/4.html [accessed Nov. 30, 2000].
Goldsmith, Jeff C. Integration Reconsidered: Five Strategies for Improved Performance. Healthcare Strateg 2(11):1–8, 1998.
Grandinetti, Deborah A. You mean I can see the doctor today? Medical Economics 77(6):102–14, 2000.
Greco, Peter J. and John M. Eisenberg. Changing Physicians’ Practice. N EngI J Med 329(17):1271– 3, 1993.
Griffin, S. and A. L. Kinmouth. Diabetes Care: The Effectiveness of Systems for Routine Surveil- lance for People with Diabetes (Cochrane Review). The Cochrane Library, Oxford: Update Software, 1998.
Grol, Richard. Personal paper: Beliefs and Evidence in Changing Clinical Practice. BMJ 315:418– 21, 1997.
Grol, Richard and Jeremy Grimshaw. Evidence-Based Implementation of Evidence-Based Medicine. Joint Commission Journal on Quality Improvement 25(10):503–13, 1999.
Hart, Julian Tudor. Clinical and Economic Consequences of Patients as Producers. Journal of Public Health Medicine 17(4):383–6, 1995.
Helmreich, Robert L. On Error Management: Lessons from Aviation. BMJ 320:781–5, 2000. Hodgetts, Richard M. Measures of Quality and High Performance: Simple Tools and Lessons
Learned from America’s Most Successful Corporations. New York, NY: American Manage- ment Association, 1998.
Hunt, Dereck L., R. Brian Haynes, Steven E. Hanna, and Kristina Smith. Effects of Computer-Based Clinical Decision Support Systems on Physician Performance and Patient Outcomes: A Sys- tematic Review. JAMA 280(15):1339–46, 1998.
Institute for Healthcare Improvement. 2000. “Idealized Design of Clinical Office Practices.” Online. Available at http://www.ihi.org/idealized [accessed Aug. 23, 2000].
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
142 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Institute of Medicine. Guidelines for Clinical Practice: From Development to Use. Marilyn J. Field and Kathleen N. Lohr, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992.
———. To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donaldson, eds. Washington, D.C: National Academy Press, 2000.
James, Brent C. Quality Management for Health Care Delivery. Chicago, IL: Hospital Research and Educational Trust, American Hospital Association, 1989.
Juran, J. M. Juran on Leadership for Quality: An Executive Handbook. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1989.
Kaiser Permanente Online. 2000. “Sample Version of Kaiser Permanente’s Members Only Web Site.” Online. Available at http://www.kaiserpermanente.org/membersonly/overview.htm [accessed Oct. 31, 2000].
Kegan, Robert. In Over Our Heads: The Mental Demand of Modern Life. Cambridge, Massachu- setts: Harvard University Press, 1994.
Kibbe, David C. and Mark Bard. Applying Clinical Informatics to Health Care Improvement: Mak- ing Progress is More Difficult Than We Thought It Would Be. Joint Commission Journal on Quality Improvement 23(12):619–22, 1997a.
Kibbe, David and Mark Bard. A Roundtable Discussion: Have Computerized Patient Records Kept Their Promise of Improving Patient Care? Joint Commission Journal on Quality Improvement 23(12):695–702, 1997b.
Knaus, William A. Draper Elizabeth A. Wagner Douglas, et al. An Evaluation of Outcome from Intensive Care in Major Medical Centers. Ann Int Med 104(3):410–8, 1986.
Langley, Gerald J., Kevin M. Nolan, Thomas W. Nolan, et al. The Improvement Guide. A Practical Approach to Enhancing Organizational Performance. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1996.
Leibovich, Mark. Child Prodigy, Online Pioneer. Washington Post. A-23, Sept. 3, 2000. Lorig, Kate R., Peter D. Mazonson, and Halsted R. Holman. Evidence Suggesting that Health Educa-
tion for Self Management in Chronic Arthritis has Sustained Health Benefits While Reducing Health Care Costs. Arthritis Rheumatism 36(4):439–46, 1993.
Lorig, Kate R., David S. Sobel, Anita L. Steward, et al. Evidence Suggesting that a Chronic Disease Self-Management Program Can Improve Health Status While Reducing Hospitalization: A Randomized Trial. Medical Care 37(1):5–14, 1999.
MacLean, Catherine H., Rachel Louie, Barbara Leake, et al. Quality of Care for Patients With Rheumatoid Arthritis. JAMA 284(8):984–92, 2000.
Mark, Barbara and Alice C. Hagenmueller. Technological and Environmental Characteristics of Intensive Care Units. Implications for Job Redesign. J Nurs Adm 24(4 Suppl):65–71, 1994.
Mundinger, Mary O., Robert L. Kane, Elizabeth R. Lenz, et al. Primary Care Outcomes in Patients Treated by Nurse Practitioners or Physicians: A Randomized Trial. JAMA 283(1):59–68, 2000.
Murray, Mark. Modernising the NHS. Patient Care: Access. BMJ 320:1594–6, 2000. Murray, Mark and Catherine Tantau. Must Patients Wait? Joint Commission Journal on Quality
Improvement 24(8):423–5, 1998. National Committee for Quality Assurance. The State of Managed Care Quality 2000. Washington,
D.C.: National Committee for Quality Assurance, 2000. National Committee for Quality Health Care. Innovative Quality Health Care Strategies. Best Prac-
tices of NCQHC National Quality Health Care Award Winners, 1994–1999. Ashburn, VA: The Severyn Group, 1999.
National Institute of Standards and Technology. 2000a. “Health Care Criteria for Performance Ex- cellence. Baldrige National Quality Program, 2000.” Online. Available at http://www. quality.nist.gov/bcpg.pdf.htm#HEALTH CARE [accessed Nov. 21, 2000].
———. 2000b. “National Quality Program: Home of the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award.” Online. Available at http://www.quality.nist.gov [accessed Dec. 4, 2000].
Nelson, Eugene C., Julie J. Mohr, Paul B. Batalden, and Stephen K. Plume. Improving Health Care, Part 1: The Clinical Value Compass. Joint Commission Journal on Quality Improvement 22(4):243–58, 1996.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORTS FOR CHANGE 143
Nolan, Thomas W. System Changes to Improve Patient Safety. BMJ 320:771–3, 2000. Nolan, Thomas W., Marie W. Schall, Donald M. Berwick, et al. Reducing Delays and Waiting Times
Throughout the Healthcare System. Boston, MA: Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 1996. Norman, Donald A. The Design of Everyday Things. New York, NY: Doubleday/Currency, 1988. Nugent, William C., Charles M. Kilo, Cathy S. Ross, et al. Improving Outcomes and Reducing Costs
in Adult Cardiac Surgery. Boston, MA: Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 1999. Oxman, A., M. Thomason, D. Davis, et al. No Magic Bullets: A Systematic Review of 102 Trials of
Interventions to Improve Professional Practice. CMAJ 153(10):1423–31, 1995. Pearson, Pauline and Kevin Jones. The Primary Health Care Non-team? BMJ 309:1387–8, 1994. Perrow, Charles. A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Organizations. American Sociologi-
cal Review 32:194–208, 1967. Peters, Thomas J. and Robert H. Waterman, Jr. In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America’s
Best-Run Companies. New York, NY: Warner Books, Inc., 1982. Pine, B. Joseph, II, Don Peppers, and Martha Rogers. Do You Want to Keep Customers Forever?
Harvard Business Review Mar/Apr, 1995. Rainey, Thomas G., Andrea Kabcenell, Donald M. Berwick, and Jane Roessner. Reducing Costs and
Improving Outcomes in Adult Intensive Care. Boston, MA: Institute for Healthcare Improve- ment, 1998.
Raschke, Robert A., Bea Bollihare, Thomas A. Wunderlich, et al. A Computer Alert System to Prevent Injury From Adverse Drug Events: Development and Evaluation in a Community Teaching Hospital. JAMA 280(15):1317–20, 1998.
Robinson, James C. and Lawrence P. Casalino. Vertical Integration and Organizational Networks in Health Care. Health Affairs 15(1):7–22, 1996.
Rosenstein, Alan H. Using Information Management to Implement a Clinical Resource Management Program. Joint Commission Journal on Quality Improvement 23(12):653–66, 1997.
Schneider, Eric C., Virginia Riehl, Sonja Courte-Wienecke, et al. Enhancing Performance Measure- ment. NCQA’s Road Map for a Health Information Framework. JAMA 282(12):1184–90, 1999.
Scholtes, Peter R. The Team Handbook: How to Use Teams to Improve Quality. Madison, WI: Joiner Associates, 1988.
Science Panel on Interactive Communication and Health. Wired for Health and Well-Being. The Emergence of Interactive Health Communication. T. R. Eng and D. H. Gustafson, eds. Wash- ington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Government Printing Of- fice, 1999.
Senge, Peter M. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. New York, NY: Doubleday/Currency, 1990.
Shortell, Stephen M., Charles L. Bennett, and Gayle R. Byck. Assessing the Impact of Continuous Quality Improvement on Clinical Practice: What It Will Take to Accelerate Progress. Milbank Quarterly 76(4):593–624, 1998.
Shortell, Stephen M., Robin R. Gillies, and David A. Anderson. Remaking Health Care in America, Second Edition. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2000a.
Shortell, Stephen M., Robert H. Jones, Alfred W. Rademaker, et al. Assessing the Impact of Total Quality Management and Organizational Culture on Multiple Outcomes of Care for Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery Patients. Medical Care 38(2):207–17, 2000b.
Shortell, Stephen M., Jack E. Zimmerman, Denise M. Rousseau, et al. The Performance of Intensive Care Units: Does Good Management Make a Difference? Medical Care 32(5):508–25, 1994.
Shum, Chau, Ann Humphreys, David Wheeler, et al. Nurse Management of Patients with Minor Illnesses in General Practice: Multicentre, Randomised Controlled Trial. BMJ 320:1038–43, 2000.
Solberg, Leif I., Milo L. Brekke, Charles J. Fazio, et al. Lessons from Experienced Guideline Implementers: Attend to Many Factors and Use Multiple Strategies. Joint Commission Journal on Quality Improvement 26(4):171–88, 2000.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
144 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Starfield, Barbara. Primary Care: Concept, Evaluation, and Policy. New York, NY: Oxford Univer- sity, 1992.
Terry, Ken. Re-engineer Your Practice—Starting Today. Medical Economics 77(2):174, 2000. Thompson, James D. Organizations in Action; Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory. New
York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1967. Transit Cooperative Research Program. Report 8. The Quality Journey: A TQM Roadmap for
Public Transportation. National Research Council – Transportation Research Board. Washing- ton, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995.
Von Korff, Michael, Jessie Gruman, Judith Schaefer, Susan J. Curry, and Edward H. Wagner. Col- laborative Management of Chronic Illness. Ann Int Med 127(12):1097–102, 1997.
Walton, Mary and W. Edwards Deming. Deming Management Method. New York, NY: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1986.
Washington Business Group on Health. Managing Care, Operations and Performance: Innovations in Organized Systems of Care. Sally Coberly, Principal Investigator. Washington, D.C.: Wash- ington Business Group on Health, 1998.
Weed, Lawrence L. Opening the Black Box of Clinical Judgment—An Overview. BMJ 319:1–4, 1999. Online. Available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/reprint/319/7220/1279.pdf [accessed Jan. 24, 2001].
Weiner, Bryan J., Jeffrey A. Alexander, and Stephen M. Shortell. Leadership for Quality Improve- ment in Health Care: Empirical Evidence on Hospital Boards, Managers, and Physicians. Medical Care Research and Review 53(4):397–416, 1996.
Weiner, Bryan J., Stephen M. Shortell, and Jeffrey Alexander. Promoting Clinical Involvement in Hospital Quality Improvement Efforts: The Effects of Top Management, Board, and Physician Leadership. Health Services Research 32(4):491–510, 1997.
Wensing, M., T. van der Weijden, and R. Grol. Implementing Guidelines and Innovations in General Practice: Which Interventions are Effective? British Journal of General Practioner 48(427): 991–7, 1998.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
145
6
Applying Evidence to Health Care Delivery
Substantial investments have been made in clinical research and develop- ment over the last 30 years, resulting in an enormous increase in the medical knowledge base and the availability of many more drugs and devices. Unfortu- nately, Americans are not reaping the full benefit of these investments. The lag between the discovery of more efficacious forms of treatment and their incorpo- ration into routine patient care is unnecessarily long, in the range of about 15 to 20 years (Balas and Boren, 2000). Even then, adherence of clinical practice to the evidence is highly uneven.
A far more effective infrastructure is needed to apply evidence to health care delivery. Greater emphasis should be placed on systematic approaches to analyz- ing and synthesizing medical evidence for both clinicians and patients. Many promising private- and public-sector efforts now under way, including the Cochrane Collaboration, the ACP Journal Club, and the Evidence-Based Practice Centers supported by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, represent excellent models and building blocks for a more comprehensive effort. Yet synthesizing the evidence is only the first step in making knowledge more usable by both clinicians and patients. Many efforts to develop clinical practice guide- lines, defined as “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circum- stances,” flourished during the 1980s and early 1990s (Institute of Medicine, 1992). Although the translation of evidence into clinical practice guidelines is an important first step, however, the dissemination of guidelines alone has not been a very effective method of improving clinical practice (Cabana et al., 1999).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
146 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Far more sophisticated clinical decision support systems will be needed to assist clinicians and patients in selecting the best treatment options and delivering safe and effective care. Certain types of clinical decision support applications, most notably preventive service reminder systems and drug dosing systems, have been demonstrated to improve clinical decisions and should be adopted on a widespread basis (Balas et al., 2000; Bates et al., 1999). More complex applica- tions, such as computer-aided diagnosis, are in earlier stages of development (Kassirer, 1994), but the potential for these systems to contribute to evidence- based practice and consumer-oriented care is great.
The spread of the Internet has opened up many new opportunities to make medical evidence more accessible to clinicians and consumers. The efforts of the National Library of Medicine to facilitate access to the medical literature by both consumers and health care professionals and to design Web sites that organize large amounts of information on particular health needs are particularly promis- ing (Lindberg and Humphreys, 1999).
The development of a more effective infrastructure to synthesize and orga- nize evidence around priority conditions and to improve clinician and consumer access to the evidence base through the Internet offers new opportunities to enhance quality measurement and reporting. A stronger and more organized evidence base should facilitate the development of valid and reliable quality measures for priority conditions that can be used for both internal quality im- provement and external accountability. Broad-based involvement of private- and public-sector groups and strong leadership from within the medical and other health professions are critical to ensuring the success of this effort.
Recommendation 8: The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services should be given the responsibility and neces- sary resources to establish and maintain a comprehensive program aimed at making scientific evidence more useful and accessible to clinicians and patients. In developing this program, the Secretary should work with federal agencies and in collaboration with profes- sional and health care associations, the academic and research com- munities, and the National Quality Forum and other organizations involved in quality measurement and accountability.
The infrastructure developed through this public- and private-sector partner- ship should focus initially on priority conditions (see Chapter 4, Recommenda- tion 5). Its activities should include the following:
• Ongoing analysis and synthesis of the medical evidence • Delineation of specific practice guidelines • Enhanced dissemination efforts to communicate evidence and guidelines
to the general public and professional communities
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPLYING EVIDENCE TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 147
• Development of decision support tools to assist clinicians and patients in applying the evidence
• Identification of best practices in the design of care processes • Development of quality measures for priority conditions
It is critical that leadership from the private sector, both professional and other health care leaders and consumer representatives, be involved in all aspects of this effort to ensure its applicability and acceptability to clinicians and patients.
BACKGROUND
Early definitions of evidence-based medicine or practice emphasized the “conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients” (Sackett et al., 1996). In response to concerns that this definition failed to recognize the importance of other factors in making clinical decisions, more recent definitions explicitly incorporate clini- cal expertise and patient values into the decision-making process (Lohr et al., 1998). Contemporary definitions also clarify that “evidence” is intended to refer not only to randomized controlled trials, the “gold standard,” but also to other types of systematically acquired information.
For purposes of this report, the following definition of evidence-based prac- tice, adapted from Sackett et al. (2000), is used:
Evidence-based practice is the integration of best research evidence with clini- cal expertise and patient values. Best research evidence refers to clinically relevant research, often from the basic health and medical sciences, but espe- cially from patient-centered clinical research into the accuracy and precision of diagnostic tests (including the clinical examination); the power of prognostic markers; and the efficacy and safety of therapeutic, rehabilitative, and preven- tive regimens. Clinical expertise means the ability to use clinical skills and past experience to rapidly identify each patient’s unique health state and diagnosis, individual risks and benefits of potential interventions, and personal values and expectations. Patient values refers to the unique preferences, concerns, and expectations that each patient brings to a clinical encounter and that must be integrated into clinical decisions if they are to serve the patient.
Evidence-based practice is not a new concept. One of its earliest proponents was Archie Cochrane, a British epidemiologist who wrote extensively in the 1950s and 1960s about the importance of conducting randomized controlled trials to upgrade the quality of medical evidence (Mechanic, 1998).
Evidence has always contributed to clinical decision making, but the stan- dards for evidence have become more stringent, and the tools for its assembly and analysis have become more powerful and widely available (Davidoff, 1999). Prior to 1950, clinical evidence consisted of case reports, whereas during the latter half of the 20th century, results of about 131,000 randomized controlled
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
148 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
trials of medical interventions were published. Study designs and methods of analysis have also become more sophisticated, and now include decision analy- sis, systematic review of the literature, meta-analysis, and cost-effectiveness analysis.
Prior to 1990, efforts to incorporate evidence-based decision making into practice encouraged clinicians to follow four steps. According to this approach, when a patient presents a problem for which the decision is not apparent, the clinician should (1) formulate a clear clinical question from that problem, (2) search for the relevant information from the best possible published or unpub- lished sources, (3) evaluate that evidence for its validity and usefulness, and (4) implement the appropriate findings (Davidoff, 1999).
During the last decade, it has become apparent that this strategy of training and encouraging clinicians to independently find, appraise, and apply the best evidence will not alone lead to major improvements in practice (Guyatt et al., 2000; McColl et al., 1998). The relevant information is widely scattered across the medical literature and of varying quality in terms of methodological rigor (Davidoff, 1999). Advanced study is required to master and apply state-of-the- art approaches to analysis of the literature. The demands and rigors of clinical practice do not allow clinicians the time required to undertake this process on a regular basis. Some have proposed a greater role for specially trained clinical librarians to assist clinicians in framing clinical questions and identifying the relevant literature (Davidoff and Florance, 2000). Many efforts are also under way to make it easier for clinicians and patients to access and interpret the findings of the literature.
SYNTHESIZING CLINICAL EVIDENCE
The most common approaches to synthesizing and integrating the results of primary studies are the conduct of systematic reviews and the development of evidence-based practice guidelines. Interest in applying both techniques has increased dramatically in the last 15 years (Chalmers and Haynes, 1994; Chalmers and Lau, 1993).
Systematic Reviews
Systematic reviews are scientific investigations that synthesize the results of multiple primary investigations. Conduct of a systematic review to answer a specific clinical question generally involves four steps (Cook et al., 1997):
• Conduct of a comprehensive search of potentially relevant articles using explicit, reproducible criteria in the selection of articles for review
• Critical appraisal of the scientific soundness of the research designs of the primary studies, including the selection of patients, sample size, and methods of accounting for confounding variables (Cook et al., 1997; Lohr and Carey, 1999)
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPLYING EVIDENCE TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 149
• Synthesis of data • Interpretation of results
There are two types of systematic reviews—qualitative and quantitative (Cook et al., 1997). In a qualitative review, the results of primary studies are summarized but not statistically combined. Quantitative reviews, sometimes called meta-analyses, use statistical methods to combine the data and results of two or more studies.
When applied properly, meta-analysis can be a powerful tool for reaching a decision about the efficacy of alternative treatments in a more timely fashion than is possible through the qualitative review of individual studies. A classic ex- ample is the case of the efficacy of thrombolysis in treating myocardial infarction (Davidoff, 1999). In a review of 33 randomized controlled trials published between 1959 and 1988 that examined the efficacy of thrombolysis in reducing acute mortality, it was found that most studies “suggested” some benefit of therapy; however, the outcomes varied considerably from one study to another, and for the most part, the studies did not achieve statistical significance (Lau et al., 1992). But through the use of meta-analysis techniques to combine the results of multiple studies (thus increasing the statistical power), it was possible to demonstrate by 1973 that the therapeutic efficacy of thrombolysis was statisti- cally significant at the 0.05 level. Unfortunately, some medical textbooks in the early 1990s still contained statements that thrombolysis was an unproven therapy (Davidoff, 1999).
Systematic reviews are highly variable in their methodological rigor. In a critical evaluation of 50 articles describing a systematic review or meta-analysis of the treatment of asthma, for example, Jadad et al. (2000b) concluded that 40 publications had serious or extensive flaws. Reviews conducted by the Cochrane Collaboration, discussed below, were found to be far more rigorous than those published in peer-reviewed journals.
Two organized efforts are directed at conducting systematic reviews or meta- analyses. The first, the Cochrane Collaboration, was started in 1992 in Oxford, England. The second, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s Evi- dence-Based Practice Centers program, started in 1997 and has resulted in the establishment of 12 centers, located mainly in universities, medical centers, and private research centers, that produce evidence-based reports on specific topics (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000b).
The Cochrane Collaboration is an international network of health care pro- fessionals, researchers, and consumers that develops and maintains regularly updated reviews of evidence from randomized controlled trials and other re- search studies (Cochrane Collaboration, 1999). It currently comprises about 50 Collaborative Review Groups, which produce systematic reviews of various pre- vention and health care issues. The Collaboration maintains the Cochrane Li- brary, a collection of several databases that is updated quarterly and distributed
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
150 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
annually to subscribers on disk, on CD-ROM, and via the Internet. One of the databases, The Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, contains Cochrane reviews, and another, The Cochrane Controlled Trials Register, is a bibliographic database of controlled trials. The Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effective- ness includes structured abstracts of systematic reviews that have been critically appraised by the National Health Services Centre for Reviews and Dissemination in York, England; the American College of Physicians’ Journal Club; and the journal Evidence-Based Medicine. The library also includes a registry of biblio- graphic information on nearly 160,000 controlled trials that provide high-quality evidence on health care outcomes.
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s 12 Evidence-Based Prac- tice Centers conduct systematic, comprehensive analyses and syntheses of the scientific literature on clinical conditions/problems that are common, account for a sizable proportion of resources, and are significant for the Medicare or Medic- aid populations (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000b). The centers include universities (Duke University, The Johns Hopkins University, McMaster University, Oregon Health Sciences University, the University of Cali- fornia at San Francisco, and Stanford University); research organizations (Meta- Works, the Research Triangle Institute, and the RAND Corporation); and health care organizations and associations (New England Medical Center, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association). Since December 1998, evidence reports have been released on the following topics: sleep apnea, traumatic brain injury, alcohol dependence, cervical cytology, urinary tract infection, depression, dysphagia, sinusitis, testosterone suppression, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and atrial fibrillation (Eisenberg, 2000a).
In response to the rapid increase in the volume of and interest in systematic reviews generated by the Cochrane Collaboration, the Evidence-Based Practice Centers, and many other smaller-scale efforts, numerous journals specializing in evidence-based publications have emerged. The first journal devoted exclusively to systematic reviews and meta-analyses was the ACP Journal Club, first pub- lished in 1991. There are now a number of evidence-based journals, including Evidence-Based Medicine, Journal of Evidence-Based Health Care, Evidence- Based Cardiovascular Medicine, Evidence-Based Mental Health, and Evidence- Based Nursing, as well as numerous “best-evidence” departments in other jour- nals (Sackett et al., 2000).
One of the most recent evidence-based resources is Clinical Evidence, an “evidence formulary” resulting from a collaborative effort of the British Medical Journal and the American College of Physicians (Godlee et al., 1999). Clinical Evidence is noteworthy because of its focus and organization around common conditions. First published in June 1999, it includes summaries on the prevention and treatment of about 70 such conditions. The summaries are based on system- atic reviews and, when these are lacking, individual randomized controlled trials.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPLYING EVIDENCE TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 151
Clinical Evidence will be updated periodically, and eventually will lead to a family of products available in electronic and print form.
Practice Guidelines
Clinical practice guidelines can be defined as “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances” (Institute of Medicine, 1992). Guide- lines build on syntheses of the evidence, but go one step further to provide formal conclusions or recommendations about appropriate and necessary care for spe- cific types of patients (Lohr et al., 1998). As a practical tool to influence practice, guidelines have been used in continuing medical education and clinical practice, as well as to make decisions about benefits coverage and medical necessity.
Guidelines have proliferated at a rapid pace during the last decade. During the early 1990s, the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (now the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality) sponsored an ambitious program for guideline development, which led to the specification of about 20 guidelines across a wide variety of clinical areas (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2000a; Perfetto and Stockwell Morris, 1996). The efforts in this area were eventually curtailed in favor of establishing the Evidence-Based Practice Centers in partnership with private-sector organizations (Lohr et al., 1998). Spe- cialty societies, professional groups, health plans, medical centers, utilization review organizations, and others have also developed many practice guidelines.
Guidelines vary greatly in the degree to which they are derived from and consistent with the evidence base, for several reasons. First, as noted above, there is much variability in the quality of systematic reviews, which are the foundation for guidelines. Second, guideline development generally relies on expert panels to arrive at specific clinical conclusions. Judgment must be exer- cised in this process because the evidence base is sometimes weak or conflicting, or lacking in the specificity needed to develop recommendations useful for mak- ing decisions about individual patients in particular settings (Lohr et al., 1998).
In an effort to organize information on practice guidelines and to identify those having an adequate evidence base, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, in partnership with the American Medical Association and the American Association of Health Plans, has developed a National Guideline Clearinghouse, which became fully operational in 1999 (Eisenberg, 2000a). The Clearinghouse provides online access to a large and growing repository of evidence-based prac- tice guidelines.
Developing and disseminating practice guidelines alone has minimal effect on clinical practice (Cabana et al., 1999; Hayward, 1997; Lomas et al., 1989; Woolf, 1993). But a growing body of evidence indicates that guidelines imple- mented with patient-specific feedback and/or computer-generated reminders lead to significant improvements (Dowie, 1998; Grimshaw and Russell, 1993). More
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
152 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
recent literature in this area also recognizes the importance of breaking down cultural, financial, organizational, and other barriers, both internal and external to health care organizations, to achieve widespread compliance with evidence-based guidelines (Solberg et al., 2000). To this end, up-front involvement of leaders from the health professions and representatives of patients in the guideline devel- opment process would likely help to ensure widespread adoption of the guide- lines developed.
USING COMPUTER-BASED CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Until now, we have believed that the best way to transmit knowledge from its source to its use in patient care is to first load the knowledge into human minds . . . and then expect those minds, at great expense, to apply the knowledge to those who need it. However, there are enormous ‘voltage drops’ along this transmission line for medical knowledge.—Lawrence Weed, 1997
A clinical decision support system (CDSS) is defined as software that inte- grates information on the characteristics of individual patients with a computer- ized knowledge base for the purpose of generating patient-specific assessments or recommendations designed to aid clinicians and/or patients in making clinical decisions.1 Work on such systems has been under way for decades with minimal impact on health care delivery. Interest in CDSSs has grown dramatically during the last decade, however, in part because of the promise such systems hold for assisting clinicians and patients in applying science to practice.
Publications reporting the results of clinical trials evaluating the effective- ness of CDSSs have also increased in number and quality in recent years. In a systematic review of controlled clinical trials assessing the effects of CDSSs on physician performance and patient outcomes, Hunt and colleagues identified 68 publications during the period 1974 through 1998, with 40 of these having been published in the most recent 6-year period (Hunt et al., 1998; Johnston et al., 1994).
CDSS applications assist clinicians and patients with three types of clinical decisions: preventive and monitoring tasks, prescribing of drugs, and diagnosis and management. Applications in the first category and most applications to date in the second category deal with less complex and frequently occurring clinical decisions. The software required to assist clinicians and patients with these types of decisions can be constructed using relatively simple rule-based logic, often based on practice guidelines (Delaney et al., 1999; Shea et al., 1996). Applica- tions in the third category are far more complex and require more comprehensive
1This definition is adapted from a physician-oriented definition developed by Hunt et al., 1998.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPLYING EVIDENCE TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 153
patient-specific data, access to a much larger repository of up-to-date clinical knowledge, and more sophisticated probabilistic mathematical models.
Use of a CDSS for prevention and monitoring purposes has been shown to improve compliance with guidelines in many clinical areas. In a meta-analysis of 16 randomized controlled trials, computer reminders were found to improve preventive practices for vaccinations, breast cancer screening, colorectal cancer screening, and cardiovascular risk reduction, but not for cervical cancer screen- ing or other preventive services (e.g., glaucoma screening, TB skin test) (Shea et al., 1996). In another meta-analysis of 33 studies of the effect of prompting clinicians, 25 of which used computer-generated prompts, the technique was found to enhance performance significantly in all 16 preventive care procedures studied (Balas et al., 2000). Computer-generated reminder systems targeting patients have also been shown to be effective (Balas et al., 2000; McDowell et al., 1986, 1989).
Computerized prescribing of drugs offers great potential benefit in such areas as dosing calculations and scheduling, drug selection, screening for interac- tions, and monitoring and documentation of adverse side effects (Schiff and Rucker, 1998). Many studies have been conducted on the use of CDSSs to improve drug dosing, and most (9 out of 15) show some positive effect (Hunt et al., 1998). The use of CDSSs for drug selection, screening for interactions, and monitoring and documentation of adverse side effects is far more limited because these applications generally require the linkage of more comprehensive patient- specific clinical information with the medication knowledge base. Although comprehensive medication order entry systems have been implemented in only a limited number of health care settings, the results of several recent studies have demonstrated that these systems reduce medical errors and costs (Bates et al., 1997, 1998, 1999). Computer-assisted disease management programs in areas in which decision making about medications is complex, such as the use of antibi- otic and anti-infective agents, also have been shown to have a positive impact on quality and cost reduction (Classen et al., 1992; Evans et al., 1998).
The third category, computer-assisted diagnostic and management aids, is by far the most challenging. These systems require (1) an expansive knowledge base covering the full range of diseases and conditions, (2) detailed patient- specific clinical information (e.g., history, physical examination, laboratory data), and (3) a powerful computational engine that employs some form of probabilistic decision analysis.
Interest in computer-assisted diagnosis goes back more than four decades, and yet there have been only a few evaluations of its performance (Kassirer, 1994). In a systematic review of 68 CDSS controlled trials between 1974 and 1998, Hunt and colleagues found only 5 studies (4 of the 5 published before 1990) that assessed the role of CDSSs in diagnosis, only one of which found a benefit from their use (Chase et al., 1983; Hunt et al., 1998; Pozen et al., 1984; Wellwood et al., 1992; Wexler et al., 1975; Wyatt, 1989).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
154 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
These early studies generally evaluated how well a computer performed in making or generating plausible diagnoses as compared with the decisions of experts, not the ability of a computer in partnership with a practicing clinician to perform better than the clinician alone (Kassirer, 1994). One recent study com- pared the performance of practicing clinicians with and without the aid of a diagnostic CDSS, and found among the former a significant improvement in the generation of correct diagnoses in hypothesis lists (Friedman et al., 1999). The study included faculty, residents, and fourth-year medical students; while all three groups performed better with the help of the computer, the magnitude of the improvement was greatest for students and smallest for faculty.
Studies conducted to date do not provide a convincing case in support of CDSS diagnostic tools. Yet it is important to recognize that changes under way in health care and computing will likely result in the development of far superior tools in the near future, for three reasons. First, CDSS diagnostic programs have been limited to date in terms of their clinical knowledge base. The cost of maintaining updated syntheses of the evidence for most conditions and translat- ing these syntheses into decision rules has been prohibitively high for commer- cial developers of these systems. As discussed above, however, interest in evi- dence-based practice has led to a logarithmic increase in systematic reviews of the clinical evidence on particular clinical questions, which are available in the public domain.
Second, advances in computer technology, accompanied by dramatic de- creases in the cost of hardware and software, have greatly reduced concerns about the computing requirements of CDSS diagnostic systems. Furthermore, there are early signs of CDSS diagnostic systems becoming available on the Internet, thus further reducing the capital investment and operational costs incurred at the level of a clinical practice (McDonald et al., 1998).
Third, the Internet has opened up new opportunities to address issues related to patient data. As noted, to be effective, CDSS diagnostic systems require detailed, patient-specific clinical information (history, physical results, medica- tions, laboratory test results), which in most health care settings resides in a variety of paper and automated datasets that cannot easily be integrated. Past efforts to develop automated medical record systems have not been very success- ful because of the lack of common standards for coding data, the absence of a data network connecting the many health care organizations and clinicians in- volved in patient care, and a number of other factors. The Internet has the potential to overcome many of these barriers to automated patient data. The World Wide Web offers much of the standardization technology needed to com- bine independent sources of clinical data (McDonald et al., 1998). The willing- ness of patients and clinicians to use these systems will depend to a great extent on finding ways to adequately address concerns about the confidentiality of per- sonally identifiable clinical information and a host of technical, legal, policy, and organizational issues that currently impede many health applications on the
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPLYING EVIDENCE TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 155
Internet. But numerous efforts are under way to address these issues as they apply to both the current and the next-generation Internet (Elhanan et al., 1996; National Research Council, 2000).
Fourth, the extraordinary advances achieved in molecular medicine in recent years will further increase the complexity of both the evidence base and the clinical decision-making process, making it imperative that clinicians use com- puter-aided decision supports. Molecular medicine introduces a huge new body of knowledge that will affect virtually every area of practice, and also opens up the possibility of developing individualized treatments linked to a patient’s ge- netic definition (Rienhoff, 2000). CDSS programs offer the prospect of applying more sophisticated forms of decision analysis to the evaluation of various treat- ment options, taking into account both the patient’s genetic definition and prefer- ences (Lilford et al., 1998).
Given the potential of CDSSs to enhance evidence-based practice and pro- vide greater opportunity for patients to participate in clinical decision making, the committee believes greater public investment in research and development on such systems is warranted. In fiscal year 1999, the Agency for Healthcare Re- search and Quality began a new initiative, Translating Research into Practice, aimed at implementing evidence-based tools and information in health care set- tings (Eisenberg, 2000a). The focus of the initiative is on cultivating partnerships between researchers and health care organizations for the conduct of practice- based, patient outcome research in applied settings. In fiscal year 1999, 3-year grants were awarded in support of projects to identify effective approaches to smoking cessation, chlamydia screening of adolescents, diabetes care in medi- cally underserved areas, and treatment of respiratory distress syndrome in preterm infants. The resources for this program should be expanded to support an applied research and development agenda specific to CDSSs.
MAKING INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON THE INTERNET
The Internet is rapidly becoming the principal vehicle for communication of health information to both consumers and clinicians. It is predicted that 90 percent of households will have Internet access by 2005–2010 (Rosenberg, 1999). The number of Americans who use the Internet to retrieve health-related informa- tion is estimated to be about 70 million (Cain et al., 2000). The connectivity of health care organizations has also increased. For example, between 1993 and 1997, the percentage of academic medical libraries with Internet connections increased from 72 to 96 percent, and that of community hospital libraries rose from 24 to 72 percent (Lyon et al., 1998).
The volume of health care information available on the Internet is enormous. Estimates of the number of health-related Web sites vary from 10,000 to 100,000 (Benton Foundation, 1999; Eysenbach et al., 1999). A survey conducted by USA Today found that consumers access health-related Web sites to research an illness
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
156 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
or disease (62 percent), seek nutrition and fitness information (20 percent), re- search drugs and their interactions (12 percent), find a doctor or hospital (4 percent), and look for online medical support groups (2 percent) (USA Today, 1998).
It is easy for a user to be overwhelmed by the volume of information avail- able on the Web. For example, there are some 61,000 Web sites that contain information on breast cancer (Boodman, 1999), and a simple search for “diabetes mellitus” returns more than 40,000 sites (National Research Council, 2000). Information available on the Internet is also of varying quality: some is incorrect, and some is misleading (Achenbach, 1996; Biermann et al., 1999). Several options have been proposed to assist users in distinguishing the good information from the bad. Silberg et al. (1997) have encouraged Web site sponsors to adhere voluntarily to a set of rules including (1) inclusion of information on authors, along with their affiliations and credentials; (2) attribution, including references and sources for all content; (3) disclosure of Web site ownership, sponsorship, advertising, underwriting, commercial funding, and potential conflicts of inter- est; and (4) dates on which content was posted and updated.
To identify valuable information, users can rely on a number of rating ser- vices that review and rate Web sites, but there are problems with many of these rating services as well. In a recent review, Jadad and Gagliardi (1998) identified 47 rating services, of which only 14 provided a description of the criteria used to produce the ratings, and none gave information on interobserver reliability or construct validity.
One of the richest sources of clinical information on the Internet is the National Library of Medicine’s (NLM) MEDLINE. MEDLINE contains more than 9 million citations and abstracts of articles drawn mainly from professional journals (Miller et al., 2000). In June 1997, NLM made MEDLINE available free of charge on the Web, and usage jumped about 10-fold to 75 million searches annually (Lindberg and Humphreys, 1998).
When MEDLINE was established, it was assumed that its primary audience would be health care professionals, but it is now recognized that the lay public has a keen interest in accessing the clinical knowledge base as well. It is esti- mated that about 30 percent of MEDLINE searches are by members of the gen- eral public and students, 34 percent by health care professionals, and 36 percent by researchers (Lindberg, 1998). In 1998, NLM added 12 consumer health journals to MEDLINE to increase its coverage of information written for the general public, and also launched MEDLINEplus, a Web site specifically for consumers (Lindberg and Humphreys, 1999). MEDLINEplus is divided into eight sections (e.g., health topics, databases, organizations, clearinghouses), each of which provides links to reputable Web sites maintained by the National Insti- tutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Food and Drug Administration, and professional organizations and associations.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPLYING EVIDENCE TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 157
The MEDLINEplus section HealthTopics provides users with access to pre- formulated MEDLINE searches on common topics, most of which are diseases or conditions. The topics included were identified through an analysis of the most common search terms used on the NLM home page, which revealed that 90 percent or more were for specific diseases, conditions, or other common medical terms (e.g., Viagra, St. John’s Wort) (Miller et al., 2000). The HealthTopics list numbers more than 300, with some of the most frequently searched topics being diabetes, shingles, prostate, hypertension, asthma, lupus, fibromyalgia, multiple sclerosis, and cancer.
There are many other sources of filtered evidence-based information as well, including the Cochrane Library discussed above. Access to evidence-based guidelines is provided in the United States by the National Guideline Clearing- house (sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality), the Ameri- can Medical Association, and the American Association of Health Plans (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality et al., 2000), and in Canada by the CPG Infobase (sponsored by the Canadian Medical Association) (Canadian Medical Association, 2000). NOAH (New York Online Access to Health) is a library collaboration for bilingual consumer health information on the Internet (Voge, 1998).
Thus many efforts are under way to assist users in accessing useful health care information on the Web. Some believe, however, that much more could be done to achieve a more “powerful and efficient synergy” between the Internet and evidence-based decision making (Jadad et al., 2000a).
DEFINING QUALITY MEASURES
The enhanced interest in and infrastructure to support evidence-based prac- tice have implications for quality measurement, improvement, and accountability (Eisenberg, 2000b). The use of priority conditions as a framework for organizing the evidence base, as discussed in Chapter 4, may also have implications for external accountability programs.
Systematic reviews and practice guidelines provide a strong foundation for the development of a richer set of quality measures focused on medical care processes and outcomes. To date, a good deal of quality measurement for pur- poses of external accountability has focused on a limited number of “rate-based” indicators—rates of occurrence of desired or undesired events. The National Committee for Quality Assurance, through its Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set, makes comparative quality data available on participating health plans and includes such measures as childhood immunization rates, mammogra- phy rates, and the percentage of diabetics who had an annual eye exam (National Committee for Quality Assurance, 1999). The Joint Commission on the Accredi- tation of Healthcare Organizations sponsors the ORYX system for hospitals, which includes measures such as infection rates and postsurgical complication
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
158 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
rates. Syntheses of the evidence base and the development of practice guide- lines should contribute to more valid and meaningful quality measurement and reporting.
As systematic reviews, development of practice guidelines, and efforts to disseminate evidence focus increasingly on priority conditions—a unit of analy- sis that is meaningful to patients and clinicians—so, too, must accountability processes. To date, efforts to make comparative quality data available in the public domain have focused on types of health care organizations, for the most part health plans and hospitals, and, as noted above, measurement of a limited number of discrete quality indicators for these organizations. Numerous efforts are under way, however, to develop comprehensive measurement sets for various conditions and quality reporting mechanisms. These include the efforts of the Foundation for Accountability, the Health Care Financing Administration’s peer review organizations, and a variety of collaborations involving leading medical associations and accrediting bodies.
The Foundation for Accountability (2000b) has developed condition-spe- cific measurement guides related to a number of common conditions: adult asthma, alcohol misuse, breast cancer, diabetes, health status under age 65, and major depressive disorders. The Foundation continues to work on child and adolescent health, coronary heart disease, end of life, and HIV/AIDS. In addi- tion, it has created FACCTONE, a survey tool designed to gather information directly from patients about important aspects of their health care (Foundation for Accountability, 2000a). The first phase of the survey addresses quality of care for people living with the chronic illnesses of asthma, diabetes, and coronary artery disease. It assesses performance related to patient education and knowl- edge, obtaining of essential treatments, access, involvement in care decisions, communication with providers, patient self-management behaviors, coping, symptom control, maintenance of regular activities, and functional status.
Since 1992, the Health Care Financing Administration, through its Peer Review Organizations, has been developing core sets of performance measures for a number of common conditions, including acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, stroke, pneumonia, breast cancer, and diabetes (Health Care Financing Administration, 2000). Comparative performance data for Medicare fee-for- service beneficiaries by state were recently released for each of these conditions (Jencks et al., 2000). Quality-of-care measures for beneficiaries experiencing acute myocardial infarction have been piloted in four states as part of the Coop- erative Cardiovascular Project (Ellerbeck et al., 1995; Marciniak et al., 1998).
The Diabetes Quality Improvement Project, a collaborative quality measure- ment effort involving the American Diabetes Association, the Foundation for Accountability, the Health Care Financing Administration, the National Commit- tee for Quality Assurance, the American Academy of Physicians, the American College of Physicians, and the Veterans Administration, has been under way for several years. The project has identified seven accountability measures (i.e.,
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPLYING EVIDENCE TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 159
hemoglobin A1c tested, poor hemoglobin A1c control, eye exam performed, lipid profile performed, lipids controlled, monitoring for kidney disease, and blood pressure controlled), six of which will be included in the National Committee for Quality Assurance’s Year 2000 Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (Health Care Financing Administration, 1999).
The American Medical Association, working with experts from national medical specialty societies and the quality measurement community, has devel- oped measure sets for physician clinical performance in the areas of adult diabe- tes, prenatal testing, and chronic stable coronary artery disease. The core mea- sure set for adult diabetes, developed with input from the Iowa Foundation for Medical Care, was approved by the American Medical Association in July 2000, while the other two measure sets are undergoing public review and comment (American Medical Association, 2000).
It will be important for the National Quality Forum, a recently created pub- lic–private partnership developed to foster collaboration across public and pri- vate oversight organizations, to consider carefully how best to align comparative quality reporting with the developing infrastructure in support of evidence-based practice and consumer-centered health care. The National Quality Forum, a not- for-profit organization established in 1999 with the participation of both public and private purchasers, is currently developing a strategic measurement frame- work to guide the future development of external quality reporting for purposes of accountability and consumer choice (Kizer, 2000). This activity, now under way, presents a unique opportunity to influence the direction of quality measurement.
REFERENCES
Achenbach, Joel. Reality Check. You Can’t Believe Everything You Read. But You’d Better Be- lieve This. Washington Post. E–C01, Dec. 4, 1996.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. 2000a. “Clinical Practice Guidelines Online.” Online. Available at http://www.ahcpr.gov/clinic/cpgonline.htm [accessed Jan. 2, 2001].
———. 2000b. “Evidence-based Practice Centers. Synthesizing Scientific Evidence to Improve Quality and Effectiveness in Clinical Care. AHRQ Publication No. 00–P013.” Online. Avail- able at http://www.ahcpr.gov/clinic/epc/ [accessed Oct. 11, 2000].
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, American Medical Association, and American Asso- ciation of Health Plans. 2000. “National Guideline Clearinghouse.” Online. Available at http:// www.guideline.gov [accessed Jan. 2, 2001].
American Medical Association. Adult Diabetes Core Physician Performance Measurement Set. Chi- cago, IL: American Medical Association, 2000.
Balas, E. Andrew and Suzanne A. Boren. Managing Clinical Knowledge for Health Care Improve- ment. Yearbook of Medical Informatics. National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, MD:65–70, 2000.
Balas, E. Andrew, Scott Weingarten, Candace T. Garb, et al. Improving Preventive Care by Prompt- ing Physicians. Arch Int Med 160(3):301–8, 2000.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
160 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Bates, David W., Lucian L. Leape, David J. Cullen, et al. Effect of Computerized Physician Order Entry and a Team Intervention on Prevention of Serious Medication Errors. JAMA 280(15): 1311–6, 1998.
Bates, David W., Nathan Spell, David J. Cullen, et al. The Costs of Adverse Drug Events in Hospi- talized Patients. JAMA 277(4):307–11, 1997.
Bates, David W., Jonathan M. Teich, Joshua Lee, et al. The Impact of Computerized Physician Order Entry on Medication Error Prevention. J Am Med Inform Assoc 6(4):313–21, 1999.
Benton Foundation. 1999. “Networking for Better Care: Health Care in the Information Age.” Online. Available at http://www.benton.org/Library/health/ [accessed Sept. 18, 2000].
Biermann, J. Sybil, Gregory J. Golladay, Mary Lou V. H. Greenfield, and Laurence H. Baker. Evaluation of Cancer Information on the Internet. Cancer 86(3):381–90, 1999.
Boodman, Sandra G. Medical Web Sites Can Steer You Wrong. Study Finds Erroneous and Mis- leading Information on Many Pages Dedicated to a Rare Cancer. Washington Post. Health– Z07, Aug. 10, 1999.
Cabana, Michael D., Cynthia S. Rand, Neil R. Powe, et al. Why Don’t Physicians Follow Clinical Practice Guidelines? A Framework for Improvement. JAMA 282(15):1458–65, 1999.
Cain, Mary M., Robert Mittman, Jane Sarasohn-Kahn, and Jennifer C. Wayne. Health e-People: The Online Consumer Experience. Oakland, CA: Institute for the Future, California Health Care Foundation, 2000.
Canadian Medical Association. 2000. “CMA Infobase – Clinical Practice Guidelines.” Online. Avail- able at http://www.cma.ca/cpgs/index.asp [accessed Jan. 2, 2001].
Chalmers, Iain and Brian Haynes. Systematic Reviews: Reporting, Updating, and Correcting Sys- tematic Reviews of the Effects of Health Care. BMJ 309:862–5, 1994.
Chalmers, T. C. and J. Lau. Meta-Analytic Stimulus for Changes in Clinical Trials. Statistical Meth- ods in Medical Research 2:161–72, 1993.
Chase, Christopher R., Pamela M. Vacek, Tamotsu Shinozaki, et al. Medical Information Manage- ment: Improving the Transfer of Research Results to Presurgical Evaluation. Medical Care 21(3):410–24, 1983.
Classen, David C., R. Scott Evans, Stanley L. Pestotnik, et al. The Timing of Prophylactic Adminis- tration of Antibiotics and the Risk of Surgical-Wound Infection. N EngI J Med 326(5):281–6, 1992.
Cochrane Collaboration. 1999. “Cochrane Brochure.” Online. Available at http://hiru.mcmaster.ca/ cochrane/cochrane/cc-broch.htm [accessed Jan. 2, 2001].
Cook, Deborah J., Cynthia D. Mulrow, and R. Brian Haynes. Systematic Reviews: Synthesis of Best Evidence for Clinical Decisions. Ann Int Med 126(5):376–80, 1997.
Davidoff, Frank. In the Teeth of the Evidence. The Curious Case of Evidence-Based Medicine. The Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine 66(2):75–83, 1999.
Davidoff, Frank and Valerie Florance. The Informationist: A New Health Profession? Ann Int Med 132(12):996–8, 2000.
Delaney, Brendan C., David A. Fitzmaurice, Amjid Riaz, and F. D. Richard Hobbs. Changing the Doctor–Patient Relationship: Can Computerised Decision Support Systems Deliver Improved Quality in Primary Care? BMJ 319:1281, 1999.
Dowie, Robin. A Review of Research in the United Kingdom to Evaluate the Implementation of Clinical Guidelines in General Practice. Family Practice 15(5):462–70, 1998.
Eisenberg, John M. Quality Research for Quality Healthcare: The Data Connection. Health Services Research 35:xii–xvii, 2000a.
———. A Research Agenda for Quality. Washington, D.C.: Presentation at the Institute of Medi- cine Thirtieth Annual Meeting, The National Academies, 2000b.
Elhanan, G., S. A. Socratous, and J. J. Cimino. Integrating DXplain into a Clinical Information System Using the World Wide Web. Proc AMIA Annual Fall Symp:348–52, 1996.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPLYING EVIDENCE TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 161
Ellerbeck, Edward F., Stephen F. Jencks, Martha J. Radford, et al. Quality of Care for Medicare Patients With Acute Myocardial Infarction: A Four-State Pilot Study from the Cooperative Cardiovascular Project. JAMA 273(19):1509–14, 1995.
Evans, R. Scott, Stanley L. Pestotnik, David C. Classen, et al. A Computer-Assisted Management Program for Antibiotics and Other Antiinfective Agents. N EngI J Med 338(4):232–8, 1998.
Eysenbach, Gunther, Eun Ryoung Sa, and Thomas L. Diepgen. Shopping Around the Internet Today and Tomorrow: Towards the Millennium of Cybermedicine. BMJ 319:1294, 1999.
Foundation for Accountability. 2000a. “FACCTONE: A Tool for Evaluating the Performance of Health Care Organizations.” Online. Available at http://www.facct.org/measures/Develop/ FACCTONE.htm [accessed Jan. 2, 2001].
———. 2000b. “Supporting Quality-Based Decisions. The FACCT Consumer Information Net- work, Comparative Information for Better Health Care Decisions.” Online. Available at http:// www.facct.org/information.html [accessed Jan. 2, 2001].
Friedman, Charles P., Arthur S. Elstein, Fredric M. Wolf, et al. Enhancement of Clinicians’ Diagnos- tic Reasoning by Computer-Based Consultation. JAMA 282(19):1851–6, 1999.
Godlee, Fiona, Richard Smith, and David Goldmann. Clinical Evidence: This month sees the publi- cation of a new resource for clinicians. BMJ 318:1570–1, 1999.
Grimshaw, Jeremy M. and Ian T. Russell. Effect of Clinical Guidelines on Medical Practice: A Systematic Review of Rigorous Evaluations. The Lancet 342:1317–22, 1993.
Guyatt, Gordon H., Maureen O. Meade, Roman Z. Jaeschke, et al. Practitioners of Evidence Based Care: Not All Clinicians Need to Appraise Evidence from Scratch but All Need Some Skills. BMJ 320:954–5, 2000.
Hayward, Robert S. A. Clinical Practice Guidelines on Trial. Can Med Assoc J 156:1725–7, 1997. Health Care Financing Administration. 1999. “Quality of Care—National Projects. Diabetes Quality
Improvement Project (DQIP).” Online. Available at http://www.hcfa.gov/quality/3l.htm [ac- cessed Jan. 2, 2001].
———. 2000. “Quality of Care – PRO Priorities. National Clinical Topics (Task 1).” Online. Avail- able at http://www.hcfa.gov/quality/11a.htm [accessed Jan. 2, 2001].
Hunt, Dereck L., R. Brian Haynes, Steven E. Hanna, and Kristina Smith. Effects of Computer-Based Clinical Decision Support Systems on Physician Performance and Patient Outcomes: A Sys- tematic Review. JAMA 280(15):1339–46, 1998.
Institute of Medicine. Guidelines for Clinical Practice: From Development to Use. Marilyn J. Field and Kathleen N. Lohr, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992.
Jadad, Alejandro R. and Anna Gagliardi. Rating Health Information on the Internet: Navigating to Knowledge or to Babel? JAMA 279(8):611–4, 1998.
Jadad, Alejandro R., R. Brian Haynes, Dereck Hunt, and George P. Browman. The Internet and Evidence-Based Decision-Making: A Needed Synergy for Efficient Knowledge Management in Health Care. Journal of the Canadian Medical Association 162(3):362–5, 2000a.
Jadad, Alejandro R., Michael Moher, George P. Browman, et al. Systematic Reviews and Meta- Analysis on Treatment of Asthma: Critical Evaluation. BMJ 320(7234):537, 2000b.
Jencks, Stephen F., Timothy Cuerdon, Dale R. Burwen, et al. Quality of Medical Care Delivered to Medicare Beneficiaries: A Profile at State and National Levels. JAMA 284(13):1670–6, 2000.
Johnston, Mary E., Karl B. Langton, R. Brian Haynes, and Alix Mathieu. Effects of Computer-Based Clinical Decision Support Systems on Clinician Performance and Patient Outcome: A Critical Appraisal of Research. Ann Int Med 120:135–42, 1994.
Kassirer, Jerome P. A Report Card on Computer-Assisted Diagnosis—The Grade: C. N EngI J Med 330(25):1824–5, 1994.
Kizer, Kenneth W. The National Quality Forum Enters the Game. International Journal for Quality in Health Care 12(2):85–7, 2000.
Lau, Joseph, Elliott M. Antman, Jeanette Jimenez-Silva, et al. Cumulative Meta-Analysis of the Therapeutic Trials for Myocardial Infarction. N EngI J Med 327(4):248–54, 1992.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
162 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Lilford, R. J., S. G. Pauker, D. A. Draunholtz, and Jiri Chard. Getting Research Findings into Practice: Decision Analysis and the Implementation of Research Findings. BMJ 317:405–9, 1998.
Lindberg, Donald A. B. 1998. “Fiscal Year 1999 President’s Budget Request for the National Li- brary of Medicine.” Online. Available at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/pubs/staffpubs/od/budget99. html [accessed Sept. 18, 2000].
Lindberg, Donald A. B. and Betsy L. Humphreys. Updates Linking Evidence and Experience. Medi- cine and Health on the Internet: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. JAMA 280(15):1303–4, 1998.
———. A Time of Change for Medical Informatics in the USA. Yearbook of Medical Informatics National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, MD:53–7, 1999.
Lohr, Kathleen N. and Tomothy S. Carey. Asessing “Best Evidence:” Issues in Grading the Quality of Studies for Systematic Reviews. Journal on Quality Improvement 25(9):470–9, 1999.
Lohr, Kathleen N., Kristen Eleazer, and Josephine Mauskopf. Health Policy Issues and Applications for Evidence-Based Medicine and Clinical Practice Guidelines. Health Policy 46:1–19, 1998.
Lomas, Jonathan Anderson Geoffrey M., Karin Domnick-Pierre, et al. Do Practice Guidelines Guide Practice? The Effect of a Consensus Statement on the Practice of Physicians. N EngI J Med 321(19):1306–11, 1989.
Lyon, Becky J., P. Zoë Stavri, D. Colette Hochstein, and Holly Grossetta Nardini. Internet Access in the Libraries of the National Network of Libraries of Medicine. Bull Med Libr Assoc 86(4):486– 90, 1998.
Marciniak, Thomas A., Edward F. Ellerbeck, Martha J. Radford, et al. Improving the Quality of Care for Medicare Patients With Acute Myocardial Infarction: Results from the Cooperative Car- diovascular Project. JAMA 279(17):1351–7, 1998.
McColl, Alastair, Helen Smith, Peter White, and Jenny Field. General Practitioners’ Perceptions of the Route to Evidence Based Medicine: A Questionnaire Survey. BMJ 316:361–5, 1998.
McDonald, Clement J., J. Marc Overhage, Paul R. Dexter, et al. Canopy Computing: Using the Web in Clinical Practice. JAMA 280(15):1325–9, 1998.
McDowell, Ian, Claire Newell, and Walter Rosser. Comparison of Three Methods of Recalling Patients for Influenza Vaccination. Can Med Assoc J 135:991–7, 1986.
———. A Randomized Trial of Computerized Reminders for Blood Pressure Screening in Primary Care. Medical Care 27(3):297–305, 1989.
Mechanic, David. Bringing Science to Medicine: The Origins of Evidence-Based Practice. Health Affairs 17(6):250–1, 1998.
Miller, Naomi, Eve-Marie Lacroix, and Joyce E. B. Backus. MEDLINEplus: Building and Main- taining the National Library of Medicine’s Consumer Health Web Service. Bull Med Libr Assoc 88(1):11–7, 2000.
National Committee for Quality Assurance. Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set, Ver- sion 3.0. Washington, D.C.: National Committee for Quality Assurance, 1999.
National Research Council. Networking Health: Prescriptions for the Internet. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000.
Perfetto, Eleanor M. and Lisa Stockwell Morris. Agency for Health Care Policy and Research Clini- cal Practice Guidelines. The Annals of Pharmacotherapy 30:1117–21, 1996.
Pozen, Michael W., Ralph B. D’Agostino, Harry P. Selker, et al. A Predictive Instrument to Improve Coronary-Care-Unit Admission Practices in Acute Ischemic Heart Disease. N EngI J Med 310(20):1273–8, 1984.
Rienhoff, Otto. Retooling Practitioners in the Information Age. Information Technology Strategies from the United States and the European Union: Transferring Research to Practice for Health Care Improvement. E. Andrew Balas, ed. Washington, D.C.:IOS Press, 2000.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPLYING EVIDENCE TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 163
Rosenberg, Matt. Popularity of Internet Won’t Peak for Years: Not Until Today’s Middle-Schoolers Reach Adulthood Will the Technology Really Take Off. Puget Sound Business Journal. May 24, 1999. Online. Available at http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/stories/1999/05/24/focus9.html [accessed Jan. 22. 2001].
Sackett, David L., William M. C. Rosenberg, J. A. Muir Gray, et al. Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t. BMJ 312:71–2, 1996.
Sackett, David L., Sharon E. Straus, W. Scott Richardson, et al. Evidence-Based Medicine: How to Practice & Teach EBM. 2nd edition. London, England: Churchill Livingstone, 2000.
Schiff, Gordon D. and T. Donald Rucker. Computerized Prescribing: Building the Electronic Infra- structure for Better Medication Usage. JAMA 279(13):1024–9, 1998.
Shea, Steven, William DuMouchel, and Lisa Bahamonde. A Meta-Analysis of 16 Randomized Con- trolled Trials to Evaluate Computer-Based Clinical Reminder Systems for Preventive Care in the Ambulatory Setting. J Am Med Inform Assoc 3(6):399–409, 1996.
Silberg, William M., George D. Lundberg, and Robert A. Musacchio. Assessing, Controlling, and Assuring the Quality of Medical Information on the Internet. JAMA 277(15):1244–5, 1997.
Solberg, Leif I., Milo L. Brekke, Charles J. Fazio, et al. Lessons from Experienced Guideline Implementers: Attend to Many Factors and Use Multiple Strategies. Joint Commission Journal on Quality Improvement 26(4):171–88, 2000.
USA Today. Health-Related Activities Conducted Online. Health, July 10, 1998. Voge, Susan. NOAH-New York Online Access to Health: Library Collaboration for Bilingual Con-
sumer Health Information on the Internet. Bull Med Libr Assoc 86(3):326–34, 1998. Wellwood, J., S. Johannessen, and D. J. Spiegelhalter. How Does Computer-Aided Diagnosis Im-
prove the Management of Acute Abdominal Pain? Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons of England 74:40–6, 1992.
Wexler, Jerry R., Phillip T. Swender, Walter W. Tunnessen, and Frank A. Oski. Impact of a System of Computer-Assisted Diagnosis: Initial Evaluation of the Hospitalized Patient. Am J Dis Child 129:203–5, 1975.
Woolf, Steven H. Practice Guidelines: A New Reality in Medicine. III. Impact on Patient Care. Arch Int Med 153:2646–55, 1993.
Wyatt, J. R. Lessons Learnt from the Field Trial of ACORN, An Expert System to Advise on Chest Pain. Proceedings of the Sixth World Conference on Medical Informatics, Singapore. 111–5, 1989.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
164
7
Using Information Technology
Throughout this report, the committee has emphasized that health care should be supported by systems that are carefully and consciously designed to produce care that is safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable. This chapter examines the critical role of information technology (IT) in the design of those systems.
IT has enormous potential to improve the quality of health care with regard to all six of the aims set forth in Chapter 2. In the area of safety, there is growing evidence that automated order entry systems can reduce errors in drug prescrib- ing and dosing (Bates et al., 1997, 1998a, 1999). In the area of effectiveness, there is considerable evidence that automated reminder systems improve compli- ance with clinical practice guidelines (Balas et al., 2000; Shea et al., 1996), and some promising studies, although few in number, indicate that computer-assisted diagnosis and management can improve quality (Durieux et al., 2000; Evans et al., 1998). There are many opportunities to use IT to make care more patient- centered, for example, by facilitating access to clinical knowledge through un- derstandable and reliable Web sites and online support groups (Cain et al., 2000); customized health education and disease management messages (Goldsmith, 2000); and the use of clinical decision support systems to tailor information according to an individual patient’s characteristics, genetic makeup, and specific conditions (Garibaldi, 1998) (see Chapter 6 for additional discussion). Both patients and clinicians can benefit from improvements in timeliness through the use of Internet-based communication (i.e., e-visits, telemedicine) and immediate access to automated clinical information, diagnostic tests, and treatment results. Clinical decision support systems have been shown to improve efficiency by
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 165
reducing redundant laboratory tests (Bates et al., 1998b). Finally, Internet-based health communication can enhance equity by providing a broader array of options for interacting with clinicians, although this can only happen if all people, regard- less of race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, geographic location, and other fac- tors, have access to the technology infrastructure (Science Panel on Interactive Communication and Health, 1999).
The committee believes IT must play a central role in the redesign of the health care system if a substantial improvement in health care quality is to be achieved during the coming decade. This is a theme underlying many of the topics addressed in this report. Chapter 5 emphasizes the importance of a strong information infrastructure in supporting efforts to reengineer care processes, manage the burgeoning clinical knowledge base, coordinate patient care across clinicians and settings and over time, support multidisciplinary team functioning, and facilitate performance and outcome measurements for improvement and ac- countability. Chapter 6 stresses the importance of building such an infrastructure to support evidence-based practice, including the provision of more organized and reliable information sources on the Internet for both consumers and clini- cians, and the development and application of clinical decision support tools. And Chapter 9 considers the need to build information-rich environments for undergraduate and graduate health education, as well as the potential to enhance continuing education through Internet-based programs.
Central to many IT applications is the automation of patient-specific clinical information. Efforts to automate clinical data date back several decades, and have tended to focus on creation of an automated medical record. For example, in 1991 the IOM set forth a vision and issued a strong call for nationwide imple- mentation of computer-based patient records (Institute of Medicine, 1991). But progress has been slow. It is important to recognize that a fully electronic medi- cal record, including all types of patient information, is not necessary to achieve many if not most of the benefits of automated clinical data. For example, use of medication order entry systems using data on patient diagnoses, current medica- tions, and history of drug interactions or allergies can result in sizable reductions in prescribing errors (Bates et al., 1998a; Leapfrog Group, 2000). The automa- tion and linking of data on services provided to patients in ambulatory and insti- tutional settings (e.g., encounters, procedures, ancillary tests) would provide a rich source of information for quality measurement and improvement purposes.
The challenges of applying IT to health care should not be underestimated. Consumers and policy makers share concerns about the privacy and confidential- ity of these data (Cain et al., 2000). The United States still lacks national stan- dards for the protection of health data and the capture, storage, communication, processing, and presentation of health information (Work Group on Computer- ization of Patient Records, 2000). Sizable capital investments will also be re- quired. Moreover, widespread adoption of many IT applications will require
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
166 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
behavioral adaptations on the part of large numbers of patients, clinicians, and organizations.
The committee believes solutions to these barriers can and must be found given the critical importance of the judicious application of IT to addressing the nation’s health care quality concerns. The time has come to establish a national health information infrastructure that will encourage public- and private-sector investments in IT while providing adequate safeguards for consumers. As dis- cussed in Chapter 4, a sizable portion of the resources of the recommended Health Care Quality Innovation Fund (see Recommendation 6) should be in- vested in projects that implement and evaluate IT applications and are likely to contribute to quality improvements.
Recommendation 9: Congress, the executive branch, leaders of health care organizations, public and private purchasers, and health informatics associations and vendors should make a renewed na- tional commitment to building an information infrastructure to sup- port health care delivery, consumer health, quality measurement and improvement, public accountability, clinical and health services research, and clinical education. This commitment should lead to the elimination of most handwritten clinical data by the end of the decade.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
In less than 5 years, the IT landscape has changed dramatically. The share of households with Internet access grew from 26.2 percent in December 1998 to 41.5 percent in August 2000, an increase of 58 percent in 20 months (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000). The explosive growth of the Internet has opened up many new promising applications that have implications for the roles of consumers, clinicians, and organizations in the delivery of health care services. A recent report by the National Research Council of The National Academies identified six major health-related application domains: consumer health, clini- cal care, administrative and financial transactions, public health, professional education, and research (see Table 7-1) (National Research Council, 2000). Many of the applications in these domains, such as online searching for health informa- tion by patients and providers, are commonplace. Others, such as remote and virtual surgery and simulations of surgical procedures, are in the early stages of development.
• Consumer Health. A September 1999 poll conducted by Harris Interac- tive found that 70 million of the 97 million American adults who were online had searched for health information in the last year (Cain et al., 2000). Consumers are using the Internet to search for health information, to obtain information
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 167
useful in selecting a health plan or provider, and to participate in formal and informal support groups. Comparative performance data are available on the Internet for many health plans (National Committee for Quality Assurance, 2000), and depending on the geographic area of interest, there may be relevant informa- tion on hospitals and providers. The Internet can also be used to post customized health education messages according to a person’s profile and needs (Kendall and Levine, 1997).
• Clinical Care. The Internet has the potential to make health care delivery more timely and responsive to consumer preferences. As discussed in Chapter 6, the Internet is playing an increasingly critical role in making scientific publica- tions, syntheses of the evidence, practice guidelines, and other tools required to support evidence-based practice available to both patients and clinicians. Ex- amples of information technologies that are of growing importance in the health care arena are reminder systems (Alemi et al., 1996); telemedicine applications, such as teleradiology and e-mail; and online prescribing (National Health Policy Forum, 2000; Schiff and Rucker, 1998).
• Administrative and Financial Transactions. To date, the area in which information systems have been used most extensively in health care has been to improve the service and efficiency of various administrative and financial trans- actions (Starr, 1997; Turban et al., 1996). In 1999, almost 65 percent of the 4.6 billion medical claims processed by private and public health insurance plans were transmitted electronically (Goldsmith, 2000).
• Public Health. IT can be used to improve the quality of health care at the population level. Applications include incident reporting, videoconferencing among public health officials during emergency situations, disease surveillance, transfer of epidemiology maps and other image files for monitoring of the spread of disease, delivery of alerts and other information to clinicians and health work- ers, and maintenance of registries.
• Professional Education. The Internet can be a powerful tool for under- graduate, graduate, and continuing medical education for all types of health pro- fessionals. A variety of Internet-based educational programs have made their curricula and training materials available on the Web. There are also educational videos, lectures, virtual classrooms, and simulation programs to teach surgical skills.
• Research. The Internet opens up many options for improving research- ers’ access to databases and literature, enhancing collegial interaction, and short- ening the time required to conduct certain types of research and disseminate results to the field. These applications are already gaining widespread accep- tance.
Of course, not all computer health applications are Internet-based. There are computerized order entry systems, reminder systems, and other applications that run on legacy systems (older IT systems, often built around mainframes, owned
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
168
T A
B L
E 7
-1 H
ea lt
h- R
el at
ed A
pp li
ca ti
on s
fo r
th e
In te
rn et
A pp
li ca
ti on
D om
ai n
T yp
es o
f A
pp li
ca ti
on s
C on
su m
er h
ea lt
h •
O nl
in e
se ar
ch in
g fo
r he
al th
i nf
or m
at io
n •
S ea
rc he
s of
m ed
ic al
l it
er at
ur e
• D
ow nl
oa di
ng o
f ed
uc at
io na
l vi
de os
• S
ea rc
h fo
r a
cl in
ic ia
n or
h ea
lt h
pl an
• P
ar ti
ci pa
ti on
i n
ch at
a nd
s up
po rt
g ro
up s
• O
nl in
e ac
ce ss
t o
pe rs
on al
h ea
lt h
re co
rd s
• C
om pl
et io
n of
p at
ie nt
s ur
ve ys
C li
ni ca
l ca
re •
S ea
rc he
s of
m ed
ic al
l it
er at
ur e
• R
ou ti
ne c
ar e
de li
ve ry
( e.
g. ,
e- vi
si ts
) an
d ch
ro ni
c di
se as
e m
an ag
em en
t (e
.g .,
pe ri
od ic
r ep
or ts
o n
he al
th c
on di
ti on
s to
cl in
ic ia
ns )
• R
em in
de rs
a nd
a le
rt s;
d ec
is io
n su
pp or
t sy
st em
s •
C on
su lt
a t io
ns a
m on
g c l
in ic
ia ns
( pe
rh a p
s in
vo lv
in g
m an
ip ul
a t io
n of
d ig
it a l
i m
ag e s
) •
R em
ot e
m on
it or
in g
of p
a t ie
nt s
in h
om e
a n d
lo ng
-t e r
m c
a r e
se tt
in gs
• T
ra ns
fe r
of m
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds a
nd i
m ag
e s •
R em
ot e
a n d
vi rt
ua l
su rg
e r y
A dm
in is
tr a t
iv e
a n d
• V
id eo
co nf
e r e n
c i ng
w it
h re
a l -t
im e
sh a r
in g
of d
oc um
en ts
fi na
nc ia
l tr
a n sa
c t io
ns •
E nr
ol lm
en t
of p
a t ie
nt s
• S
c h e d
ul in
g of
a pp
oi nt
m en
ts •
B il
li ng
f or
s e r
vi c e
s, p
a y m
en t
of p
ro vi
de rs
• C
e r ta
in a
sp e c
ts o
f c l
in ic
ia n
c r e d
e n ti
a l in
g •
C on
su m
e r a
c c e s
s to
i nf
or m
a t io
n a b
ou t
he a l
th p
la ns
, pa
rt ic
ip a t
in g
pr ov
id e r
s, e
li gi
bi li
ty f
or p
ro c e
du re
s, c
ov e r
e d d
ru gs
i n
fo rm
ul a r
y, e
tc .
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
169 P
ub li
c he
al th
• V
id eo
co nf
er en
ci ng
a m
on g
pu bl
ic h
ea lt
h of
fi ci
al s
du ri
ng e
m er
ge nc
y si
tu at
io ns
• In
ci de
nt r
ep or
ti ng
• C
ol le
ct io
n of
i nf
or m
at io
n fr
om l
oc al
p ub
li c
he al
th d
ep ar
tm en
ts •
S ur
ve il
la nc
e fo
r em
er gi
ng d
is ea
se s
or e
pi de
m ic
s •
T ra
ns fe
r of
e pi
de m
io lo
gy m
ap s
or o
th er
i m
ag e
fi le
s fo
r m
on it
or in
g th
e sp
re ad
o f
a di
se as
e •
D el
iv er
y of
a le
rt s
an d
ot he
r in
fo rm
at io
n to
p ro
vi de
rs a
nd h
ea lt
h w
or ke
rs
P ro
fe ss
io na
l ed
uc at
io n
• A
cc es
si ng
r ef
er en
ce m
at er
ia l
• D
is ta
nc e
ed uc
at io
n w
it h
re al
-t im
e tr
an sm
is si
on o
f le
ct ur
es o
r pr
er ec
or de
d vi
de os
• R
ea l-
ti m
e co
ns ul
ta ti
on s
w it
h ex
pe rt
s ab
ou t
di ff
ic ul
t ca
se s
• V
ir tu
al c
la ss
ro om
s, d
is tr
ib ut
ed c
ol la
bo ra
ti ve
p ro
je ct
s an
d di
sc us
si on
s •
S im
ul at
io n
of s
ur gi
ca l
pr oc
ed ur
es •
V ir
tu al
e xp
lo ra
ti on
o f
th re
e- di
m en
si on
al e
nv ir
on m
en ts
H ea
lt h
se rv
ic es
, •
H ea
lt h
se rv
ic es
r es
ea rc
h us
in g
ad m
in is
tr at
iv e
an d
cl in
ic al
d at
a bi
om ed
ic al
, an
d •
S ea
rc hi
ng o
f re
m ot
e da
ta ba
se s
an d
pr of
es si
on al
l it
er at
ur e
cl in
ic al
o ut
co m
es •
C ol
la bo
ra ti
on a
m on
g re
se ar
ch er
s, p
ee r
re vi
ew ,
in te
ra ct
iv e
vi rt
ua l
co nf
er en
ce s
re se
ar ch
• C
on tr
ol o
f ex
pe ri
m en
ta l
eq ui
pm en
t, s
uc h
as e
le ct
ro n
m ic
ro sc
op es
, vi
su al
f ee
db ac
k fr
om r
em ot
e in
st ru
m en
ta ti
on •
R ea
l- ti
m e
m on
it or
in g
of c
om pl
ia nc
e w
it h
pr ot
oc ol
s •
T ra
ns fe
r of
l ar
ge d
at as
et s
be tw
ee n
co m
pu te
rs f
or h
ig h-
sp ee
d co
m pu
ta ti
on a
nd c
om pa
ri so
ns •
E nr
ol li
ng o
f po
pu la
ti on
s in
c li
ni ca
l tr
ia ls
S O
U R
C E
: A
da pt
ed f
ro m
N at
io na
l R es
ea rc
h C
ou nc
il , 2
00 0.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
170 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
by some hospitals, medical centers, and group practices) (Turban et al., 1996). In the future, however, the Internet will likely be the platform of choice for many if not most health applications because of the ready access it provides to both consumers and clinicians, as well as other financial and technical considerations.
It must be acknowledged that although the potential benefits of IT are com- pelling, the evidence in support of these benefits varies greatly by type of appli- cation. As discussed in Chapter 6, there is strong evidence to support the effec- tiveness of computerized reminder systems in improving compliance with practice guidelines. For computerized medication order entry systems, recent studies substantiate reductions in errors and unnecessary services, but such studies are few in number (Bates et al., 1998a). A recent review of 80 controlled trials carried out between 1966 and 1996 concluded that telephone-based distance medicine or telemedicine technologies are beneficial in the areas of preventive care and the management of osteoarthritis, cardiac rehabilitation, and diabetes care (Balas et al., 1997). In a review of 15 controlled trials in which diabetic patients received computer-generated information, it was found that 12 of the 15 trials documented positive clinical outcomes, such as improved hemoglobin and blood glucose levels (Balas et al., 1998).
In summary, the strength of the evidence on the effects of various IT applica- tions is highly varied. Many applications, such as simulation of surgical proce- dures for educational purposes and remote and virtual surgery, are in the early developmental stages. Others may be highly promising, but their adoption and testing are hampered by the lack of computerized patient information (e.g., com- puter-aided diagnosis), regulatory or legal impediments (e.g., e-mail communica- tions across state lines), and payment issues (e.g., for e-visits). Still other appli- cations, such as telemedicine, have not been rigorously evaluated (Grigsby and Sanders, 1998; Institute of Medicine, 1996).
AUTOMATED CLINICAL INFORMATION
Much of the potential of IT to improve quality is predicated on the automa- tion of at least some types of clinical data. Automated clinical data are required by many of the most promising IT applications, including computer-aided deci- sion support systems that couple medical evidence with patient-specific clinical data to assist clinicians and patients in making diagnoses and evaluating treat- ment options (see Chapter 6) (Burger, 1997; Weed and Weed, 1999). Automated clinical data also open up the potential to glean medical knowledge from patient care (Institute of Medicine, 2000). An example is the extraordinary gains in cancer survival for children as compared with adults, attributable in part to the participation of virtually all pediatric cancer patients in clinical trials that system- atically collect, pool, and analyze data and disseminate results to all participants (Simone and Lyons, 2000). Automated clinical and administrative data also enable many types of health service research applications, such as assessment of
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 171
clinical outcomes associated with alternative treatment options and care pro- cesses; identification of best practices; and evaluation of the effects of different methods of financing, organizing, and delivering services.
Both private- and public-sector groups have identified the need to move forward expeditiously with the automation of clinical information. In 1991, the IOM issued a report concluding that computer-based patient records are an “es- sential technology” for health care and that electronic records should be the standard for medical and all other records related to health care. In that same year, the U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report stating that automated medical records offer great potential to improve patient care, increase efficiency, and reduce costs, and calling for the development of standards to ensure uniform electronic recording and transmission of medical information. A 1993 report of the U.S. General Accounting Office called for leadership and the acceleration of efforts to develop standards. In 1997, a revised edition of the 1991 IOM report noted the strides that had been made in the power and capacity of personal computers and other computer-based technologies, the remarkable growth of the Internet for research and some health applications, the increasing level of com- puter literacy among health professionals and the public, and the linkage of organizations and individuals in local and regional networks that were beginning to tackle the development of population databases.
Some health care organizations have made important advances, but overall progress has been slow. In a few large systems—most notably the health systems of the Department of Veterans Health Affairs—integrated electronic records sys- tems have been implemented. There are also examples of robust, well-integrated hospital-based information systems (National Research Council, 2000), such as Intermountain Health Care (in Salt Lake City, Utah), but they are few and notable for their rarity. Many other organizations have automated major portions of clinical information systems—laboratory data, order entry, and the like—and others are on their way to becoming paperless in the next few years (McDonald et al., 1997; Warden and Lawrence, 2000).
There are numerous barriers to the automation of clinical information. The remainder of this section addresses four of these barriers: privacy concerns, the need for standards, financial requirements, and human factors issues.
Privacy Concerns and the Need for Standards
Two of the greatest impediments to the widespread automation of clinical information are the absence of national policies pertaining to privacy, security, and confidentiality and the lack of standards for the coding and exchange of clinical information (e.g., definitions and nomenclature, patient identifiers, and electronic transfer) (Dwyer, 1999; Kleinke, 1998; McDonald, 1998; U.S. Depart- ment of Commerce, 1994). Indeed, the issues of protecting privacy and data standardization are closely interrelated. In 1998, for example, plans of the De-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
172 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
partment of Health and Human Services to issue recommendations for establish- ing unique patient identifiers were put on hold in response to public outcry over potential violations of medical privacy (Goldman, 1998).
There is general agreement that privacy protections are needed for consum- ers, but there is also recognition that unless carefully balanced, such protections may limit the future prospects of IT (Detmer, 2000a). Public opinion polls conducted during the last decade document high and increasing levels of concern about privacy, raising questions about whether people’s fear of violations of their privacy may lead some to forego seeking necessary health services or to withhold personal information from clinicians (Goldman, 1998). Others point out that, if too stringent, privacy protections will impede the adoption of many IT applica- tions critical to addressing health care quality concerns (Detmer, 2000a).
The demands of health care with regard to security and availability are both more stringent and more varied than those of other industries (Institute of Medi- cine, 1994). Automated records can make it much easier for hackers to assemble lists or to find (or alter) information about individuals. At the same time, there are many different sources and types of health data, and clinical information must be available to all clinicians and others involved in care delivery whenever needed. Well-crafted policies can be implemented to ensure timely access for those with a valid need to access the data, including treating clinicians and pa- tients, while denying access to unauthorized users. Information security tech- nologies, such as encryption, authentication of both the sender and receiver of data, and audit trails to detect unauthorized users, are available to support such policies (Detmer, 2000a; National Research Council, 1998; U.S. General Ac- counting Office, 1999). Legal enforcement of privacy and confidentiality rights with strong remedies can serve as both a deterrent to unauthorized users and a method of redress for individuals whose privacy rights have been violated.
The lack of commonly accepted definitions and nomenclature for the collec- tion and coding of data and standards for the exchange of information has also been recognized as an obstacle to broad adoption of clinical information tech- nologies (Dwyer, 1999; Kleinke, 1998; McDonald, 1998; U.S. Department of Commerce, 1994). Data standards are needed to facilitate sharing and communi- cation of the data across different health care information systems, and to ensure that the data are complete, accurate, and comparable (National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, 2000). Numerous groups, including the American National Standards Institute’s Healthcare Informatics Standards Board, High Level 7, the American Sociey for Testing and Material, the American Standards Committee, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, international organizations, and numerous governmental groups, have developed standards for claims forms, datasets, diagnostic and procedure classifications, vocabularies, and messaging formats (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 1999; Cushman and Detmer, 1998). The Library of Medicine has made extensive efforts to standardize vocabulary (including the construction and maintenance of
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 173
a metathesaurus as part of the unified medical language system). But these efforts, as important as they are, amount to a patchwork of standards that address some areas and not others, and are not adhered to by all users.
To begin addressing the need for comprehensive national standards, Con- gress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act in 1996, creating a federal mandate to develop standards for all electronic health transmis- sions (Health Care Financing Administration, 2000). The law directed the Secre- tary of Health and Human Services to make recommendations to Congress re- garding the privacy of individually identifiable health information by August 1997, and if Congress failed to pass privacy legislation by August 1999, the Secretary of DHHS was directed to issue health privacy regulations by January 2000. The law also provided that the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics was to report to the Secretary of DHHS by August 21, 2000, on recom- mendations and legislative proposals pertaining to data standards for patient medi- cal record information (National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, 2000).
Congress failed to enact legislation implementing a comprehensive package of privacy protections by the August 1999 deadline. Therefore, DHHS worked to develop these regulations, based on the Secretary’s recommendations to Con- gress in 1997 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1997). These regulations were extremely controversial and generated over 50,000 comments when published in proposed rulemaking form. However, DHHS was able to finalize and announce them in December 2000 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2000).
DHHS also has efforts under way to develop national standards for the definition, collection, coding, and exchange of patient medical record informa- tion, but progress has been slow. In July 2000, the National Committee on Vital Health Statistics forwarded a report to the Secretary of Health and Human Ser- vices addressing a variety of process, technical, organizational, financing, and other issues related to the development of national standards (National Commit- tee on Vital and Health Statistics, 2000). Some progress has been made toward developing coding standards for data elements; however, none has emerged as a comprehensive standard (Institute of Medicine, 1997), and, as noted above, the adoption of a standardized health identifier has been suspended. Chief informa- tion officers and other health care executives have reported they do not believe that health records can be restructured to comply with electronic formats in the time frame required by the law (Shinkman and Jonathan, 2000).
In the absence of strong national leadership in establishing standards and defining appropriate legal and regulatory structures for an IT-driven health care delivery system, states and various branches of the federal government have responded to issues and concerns primarily on an ad hoc basis. For example, more than two-thirds of states have made legislative efforts to affect various types of health information practices, resulting in an increasingly complex array of laws (Cushman and Detmer, 1998). In other instances, existing legal and
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
174 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
regulatory structures are being applied to IT issues, creating confusion and prob- ably ineffective oversight. For example, online pharmacies, whereby the physi- cian enters orders into pharmacy computers often using a handheld wireless electronic prescription pad, have given rise to a set of jurisdictional issues. These issues relate both to federal and state responsibilities and, at the federal level, to questions about the responsibilities of different agencies (i.e., Federal Trade Com- mission, Food and Drug Administration, Drug Enforcement Administration, De- partment of Justice, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Postal Service) for consumer protection, rooting out of fraud and misinformation, drug quality, advertising of prescription drugs, and importation and domestic mailing of pharmaceutical prod- ucts (National Health Policy Forum, 2000).
Financial Requirements
The 21st-century health care system will require a significant financial in- vestment in information technology—far greater than current investments by most health care organizations. Capital will be needed to purchase and install new technology, while installation of the new systems is likely to produce tempo- rary disruptions in the delivery of patient care and result in sizable short-term costs to manage the transition. Some specialized training and education will also be needed to help the workforce adapt to the new environment.
In addition, some health care organizations have invested heavily in legacy systems—older computer systems built around mainframes (Turban et al., 1996). There is no easy way to shift from such systems to state-of-the-art information systems based on an open client–server architecture, personal computer net- works, and more flexible, nonproprietary protocols. These are important consid- erations for all health care organizations when making decisions about investing in IT. Recent reductions in Medicare payments under the 1997 Balanced Budget Act have likely contributed to an even more cautious approach to long-term investment in technology on the part of many health care institutions.
Access to capital may be particularly limited for certain types of health care organizations. Not-for-profit hospitals and health plans must obtain capital from bond rather than equity markets. Many small physician group practices have a limited ability to obtain capital. Large for-profit health plans may have ready capital to invest in IT, but absent strong, long-term partnerships with provider groups, lack the leverage and incentive to implement such systems.
These capital decisions are also being made in an environment in which benefits are difficult to quantify. Unlike billing or pharmaceutical transactions, clinical transactions have only an indirect effect on profitability, and demonstrat- ing the value of clinical information systems in improving the quality of care has been difficult although, as discussed above, evidence has begun to accumulate about their usefulness in specific settings and applications. Moreover, as dis-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 175
cussed in Chapter 8, current payment policies do not adequately reward improve- ments in quality.
There are some indications that the use of IT is slowly becoming more widespread. In 1997, the health information technology industry sold $15 billion worth of products to health care organizations (Kleinke, 1998). The development of Web-based applications for use on the Internet may also open the door to new forms of financing the expenses of IT. For example, if IT shifts from an equip- ment purchase to a service expense, it can be bought on a monthly basis and upgraded easily in response to both technological advances and changes in medi- cal practice. Maintaining up-to-date applications that reflect the evolution of technology and the knowledge base and making them available by subscription at a Web site rather than requiring users in individual organizations to purchase and maintain them is likely to provide great impetus for the development and use of these systems.
Human Factors Issues
One of the most challenging, and least understood, barriers to the application of useful information technologies in health care relates to human factors. These barriers include both workforce and patient issues.
The health care sector is labor-intensive, with about 700,000 physicians, over 2 million nurses, and many other health care workers being involved in the delivery of patient care to varying degrees (Health Resources and Services Ad- ministration, 2000). The workforce is highly variable in terms of IT-related knowledge and experience, and probably also in terms of receptivity to learning or acquiring these skills. Some clinicians may also be wary of embracing new IT applications because of frustrating experience with earlier IT applications that failed to prove useful in solving diagnostic and therapeutic problems (Kassirer, 2000). Moreover, the development of new data infrastructures and the incorpora- tion of new IT applications into clinical practice generally entails disruptions in patient care, resulting in lost revenues for many clinicians.
Many IT applications require the forging of new relationships between clini- cians and institutional providers, which may be slow to develop. For example, some have observed that the deeply ingrained economic distrust and cultural conflict between physicians and hospitals has impeded the adoption of IT appli- cations that require Web-based integration (Kleinke, 2000).
IT will undoubtedly alter the clinician and patient relationship, and in some cases, these changes may be threatening to clinicians. The standardization and automation of various types of clinical data opens up many new opportunities to make comparative quality data available to consumers who must chose among clinicians, sites of care, and treatment options, and to bolster oversight and ac- countability programs (Kleinke, 2000). The availability of clinical knowledge on
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
176 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
the Internet will lead to more informed patients who will be increasingly likely to question clinician recommendations.
Not all patients will embrace these new roles of IT. Although consumers are migrating to the Internet at a rapid pace, there will likely be some proportion of individuals who do not have access either by personal choice or because of economic or other constraints (Conte, 1999). Consequently, there will be a need for the health system to operate in the old and the new, automated ways in parallel for the foreseeable future (Ferguson, 1999).
NEED FOR A NATIONAL HEALTH INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
Many developments now under way augur well for the future adoption of IT by the health care sector. A growing body of evidence supports the conclusion that various types of IT applications lead to improvements in safety, effective- ness, patient-centeredness, timeliness, efficiency, and equity. Some progress is being made on the specification of standards for protecting privacy, and various private- and public-sector standardization efforts are being undertaken to provide the foundation for a more expansive effort focused on achieving national consen- sus. The extraordinary growth of the Internet has opened up a plethora of new applications; provided a highly accessible platform for tapping the clinical knowl- edge base, running applications, and sharing data; and lowered capital require- ments.
Nonetheless, IT has barely touched patient care. The vast majority of clini- cal information is still stored in paper form. Only a fraction of clinicians offer e- mail as a communication option to patients (Hoffman, 1997). Few patients benefit even from very simple decision aids, such as reminder systems, which have been shown repeatedly to improve compliance with practice guidelines. Many medical errors, ubiquitous throughout the health care system, could be prevented if only clinical data were accessible and readable, and prescriptions were entered into automated order entry systems with built-in logic to check for errors and oversights in drug selection and dosing. The pace of change is unac- ceptably slow. Much more can and should be done.
To achieve a substantial improvement in quality, the United States, like other industrialized countries, will need to begin developing a comprehensive national health information infrastructure (Detmer, 2000b). As defined by the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, such a structure is “a set of technolo- gies, standards, applications, systems, values, and laws that support all facets of individual health, health care, and public health (Work Group on Computeriza- tion of Patient Records, 2000). A national health information infrastructure is not a centralized government database, but rather “rules for the road” that offer a way to connect distributed health data in the framework of a secure network.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 177
As discussed above, some elements of such a structure are in various stages of development, but at the current pace, many more years will be required for its completion. To further the development process, the country must move forward expeditiously with the promulgation of national standards to protect data privacy. Moreover, these standards should be reevaluated and fine-tuned periodically to strike the right balance between protecting consumer privacy and providing ac- cess to clinical data for legitimate purposes, such as care delivery, quality evalu- ation, research, and public health (Detmer, 2000a). A high priority for the com- ing 2 years should be to achieve national consensus on comprehensive standards for the definition, collection, coding, and exchange of clinical data.
As technological barriers are overcome, much greater attention should be focused on legal, societal, organizational, and cultural issues (Work Group on Computerization of Patient Records, 2000). Legal and regulatory structures that have the unintended consequence of impeding the adoption of useful IT applica- tions must be identified and modified (Moran, 1998). Health care organizations and the health professions will need strong leadership and a clear direction as they move forward with what will be a dramatic transformation of care delivery (Shortliffe, 2000).
Finally, efforts should also be made to better inform the American public about IT issues, and to ensure that all individuals have the opportunity to benefit from the extraordinary innovations now under way. The American public should be fully informed of both the benefits and risks of automated clinical data and electronic communication, as well as the various options available for protecting privacy. Steps must also be taken to ensure that all Americans have ready access to the Internet, should they so desire, and that the benefits of IT reach practice settings that serve a disproportionate share of the most vulnerable populations.
REFERENCES
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. 1999. “Health Care Informatics Standards: Activities of Selected Federal Agencies.” Online. Available at http://www.ahcpr.gov/data/infostd1.htm [accessed Dec. 15, 2000].
Alemi, Farrokh, Sonia A. Allemango, Jeffrey Goldhagen, et al. Comptuer Reminders Improve On- time Immunization Rates. Medical Care 34(10[Supplement]):OS45–51, 1996.
Balas, E. Andrew, Suzanne A. Boren, and G. Griffing. Computerized Management of Diabetes: A Synthesis of Controlled Trials. A Paradigm Shift in Health Care Information Systems: Clini- cal Infrastuctures for the 21st Century: Proceedings of the 1998 AMIA Annual Symposium. Christopher G. Chute, ed., 295–9, 1998.
Balas, E. Andrew, Farah Jaffrey, Gilad J. Kuperman, et al. Electronic Communication With Patients: Evaluation of Distance Medicine Technology. JAMA 278(2):152–9, 1997.
Balas, E. Andrew, Scott Weingarten, Candace T. Garb, et al. Improving Preventive Care by Prompt- ing Physicians. Arch Int Med 160(3):301–8, 2000.
Bates, David W., Lucian L. Leape, David J. Cullen, et al. Effect of Computerized Physician Order Entry and a Team Intervention on Prevention of Serious Medication Errors. JAMA 280(15): 1311–6, 1998a.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
178 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Bates, David W., Elizabeth M. Pappius, Gilad J. Kupperman, et al. Measuring and Improving Qual- ity Using Information Systems. MedInfo 1998: Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress on Medical Informatics. B. Cesnik, A. T. McCray, and J. R. Scherrer, eds., 814–8 in Part 2. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 1998b.
Bates, David W., Nathan Spell, David J. Cullen, et al. The Costs of Adverse Drug Events in Hospi- talized Patients. JAMA 277(4):307–11, 1997.
Bates, David W., Jonathan M. Teich, Joshua Lee, et al. The Impact of Computerized Physician Order Entry on Medication Error Prevention. J Am Med Inform Assoc 6(4):313–21, 1999.
Burger, C. S. The Use of Problem Knowledge Couplers in a Primary Care Practice. Healthcare Information Management Winter;11(4):13–26, 1997.
Cain, Mary M., Robert Mittman, Jane Sarasohn-Kahn, and Jennifer C. Wayne. Health e-People: The Online Consumer Experience. Oakland, CA: Institute for the Future, California Health Care Foundation, 2000.
Conte, Christopher Networking for Better Care: Health Care in the Information Age. Jean Smith and Rachel Anderson, eds.Benton Foundation, 1999.
Cushman, F. Reid and Don E. Detmer. 1998. “Information Policy for the U.S. Health Sector: Engi- neering, Political Economy, and Ethics.” Online. Available at http://www.milbank.org/art/ intro.html [accessed Dec. 1, 2000].
Detmer, Don E. Your Privacy or Your Health: Will Medical Privacy Legislation Stop Quality Health Care? International Journal for Quality in Health Care 12:1–3, 2000a.
———. Information Technology for Quality Healthcare: A Summary of United Kingdom and United States Experiences. Background Paper for the Ditchley Park Conference: Co-sponsored by The Commonwealth Fund and the Nuffield Trust, Oxfordshire, England, 2000b.
Durieux, Pierre, Remy Nizard, Philippe Ravaud, et al. A Clinical Decision Support System for Prevention of Venous Thromboembolism. JAMA 283(21):2816–21, 2000.
Dwyer, Chris. Ideas and Trends: Medical Informatics and Health Care Computing. Ann Int Med 130(2):170–2, 1999.
Evans, R. Scott, Stanley L. Pestotnik, David C. Classen, et al. A Computer-Assisted Management Program for Antibiotics and Other Antiinfective Agents. N EngI J Med 338(4):232–8, 1998.
Ferguson, Roger, Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Boston, MA. Presentation at the IOM Workshop on Information Technology and Quality. Sept. 29, 1999.
Garibaldi, Richard A. Computers and the Quality of Care — A Clinician’s Perspective. N EngI J Med 338(4):259–60, 1998.
Goldman, Janlori. Protecting Privacy To Improve Health Care. Health Affairs 17(6):47–60, 1998. Goldsmith, Jeff. The Internet and Managed Care: A New Wave of Information. Health Affairs
19(6):42–56, 2000. Grigsby, Jim and Jay H. Sanders. Telemedicine: Where It Is and Where It’s Going. Ann Int Med
129:123–7, 1998. Health Care Financing Administration. 2000. “Medicare EDI (Electronic Data Exchange).” Online.
Available at http://www.hcfa.gov/medicare/edi/edi.htm [accessed Jan. 3, 2001]. Health Resources and Services Administration. United States Health Workforce Personnel Factbook.
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Health Professions, 2000. Hoffman, A. Take 2 and E-mail Me in the Morning: Doctors Consult Patients Electronically. New
York Times, June 3, 1997. Institute of Medicine. The Computer-Based Patient Record: An Essential Technology for Health
Care. Richard S. Dick and Elaine B. Steen, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1991.
———. Health Data in the Information Age: Use, Disclosure, and Privacy. M. S. Donaldson and K. N. Lohr, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994.
———. Telemedicine: A Guide to Assessing Telecommunications for Health Care. Marilyn J. Field, ed. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 179
———. The Computer-Based Patient Record: An Essential Technology for Health Care. Revised edition. Richard S. Dick, Elaine B. Steen, and Don E. Detmer, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997.
———. Enhancing Data Systems to Improve the Quality of Cancer Care. Maria Hewitt and Joseph V. Simone, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000.
Kassirer, Jerome P. Patients, Physicians, And The Internet. Health Affairs 19(6):115–23, 2000. Kendall, David B. and S. Robert Levine Creating a Health Information Network. Stage Two of the
Health Care Revolution. Washington, D.C.: Progressive Policy Institute, Policy Report, 1997. Online. Available at http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?contentid=1941&knlgAreaID= 111&subsecid=138 [accessed Jan. 31, 2001].
Kleinke, J. D. Release 0.0: Clinical Information Technology In The Real World. Health Affairs 17(6):23–38, 1998.
———. Vaporware.com: The Failed Promise of the Health Care Internet. Health Affairs 19(6):57– 71, 2000.
Leapfrog Group. 2000. “Leapfrog Patient Safety Standards: The Potential Benefit of Universal Adoption.” Online. Available at http://www.leapfroggroup.org [accessed Jan. 3, 2001].
McDonald, Clement J., et al. The Three Legged Stool: Regenstrief Institute for Health Care. Third Annual Nicholas E. Davies Award Proceedings of the CPR Recognition Symposium. Com- puter-Based Patient Record Institute. Burr Ridge, IL: McGraw-Hill Healthcare Education Group, 1997.
McDonald, Clement J. Need For Standards In Health Information. Health Affairs 17(6):44–6, 1998. Moran, Donald W. Health Information Policy: On Preparing For The Next War. Health Affairs
17(6):9–22, 1998. National Committee for Quality Assurance. The State of Managed Care Quality 2000. Washington,
D.C.: National Committee for Quality Assurance, 2000. National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics. Uniform Data Standards for Patient Medical
Record Information: Report to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2000.
National Health Policy Forum. Physician Connectivity: Electronic Prescribing. Issue Brief, No. 752. Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University, 2000.
National Research Council. Privacy Issues in Biomedical and Clinical Research. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1998.
———. Networking Health: Prescriptions for the Internet. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000.
Schiff, Gordon D. and T. Donald Rucker. Computerized Prescribing: Building the Electronic Infra- structure for Better Medication Usage. JAMA 279(13):1024–9, 1998.
Science Panel on Interactive Communication and Health Wired for Health and Well-Being. The Emergence of Interactive Health Communication. T. R. Eng and D. H. Gustafson, eds. Wash- ington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Government Printing Of- fice, 1999.
Shea, Steven, William DuMouchel, and Lisa Bahamonde. A Meta-Analysis of 16 Randomized Con- trolled Trials to Evaluate Computer-Based Clinical Reminder Systems for Preventive Care in the Ambulatory Setting. J Am Med Inform Assoc 3(6):399–409, 1996.
Shinkman, Ron and Gardner Jonathan. The HIPAA Lurks. Just when CIOs thought it was safe for business as usual. . . . Modern Healthcare 30(5):24–9, 2000.
Shortliffe, Edward H. Networking Health: Learning From Others, Taking The Lead. Health Affairs 19(6):9–22, 2000.
Simone, Joseph V. and Jane Lyons. Superior Cancer Survival in Children Compared to Adults: A Superior System of Cancer Care. National Cancer Policy Board Background Paper. Washing- ton, D.C.: Institute of Medicine, 2000. Online. Available at http://www.iom.edu/IOM/ IOMHome.nsf/WFiles/Manuscript/$file/Manuscript.PDF [accessed Jan. 26, 2001].
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
180 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Starr, Paul. Smart Technology, Stunted Policy: Developing Health Information Networks. Health Affairs 16(3):91–105, 1997.
Turban, Efraim, Ephraim McLean, and James Wetherbe. Information Technology for Management: Improving Quality and Productivity. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1996.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Putting the Information Infrastructure to Work. Report of the infor- mation infrastructure task force committee on applications and technology. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 1994. PB94–163383.
———. Falling Through the Net: Toward Digital Inclusion. A Report on American’s Access to Technology Tools. Washington, D.C.: Economics and Statistics Administration; National Tele- communications and Information Administration, 2000. Online. Available at: http://www. ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/digitaldivide/ [accessed Sept. 19, 2000].
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Confidentiality of Individually Identifiable Health Information: Recommendations Submitted by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to Congress for Federal Health Record Confidentiality Legislation. Washington, D.C.: U.S. De- partment of Health and Human Services, 1997. Submitted on September 11, 1997. Online. Available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/1997pres/970911c.html [accessed Jan. 28, 2001].
———. Press Briefing on Final Privacy Regulation. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2000. Released on December 20, 2000. Online. Available at http:// www.hhs.gov/ocr/briefs.html [accessed Jan. 30, 2001].
U.S. General Accounting Office. Automated Medical Records: Leadership Needed to Expedite Standards Development. GAO/IMTEC-93-17. Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1993.
———. Medical Records Privacy: Access Needed for Health Research, But Oversight of Privacy Protection is Limited. Report B-280657. Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1999.
Warden, Gail, The Henry Ford Health System and David Lawrence, Kaiser Permanente. Personal communication: telephone conversation. September, 2000.
Weed, Lawrence L. and Lincoln Weed. Opening the Black Box of Clinical Judgment. Part III: Medical Science and Education. EBMJ. November 13, 1999. Online. Available at http:// www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/319/7220/1279/DC2 [accessed Jan. 24, 2001].
Work Group on Computerization of Patient Records. Toward a National Health Information Infra- structure: Report of the Work Group on Computerization of Patient Records. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2000.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
181
8
Aligning Payment Policies with Quality Improvement
Many factors influence how health care organizations and professionals de- liver care to patients. For example, information can be used to compare perfor- mance with that of peers and motivate improvement. Similarly, tools such as practice guidelines, clinical pathways, or protocols aim to change clinical prac- tice to make it more consistent around a definition of best practice. Health care professionals and organizations are also motivated by public acknowledgment and honorary recognition. Recognition of professional accomplishment and in- novation is a strong motivator of improvement.
Payment policies are another strong influence on how health care organiza- tions and professionals deliver care and how patients select and use that care (Hillman, 1991). Thus, to achieve the aims of the 21st-century health care system set forth in Chapter 2, it is critical that payment policies be aligned to encourage and support quality improvement. Yet financial barriers embodied in current payment methods can create significant obstacles to higher-quality health care. Even among health professionals motivated to provide the best care possible, the structure of payment incentives may not facilitate the actions needed to system- atically improve the quality of care, and may even prevent such actions. For example, redesigning care processes to improve follow-up for chronically ill patients through electronic communication may reduce office visits and decrease revenues for a medical group under some payment methods. Current payment policies are complex and contradictory, and although incremental improvements are possible, more fundamental reform will be needed over the long run.
The goals of any payment method should be to reward high-quality care and to permit the development of more effective ways of delivering care to improve
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
182 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
the value obtained for the resources expended. These goals are relevant regard- less of whether care is delivered in a predominantly competitive or regulated environment, and whether the ultimate purchaser is an employer or the patient/ consumer. Payment policies should not create barriers to improving the quality of care.
Recommendation 10: Private and public purchasers should exam- ine their current payment methods to remove barriers that cur- rently impede quality improvement, and to build in stronger incen- tives for quality enhancement.
Although some purchasers are pursuing payment approaches that include rewards for quality, all existing payment methods could be modified to create stronger incentives for quality improvement. Purchasers should identify ways to (1) recognize quality, (2) reward quality, and (3) support quality improvement. For example, quality could be recognized by developing better quality measures and making their results more broadly available to covered populations, whether through new forms of information or improvements in the ways existing informa- tion is shared. Quality could be rewarded by using direct payment mechanisms or by redirecting volume to health plans and providers recognized for providing high-quality care by offering stronger incentives for people to seek out better quality care (e.g., adjustments to out-of-pocket costs). Quality improvement could be supported by exploring the potential for shared-risk arrangements that could encourage making significant changes in care processes to improve quality. Although more fundamental change may be required in the long run, immediate improvements can and should be pursued.
Recommendation 11: The Health Care Financing Administration and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, with input from private payers, health care organizations, and clinicians, should develop a research agenda to identify, pilot test, and evaluate various options for better aligning current payment methods with quality improvement goals.
Although most payment methods have an objective of cost containment or reflect consideration of issues of access (e.g., in determining levels of copay- ments), they do not have the explicit goal of ensuring quality care or facilitating quality improvement. Approaches to incorporating such an explicit goal into payment policy should be explored. This research agenda should include work in the following areas: blended or bundled methods of payment for providers, multiyear contracts, payment modifications to encourage use of electronic inter- actions between providers and patients, risk adjustment, and alternative ap- proaches for addressing the capital requirements necessary to improve quality. Blended or bundled payments may offer providers greater flexibility in incorpo- rating quality. Multiyear contracts can encourage longer-term relationships
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ALIGNING PAYMENT POLICIES WITH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 183
among providers, purchasers, and payers to permit investment in improved qual- ity of care. Payment methods that support electronic or other forms of communi- cation between providers and patients can improve contacts with the health sys- tem. Payment methods that are appropriately adjusted for the risk of the patients served can support the provision of needed care and improved sources. Capital will be needed for the redesigning and reengineering of health care that will be required to improve quality. A better understanding is needed of how these, as well as other mechanisms, can enhance the effects of payment policy on the provision of high-quality health care.
The potential to link payment methods to priority conditions should also be explored. As noted in Chapter 4, priority conditions can provide a framework for aligning payment methods with patient needs and the ways care is organized and measured. If payment methods were designed to encompass the scope of services received by patients, providers could allocate resources according to patient needs, across provider types and settings of care. Pilot testing should include an evalu- ation of the use of bundled payments for priority conditions to provide incentives for redesigning care processes and to permit resources to be allocated according to the scope and types of services needed by patients.
The committee believes certain principles should guide the development of payment policies to reward quality, regardless of the specific payment method used for any given transaction. The aim of these principles is to guide payment policy reforms that can support care that is more patient-centered, evidence- based, and systems-based. Payment arrangements should facilitate alignment of the units of patient care delivered (including consistency with best practice) with the needs of consumers and patients, the unit of payment, and the level at which information is collected and shared. To achieve alignment that can reward qual- ity care, payment methods should:
• Provide fair payment for good clinical management of the types of pa- tients seen. Clinicians should be adequately compensated for taking good care of all types of patients, neither gaining nor losing financially for caring for sicker patients or those with more complicated conditions. The risk of random inci- dence of disease in the population should reside with a larger risk pool, whether that be large groups of providers, health plans, or insurance companies.
• Provide an opportunity for providers to share in the benefits of quality improvement. Rewards should be located close to the level at which the re- engineering and process redesign needed to improve quality are likely to take place.
• Provide the opportunity for consumers and purchasers to recognize qual- ity differences in health care and direct their decisions accordingly. In particular, consumers need to have good information on quality and the ability to use that information as they see fit to meet their needs.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
184 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
• Align financial incentives with the implementation of care processes based on best practices and the achievement of better patient outcomes. Substantial improvements in quality are most likely to be obtained when providers are highly motivated and rewarded for carefully designing and fine-tuning care processes to achieve increasingly higher levels of safety, effectiveness, patient-centeredness, timeliness, efficiency, and equity.
• Reduce fragmentation of care. Payment methods should not pose a bar- rier to providers’ ability to coordinate care for patients across settings and over time.
The remainder of this chapter examines in greater detail the relationship between payment methods and the ability of health care organizations and profes- sionals to undertake quality improvement activities. In the first section, the theoretical incentives of current payment methods are briefly reviewed. The second section focuses on barriers in the payment system that inhibit the achieve- ment of significant improvements in quality. The third section describes how existing payment methods could be adapted to support quality improvement. Although difficult to accomplish in today’s environment, examples are provided to illustrate how some health care organizations are attempting to incorporate greater attention to quality in their payment arrangements. Any payment method can be improved to support quality. However, fundamental misalignments will remain; thus fixing current payment methods may be important, but not suffi- cient. The final section therefore explores the need for a new approach to pay- ment policy that can better align the needs of patients with the unit and type of payment method.
INCENTIVES OF CURRENT PAYMENT METHODS
Payment processes link together many different actors in health care. Pur- chasers, consumers and patients, health plans and insurers, and health care pro- viders are all connected through various financial transactions (see Figure 8-1). Purchasers or funders of health care include public and private purchasers, such as employers and the Health Care Financing Administration; individual consum- ers and families; and federal, state, and local governments that may offer direct subsidies to certain providers (e.g., public hospitals) or for certain services (e.g., immunizations). Many purchasers buy coverage for their employees or covered populations through contractual arrangements with health plans or insurers. These health plans and insurers, in turn, contract with individual providers and/or pro- vider groups to deliver health care services. In some cases, purchasers and providers may also be directly linked through contracting approaches under which employers contract directly with a provider group to deliver care.
Payment linkages also exist within the boxes shown in Figure 8-1. Purchas- ers and individuals are linked when purchasers provide a choice of coverage to
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ALIGNING PAYMENT POLICIES WITH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 185
their workers or covered populations and when individuals contribute to the cost of that coverage. Similarly, different types of providers can be linked through payment, such as when individual physicians receive payment through a larger medical group or when hospitals and physicians are linked financially in shared- risk arrangements. Because of these complex and diverse linkages, any given approach to payment policy can exert a powerful influence on the way services are provided to consumers and patients, and can produce unintended conse- quences.
Although this chapter focuses primarily on payments involving a payer and a provider, the committee recognizes the need to have a better understanding of how consumer decision making influences payment relationships. Consumers pay for health coverage both when they contribute to the cost of premiums and when they pay directly for health services through copayments, deductibles and payment for noncovered services. Although a great deal of research has been done recently on how consumers use information in selecting a health plan, less attention has been focused on how their decision making affects the payment relationship.
The committee believes consumers and patients should have a direct role in rewarding quality care. To have this role, consumers should have choices, re- ceive information about their choices, and have the power to act on those choices. Not all consumers have a choice of health plans (Trude, 2000), but all have a choice of providers (and some services) within even a single health plan.1 Yet
FIGURE 8-1 Linkages through payment arrangements.
Public and private purchasers
Individuals
Direct public subsidies
Health plans or insurers
Hospitals
Physicians
Other providers
Source of Funds Payment for Services Payment for
Health Coverage
1Increasing interest in defined contribution plans suggests the potential for consumers to entertain more choices.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
186 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
little information is made available to consumers at the level of providers or specific services, particularly relative to quality differences. As a consequence, consumers rarely switch health plans or providers for quality reasons (Cunning- ham and Kohn, 2000). Additional research is needed to understand how con- sumer decision making might affect the way payment flows may be altered in the future. A better understanding is also needed of how to communicate effectively with patients about best practices and evidence-based practice so that quantity is not automatically equated with quality.
The remainder of this section focuses on the right side of Figure 8-1— payment to providers for the direct delivery of services, especially the relation- ship between a health plan or insurer and providers. Other issues of financing health care, such as the source of funds or insurance coverage, are beyond the scope of this report, although the committee believes they are important issues and merit analysis. The following subsections provide a brief overview of com- mon payment methods and the theoretical incentives offered by each. Four types of payment methods are reviewed: methods that pay by prospectively deter- mined budgets regardless of whether services are used, per case payment meth- ods that pay for a bundle of services used in a case, methods that pay by a unit of care as the units are used, and blended methods that combine approaches (Aas, 1995).
Budget Approaches
Under budgeted payment approaches, a budget is set for some defined set of services over a specified period of time and becomes a spending ceiling. A total budget can be set on a per capita basis or be based on historical costs (Aas, 1995). Capitation is a form of budgeting in which the budget is based on a fixed fee for each enrolled person to cover a specified level of health care, regardless of the amount of service actually provided (Aas, 1995; Anderson and Weller, 1999).
The advantages of a budgetary approach are that it provides an incentive to control costs and produce care efficiently, and can encourage innovation in cost- reducing technologies, use of lower-cost settings of care, and investment in health promotion and disease prevention. The approach also can make costs more predictable for the funder. Additionally, it can provide flexibility to providers in deciding how to spend the budgeted amount and coordinate care with other providers encompassed by the budget. Disadvantages include the potential for risk selection to avoid patients who might be high-cost users of care, and the potential to provide insufficient or reduced quality of services to minimize costs and stay within budget (Aas, 1995; Barnum et al., 1995; Lee, 1997). There is also the potential for conflicting incentives if physicians and hospitals are paid under separate risk pools, which could encourage a physician to admit a patient to the hospital (or refer the patient to a specialist) to reduce his or her own costs (Aas, 1995; Barnum et al., 1995).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ALIGNING PAYMENT POLICIES WITH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 187
A variant of the budget approach applied specifically to physician payment is salary. The advantage of the salary approach is good control over total costs and the dissociation of treatment decisions from a physician’s financial gain or loss. The main disadvantage is the potential for reduced productivity if sufficient rewards are not built in (Aas, 1995).
Per Case Payment
Per case payment methods were introduced in 1983 by Medicare for short- term hospitals providing acute care services to Medicare beneficiaries (Cleverley, 1992). A prospectively set payment amount is determined on the basis of the diagnosis that resulted in the patient’s hospital admission. From the hospital’s perspective, the incentive is to reduce the costs of caring for patients within each diagnosis related group (DRG) in order to benefit from the savings achieved. From the purchaser’s perspective, spending can be controlled directly through payment rates and updates (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2000a). Medicare prospective payment for hospitals is generally believed to have reduced spending growth and increased efforts by hospitals to control costs, as evidenced by shorter lengths of stay and increased margins (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2000a). On August 1, 2000, Medicare instituted a per case pay- ment method for hospital outpatient care using ambulatory payment classifica- tion (APC) groups (Hallam, 2000; Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2000b).
Per case payment methods could be applied to the concept of priority condi- tions. For example, the mix of services covered under a payment method could be extended to include a comprehensive bundle of services that could be provided across different settings of care and over a defined period of time, similar to an episode of care. The advantage of this approach is that it would permit providers to design care and allocate resources for a population of patients (e.g., diabetics). Such an approach could also support the formation of multidisciplinary teams that would span settings of care to improve coordination among providers and foster the use of alternative modalities for treatment, such as e-mail for monitor- ing patients over time. Additional research would be needed to determine how to define an episode of care, particularly as applied to a chronic condition (Aas, 1995).
Payment by Unit of Care
Payment methods may be based on some unit of care. For example, under fee-for-service payment for physicians, the unit of payment is a visit or proce- dure. For hospitals, the unit of payment might be a patient day (per diem pay- ment). These are retrospective payment methods in that care is paid for after it is used, although the rate to be paid may be set in advance.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
188 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
In general, payment by unit of care offers little incentive to contain total costs since the incentive is to produce more of the unit of care that is being reimbursed. Under fee-for-service specifically, there is a potential for overuse of services by increasing the intensity of care and treating more patients. Also, since the method is based on individual units of care or service, it can be difficult to coordinate payment across the many members of a care team. The main advantages of payment by some unit of care are that it reduces the incentive for risk selection (i.e., avoiding people who are likely to be high users of care), and that physicians may specialize in difficult-to-treat medical problems. For per diem payment methods, there can also be an incentive to produce care efficiently to maximize profits per day (Aas, 1995; Barnum et al., 1995; Dudley et al., 1998).
Blended Methods
Approaches for bundling payments to providers have received increasing attention in recent years as a mechanism to align more closely the incentives faced by different providers involved in the care of a single patient. The central characteristic of bundled payment is that it covers multiple providers. The advan- tage of bundled payment methods is the opportunity to use resources more effi- ciently if some services across the continuum of care are substitutes for each other. For example, monitored home care could substitute for some office visits. Even if there is no substitution, a payer can make one entity responsible for a bundle of services and provide that entity with an incentive to deliver an efficient combination of services (Welch, 1998). Any possible gains associated with shifting patients among services is diminished.
Concerns with bundled payment approaches include questions about which entity should receive the payment and be held responsible for care (Welch, 1998). Possible responsible entities include health plans, hospitals, and physician groups. Another concern is feasibility in rural areas, where providers may face special difficulties in managing a continuum of services. Concerns have also been raised regarding the technical issues involved in building billing systems that can com- bine services offered by multiple providers (Schmitz, 1999). Additionally, legis- lative changes may be required to bundle payments for some combination of services, such as acute and postacute care (Welch, 1998).
One evaluated program that illustrates the potential of bundled payment is found in the Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center demonstration, begun in 1991 by the Health Care Financing Administration (Cromwell et al., 1997). Four hospitals were paid a single fee for all inpatient institutional and physician care for heart bypass patients. Hospitals and physicians could split the fee in whatever manner they chose; however, no additional inpatient billing was permitted. The average total costs fell in three of four hospitals, and length of stay for patients in the program declined in all four hospitals. The savings were achieved because of changes in physician practice patterns that occurred when hospital and physician
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ALIGNING PAYMENT POLICIES WITH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 189
incentives were aligned. Surgeons took a more active role in discharge planning, review of drug protocols, and elimination of unnecessary standard orders for routine testing.
Payment methods could be combined along several dimensions (Aas, 1995; Barnum et al., 1995). First, a payment approach could blend methods for a specific type of provider. For example, physicians could be paid using a combi- nation of fee for service and a target rate of growth in overall spending for physician services. Medicare applied this approach when it combined a fee schedule with a sustainable growth rate system for updating physician payment rates (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2000c). Second, methods could be blended by the type of service provided. For example, a provider could be paid under capitation, with certain services designated for separate payment (Maguire et al., 1998). Third, methods could be blended by category of provider. For example, in an integrated delivery system, physicians could be paid under capitation and hospitals paid on a per diem basis. Finally, methods could be blended by time horizon. For example, providers could be paid under a prospec- tively determined budget, with a retrospective adjustment for the mix of patients actually seen.
Summary
In general, payment methods based on budget for a range of care are better at controlling the total costs of that care, but can create concerns regarding underuse. They may also require greater institutional investment in information and man- agement systems so the provider organization can monitor care and costs. Pay- ment on a per unit basis has the opposite effect: it is often easier for providers to manage, but is usually less amenable to controlling total costs.
The payment methods used most commonly today are based on payment for some unit of care as it is used (see Table 8-1). Physicians are typically paid through fee-for-service methods and hospitals through billed (discounted) charges, per diem or per case. Some surveys suggest that capitation may be increasing for physicians (Kane et al., 1998; Simon and Emmons, 1997); how- ever, other sources suggest its use may be flat or declining (Lesser and Ginsburg, 2000). The use of capitation for hospitals may also be declining in favor of per diem, perhaps influenced by reductions in length of stay so that health plans prefer to “rent beds” on as as-needed basis (Rauber, 1999). Information is not available on the frequency of use of budget approaches. It is important to note, however, that most providers receive payment from a variety of payers that may rely on different methods. Therefore, any given provider faces a mix of incen- tives and rewards, rather than a consistent set of expectations. This mix has a significant influence on how payment methods can inhibit quality improvement, as discussed in the following section.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
190
T A
B L
E 8
-1 C
ur re
nt P
ay m
en t
M et
ho ds
f or
P hy
si ci
an s
an d
H os
pi ta
ls B
as ed
o n
P ri
va te
ly I
ns ur
ed P
at ie
nt s
P ay
m en
t M
et ho
ds F
or P
hy si
ci an
s P
ay m
en t
M et
ho ds
F or
H os
pi ta
ls
F ee
f or
S er
vi ce
/ S
al ar
ie d
C ap
it at
io n
B il
le d
C ha
rg es
o r
P er
D ie
m P
er C
as e
C ap
it at
io n
D is
co un
te d
F ee
f or
S er
vi ce
D is
co un
te d
C ha
rg es
P ri
m ar
y ca
re :
7 2%
P ri
m ar
y ca
re :
3 %
P ri
m ar
y ca
re :
2 5%
30 %
43 %
18 %
8% S
pe ci
al ty
c ar
e:
82 %
S pe
ci al
ty c
ar e:
3%
S pe
ci al
ty c
ar e:
15
%
N O
T E
: D
at a
ar e
ba se
d on
C om
m un
it y
T ra
ck in
g S
tu dy
( C
T S
), I
ns ur
an ce
F ol
lo w
ba ck
S ur
ve y,
1 99
6- 19
97 , c
on du
ct ed
b y
th e
C en
te r
fo r
S tu
dy in
g H
ea lt
h S
ys te
m C
ha ng
e.
T he
C T
S I
ns ur
an ce
F ol
lo w
ba ck
S ur
ve y
is a
s up
pl em
en t
to t
he C
T S
H ou
se ho
ld S
ur ve
y, a
l ar
ge ,
na ti
on al
ly r
ep re
se nt
at iv
e lo
ng it
ud in
al s
ur ve
y. In
fo rm
at io
n on
th e
pr iv
at el
y in
su re
d ob
ta in
ed f
ro m
th e
H ou
se ho
ld S
ur ve
y w
as u
se d
to c
on ta
ct in
su re
rs /h
ea lt
h pl
an s
an d
ob ta
in in
fo rm
at io
n on
c ha
ra ct
er is
ti cs
o f
th e
he al
th i
ns ur
an ce
p ro
du ct
s th
ey o
ff er
. In
su re
rs a
nd h
ea lt
h pl
an s
w er
e as
ke d
to r
ep or
t th
e ty
pi ca
l m
et ho
d of
p ay
m en
t us
ed f
or e
ac h
ty pe
o f
se rv
ic e
fo r
ea ch
pr od
uc t.
T he
se r
es po
ns es
w er
e th
en m
at ch
ed t
o H
ou se
ho ld
S ur
ve y
re sp
on de
nt s
to d
es cr
ib e
th ei
r in
su ra
nc e
co ve
ra ge
. E
st im
at es
a re
e nr
ol le
e- w
ei gh
te d,
re pr
es en
ti ng
a ll
p eo
pl e
un de
r ag
e 65
w it
h pr
iv at
e in
su ra
nc e.
T ot
al s
m ay
n ot
s um
to 1
00 b
ec au
se o
f ro
un di
ng e
rr or
.
M ed
ic ar
e pa
ys p
hy si
ci an
s pr
ed om
in an
tl y
by f
ee -f
or -s
er vi
ce u
si ng
a f
ee s
ch ed
ul e
an d
ho sp
it al
s on
a p
er -c
as e
ba si
s us
in g
di ag
no si
s re
la te
d gr
ou ps
( D
R G
).
F or
be ne
fi ci
ar ie
s en
ro ll
ed i
n M
ed ic
ar e+
C ho
ic e,
h ea
lt h
pl an
s ar
e pa
id o
n a
ca pi
ta te
d ba
si s.
A
cc or
di ng
t o
a Ju
ne 2
00 0
F ac
t S
he et
, ab
ou t
16 p
er ce
nt o
f M
ed ic
ar e
be ne
fi ci
ar ie
s ha
d se
le ct
ed M
ed ic
ar e
H M
O s
(“ T
he M
ed ic
ar e+
C ho
ic e
P ay
m en
t M
et ho
do lo
gy ,”
F ac
t S
he et
, Ju
ne 2
00 0;
w w
w .h
cf a.
go v/
fa ct
s/ fs
00 06
a. ht
m ).
In
M ed
ic ai
d, 5
5. 6
pe rc
en t
ar e
en ro
ll ed
i n
m an
ag ed
c ar
e; t
he r
em ai
nd er
a re
i n
fe e
fo r
se rv
ic e
( N at
io na
l Su
m m
ar y
of M
ed ic
ai d
M an
ag ed
C ar
e P
ro gr
am s
an d
E nr
ol lm
en t,
Ju ne
3 0,
1 99
9, H
ea lt
h C
ar e
F in
an ci
ng A
dm in
is tr
at io
n, U
.S .
D ep
ar tm
en t
of H
ea lt
h an
d H
um an
S er
vi ce
s; h
tt p:
// w
w w
.h cf
a. go
v/ m
ed ic
ai d/
tr en
ds 99
.h tm
).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ALIGNING PAYMENT POLICIES WITH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 191
Finally, as was noted at the beginning of the chapter, different payment methods are designed to meet different objectives, but none automatically has quality improvement as an objective. Such an objective must therefore be explic- itly designed into any payment method.
BARRIERS TO QUALITY IMPROVEMENT IN CURRENT PAYMENT METHODS2
There is a growing body of evidence that quality improvement can translate into dollar savings (Classen et al., 1997; Clemmer et al., 1999; Conrad et al., 1996; Jarlier and Charvet-Protat, 2000). Poor quality is costly in several ways. First, quality-related problems can result in waste, such as when a step in the care process fails so that treatment must be repeated (e.g., the CT scan has to be redone), or extra resources are required to fix the failed process (e.g., treat an avoidable complication). Second, quality-related problems can lead to ineffi- ciencies, as when two processes can produce the same outcome, but the more costly alternative is selected. An additional issue is that some processes may produce superior outcomes but utilize more resources, therefore resulting in cost increases. There is no advantage to this kind of quality improvement. In an environment that evaluates costs but not results, Anderson and Daigh (1991) suggest that quality waste accounts for 25–40 percent of all hospital costs.
Despite the evidence that poor quality costs money, however, health care organizations and professionals have not adopted quality-based process manage- ment to compete in today’s marketplace. In fact, there are cases in which signifi- cant financial losses have resulted in the elimination of quality projects rather than the intensification of such efforts (Shulkin, 2000). Indeed, a variety of barriers embodied in current payment methods prevent health care organizations from pursuing quality improvement. The following subsections describe ex- amples of four such payment barriers: perverse payment methods, adverse risk selection, annual contracting arrangements, and up-front investments required by provider groups.
Perverse Payment Mechanisms
Two examples of how payment mechanisms can inhibit quality improve- ment were provided at the IOM workshop held on April 24, 2000, by Dr. Brent James of the Intermountain Health System, Salt Lake City, Utah:
2Much of the discussion in this section draws on a paper prepared by Brent James, M.D. presented at an IOM-sponsored workshop on the relationship between payment and quality improvement held on April 24, 2000.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
192 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Example 1 A physician group paid primarily on a fee-for-service basis instituted a
new program to improve blood sugar control for diabetic patients. Specifically, pilot studies suggested that tighter diabetic management could decrease hemo- globin A1c levels by 2 percentage points for about 40 percent of all diabetic patients managed by the physician group. Data from two randomized con- trolled trials demonstrated that better sugar controls should translate into lower rates of retinopathy, nephropathy, peripheral neurological damage, and heart disease (The Diabetes Control and Complications Trial Research Group, 1993). The savings in direct health care costs (i.e., reduced visits and hospital epi- sodes) from avoided complications have been estimated to generate a net sav- ings of about $2,000 per patient per year, on average, over 15 years (Demers et al., 1997). Across the more than 13,000 diabetic patients managed by the physician group, the project had the potential to generate over $10 million in net savings each year. The project was costly to the medical group in two ways. First, expenses to conduct the project, including extra clinical time for tighter management, fell to the physician group. Second, over time, as diabetic com- plication rates fell, the project would reduce patient visits and, thus revenues as well. The savings from avoided complications would fall to the insurer or a self-funded purchaser.
Example 2 A delivery system refined and implemented the American Thoracic Soci-
ety’s practice guideline on community-acquired pneumonia in ten rural Utah hospitals, focusing on indications for hospitalization and choice of initial antibi- otics. In a prospective nonrandomized controlled trial using other Utah hospi- tals as controls, compliance with the guideline in the intervention hospitals increased from 22 to 40 percent (p < 0.001); the proportion of patients suffering significant complications fell from 15.3 to 11.6 percent (p < 0.001); inpatient mortality rates fell from 7.2 to 5.3 percent (p = 0.015); and costs fell by 12.3 percent (p < 0.001), primarily as a result of expenses avoided through the lower complication rate. The cost savings in those ten small rural hospitals totaled more than $500,000 per year, but an analysis of net operating income showed a loss to the facilities of over $200,000 per year. The reason was that as the complication rate fell, patients shifted from diagnosis related groups (DRGs) associated with complications (such as DRG 475, respiratory system diagnosis with ventilator support, carrying a per case payment of about $16,500 and pro- viding a small excess of payment beyond treatment costs) to classifications such as DRG 89 (simple pneumonia and pleurisy, age > 17, with complications or comorbidities, carrying a per case payment of about $4,730, which failed to cover the full costs of care).
Quality problems can be grouped in three categories (Chassin et al., 1998). Overuse is the provision of a health care service under circumstances in which its potential for harm exceeds the possible benefit. Underuse is the failure to pro- vide a health care service when it would have produced a favorable outcome for a patient. With misuse an appropriate service is provided, but a preventable
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ALIGNING PAYMENT POLICIES WITH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 193
complication occurs, and the patient does not receive the full potential benefit of the service. Efforts to correct each of these kinds of problems are affected differently by alternative payment methods, given the theoretical incentives de- scribed in the previous section. An example is provided below of what happens at the delivery level in trying to correct each type of quality problem, along with the effects of different payment methods.
Correcting Problems of Overuse. An example of correcting problems of overuse is a reduction in unnecessary surgical procedures. If a physician (or medical group) were paid under fee-for-service methods, the physician would lose revenues because fewer procedures would be performed. However, physi- cians paid under a budgeted approach (such as capitation or a shared risk arrange- ment) could benefit financially because fewer resources would be used in caring for affected patients. Hospitals would lose revenues under most payment meth- ods (billed charges, per case, or per diem) because of the reduced volume of care, but, like physicians, would potentially gain financially under a capitation or shared-risk arrangement.
Correcting Problems of Underuse. An example of correcting problems of underuse is the provision of needed services to those who were previously un- treated. Physicians paid under fee-for-service methods would potentially gain financially by seeing more patients who need care, but could lose under capita- tion or risk-sharing arrangements if patients in their current panel received more services. Similarly, hospitals would gain under most payment methods (billed charges, per diem, per case) because they would be serving more patients, but could suffer financial losses under capitation or shared-risk methods for the same reasons as physicians.
Correcting Problems of Misuse. An example of correcting problems of misuse is a reduction in infections acquired by patients while receiving needed health care services. Under fee-for-service payment, physicians would poten- tially lose revenues if fewer services were needed by patients because there were fewer infections. Under capitation or risk-sharing arrangements, physicians could benefit by expending fewer resources to manage the avoided infections. Hospi- tals would face a potentially mixed set of effects. Under billed charges, the hospital could lose revenues if reduced infections meant fewer services provided. Hospitals could gain under per diem methods if the length of stay remained the same for patients, but they used fewer resources each day because of the avoided infections. However, hospitals could also potentially lose under per diem pay- ment if the avoided infections reduced patients’ length of stay. A mixed effect is possible as well under per case payment. A hospital could gain financially if fewer resources were required per case, but could potentially lose financially if patients fell into a lower-paying DRG because of avoided infections (as in ex- ample 2). Generally, hospitals would gain financially under capitation or risk- sharing arrangements because patients would require fewer resources.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
194 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
In sum, efforts to improve quality by correcting overuse, underuse, or misuse all have an impact on provider revenues; no payment method is neutral. Under the most common payment methods, correcting problems of underuse and those of overuse would have opposite effects: providers would gain financially by correcting the former problems, but they would lose by correcting the latter. Correcting problems of misuse would produce mixed effects for both physicians and hospitals, especially since physicians get most of their revenues from fee-for- service payment, and hospitals get a substantial portion of their revenues from per case payment. Thus the most common payment methods have insufficient incen- tives to fix problems of overuse and present great difficulties in fixing problems of misuse (because of the mixed effects, which can also make it difficult for hospitals and physicians to work together). There is a greater likelihood of financial gain from fixing problems of underuse. This reinforces the perception that improving quality costs money.
Even when care delivery groups want to improve the quality of the clinical processes and outcomes they routinely deliver to their patients, they can be se- verely limited in their ability to pursue such strategies if providers lose revenues from many quality improvement activities because of the expenses of implement- ing the improvements and the revenues lost as a result of reduced care delivery. Many health care professionals and organizations conduct activities that are harm- ful to their bottom line (e.g., provision of uncompensated care). However, it is not possible to sustain broad-based efforts to achieve a substantial improvement in quality if such efforts are financially harmful to those undertaking them. Fur- thermore, as earlier improvement efforts worsen their financial position, provider groups will not have the resources necessary to pursue additional clinical im- provement projects. Therefore, although a payer may reap the initial benefits from quality improvement through reduced intensity or volume of care, the in- ability of providers to sustain such strategies on a long-term basis will hinder the ability to achieve continuous and lasting improvement.
Two broad options are possible to address problems associated with perverse payment mechanisms. One possible approach is to provide mechanisms to facili- tate more shared-risk arrangements that include not only hospitals and physicians aligning purpose, but also payer involvement. Shared-risk arrangements could include capitation, but could also include negotiated arrangements around an agreed-upon budget amount, which might or might not result in per capita pay- ment. Payers gain from reduced care delivery, but hospitals and physicians are responsible for changing the way care is delivered. Shared-risk arrangements could provide mechanisms for all parties involved to gain from changes in care. Alternatively, since fee-for-service payments (or billed charges for hospitals) remain in common use, mechanisms could be developed to compensate providers for the expenses associated with developing and implementing quality improve- ment programs. This compensation could take the form of making a direct
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ALIGNING PAYMENT POLICIES WITH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 195
payment or directing increased volume to those providers with recognized and measurable quality improvement initiatives. Both of those options reflect the need for resources to shift if broad-based and lasting quality improvement is to be achieved.
Adverse Risk Selection
Adverse risk selection occurs when an organization that bears financial risk (whether a health plan or provider group) attempts to avoid enrolling or caring for sick patients who have conditions that result in high and/or continuing costs. Both insurers and providers are concerned that undertaking quality improvement and publicizing quality outcomes will attract patients more likely to have condi- tions that make them high users of care and high-cost (Dudley et al., 1998). For example, if a health plan has a good program for identifying and managing those with diabetes, it is likely to enroll more diabetic patients. Since few purchasers adjust payment for this type of risk, the health plan bears the burden. Such health plans in turn, are unlikely to give their providers incentives to design programs that will attract a disproportionate share of people with diabetes. If financial risk is delegated to the provider group, the providers bear the financial burden of care for this population. The concern is related mainly to chronic conditions rather than acute care needs since the former represent ongoing expenses.
Risk-adjustment methods are an attempt to provide payment to health plans and providers that is commensurate with the health risks of the population served so that the organizations compete on efficiency, service, and quality instead of risk selection (Bowen, 1995). In the context of payment policy, risk is defined as how precisely future medical costs of an enrollee or group can be predicted (Gauthier et al., 1995). Risk adjustment is important because the distribution of medical expenditures is highly skewed, with a small fraction of individuals ac- counting for a substantial proportion of expenditures in any given year (Luft, 1995; Maguire et al., 1998). It has been estimated that the top 1 percent of spenders account for 30 percent of health care expenditures, whereas the bottom 50 percent account for only 3 percent (Berk and Monheit, 1992). Although some expenditures are unpredictable (such as trauma related to an auto accident), some are predictable (such as people with a chronic illness who are recognized as incurring continuing costs). Since some expenditures are predictable, organiza- tions that assume financial risk for the care of a group can potentially avoid recognized high users of care and their costs.
There are a number of different approaches to adjust for risk, such as use of specific adjustment methods, withholds and risk pools, carve-outs, and reinsur- ance (Newhouse et al., 1997). Prospective risk-adjustment methods, several of which have been developed in recent years, have gained attention (particularly by the Health Care Financing Administration). Two leading models are adjusted
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
196 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
clinical groups (ACGs, formerly referred to as ambulatory care groups) and diagnostic cost groups (DCGs) (Newhouse et al., 1997). Both methods use diagnostic information to improve predictability as compared with the demo- graphic adjustments used by Medicare to pay health plans.
ACGs were developed at The Johns Hopkins University to classify risks by using diagnoses reported in ambulatory visits (Starfield et al., 1991). The system assigns diagnoses to a risk group based on five clinical dimensions, such as a condition’s duration, severity, and diagnostic certainty. Both inpatient and am- bulatory versions are available.
Initial development on DCGs was conducted through a consortium of re- searchers at Boston University, Health Economics Research, and the Harvard University School of Medicine, and is based on inpatient diagnoses for prior hospitalizations. The DCG model has been expanded to include both inpatient and ambulatory information and to account for multiple medical conditions pa- tients may experience (Ellis et al., 1996).
Another method is clinical risk groups (CRGs), developed by 3M Health Information Systems (Averill et al., 1999). This clinical classification system assigns each patient to a risk group that relates past clinical information to the amount and type of health services the individual will consume in the future. Additionally, a survey-based approach has been developed at Kaiser-Permanente Health Plan for the working-age population. This method uses a chronic disease checklist and self-reported health status and functional status (using the RAND SF-36) to assess health risk (Hornbrook and Goodman, 1996).
The challenges involved in developing a fair and adequate risk-adjustment system cannot be underestimated. All current methods are limited in their ability to predict variation in expenditures. The Health Care Financing Administration implemented a transitional risk-adjustment system in January 2000 using a form of the DCG model, and is moving forward with an expanded model that will include inpatient, hospital outpatient, and physician encounter data. A number of models for this more comprehensive approach are being considered. It should be noted that improving risk-adjustment methods will likely necessitate more clini- cal information (rather than just claims information), which in turn will require significantly improved information systems (Dudley et al., 2000).
The goals for risk adjustment need to be balanced with the goals of quality improvement. In risk adjustment, the objective is to identify the subpopulation at risk of high utilization and high cost, whereas in quality improvement, the objec- tive is to identify all patients with a particular condition who could benefit from treatment (Dudley et al., 2000). On the one hand, if there is a potential for higher payment, health care organizations are likely to identify as many at-risk patients as possible and collect whatever information is necessary. On the other hand, doing so could bias quality measures through possible upcoding and might not provide incentives to design efficient and effective systems of care. The potential for payment methods to be based on similar patients with common conditions,
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ALIGNING PAYMENT POLICIES WITH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 197
including definitions of best practice, may help mediate some of the possible adverse effects.
Annual Contracting Arrangements
In theory, capitation and shared-risk arrangements provide incentives to pur- sue quality improvement strategies that minimize costs over the long term by keeping people healthy. To the extent that turnover in health plan membership and contracting arrangements occurs, however, suboptimization may result if the organization that undertakes the quality improvement does not see the benefits from those efforts.
Annual contracting arrangements can produce turnover in three ways. First, health plans and purchasers can alter annually the plans offered to consumers and force a change in health plan enrollment. Second, health plans and providers can alter annually the composition of provider networks, forcing patients to switch providers. Third, annual enrollment by individuals in health plans can produce turnover for the plans even if there is no change in the two former arrangements.
Annual contracting cycles may hinder a health care organization’s ability to pursue quality improvement initiatives if the organization believes the benefits will accrue to a competitor. If a health plan has even modest enrollee turnover, and a quality improvement project requires an up-front investment while the financial savings span years, patients may very well have shifted to another plan by the time the health benefits and related savings accrue. The same is true for a provider group that may develop a good program for difficult-to-manage diabet- ics and is able to improve compliance with treatment, but is dropped from the health plan’s provider panel, so that those now well-controlled patients go to a competitor’s diabetic program. Such turnover can eliminate the benefit for many proposed clinical improvement projects.
Longer-term arrangements among provider groups, health plans, and pur- chasers may be advisable to facilitate the investments needed to achieve quality improvement and ensure gains to the partners from the benefits that are generated over time (whether in the form of savings or improved outcomes). However, patients and consumers should be able to shift coverage or source of care for quality-related reasons. The ability of consumers and patients to do so can be a strong motivator for clinicians and health plans to offer such good care that people will not want to leave.
Up-Front Investments Required by Provider Groups
Provider groups face two specific managerial issues that are affected by payment arrangements and can hamper efforts by health care organizations to pursue quality improvement: (1) the difficulty of measuring the impact of quality improvement on the organization’s bottom line and (2) infrastructure challenges
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
198 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
encountered by those organizations seeking to implement broad-based quality improvement programs. Up-front investments are likely to be required to address both of these issues.
Difficulty of Measuring the Impact of Quality Improvement on the Bottom Line
When evaluating the potential for a quality improvement project to improve a health care organization’s bottom line, the expense of the proposed improve- ment is compared with the potential savings in variable costs. Variable costs are expenses that fluctuate directly with patient volumes, such as medications, dis- posable equipment, other supplies, and staffing levels, and are achieved relatively quickly. The impact of the proposed clinical quality improvement initiative is rarely evaluated in terms of savings in fixed costs, since those costs accrue over a longer time period. Fixed costs are expenses that a physician, clinic, hospital, or delivery system must pay regardless of patient volumes, such as payments for buildings, diagnostic and other equipment, licensing and regulatory fees, mal- practice insurance, and minimum required staffing.
Most health care costs are considered fixed, although there is likely variation in how individual health care organizations define their fixed or variable costs. For example, many consider labor costs to be fixed in the short term, but variable over the long term. However, it has been estimated that 60 to 75 percent of all expenses fall into the fixed cost category (Lave and Lave, 1984; Williams, 1996), leaving only about 25 to 40 percent of the savings generated by quality-based elimination of clinical waste (the proportion accounted as variable expenses) to appear quickly on an organization’s balance sheet. The remaining 60 to 75 percent of the potential savings, representing the fixed cost portion, appears as unused capacity within the organization. If a care delivery group can recruit additional patients to reduce excess capacity, an immediate benefit will be real- ized. The organization’s fixed costs will be spread across a larger patient popu- lation (all of the old patients, plus a number of new ones) so that the effective fixed cost per patient will fall, creating a larger financial margin for each patient treated. However, if the organization cannot increase patient volume, several years can be required to affect the fixed costs. Thus, the proportion of fixed costs in health care affects the ability to measure the impact of quality improvement efforts on an organization’s bottom line.
Infrastructure Investments
An organization that wants to use clinical quality as a business strategy must make a substantial investment in skill building and culture change. Clinical process management, a health care delivery organization’s core business func- tion, has traditionally been seen as a secondary responsibility of the voluntary medical staff. Practicing physicians are asked to contribute time without com-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ALIGNING PAYMENT POLICIES WITH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 199
pensation and to serve on clinical oversight committees, taking time away from their primary patient care role. An organization must make a substantial invest- ment in medical and other clinical leadership, as well as build an effective man- agement and information infrastructure to use for tracking outcomes, assessing performance, and setting clinical improvement goals. This investment should include tools and training in quality methods, but also adequate information systems that can be applied to clinical quality improvement (see Chapter 7).
ADAPTING EXISTING PAYMENT METHODS TO SUPPORT QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
As noted earlier, the IOM held a workshop on April 24, 2000, to discuss the relationship between payment and quality improvement. At the workshop, sev- eral examples were provided to illustrate how various existing payment meth- ods—including fee for service, capitation, a blended method, and a shared-risk (budget) method—could be adapted to support quality improvement. This sec- tion describes the examples presented at the workshop.
Adapting Fee-for-Service Payment
Dr. Glenn Littenberg described how fee-for-service payment could be adapted to provide incentives for quality improvement by encouraging coopera- tion and providing reimbursement for care outside of the traditional office visit, which is not always optimal for meeting patients’ needs. The approach involves developing relative values for the elements of work performed over time by physicians and other health professionals. For example, physicians provide care between visits, including coordination of complex cases, phone consults with patients and other professionals, and follow-up on tests performed. These activi- ties do not require face-to-face contact, but can occupy a significant amount of professional time. A Current Procedural Technology (CPT) code could be devel- oped for use of electronic media with the patient not present for specific commu- nications, for research, for clinical updates, and for coordination of care with other health professionals within a 30-day period. Codes could also be developed and relative values assigned for other organizational innovations designed to improve quality (e.g., anticoagulation clinics, which would include the clinical groups that have key roles, such as physicians, pharmacists, nurses, and dietary staff).
Despite the growth of alternative payment methods, fee-for-service payment remains important. Even in capitated systems, many individual physicians are paid using a fee-for-service method. Additionally, fee-for-service payment lev- els often serve as the benchmark for other payment methods. As a result, finan- cial support for activities that would improve quality care and rely on fee-for- service payment remains one avenue for building in rewards for quality care.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
200 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Adapting Capitation Payment
Dr. Sam Ho described how PacifiCare Health System has developed a pay- ment structure that rewards quality care provided by the 700 medical groups with which the plan contracts. PacifiCare pays the majority of medical groups by capitation for all professional services. Hospitals are also paid predominantly through capitation. The health plan retains risk for certain hospital, pharmacy, and ancillary services (e.g., durable medical equipment). The core of the system is a report card program that provides quality performance information to both physicians and consumers. The provider profile contains about 80 measures enabling medical groups to compare their own performance over time, as well as with regional and national benchmarks. The consumer-focused performance report currently contains 32 indicators, with more being added each year. Pre- liminary analysis conducted by PacifiCare indicates that the medical groups with higher scores on “best practice” are seeing statistically significant increases in membership and high member retention rates.
Two specific elements of the PacifiCare approach are worth noting. First, the approach focuses on the availability of data, relying on depth and breadth of data. Second, much of the information is directed toward consumers as decision makers. Rather than being directed at selection of a health plan, the information is at the medical group level, where consumers can evaluate their own trade-offs among cost, quality, access, and any other dimensions of importance to them.
Adapting Blended Payment Methods
Ann Robinow of the Buyers Health Care Action Group, Minneapolis, Min- nesota, described what some have termed a direct contracting approach. The group contracts with “care systems,” defined as groups of primary care physi- cians and affiliated specialists and facilities that could assume responsibility for the provision of a full continuum of care (Christianson et al., 1999). Payment is blended in that a budget target is set prospectively and adjusted retrospectively. Each year, care systems set a financial target for all care to enrollees (including pharmacy) that becomes the price to consumers and the benchmark for financial performance. The prices are risk adjusted every quarter using ACGs by compar- ing the care system’s performance for the most recent 12-month period with the target (Christianson et al., 1999), which is adjusted each quarter to reflect the relative illness burden of patients during the same time period for which financial information is being collected. Because it is a claims-based system in which each employer pays its own fees, fee levels are increased or decreased over time so that the fees approximate the target submitted (fees increase if the organization is below target and decrease if the target is exceeded). Consumers receive com- parative information at the care system level. Ms. Robinow indicated that the group’s own analysis indicates people are moving from the higher-cost to the
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ALIGNING PAYMENT POLICIES WITH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 201
lower-cost systems and that systems with higher satisfaction scores have also had higher enrollment gains.
Two notable elements of this approach are its focus on the care system and consumer involvement. The focus on the care system places responsibility at the level at which processes of care can be modified to improve quality. Providing comparative information to consumers at this level of the care system gives them information about care delivery and not just health coverage. This information is perceived as being more valuable for patients.
Adapting Shared-Risk (Budget) Arrangements
Dr. Brent James of Intermountain Health Care described the organization’s recent experience in moving toward shared-risk arrangements in which partner- ships are established with purchasers, and risk is shared around a budget based on the expectations of caring for a population. Costs are typically projected on the basis of a particular set of disease entities in clinical programs that represent the work of smaller groups. These are referred to as care processes. These groups do not manage just one activity (e.g., mammography), but rather a number of pro- cesses for a single condition (e.g., breast cancer). The price is negotiated among the partners. If Intermountain is able to produce care for the population below budget, all the partners share in the savings.
Intermountain perceives several advantages to this approach. First, it per- mits the organization to share in the benefits of quality improvement. Second, care can be organized around processes that are meaningful to health profession- als, patients, and purchasers, which helps align incentives and work priorities. Third, the approach uses a budgeted target to impose financial discipline, but does not rely on capitation, which means it can be applied to smaller groups of practitioners and patients that would not assume actuarial risk. The challenge is the need for good data to set budgets fairly and monitor clinical processes of care.
NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH
Although incentives to improve quality could be strengthened through incre- mental improvements in existing payment methods, more significant reform of the payment system will be needed over the long term. All health care organiza- tions face serious barriers in pursuing broad-based efforts at quality improve- ment, and providers face a mix of incentives from different payment methods. Conceptually, a provider group could manage effectively in an environment that was entirely fee for service or entirely capitation, but the present environment is a mix of both. An organization that manages to succeed predominantly under fee-for-service payment will fail under the incentives of capitation. On the other hand, an organization that manages to succeed under capitation will fail on the portion of care that is paid through fee for service. Thus, health care organiza-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
202 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
tions are faced with a financial situation in which it is almost impossible to manage for quality.
There are several ways to improve the way payment methods reward quality care. One option is to refine existing payment methods to provide greater re- wards for quality. As noted in the preceding discussion, all existing payment methods can be improved to reward quality better. However, although these incremental improvements are important to pursue, a more fundamental restruc- turing of the payment system is needed. One of the common threads that runs through most of the recent innovations in payment is greater attention to sub- populations with common clinical needs.
Chapter 4 describes the need for a classification system around priority conditions to facilitate the provision of care based on the common reasons for which people seek care. Although it would be premature to recommend payment based on priority conditions, it is appropriate to study their feasibility as a tool for aligning the scope of services provided with the scope of payment. For example, a patient with a chronic condition may be seeking the acute care services tradi- tionally covered under insurance, but may also need, for example, services re- lated to counseling and behavior change, support groups, e-mail access for com- munication between visits, strongly managed and continuous coordination with other health professionals, and medical supplies. However, today’s payment approaches offer a chronically ill patient face-to-face office visits as the primary mechanism for receiving care and rarely encompass the range of services needed across the continuum of care. Furthermore, the fragmentation of payment by service can make it difficult for care to be coordinated efficiently across multiple settings. There is a misalignment among what the patient needs, the services provided, and how needed services are paid for. Organizing care and payment around priority conditions could offer a framework for aligning payment incen- tives around a common clinical purpose that is consistent with meeting patient needs as completely and efficiently as possible.
The committee recognizes that such redesign could require significant changes in the purpose and structure of the insurance function. The role of health plans could shift toward a heavy emphasis on obtaining information from various configurations of providers and, in turn, releasing information to the public. Consumers’ responsibilities could also shift if they are to become more directly involved in comparing options for care and the arrangements through which they wish to receive care. Despite the challenges, however, the committee believes good-quality care can be recognized and rewarded through payment policies.
Although this chapter focuses on current payment policy and its shortcom- ings, the committee also discussed a set of larger economic issues. The commit- tee recognizes that the recommendations in this report will reduce costs in some areas and increase costs in others. In general, correcting problems of overuse and misuse is likely to result in cost reductions, whereas correcting problems of underuse is likely to increase costs (Chassin et al., 1998). Quality problems
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ALIGNING PAYMENT POLICIES WITH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 203
related to overuse increase costs through the provision of services from which patients do not benefit. Patients may also be exposed to unnecessary risks asso- ciated with treatment (Fisher and Welch, 1999). Quality problems related to misuse increase costs when tests and procedures have to repeated or when avoid- able complications increase treatment needs. On the other hand, quality prob- lems related to underuse represent artificial “savings,” as patients do not receive beneficial services, such as immunizations.
In terms of the specific recommendations in this report, there are several potential areas in which cost savings may be produced. Greater use of informa- tion technology (see Chapter 7) should result in costs savings in several ways. First, automation of certain functions may reduce some labor costs. This has happened in other industries, such as manufacturing. Second, information tech- nology may permit substitution of less costly alternatives of care. For example, to the extent that monitoring of patients can occur partly through e-mail, some office visits may be eliminated, as in the case of patients with controlled chronic conditions who may be able to visit their physician’s office twice a year instead of quarterly, relying on electronic communication between visits. Third, use of computerized drug prescribing has been shown to reduce medication errors, which are known to increase costs (Bates et al., 1997, 1998, 1999).
Cost reductions may also be possible with better application of the evidence base (see Chapter 6). Standardizing care around best practices and reducing variation in treatment patterns should result in reduced and/or more predictable costs of care. The use of effective decision support systems can reduce variation in practice through improved compliance with practice guidelines (Balas et al., 2000; Shea et al., 1996).
Finally, cost savings may be achieved through greater use of multidisciplinary teams (see Chapter 5). When teams are well coordinated and are able to suffi- ciently plan care and share information, it may become possible to substitute less- costly personnel for higher-cost personnel. Developing and using care teams properly can improve coordination across settings and over time to reduce ineffi- ciencies associated with handoffs among members of the care team.
The committee recognizes, however, that not all activities to improve quality will be cost-reducing. In addition to cost increases associated with correcting problems of underuse, as noted above, there will also be costs associated with implementing changes in the organization and delivery of care. Even if a change ultimately reduces cost, the process of evolving from the current system to the system of the 21st century may incur significant costs. Although some public support can help move such a process forward, health care organizations them- selves will need to invest in change, just as other industries (e.g., banking) have invested in transforming their business procedures. Key transitional areas that are likely to increase costs in the short- to mid-term time frame include (1) the need to train people for new jobs in health care (or in other fields) as some workers are displaced by new approaches to organizing and delivering care,
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
204 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
(2) investment in information technology and associated training costs, (3) the need to maintain duplicative systems temporarily while redesigning care pro- cesses (i.e., retaining the old process while the new process is being implemented and refined), and (4) capital investment to support redesign and reengineering of the current system.
It is not known how cost increases and decreases will ultimately balance over time. Regardless of the final calculus, however, what can be obtained is better value for the resources expended. Good value does not lie in spending over $1 trillion on health care that leaves some people receiving care they do not need and others not receiving the care they need. There should be a strong commitment to evaluating the economic and other impacts associated with improving the quality of care. However, such evaluations may not be amenable to existing measure- ment approaches. For example, benefits from information technology have in- cluded easier access to medical histories, improved access to summary patient details, support for protocols or guidelines, and quicker reporting of results of treatment (Lock, 1996). These benefits are difficult to quantify and to incorpo- rate into a traditional return-on-investment analysis. Therefore, assessing the impact of new approaches and innovative programs designed to improve quality may require new measurement approaches.
REFERENCES
Aas, I. H. Monrad. Incentives and Financing Methods. Health Policy 34:205–20, 1995. Anderson, Craig A. and Robin D. Daigh. Quality Mind-Set Overcomes Barriers to Success. Health-
care Financial Management 45(2):21–32, 1991. Anderson, Gerard F. and Wendy E. Weller. Methods of Reducing the Financial Risk of Physicians
Under Capitation. Archives of Family Medicine 8:149–55, 1999. Anonymous. Top-Priority Actions for Preventing Adverse Drug Events in Hospitals. Recommenda-
tions of an Expert Panel. Am J Health Syst Pharm 53(7):747–51, 1996. Averill, Richard F., Norbert I. Goldfield, Jon Eisenhandler, et al. 1999. “3M HIS Research Report
9–99: Development and Evaluation of Clinical Risk Groups (CRGs).” Online. Available at http://www.3M.com/market/healthcare/his/us/documents/reports/crg-article999.pdf [accessed Aug. 23, 2000].
Balas, E. Andrew, Scott Weingarten, Candace T. Garb, et al. Improving Preventive Care by Prompt- ing Physicians. Arch Int Med 160(3):301–8, 2000.
Barnum, Howard, Joseph Kutzin, and Helen Saxenian. Incentives and Provider Payment Methods. International Journal of Health Planning and Management 10:23–45, 1995.
Bates, David W., Lucian L. Leape, David J. Cullen, et al. Effect of Computerized Physician Order Entry and a Team Intervention on Prevention of Serious Medication Errors. JAMA 280(15): 1311–6, 1998.
Bates, David W., Nathan Spell, David J. Cullen, et al. The Costs of Adverse Drug Events in Hospi- talized Patients. JAMA 277(4):307–11, 1997.
Bates, David W., Jonathan M. Teich, Joshua Lee, et al. The Impact of Computerized Physician Order Entry on Medication Error Prevention. J Am Med Inform Assoc 6(4):313–21, 1999.
Berk, Marc L. and Alan C. Monheit. The Concentration of Health Expenditures: An Update. Health Affairs 11(4):145–9, 1992.
Bowen, Bruce. The Practice of Risk Adjustment. Inquiry 32(Spring):33–40, 1995.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ALIGNING PAYMENT POLICIES WITH QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 205
Chassin, Mark R., Robert W. Galvin, and the National Roundtable on Health Care Quality. The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality. JAMA 280(11):1000–5, 1998.
Christianson, Jon, Roger Feldman, Jonathan P. Weiner, and Patricia Drury. Early Experience With A New Model of Employer Group Purchasing in Minnesota. Health Affairs 18(6):100–14, 1999.
Classen, David C., Stanley L. Pestotnik, Scott Evans, et al. Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients: Excess Length of Stay, Extra Costs, and Attributable Mortality. JAMA 277(4):301–6, 1997.
Clemmer, Terry P., Vicki J. Spuhler, Thomas A. Oniki, and Susan D. Horn. Results of a Collabora- tive Quality Improvement Program on Outcomes and Costs in a Tertiary Critical Care Unit. Crit Care Med 27(9):1768–74, 1999.
Cleverley, William O. Essentials of Health Care Finance. Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen Publications, 1992.
Conrad, Douglas, Thomas Wickizer, Charles Maynard, et al. Managing Care, Incentives and Infor- mation: An Exploratory Look Inside the “Black Box” of Hospital Efficiency. Health Services Research 31(3):235–59, 1996.
Cromwell, Jerry, Debra A. Dayhoff, and Armen H. Thoumaian. Cost Savings and Physician Re- sponses to Global Bundled Payments for Medicare Heart Bypass Surgery. Health Care Financ- ing Review 19(1):41–57, 1997.
Cunningham, Peter J. and Linda Kohn. Health Plan Switching: Choice Or Circumstance? Health Affairs 19(3):158–64, 2000.
Demers, David, Nathaniel Clark, Geoff Tolzmann, et al. Computer Simulated Cost Effectiveness of Care Management Strategies on Reduction of Long-Term Sequelae in Patients with Non-Insu- lin Dependent Diabetes Mellitus. Quality Mgmt in Hlth Care 6(1):1–13, 1997.
Dudley, R. Adams, Lisa V. Bowers, and Harold S. Luft. Reconciling Quality Measurement with Financial Risk Adjustment in Health Plans. Journal on Quality Improvement 26(3):137–46, 2000.
Dudley, R. Adams, Robert H. Miller, Tamir Korenbrot, and Harold S. Luft. The Impact of Financial Incentives on Quality of Health Care. The Milbank Quarterly 76(4):649–86, 1998.
Ellis, Randall P., Gregory C. Pope, Lisa I. Iezzoni, et al. Diagnosis-Based Risk Adjustment for Medicare Capitation Payments. Health Care Financing Review 17(3):101–28, 1996.
Fisher, Elliott S. and H. Gilbert Welch. Avoiding the Unintended Consequences of Growth in Medi- cal Care. How Might More Be Worse? JAMA 281(5):446–53, 1999.
Gauthier, Anne K., Jo Ann Lamphere, and Nancy L. Barrand. Risk Selection in the Health Care Market: A Workshop Overview. Inquiry 32(Spring):14–22, 1995.
Hallam, Kristen. HCFA to Go Ahead with Medicare PPS. Modern Healthcare 30(31):2–3, 2000. Hillman, Alan L. Managing The Physician: Rules Versus Incentives. Health Affairs 10(4):138–46,
1991. Hornbrook, Mark C. and Michael J. Goodman. Chronic Disease, Functional Health Status, and
Demographics: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Risk Adjustment. Health Services Research 31(3):283–307, 1996.
Jarlier, Agnes and Suzanne Charvet-Protat. Can Improving Quality Decrease Hospital Costs? Inter- national Journal for Quality in Health Care 12(2):125–31, 2000.
Kane, Carol K., David W. Emmons, and Gregory D. Wozniak. Physician Managed Care Contracting. Socioeconomic Characteristics of Medical Practice 1997/98. Martin L. Gonzalez and Puling Zhang, eds. Chicago, IL: American Medical Association, 1998.
Lave, Judith R. and Lester B. Lave. Hospital Cost Functions. Annual Review of Public Health 5:193– 213, 1984.
Lee, A. James. The Role of Financial Incentives in Shaping Clinical Practice Patterns and Practice Efficiency. American Journal of Cardiology 80(88):28H–32H, 1997.
Lesser, Cara S. and Paul B. Ginsburg. Update on the Nation’s Health Care System: 1997–1999. Health Affairs 19(6):206–16, 2000.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
206 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Lock, Chris. What Value Do Computers Provide to NHS Hospitals? BMJ 312(7043):1407–10, 1996. Luft, Harold S. Potential Methods to Reduce Risk Selection and Its Effects. Inquiry 32(Spring):23–
32, 1995. Maguire, Ann M., Neil R. Powe, Barbara Starfield, et al. “Carving out” Conditions from Global
Capitation Rates: Protecting High-Cost Patients, Physicians, and Health Plans in a Managed Care Environment. The American Journal of Managed Care 4(6):797–806, 1998.
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. Chapter 1: Recent Changes in the Medicare Program. Report to the Congress: Selected Medicare Issues. Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, 2000a.
———. Chapter 2: Assessing the design and impact of the hospital prospective payment system. Report to Congress: Selected Medicare Issues. Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, 2000b.
———. Chapter 7: Reviewing the estimated payment update for physician services. Report to Congress: Selected Medicare Issues. Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, 2000c.
Newhouse, Joseph P., Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin, and John D. Chapman. Risk Adjustment and Medicare: Taking A Closer Look. Health Affairs 16(5):26–43, 1997.
Rauber, Chris. De-Capitating Managed Care Contracts. Modern Healthcare 29(36):52–7, 1999. Schmitz, Richard B. Building Global Billing and Payment Systems. Managed Care Quarterly 7(1):
16–28, 1999. Shea, Steven, William DuMouchel, and Lisa Bahamonde. A Meta-Analysis of 16 Randomized Con-
trolled Trials to Evaluate Computer-Based Clinical Reminder Systems for Preventive Care in the Ambulatory Setting. J Am Med Inform Assoc 3(6):399–409, 1996.
Shulkin, David. Comments at IOM “Workshop on the Effects of Financing Policy on Quality of Care.” April 24, 2000.
Simon, Carol J. and David W. Emmons. Physician Earnings at Risk: An Examination of Capitated Contracts. Health Affairs 16(3):120–6, 1997.
Starfield, Barbara, Jonathan Weiner, Laura Mumford, and Donald Steinwachs. Ambulatory Care Groups: A Categorization of Diagnoses for Research and Management. Health Services Re- search 26(1):53–74, 1991.
The Diabetes Control and Complications Trial Research Group. The Effect of Intensive Treatment of Diabetes on the Development and Progression of Long-Term Complications of Insulin-Depen- dent Diabetes Mellitus. N EngI J Med 329(14):977–86, 1993.
Trude, Sally. Who Has a Choice of Health Plans? Washington, D.C.: Center for Studying Health System Change, Issue Brief Number 27 , 2000.
Welch, W. Pete. Bundled Medicare Payment For Acute and Postacute Care. Health Affairs 17(6):69– 81, 1998.
Williams, Robert M. The Costs of Visits to Emergency Departments. N EngI J Med 334(10):642–6, 1996.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
207
9
Preparing the Workforce
Health care is not just another service industry. Its fundamental nature is characterized by people taking care of other people in times of need and stress. Patients are ill, families are worried, and the ultimate outcome may be uncertain. Stable, trusting relationships between a patient and the people providing care can be critical to healing or managing an illness. The people who deliver care are the health system’s most important resource.
All of the issues raised in the previous chapters of this report have important implications for the health care workforce, potentially requiring different work in new types of organizations that may use fewer people. Accountabilities and standards of care may change; relationships between patients and health profes- sionals are certain to do so.
The health care workforce is large, having employed almost 6 million people in 1998 (Occupational Employment Statistics, 2000) with a wide variety of edu- cational backgrounds, specialization, and skills. Professional hierarchies are well established and reinforced by training, laws, and regulations, as well as culture and history. In general, health professionals are also conservative, stressing the application of precedent and risk avoidance in clinical practice, particularly rela- tive to changes that may affect the quality of care for patients. As a result, any change can be exceedingly slow and difficult to accomplish, especially if there is not a clear understanding of why the change may be needed or of its impact on current practices.
The importance of appropriately preparing the workforce for the changes in health care delivery that will be necessitated by the recommendations in this report cannot be underestimated. There are many serious challenges facing the
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
208 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
health care workforce, including difficulties in retention of personnel, the im- pending crisis in nursing supply, and the need for strong leadership within the health care system to guide and support what will be a very difficult transition. When clinicians are under stress themselves, it is difficult to take care of patients who are ill and stressed. Indeed, this was one of the key transitional issues identified during the committee’s deliberations. It is a broad topic that can only be introduced here, but the committee emphasizes the need for additional study to understand the effects of the changes recommended herein on how the workforce is prepared for practice, how it is deployed, and how it is held accountable.
Recommendation 12: A multidisciplinary summit of leaders within the health professions should be held to discuss and develop strate- gies for (1) restructuring clinical education to be consistent with the principles of the 21st-century health system throughout the con- tinuum of undergraduate, graduate, and continuing education for medical, nursing, and other professional training programs; and (2) assessing the implications of these changes for provider credentialing programs, funding, and sponsorship of education pro- grams for health professionals.
Recommendation 13: The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality should fund research to evaluate how the current regula- tory and legal systems (1) facilitate or inhibit the changes needed for the 21st-century health care delivery system, and (2) can be modi- fied to support health care professionals and organizations that seek to accomplish the six aims set forth in Chapter 2.
This chapter briefly examines three specific issues: clinical training and education, regulation of the health professions, and legal liability issues. Clinical training and education is seen as particularly important for changing the culture of health care practice to support achievement of the aims set forth in Chapter 2. Greater understanding is needed of why prior efforts at modifying clinical educa- tion have not had the desired impact and of the supportive strategies needed to overcome such barriers.
CLINICAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING
To achieve the six aims proposed in Chapter 2, additional skills may be required of health professionals—not just physicians, but all clinicians who care for patients. Prior chapters have identified a number of changes affecting health care delivery, including a shift from acute to chronic care, the need to manage a continually expanding evidence base and technological innovations, more clini- cal practice occurring in teams and complex delivery arrangements, and changing patient–clinician relationships. The need to balance cost, quality, and access in
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PREPARING THE WORKFORCE 209
health care will put pressures on clinical education programs, particularly given the outlay of public dollars for clinical education.
The types of new or enhanced skills required by health professionals might include, for example, the ability to:
• Use a variety of approaches to deliver care, including the provision of care without face-to-face visits (e.g., using electronic communications to provide follow-up care and routine monitoring) (see Chapter 3).
• Synthesize the evidence base and communicate it to patients (see Chapter 6).
• Combine the evidence base, knowledge about population outcomes, and patient preferences to tailor care for an individual patient (Weed and Weed, 1999a) (see Chapter 6).
• Communicate with patients in a shared and fully open manner to support their decision making and self-management (to the extent they so desire), includ- ing the potential for unfettered access to the information contained in their medi- cal records (see Chapter 3).
• Use decision support systems and other tools to aid clinical decision making in order to minimize problems of overuse and underuse and reduce waste (Weed and Weed, 1999a) (see Chapter 6).
• Identify errors and hazards in care; understand and implement basic safety design principles, such as standardization and simplification (Institute of Medi- cine, 2000) (see Chapter 5).
• Understand the course of illness and a patient’s experience outside of the hospital (where most training is conducted).
• Continually measure quality of care in terms of both process and out- comes; develop and implement best practices (Berwick et al., 1992) (see Chapter 5).
• Work collaboratively in teams with shared responsibility (Chassin, 1998) (see Chapter 5).
• Design processes of care and measure their effectiveness, even when the members of the team that cares for a patient are not in the same physical locale (Berwick et al., 1992).
• Understand how to find new knowledge as it continually expands, evalu- ate its significance and claims of effectiveness, and decide how to incorporate it into practice (Chassin, 1998) (see Chapter 6).
• Understand determinants of health, the link between medical care and healthy populations, and professional responsibilities.
Teaching these skills will likely require changes in curriculum. Although some schools have added courses that are consistent with the desired skills, the needed content is likely to evolve over time. For example, many schools now have courses in patient communications, information systems, and biostatistics.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
210 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
However, communicating with patients to improve adherence to a recommended treatment is different from communicating with patients who are key decision makers and full partners in their care. Using information technology to do a MEDLINE search is important, but not the same as using the technology as a central component in delivering care and using decision support as an aid to clinical decision making. Knowing biostatistics aids in understanding the pub- lished literature, but is not the same as using statistics to design processes of care to reduce variations in practice. Likewise, care provided by multidisciplinary teams involves more than knowing the responsibilities of people in a clinical department; it should involve knowing how to form and use teams to customize care across settings and over time, even when the members of the team are in entirely different physical locations.
Although curriculum changes are essential in providing new skills to health professionals, they are not sufficient by themselves. It is also necessary to ad- dress how health professional education is approached, organized, and funded to better prepare students for real practice in an information rich environment. Two examples are teaching evidence-based practice and training in multidisciplinary teams.
The traditional emphasis in clinical education, particularly medical educa- tion, is on teaching a core of knowledge, much of it focused on the basic mecha- nisms of disease and pathophysiological principles. Given the expansiveness and dynamic nature of the science base in health care, this approach should be ex- panded to teach how to manage knowledge and use effective tools that can support clinical decision making (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992; Weed and Weed, 1999c). Effective teaching of evidence-based practice requires faculty role models, an emphasis on teaching the application of critical appraisal skills in actual patient care settings, and experience in conducting litera- ture searches and applying methodological rules to the evaluation and under- standing of evidence (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992). In a survey of 269 internal medicine residency programs, it was found that only 99 offered a freestanding program in evidence-based medicine (Green, 2000). The curricula for these 99 programs varied greatly: 77 included critical appraisal of the literature; 52 provided information on how to search for evidence; 44 covered issues related to the articulation of a focused clinical question; 35 covered the application of evidence to individual decision making; and 23 included integra- tion of the evidence into decision making in actual practice. Nearly all programs provided access to MEDLINE, while only about one-third provided access to the Cochrane Library (see Chapter 6).
Similarly, as more care is provided by teams, more opportunities for multidisciplinary training should be offered (Institute of Medicine, 1996a). People should be trained in the kinds of teams in which they will provide care, starting with initial professional training and continuing through graduate train- ing and ongoing professional development. Multidisciplinary training is difficult
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PREPARING THE WORKFORCE 211
to implement because of professional boundaries, the traditional hierarchical structure of health care, clinical specialization, faculty experience, and educa- tional isolation. Changing the situation will require an examination of clinical curricula, funding for education, and faculty preparation. Although there was great interest and innovation in multidisciplinary training during the 1960s, little lasting change resulted (Pew Health Professions Commission, 1993). The ability to plan care and practice effectively using multidisciplinary teams takes on in- creasing importance as the proportion of the population with chronic conditions grows, requiring the provision of a mix of services over time and across settings.
A changing relationship between clinicians and their patients also calls for new skills in communication and support for patient self-management, especially for patients with chronic conditions. Collaborative management requires col- laboration between clinicians and patients in defining problems, setting goals, and planning care; training and support in self-management; and continuous follow-up (Von Korff et al., 1997). Patients with chronic conditions who are provided with knowledge and skills for self-management have been shown to experience improvements in health status and reduced hospitalizations (Lorig et al., 1999). Clinicians need to have skills to train patients in techniques of good self-management.
Teaching a different set of skills also has implications for the capabilities of health care organizations that conduct training programs if these skills and behav- iors are to be reinforced in training beyond basic coursework. For example, training can emphasize the importance of information technology in clinical care, but that message is not reinforced if students continue their training in health care organizations that are not equipped with such systems or where the faculty are not prepared to use the skills themselves. This is a particular challenge for training in ambulatory settings and physician offices. Although many would agree that more training needs to be offered in such settings, additional support may be required for this purpose.
Although improved methods of training the next generation of clinicians are important, efforts must also be made to retool practicing clinicians. Traditional methods of continuing education for health professionals, such as formal confer- ences and dissemination of educational materials, have been shown to have little effect by themselves on changing clinician behaviors or health outcomes (Davis et al., 1995). Continuing education needs to emphasize a variety of interventions, particularly reminder systems, academic detailing, and patient-mediated meth- ods, and use a mix of approaches, including Web-based technologies. Reorienta- tion of credentialing processes to assess a clinician’s proficiency in evidence- based practice and the use of decision support tools may be necessary to provide strong incentives for clinicians to undertake this important learning process. The development of clinical leadership is another area that needs attention. Clinical leadership will be required to direct the changes discussed, but there will also be
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
212 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
a need for new leaders who are able to function effectively in and lead complex delivery systems.
Finally, there are implications for the training and development of nonclinical administrative and management personnel, as well as governance. By making budgetary and resource decisions for health care organizations, these groups, with input from and in collaboration with the clinical community, influence priorities and the pace at which they are implemented. For example, the admin- istration of a hospital can provide sufficient resources to support the implementa- tion of medication order/entry systems that help clinicians provide safer care, or they can slow the pace at which such systems are implemented by not ensuring sufficient resources or training. Training and development for both management and governance should recognize the important role these groups play in collabo- rating with clinicians to make possible the types of changes needed for the health system of the 21st century.
There have been many prior examinations of clinical education, particularly medical education. The structure and form of medical education were set through the Flexner report of 1910. That report called for a 4-year curriculum comprising 2 years of basic sciences and 2 years of clinical teaching, university affiliation (instead of proprietary schools), entrance requirements, encouragement of active learning and limited use of lectures and learning by memorization, and emphasis on the importance of problem solving and critical thinking (Ludmerer, 1999; Regan-Smith, 1998).
More than 20 different reports followed Flexner’s, each calling for the re- form of medical and clinical education. The striking feature of these reports is their similarity in the problems identified and proposed solutions. Christakis (1995) reviewed 19 reports and found eight objectives of reform among them: serve changing public interest, address physician workforce needs, cope with burgeoning knowledge, foster generalism and decrease fragmentation, apply new educational methods, address the changing nature of illness, address the changing nature of practice, and improve the quality and standards of education. Enarson and Burg (1992) reviewed 13 studies of medical education and summarized the recommended changes under the categories of (1) methods of instruction and curriculum content (including the need for a broad general education, definition of educational objectives, acquisition of lifelong learning skills, and expansion of training sites); (2) internal structure of medical school (including integration of medical education across the continuum of preparation, control of education programs in multidisciplinary and interdepartmental groups, and definition of budget for teaching); and (3) the relationship between medical schools and exter- nal organizations (including integration of accreditation processes, assessment of readiness for graduate training, and use of licensing exams).
Many believe that changes in medical education are needed. In their survey of medical school deans, Cantor et al. (1991) found that 68 percent believed
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PREPARING THE WORKFORCE 213
fundamental change in medical education was needed. This was true for their own institutions as well as medical education overall. Petersdorf and Turner (1995) report that the education given to students is “dated and arcane” and not in tune with societal needs. In interpreting their survey of young physicians, Cantor et al. (1993) found that “while medical training has remained largely unchanged, the demands placed on practicing physicians have changed dramatically.”
Some believe that the premises of the current apprenticeship model of medi- cal education are so faulty in today’s complex health care environment that they need drastic overhaul (Chassin, 1998). Others have suggested that “research’s stranglehold on medical education reform needs to be broken by separating re- searchers from medical student teaching and from curriculum decision making” (Regan-Smith, 1998). Teaching should be an explicit and compensated part of one’s job. Still others have called for new relationships between medical schools and academic health centers that would permit the latter to focus on making the best decisions for patient care and allow medical schools to control education and its location (Thier, 1994). In such a circumstance, academic health centers might be affiliated with several medical schools and medical schools might be affiliated with multiple health centers to allow for greater flexibility by the partners.
Medical curriculum has not been static over the years, but has undergone extensive changes (Anderson, 2000; Milbank Memorial Fund and Association of American Medical Colleges, 2000). However, many believe that in general, the current curriculum is overcrowded and relies too much on memorizing facts, and that the changes implemented have not altered the underlying experience of educators and student (Ludmerer, 1999; Regan-Smith, 1998). Despite the changes that have been made, the fundamental approach to clinical education has not changed since 1910. A number of reasons have been cited for so little response to so many calls for reform:
• Lack of funding to review curriculum and teaching methods and of re- sources to make changes in them (Griner and Danoff, 2000; Meyer et al., 1997)
• Emphasis on research and patient care, with little reward for teaching (Cantor et al., 1991; Griner and Danoff, 2000; Ludmerer, 1999; Petersdorf and Turner, 1995; Regan-Smith, 1998)
• Need for faculty development to ensure that faculty are available at train- ing sites and able to teach students effectively (Griner and Danoff, 2000; Weed, 1981)
• Decentralized structure in medical schools, with powerful department chairs (Cantor et al., 1991; Marston, 1992; Petersdorf and Turner, 1995; Regan- Smith, 1998)
• No coordinated oversight across the continuum of education, and frag- mented responsibilities for undergraduate and graduate education, licensing, cer- tification, etc. (Enarson and Burg, 1992; Ludmerer, 1999)
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
214 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
• Difficulty in assessing the impact of changes in teaching methods or curriculum (Ludmerer, 1999)
Although much has been written on medical education, future work on the clinical preparation of the workforce should include examining issues related to the education of all health professionals individually and the way they interact with each other. Separation of clinical training programs and dispersed oversight of training programs, especially across the continuum of initial training, graduate training, and continuing development, inhibit the types and magnitude of change in clinical education. For example, various aspects of medical education are affected by the policies of the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, the Association of American Medical Colleges, the Accreditation Council for Gradu- ate Medical Education, 27 residency review committees, the American Board of Medical Specialties and its 24 certifying boards, the Bureau of Health Profes- sions at the Department of Health and Human Services, the American Medical Association, the American Osteopathic Association and its 18 certifying boards, the American Association of Colleges of Osteopathic Medicine, and various professional societies involved in continuing medical education. Similarly, nurs- ing education is influenced by the policies of the American Association of Col- leges of Nursing, the National League for Nursing, the American Nurses Creden- tialing Center, the National Council of State Boards of Nursing, the American Nurses Association, and various specialty nursing societies. Academic health centers and faculty also play a strong role in shaping the education experience of their students. Such diffusion of responsibilities for clinical education makes it difficult to create a vision for health professional education in the 21st century.
REGULATION OF THE PROFESSIONS
If innovative programs are to flourish, they will require regulatory environ- ments that foster innovation in organizational arrangements, staffing and work relationships, and use of technology. The 21st-century health care system de- scribed in this report cannot be achieved without substantial change in the current environment of regulation and oversight.
In general, regulation in this country can be characterized as a dense patch- work that is slow to adapt to change. It is dense because there is a forest of laws, regulations, agencies, and accreditation processes through which each care deliv- ery system must navigate at the local, state, and federal levels. It is a patchwork system because the regulatory and accreditation frameworks at the state level are often inconsistent, contradictory, and duplicative, in part because the needs, pri- orities, and available resources of the states are not equal. And the regulating process is slow in that it is unable to keep pace with changes in health care. The health care delivery system is under great pressure to innovate and change to
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PREPARING THE WORKFORCE 215
incorporate new knowledge and technologies. Regulatory and accreditation re- quirements can, at times, be at odds with needed innovations (Pew Health Profes- sions Commission, 1993). Statutes and regulations, while not the only factors that influence the practices of nonphysician clinicians, are powerful determinants of their authority and independence (Cooper et al., 1998).
A key regulatory issue that affects the health care workforce and the way it is used is scope-of-practice acts, implemented at the state level. The general public does not have adequate information to judge provider qualifications or compe- tence, so professional licensure laws are enacted to assure the public that practi- tioners have met the qualifications and minimum competencies required for prac- tice (Pew Health Professions Commission, 1993; Safriet, 1994). Along with licensure, such state laws that define the scope of practice for specific types of caregivers serve as an important component of the overall system of health care quality oversight.
One effect of licensure and scope-of-practice acts is to define how the health care workforce is deployed. In general, medical practice acts are defined broadly so that individual practitioners are licensed for medicine (not a specific spe- cialty), and are thereby permitted to perform all activities that fall within med- icine’s broad scope of practice. Although a dermatologist would not likely per- form open-heart surgery, doing so is not restricted by licensure. However, patients often seek out information about a physician’s reputation and credentials, and professional societies also monitor the activities of their members. Other health professions have more narrowly defined scopes of practice, having to carve out their responsibilities from the medical practice act in each state (Safriet, 1994).
Although scope-of-practice acts are motivated by the desire to establish minimum standards to ensure the safety of patients, they also have implications for the changes to the health care system recommended in this report. Since, any change can potentially affect scope-of-practice acts, it can be difficult to use alternative approaches to care, such as telemedicine, e-visits, nonphysician pro- viders, and multidisciplinary teams, all of which can help in caring for patients across settings and over time (see Chapter 3).
Current systems of licensure raise both jurisdictional and liability issues for some clinical applications of telemedicine, such as centralized consultation ser- vices to support primary care (Institute of Medicine, 1996b) or the provision of online, continuous, 24-hour monitoring and clinical management of patients in intensive care units for hospitals that have no or too few critical care intensivists on staff to provide this coverage (Janofsky, 1999; Rosenfeld et al., 2000). Inte- grated delivery systems that cross state lines and telemedicine have rendered geographic boundaries obsolete (Finocchio et al., 1998), making it more difficult for those charged by statute to protect the public.
Scope-of-practice acts can include provisions that inhibit the use of non- physician practitioners, such as advanced practice nurses and physician assis- tants, for primary care (Pew Health Professions Commission, 1993; Safriet, 1994).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
216 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
In some states, advanced practice nurses can diagnose, treat, and prescribe; in others they work only under the direction of a physician (Cooper et al., 1998). Inconsistencies are exacerbated by variation in the scope of practice by setting of care. For example, advanced practice nurses may be permitted a broader scope of practice in rural areas or community health clinics than in other settings (Safriet, 1994). Such policies are enacted to address problems of underservice that exist in certain areas. Although patient needs do not necessarily differ in rural versus urban areas of a state, the available resources of talent, capital, and personnel often vary considerably.
Scope-of-practice acts can also affect the ability to form cohesive care teams that draw on individuals from different disciplines to complement one another in patient care. The skills of some nonphysician providers may overlap with a subset of physician services, often creating tensions among clinicians (Cooper et al., 1998). For example, although there is a difference in their knowledge and training for practice, certified registered nurse anesthetists and anesthesiologists have a subset of skills that overlap (Cromwell, 1999). Separate governance structures and standards are maintained for different types of health professionals even though they may perform a subset of overlapping functions, practice to- gether in the same state and at the same health care institutions, and serve the same population of patients (Finocchio et al., 1998). The complexity of rules across disciplines and settings makes it a challenge to form multidisciplinary teams and establish best practices, especially those that draw on caregivers based in different settings (e.g., hospital, physician’s office, and home). Scope-of- practice laws are not the only barrier to greater use of multidisciplinary teams (Sage and Aiken, 1997), but are an important one.
Because licensure and scope-of-practice acts are implemented at the state level, there is a great deal of variation among the states in who is licensed and what standards for licensure and practice are applied. State licensure is not constitutionally based, but rather founded in tradition (Safriet, 1994). On the one hand, state licensure permits regulations to be tailored to meet local needs, re- sources, and patient expectations. On the other hand, the resulting state-by-state variation is not always logical given the growth of the Internet and the formation of large, multistate provider groups that cut across geographic boundaries. Even with new technologies and organizational arrangements, however, public protec- tions must still be ensured. In response, some have proposed nationally uniform scopes of practice (O’Neil and the Pew Health Professions Commission, 1998) or, at least, more coordinated, publicly accountable policies (Grumbach and Coffman, 1998). The National Council of State Boards of Nursing has endorsed a mutual recognition model for interstate nursing practice that retains state licen- sure authority, but provides a mechanism for practice across state lines (similar to a driver’s license that is granted by one state and recognized in other states) (Finocchio et al., 1998). Still others have argued the relative merits of state-based versus national licensing systems (Federation of State Medical Boards, 1998).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PREPARING THE WORKFORCE 217
The committee does not recommend one approach over another, but does call for greater coordination and communication among professional boards both within and across states as this issue is resolved over time.
Although the preceding examples suggest that some regulations may be duplicative or outdated for today’s clinical practice, gaps exist in other areas as well. For example, current licensure and scope-of-practice laws offer no assur- ance of continuing competency. In a field with a continually expanding knowl- edge base, there is no mechanism for ensuring that practitioners remain up to date with current best practices. Responsibility for assessing competence is dispersed among multiple authorities. For example, a licensing board may question compe- tence only if it receives a complaint, but does not routinely assess competency after initial licensure. A health care organization may assess competence when an individual applies for privileges or employment. Professional societies and organizations may require examination for certification, but are just beginning to assess competence in addition to knowledge for those health professionals who voluntarily seek certification. There are no consistent methods for ensuring the continued competence of health professionals within current state licensing func- tions or other processes.
At least two approaches have been suggested to address this gap. First, some researchers have suggested that licensure be based on a professional’s demon- strated ability to perform certain functions or on a certain level of practice (Coo- per et al., 1998; Weed and Weed, 1999b). In aviation, for example, pilots are granted a private, commercial, or air transport license by the Federal Aviation Administration. Generally, pilots first obtain a private, single-engine license and then progressively add multi-engine and instrument qualifications to obtain a commercial license. They can then accumulate flying hours and experience to qualify for an air transport license, subsequently obtaining particular types of ratings for specific aircraft (Bisgard, 2000). In addition, professional pilots are recertified at regular intervals throughout their flying career. Taking such an approach in health care would represent a profound paradigm shift, with a grada- tion of licensure being based on the services in which a health professional has demonstrated competence to serve patients.
A second approach has been suggested, involving an additional level of oversight in which teams of practitioners, in addition to individuals, would be licensed or certified to perform certain tasks (Pew Health Professions Commis- sion, 1993). For example, an individual receiving care for diabetes could go to a “certified” diabetes team that would ensure specific competencies and resources within the delivery team. The team could be collocated or comprise a dispersed network of individual providers practicing and communicating with each other as a team. The certification requirements could be used as a measure of quality by consumers and as a tool for quality improvement by teams seeking to obtain such certification.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
218 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
It would be premature for the committee to offer a recommendation related to licensure, scope-of-practice, or other regulations. In raising these issues, how- ever, we recognize their importance in supporting or hindering the types of changes recommended in this report. Thus we call for additional, in-depth study aimed at understanding the areas and forms of regulation that are most beneficial for patients and in which modification may be needed to achieve the 21st-century health care system envisioned in this report. Properly conceived and executed, regulation can both protect the public’s interest and support the ability of health care professionals and organizations to innovate and change to meet the needs of their patients.
LEGAL LIABILITY ISSUES
The recommendations in this report represent, in many instances, a very different way of delivering services to patients. Achieving the aims set forth in Chapter 2 will require significant innovations in the delivery of care, innovations that may also raise concerns associated with traditional forms of accountability, especially liability issues. Delivering care that is patient-centered, evidence- based, and systems-minded has implications for traditional methods of account- ability, particularly with regard to patients’ participation in their care, efforts to define standards of care consistent with the evidence base rather than local tradi- tions, and the responsibilities of individual practitioners who deliver care within larger systems that have the capacity for improvement.
Innovations in care can contribute to increased threats of litigation because, by definition, innovation implies a change from previous practice, and medical advances are often imperfect when first applied in clinical practice. Mohr (2000) cites an early example of compound fractures. Through a change in treatment, patients may have avoided an amputation, but they did not always regain full functioning of the limb and pursued litigation against the physician. Significant innovation in health care will occur in many areas with the use of new processes of care and new technologies that will alter how and by whom services are delivered to patients. It is not yet clear how these new processes and technolo- gies, such as e-mail, will affect the liability of health professionals in the future.
Although less studied, changes in organizational approaches raise similar issues. For example, patients may receive care from members of a care team other than a physician or be counseled by e-mail rather than in a face-to-face visit. Such changes can be disorienting to patients if not well understood and in the short run, and create new hazards and new risks of litigation. Thus there is a need for good educational efforts and communication with patients about the changes taking place. It is also necessary, however, to examine the extent to which current liability approaches inhibit the kinds of changes needed to improve the quality and safety of care. For example, liability concerns can affect the
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PREPARING THE WORKFORCE 219
willingness of physicians and other clinicians to share information about areas in which quality improvement is needed if they believe the information may subse- quently be used against them (Institute of Medicine, 2000). The committee’s previous report on patient safety calls for peer review protection of data that are used inside health care organizations or shared with others solely for purposes of improving safety and quality, as well as an improved climate for identifying areas needing improvement (Institute of Medicine, 2000).
Legal issues are also likely to influence the development of evidence-based practice. The legal system influences health care through two types of deci- sions—medical malpractice and benefits coverage—both of which involve judg- ments about the quality of care (Rosoff, 2001). Should the legal system fail to incorporate evidence-based thinking into its decision-making processes (whether related to medical malpractice or other decisions), clinicians and health care organizations will be subject to confusing and conflicting incentives and de- mands.
Legal decisions that involve determining whether care provided was consis- tent with the “standard practice in the relevant medical community” (Rosoff, 2001) often rely on expert testimony. It is unclear how courts will incorporate clinical evidence and clinical practice guidelines into legal decision making. To date, clinical practice guidelines have had little effect on litigation. In a legal search covering the period January 1980 to May 1994, Hyams et al. (1996) found only 37 cases involving clinical practice guidelines. But clinical practice guide- lines probably have had some effect on prelitigation decisions, since surveys show that medical malpractice attorneys consider guidelines in making decisions about whether to take on malpractice cases and conducting settlement negotia- tions (Hyams et al., 1996).
Alternative approaches to liability, such as enterprise liability or no-fault compensation, could produce a legal environment more conducive to uncovering and resolving quality problems. Enterprise liability shifts liability from indi- vidual practitioners to responsible organizations (Abraham and Weiler, 1994; Sage et al., 1994). For example, workplace injuries to employees are handled through a form of no-fault, enterprise liability. Although analysis of such ap- proaches is beyond the scope of the present study, the committee believes they merit a focused, in-depth analysis.
RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE
Modifying training, regulatory, and legal environments is not a quick strat- egy for changing practice. These environments are closely interrelated with the delivery setting. Training programs are not likely to change unless the delivery setting does so, but the setting cannot change if people are not trained to practice differently. Similarly, the delivery setting cannot change without modifications
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
220 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
in regulation and legislation, but adjustments in practice often prompt additional regulation to protect against unwanted consequences.
A comprehensive approach is needed for the many aspects of health care workforce planning. Many prior efforts in such planning have focused on at- tempting to determine an appropriate supply of clinicians. Previous studies have examined the adequacy of supply for selected disciplines (e.g., physicians) or the mix of providers within a discipline (e.g., primary care and specialty mix of physicians), or have assumed a specific organizational model (e.g., supply of physicians needed given extensive enrollment in HMOs). Although a compre- hensive workforce agenda should address issues of supply, it would be difficult to conduct any such studies meaningfully without first addressing how clinicians might be deployed given different approaches to training, regulation, and liabil- ity. It is not sufficient to ask how many health professionals are needed; one must also ask what types are needed (Pew Health Professions Commission, 1993). Ultimate assessments of supply depend on how responsibility for patients is divided among licensed clinicians, as well as on society’s expectations (Cromwell, 1999). Workforce planning should shift from determining the supply of clini- cians in specific disciplines who continue to perform the same tasks using the same methods toward assessing the adequacy of supply given that care is pro- vided through processes that rely on multidisciplinary approaches, modern tech- nological support, and continuous care. The starting point for addressing work- force issues should not be the present environment of licensure, reimbursement, and organization of care, but a vision of how care ought to be delivered in the 21st century. A comprehensive agenda on workforce planning should cover the fol- lowing key issues:
• Training and Education Issues
– What is the vision for the education and training of health professionals for the 21st century? What is the relationship between the education of health care providers and quality of care?
– How is the vision relayed throughout the continuum of education? How can new health professionals learn most effectively the basic skills related to patient-centeredness, evidence-based practice, and systems think- ing? How can such skills be reinforced in graduate training programs? How can they be meaningfully relayed to professionals already in practice?
– What are the implications of changes in clinical education for the health care organizations that serve as training sites? What is the potential effect on the role and mission of academic health centers?
– What are the implications of changes in clinical education for licensing and accreditation processes? For funding approaches to support clinical education?
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PREPARING THE WORKFORCE 221
• Legal and Regulatory Issues
– How can regulatory and other oversight processes be coordinated to reinforce the principles of patient-centeredness, evidence-based practice, and systems thinking? What specific legal and regulatory constraints inhibit changes in processes of care? Where are different types of regulations needed? In what areas can existing regulations be streamlined or reduced?
– How can greater coordination among licensing boards within an indi- vidual state and across states be facilitated? How can the continuing compe- tence of health professionals be assessed and ensured?
– Can liability reform support the principles of patient-centeredness, evidence-based practice, and systems thinking? Are alternative models, such as enterprise liability, desirable?
– What is the link between regulation of health professions and quality of care?
– What are the appropriate links among licensure, accountability, and liability?
• Workforce Supply
– Given a greater understanding of the previous issues (e.g., what training is provided, the need for greater flexibility in deploying human resources, and alternative approaches to accountability), what are the implications for the needed supply and mix of health professionals?
REFERENCES
Abraham, Kenneth S. and Paul C. Weiler. Enterprise Medical Liability and the Choice of the Re- sponsible Enterprise. American Journal of Law and Medicine 20(1 & 2):29–36, 1994.
Anderson, Brownell M., ed. A Snapshot of Medical Students’ Education at the Beginning of the 21st Century: Reports from 130 Schools. Academic Medicine 75(9, Suppl), 2000.
Berwick, Donald M., A. Enthoven, and J. P. Bunker. Quality Management in the NHS: The Doctor’s Role—II. BMJ 304:304–8, 1992.
Bisgard, J. Cris, Delta Airlines, Oct. 26, 2000. Personal communication: e-mail. Cantor, Joel C., Laurence C. Baker, and Robert G. Hughes. Preparedness for Practice: Young
Physicians’ Views of Their Professional Education. JAMA 270(9):1035–40, 1993. Cantor, Joel C., Alan B. Cohen, Dianne C. Barker, et al. Medical Educators’ Views on Medical
Education Reform. JAMA 265(8):1002–6, 1991. Chassin, Mark R. Is Health Care Ready for Six Sigma Quality? Milbank Quarterly 76(4):575–91,
1998. Christakis, Nicholas A. The Similarity and Frequency of Proposals to Reform U.S. Medical Educa-
tion: Constant Concerns. JAMA 274(9):706–11, 1995. Cooper, Richard A., Tim Henderson, and Craig L. Dietrich. Roles of Nonphysician Clinicians as
Autonomous Providers of Patient Care. JAMA 280(9):795–802, 1998. Cromwell, Jerry. Barriers to Achieving a Cost-Effective Workforce Mix: Lessons from Anesthesiol-
ogy. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 24(6):1331–61, 1999.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
222 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Davis, David A., Mary Ann Thomson, Andrew D. Oxman, and Brian Haynes. Changing Physician Performance: A Systematic Review of the Effect of Continuing Medical Education Strategies. JAMA 274(9):700–5, 1995.
Enarson, Cam and Frederic D. Burg. An Overview of Reform Initiatives in Medical Education: 1906 Through 1992. JAMA 268(9):1141–3, 1992.
Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group. Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teach- ing the Practice of Medicine. JAMA 268(17):2420–5, 1992.
Federation of State Medical Boards. 1998. “Maintaining State-Based Medical Licensure and Disci- pline: A Blueprint for Uniform and Effective Regulation of the Medical Profession.” Online. Available at http://www.fsmb.org/uniform.htm [accessed Jan. 12, 2001].
Finocchio, L. J., C. M. Dower, N. T. Blick, C. M. Gragnola, and the Taskforce on Health Care Workforce Regulation. Strengthening Consumer Protection: Priorities for Health Care Work- force Regulation. San Francisco, CA: Pew Health Professions Commission, 1998.
Green, Michael L. Evidence-Based Medicine Training in Internal Medicine Residency Programs: A National Survey. J Gen Intern Med 15(3):129–33, 2000.
Griner, Paul F. and Deborah Danoff. Sustaining Change in Medical Education. JAMA 283(18):2429– 31, 2000.
Grumbach, Kevin and Janet Coffman. Physicians and Nonphysician Clinicians. Complements or Competitors? JAMA 280(9):825–6, 1998.
Hyams, Andrew L., David W. Shapiro, and Troyen A. Brennan. Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation: An Early Retrospective. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 21(2):289–313, 1996.
Institute of Medicine. Primary Care: America’s Health in a New Era. Molla S Donaldson, Karl D. Yordy, Kathleen N. Lohr, and Neal A. Vanselow, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996a.
———. Telemedicine: A Guide to Assessing Telecommunications for Health Care. Marilyn J. Field, ed. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996b.
———. To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donaldson, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000.
Janofsky, Michael. Finding Value in Intensive Care, From Afar. The New York Times. Health and Fitness, July 27, 1999.
Lorig, Kate R., David S. Sobel, Anita L. Steward, et al. Evidence Suggesting that a Chronic Disease Self-Management Program Can Improve Health Status While Reducing Hospitalization: A Randomized Trial. Medical Care 37(1):5–14, 1999.
Ludmerer, Kenneth. Time to Heal: American Medical Education from the Turn of the Century to the Era of Managed Care. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Marston, Robert Q. Medical Education in Transition. Princeton, NJ: The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1992.
Meyer, Gregg S., Allison Potter, and Nancy Gary. A National Survey to Define a New Core Curricu- lum to Prepare Physicians for Managed Care Practice. Academic Medicine 72(8):669–76, 1997.
Milbank Memorial Fund and Association of American Medical Colleges. The Education of Medical Students: Ten Stories of Curriculum Change. New York, NY: Milbank Memorial Fund, 2000.
Mohr, James C. American Medical Malpractice Litigation in Historical Perspective. JAMA 283(13): 1731–7, 2000.
O’Neil, E. H. and the Pew Health Professions Commission. Recreating Health Professional Practice for a New Century. San Francisco, CA: Pew Health Professions Commission, 1998.
Occupational Employment Statistics. 2000. “1998 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: Professional, Paraprofessional, and Technical Occupations.” Online. Available at http://stats.bls.gov/oes/national/oes_prof.htm [accessed Jan. 12, 2001].
Petersdorf, Robert G. and Kathleen S. Turner. Medical Education in the 1990s—and Beyond: A View from the United States. Academic Medicine 70(7, Suppl):S41–7, 1995.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PREPARING THE WORKFORCE 223
Pew Health Professions Commission. Contemporary Issues in Health Professions Education and Workforce Reform. San Francisco, CA: University of California, San Francisco – Center for Health Professionals, 1993.
Regan-Smith, Martha G. “Reform without Change”: Update, 1998. Academic Medicine 73(5):505– 7, 1998.
Rosenfeld, Brian A., T. Dorman, M. J. Breslow, et al. Intensive Care Unit Telemedicine: Alternate Paradigm for Providing Continuous Intensivist Care. Crit Care Med 28(12):3925–31, 2000.
Rosoff, Arnold J. Evidence-Based Medicine in the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 327–68, forthcoming April 2001.
Safriet, Barbara J. Impediments to Progress in Health Care Workforce Policy: License and Practice Laws. Inquiry 31(3):310–7, 1994.
Sage, William M. and Linda H. Aiken. Chapter 4: Regulating Interdisciplinary Practice. Regulation of Healthcare Professions. Timothy S. Jost. Chicago, IL: Health Administration Press, 1997.
Sage, William M., Kathleen E. Hastings, and Robert A. Berenson. Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health Care Quality Improvement. American Journal of Law and Medicine 20(1 & 2):1–28, 1994.
Thier, Samuel O. Academic Medicine’s Choices in an Era of Reform. Academic Medicine 69(3):185– 9, 1994.
Von Korff, Michael, Jessie Gruman, Judith Schaefer, Susan J. Curry, and Edward H. Wagner. Col- laborative Management of Chronic Illness. Ann Int Med 127(12):1097–102, 1997.
Weed, Lawrence L. Physicians of the Future. N EngI J Med 304(15):903–7, 1981. Weed, Lawrence L. and Lincoln Weed. Opening the Black Box of Clinical Judgment. Part I: A
Micro Perspective on Medical Decision-Making. eBMJ. November 13, 1999a. Online. Avail- able at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/319/7220/1279/DC2 [accessed Jan. 24, 2001].
———. Opening the Black Box of Clinical Judgment. Part II: Consumer Protection and the Patient’s Role. eBMJ. November 13, 1999b. Online. Available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/ 319/7220/1279/DC2 [accessed Jan. 24, 2001].
———. Opening the Black Box of Clinical Judgment. Part III: Medical Science and Education. eBMJ. November 13, 1999c. Online. Available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/319/ 7220/1279/DC2 [accessed Jan. 24, 2001].
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
225
Appendix A
Report of the Technical Panel on the State of Quality to the Quality of
Health Care in America Committee
Millions of Americans receive high-quality health care in the United States. Our capacity to provide the most sophisticated and effective care is unrivaled, and there is no evidence that any other system achieves better quality. Yet there is abundant evidence that serious and extensive quality problems exist throughout the U.S. health care system, resulting in harm to many Americans. Opportunities for improvement exist in all areas of clinical practice, across the continuum of care.
As a result of overuse, underuse, and misuse of health care services, our society pays a substantial price. The opportunity costs of poor quality include years of life lost or spent with major or minor impairments, pain and suffering, disability costs, and lost productivity. In many areas, especially those involving overuse and misuse of health care services, that improving quality is also likely to lower health care costs.
BACKGROUND
The Quality of Health Care in America (QHCA) Project, a part of the Insti- tute of Medicine’s Special IOM Initiative on Quality, was established in June 1998 and charged with developing a strategy to produce a significant improve- ment in quality over the coming decade.
The Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America, chaired by Will- iam C. Richardson, Ph.D., was responsible for this 2-year project.
Four advisory groups were established to assist the QHCA Committee in carrying out its charge. To provide a broad base of expertise, these advisory
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
226 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
groups consisted of both committee members and other distinguished leaders within the health care arena. Each advisory group was chaired by a member(s) of the QHCA Committee. One of these four groups, the Technical Advisory Panel on the State of Quality, chaired by Mark Chassin, M.D., was asked to review and synthesize literature on the state of quality in the health care industry. Other members of this panel included: Arnold Epstein, M.D., M.A.; Brent James, M.D.; James P. Logerfo, M.D.; Harold Luft, Ph.D.; R. Heather Palmer, M.B., B.Ch.; Kenneth B. Wells, M.D. This appendix presents the panel’s findings.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In developing its approach to this effort, the State of Quality Panel reviewed an earlier synthesis of the literature on quality that was carried out by investiga- tors at the RAND Corporation (Schuster et al., 1998). This earlier review covered papers that, for the most part, were published between 1993 and mid-1997. To extend that earlier work, the IOM commissioned an updated synthesis from the investigators at RAND. This update covered the literature included in the earlier review with the addition of (1) papers published between July 1997 and August 1998, and (2) selected publications identified by members of the State of Quality Panel. A draft of this commissioned paper was reviewed by the State of Quality Panel at its November 1998 meeting, and subsequently revised in accordance with the panel’s suggestions. The final version, provided at the end of this appen- dix, was completed in January 1999.
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
A synthesis of findings from the literature on the quality of health care provides abundant evidence of poor quality. There are examples of exemplary care, but the quality of care is not consistent. Thus, the average American cannot assume that he or she will receive the best care modern medicine has to offer.
There are many examples of overuse, underuse, and misuse of health care services. Overuse refers to the provision of health services for which the potential risks outweigh the potential benefits. Underuse indicates that a health care ser- vice for which the potential benefits outweigh the potential risks was not pro- vided. Misuse occurs when otherwise appropriate care is provided, but in a man- ner that does or could lead to avoidable complications.
Overuse of health care services is common. Examples include the following:
• performance of major surgery (e.g., hysterectomy, coronary artery bypass graft) without appropriate reasons;
• provision of antibiotics for the common cold and other viral upper respi- ratory tract infections for which they are ineffective;
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX A 227
• insertion of tubes in children’s eardrums in the absence of clinically ap- propriate indications; and
• performance of chiropractic spinal manipulation for certain back condi- tions for which there is no evidence of benefit.
Lack of insurance is a major contributing factor to underuse. Even with comprehensive insurance coverage, however, much of the population fails to receive recommended preventive services, and many patients do not receive the full range of clinically indicated services for acute and chronic conditions. Ex- amples include the following:
• Cardiac care In a study of 3,737 Medicare patients with a diagnosis of heart attack who were eligible for treatment with beta blockers, only 21 percent were found to have received beta blockers within 90 days of discharge. The adjusted mortality rate for patients with treatment was 43 percent below that of patients without treatment (Soumerai et al., 1997).
• Pneumococcal vaccine In 1989, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force recommended that people 65 years and older receive a one-time vaccination for pneumonia, and in 1996, this recommendation was modified to apply to all immunocompetent people aged 65 and older. Yet studies of the proportion of elderly who had been vaccinated produced estimates in the range of only 28 to 36 percent (CDC, 1995; Kottke et al., 1997).
• Acute care for pneumonia Two studies of hospitalized patients with pneu- monia found serious shortcomings in the proportion of patients receiving appro- priate components of care (Kahn et al., 1990; Meehan et al., 1997).
In recent years, increased attention has been focused on misuse. Studies of misuse are particularly challenging because actual or potential adverse events often go undocumented and unreported. But studies of preventable deaths and adverse drug events point to frequent and sometimes serious errors. For example, one study of over 4,000 hospitalized patients found that there were 19 prevent- able or potential adverse drug events per 1,000 patient days in intensive care units and 10 preventable or potential adverse drug events per 1,000 patient days in general care units (Cullen et al., 1997).
LEVEL OF HARM CAUSED BY POOR QUALITY
The existing literature does not allow a comprehensive estimate of the bur- den of harm due to poor quality. The literature on health care quality covers only a portion of the full range of quality concerns. For the most part, published studies focus on individuals who come into contact with the health care system. From a population perspective, the opportunity cost of poor quality must also
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
228 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
include the health benefits lost as a result of limited access due to financial or other barriers and poor patient adherence to therapeutic advice. These opportu- nity costs include years of life lost or spent with major or minor impairments, pain and suffering, disability costs, and lost productivity.
The literature also does not reveal how frequently the various types of qual- ity problems occur. For example, some kinds of overuse problems may have a greater likelihood of being documented than some types of misuse or underuse problems because the data necessary to document overuse are more likely to reside in administrative datasets or medical records.
From the available literature, it is also not possible to produce estimates of the costs of eliminating certain types of quality problems or the benefits likely to be derived. But there is no doubt that major improvements are possible in many clinical areas and health care settings, across the full continuum of care.
NEED FOR FURTHER WORK
The panel’s work represents a modest effort to review the state of health care quality. Specifically, the literature review was commissioned for this study lim- ited in the following ways:
• It focused only on publications in leading peer-reviewed journals. Other sources of information, such as the data and analyses of Medicare Peer Review Organizations (PROs) or analyses using malpractice data, were not included. The Medicare PRO program is a particularly promising source of information on quality because the PROs have been conducting quality review projects involv- ing physicians, hospitals, and health plans for over 10 years.
• The review did not focus in depth on specific clinical areas. An intensive review by clinical area would provide a more complete picture of the full spec- trum of quality problems and their frequency of occurrence.
• The review did not include the many publications based on reports of patient experience or satisfaction.
• The review did not include the body of studies reporting the impact of quality improvement activities. Thus it permits only anecdotal observations on the effectiveness of various of attempts to improve quality.
• Although the publications included in the review appeared in peer-re- viewed journals, the panel made no attempt to assess the scientific rigor of the methodologies employed.
Despite the above limitations, the panel believes that more in-depth reviews would not change its general conclusions that there are many areas in which quality of care can be improved. At the same time, additional research might be helpful for several reasons:
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX A 229
• A fuller understanding of quality problems would be useful in identifying specific areas in which those problems are greatest, as well as the most promising opportunities for improvement.
• Condition-specific analyses would provide better estimates of the poten- tial benefits foregone as a result of poor quality and the best strategies for im- provement.
• Additional work focused in particular clinical areas might also be helpful in raising awareness of practitioners and others who are skeptical about the existence of quality problems in their areas of expertise. Condition-specific analy- ses of quality that employ rigorous and valid measures could help build stronger support for quality improvement initiatives.
• Additional reviews of the literature should be conducted to identify fac- tors that contribute to poor quality and effective strategies for improvement. For example, review of the literature on quality substantiates that for certain complex procedures, higher volume leads to better outcomes. But we do not know whether this result is attributable to the greater skill of an experienced surgeon, the greater standardization of processes in high-volume settings, or some other factor. Abun- dant evidence exists that quality can be improved, and there is much to be learned from the review of various improvement strategies about the roles of patients, clinicians, and systems and the use of various types of incentives.
• Additional conceptual work, literature and data analysis, and develop- ment of measures are needed to improve capacities for quality-of-care assessment in certain key areas of medicine. An example is quality assessment in the areas of mental health, substance abuse, and neurologic disorders, and quality assessment for special populations, such as the frail elderly, poor children, and ethnic minorities.
REFERENCES
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 1995. Influenza and Pneurnococcal Vaccination Cover- age Levels among Persons Aged > 65 Years—United States, January–December 1995. Mor- bidity and Mortality Weekly Report 46:176–82.
Cullen D.J., et al. 1997. Preventable Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients: a Comparative Study of Intensive Care and General Care Units. Critical Care Medicine 8:1289–97.
Kahn, K.L., W.H. Rogers, L.V. Rubenstein, et al. 1990. Measuring Quality of Care with Explicit Process Criteria before and after Implementation of the DRG-Based Prospective Payment Sys- tem. Journal of the American Medical Association 264:1969–73.
Kottke, T.E., L.I. Solberg, ML. Brekke, et al. 1995, Aspirin in the Treatment of Acute Myocardial Infarction in Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries: Patterns of Use and Outcomes. Circulation 92:2841–7.
Meehan, T.P., M.J. Fine, H.M. Krumholz, et al. 1997. Quality of Care, Process and Outcomes in Elderly Patients with Pneumonia. Journal of the American Medical Association 278:2080–4
Schuster, Mark A., Elizabeth A. McGlynn, and Robert H. Brook. 1998. “How Good Is the Quality of Health Care in the United States?” 1998. 76 (4) Milbank Quarterly 517–563.
Soumerai, S.B., T.D. McLaughlin, E. Hertzmark, G. Thibault, and L. Goldman. 1997. Adverse Outcomes of Underuse of Beta-Blockers in Elderly Survivors of Acute Myocardial Infarction. Journal of the American Medical Association 277:115–21.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
231
The Quality of Health Care in the United States:
A Review of Articles Since 1987
Mark A. Schuster, M.D., Ph.D.;1 Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Ph.D.;2
Cung B. Pham, B.A.;3 Myles D. Spar, M.D.;4 and Robert H. Brook, M.D., Sc.D.5
Submitted January 1999
Quality of health care is on the national agenda. In September 1996, Presi- dent Clinton established the Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry, which has released its final report on how to define, measure, and promote quality of health care (Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry, 1998).
Much of the interest in quality of care has developed in response to the dramatic transformation of the health care system in recent years. New organiza- tional structures and reimbursement strategies have created incentives that may affect quality of care. Although some of the systems are likely to improve quality, concerns about potentially negative consequences have prompted a movement to assure that quality will not be sacrificed to control costs.
The concern about quality arises more from fear and anecdote than from facts; there is little systematic evidence about quality of care in the United States. The nation has no mandatory national system and few local systems to track the quality of care delivered to the American people. More information is available on the quality of airlines, restaurants, cars, and VCRs than on the quality of health care.
In 1997, the National Coalition on Health Care (NCHC) commissioned us to review the academic literature for articles that provide evidence of the quality of care in the United States (Schuster et al., 1998). The Institute of Medicine’s
Authors’ affiliations: 1Health Sciences, RAND; Department of Pediatrics, UCLA 2Health Sci- ences, RAND 3Department of Pediatrics, UCLA 4HSR&D Field Program, Sepulveda Veterans Administration Medical Center; and 5Health Sciences, RAND; Department of Medicine, UCLA.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
232 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Technical Advisory Panel on the State of Quality commissioned an update to include studies published between January 1997 and July 1998. In this report, we summarize our findings from both the original study and the update. In the absence of a national quality tracking system, we believe such a summary is the best way to provide an overview of the quality of care delivered in the United States. We provide examples to illustrate quality in diverse settings, for diverse conditions, and for diverse demographic groups, and to offer insight into the quality that exists nationwide.
DEFINING QUALITY
The Institute of Medicine has defined quality as “the degree to which health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge” (Lohr, 1990). Good quality means providing patients with appropriate services in a technically competent manner, with good communication, shared decision making, and cul- tural sensitivity.
Quality can be evaluated based on structure, process, and outcomes (Donabedian, 1980). Structural quality evaluates health system capacities, pro- cess quality assesses interactions between clinicians and patients, and outcomes offer evidence about changes in patients’ health status. The best process mea- sures are those for which there is research evidence that better processes lead to better outcomes. For example, controlling blood pressure reduces mortality from stroke and heart disease; performing routine mammography identifies breast can- cer at an earlier stage so that a cure is more likely; prescribing inhaled corticoster- oids reduces the likelihood and severity of asthma flare-ups. Similarly, the best outcome measures are those which are tied to processes of care, in other words, those over which the health care system has influence. For example, the survival rate for pancreatic cancer would not be a good outcome measure because we do not yet have treatments that meaningfully affect survival. By contrast, pain level in patients with pancreatic cancer is a reasonable outcome measure.
All three dimensions can provide valuable information for measuring qual- ity, but most of the quality-of-care literature focuses on measuring processes of care. Two measurement approaches dominate in the literature: (a) assessing appropriateness of care and (b) adherence to professional standards.
(a) An intervention or service (e.g., a lab test, procedure, medication) is considered appropriate if, for individuals with particular clinical and personal characteristics, its expected health benefits (e.g., increased life expectancy, pain relief, decreased anxiety, improved functional capacity) exceed its expected health risks (e.g., mortality, morbidity, anxiety anticipating the intervention, pain caused by the intervention, inaccurate diagnoses) by a wide enough margin to make the intervention or service worth doing (Brook et al., 1986). A subset of appropriate
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX A 233
care is necessary or crucial care. Care is considered necessary if there is a reason- able chance of a nontrivial benefit to the patient and if it would be improper not to provide the care—in other words, if it might be considered ethically unaccept- able not to provide this care (Kahan et al., 1994; Laouri et al., 1997).
(b) Another way to measure process quality is to determine whether care meets or adheres to professional standards. This assessment can be done by creating a list of quality indicators that describe a process of care that should occur for a particular type of patient or clinical circumstance and by evaluating whether patients’ care is consistent with the indicators. Quality indicators are based on standards of care, which are either found in the research literature and in statements of professional medical organizations or determined by an expert panel. Current performance can be compared against a physician’s or a plan’s own prior performance, against the performance of other physicians and plans, or with reference to a benchmark that establishes a goal. Indicators can cover a specific condition (e.g., children with sickle cell disease should be prescribed daily penicillin prophylaxis starting by no later than six months of age, until at least five years of age), or they can cover general aspects of care regardless of condition (e.g., patients prescribed a medication should be asked about medica- tion allergies).
HOW WE CONDUCTED OUR LITERATURE SEARCHES
This report draws on two searches of the scientific literature. The original NCHC report was based on a search for quality-of-care articles from the MEDLINE PLUS database (1993 to present) conducted in June 1997 and on relevant studies identified from the bibliographies of these articles. This database incorporates both the National Library of Medicine (NLM)’s MEDLINE data- base and the Health Planning and Administration’s HEALTH database. The NCHC report excluded articles published before 1987. In conducting our litera- ture search, we did not aim to be exhaustive, but rather to find examples that encompass a broad range of conditions and settings. (The inclusion criteria are described in the next section.)
For this update, we conducted a systematic search of articles published be- tween January 1, 1997, and July 31, 1998, using the NLM’s Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) to search for appropriate articles. This system is designed so that each MeSH term corresponds to a single concept appearing in the biomedical literature. Trained NLM indexers assign relevant MeSH terms to each database entry (usually about 10–12 per entry) (NLM, 1997a). The more than 17,000 MeSH terms are organized in a tree format, with multiple hierarchical layers of subheadings (NLM, 1997b)(Our search terms appear at the end of the report).
We conducted our search on August 24, 1998, and obtained 2,402 entries. Two authors reviewed each entry and its abstract to determine whether the study had potential for inclusion in our summary tables. Based on this initial screening,
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
234 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
we retrieved more than 200 articles. Each was reviewed by two authors to deter- mine whether the article was eligible for inclusion in this report. Some articles identified in the literature search were not available from the library by the completion date of the report.
Because we did not find any studies of misuse in our update search, we conducted a supplemental search using key words such as “adverse,” “event#,” and “preventable” that produced additional relevant articles. In addition, several studies were recommended by members of the Institute of Medicine’s Technical Advisory Panel on the State of Quality.
Criteria for Including Studies
We include only data from large or diverse U.S. populations—for example, the nation, an entire state, an entire city, or several hospitals. Studies from mul- tiple offices of a single managed care organization are also considered eligible, but we do not include data from studies that cover only a single hospital or clinic. Although such studies are informative and the cumulative weight of their find- ings compelling, they are especially subject to concerns that they provide evi- dence of isolated problems rather than insight into the quality of care delivered more broadly.
We include baseline data from quality improvement interventions as well as data for comparison/control/nonintervention groups from such interventions. We report baseline rather than follow-up data because the former are more likely to be representative of the quality of care provided around the country. Quality measurement conducted after a specific intervention shows the potential for in- terventions to improve quality, but until such interventions are commonplace, these post-intervention results are unlikely to represent what is taking place in most parts of the country. In addition, even the post-intervention results from such studies virtually always show room for further improvement.
We report results only from studies for which we can identify a standard of good quality and exclude those for which there is no standard. For example, some studies show variations in practices that may reflect variations in quality. How- ever, the studies cannot determine which hospital or clinic or group of physicians is providing better or worse quality care.
Types of Studies Not Included
There are several ways to measure quality of care that are not represented among the studies listed in our summary tables. Although these approaches are valuable components of the quality-of-care toolbox, they have not been used in a way that provides an overview of quality in the United States.
Studies often compare outcomes across multiple institutions to show which have better and which have worse outcomes, but the studies do not always present
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX A 235
a standard against which to compare outcomes. As a consequence, we do not know if the institution with the best outcomes is not nearly as good as it should be, or if the institution with the worst outcomes is nonetheless doing quite well. We only know how they compare with each other. If the outcomes are not risk-adjusted, it can be even more difficult to interpret them. This does not mean that studies cannot use outcomes to shed light on variations in quality. For ex- ample, prescription of beta blockers after a heart attack is a frequently used measure of quality. One study found that only about one in five eligible patients with a heart attack received beta blockers within 90 days of hospital discharge and also that those who received the treatment were much less likely to die than those who did not (Soumerai et al., 1997). Another study showed that poorer quality of care for children with asthma was associated with more hospitaliza- tions (Homer et al., 1996).
We found a similar limitation with using satisfaction ratings, which some consider a type of outcome. We do not report on levels of satisfaction because it is difficult to determine what is an acceptable level of satisfaction. There is generally no standard to which to compare the results, and we do not know whether the institution with the best satisfaction ratings could and should be doing much better.
Studies of access to care are not typically classified as quality-of-care stud- ies, but a person who is unable to obtain health care could hardly be said to be receiving good quality care. Access studies are beyond the scope of this report. However, we need to keep in mind that quality-of-care studies often measure quality only for people who have interacted with the health care system and so tend to overstate quality of care received by the population as a whole (Franks et al., 1993a, 1993b; Lurie et al., 1984, 1986; Sorlie et al., 1994).
In general, structural measures have not been consistently shown to relate either to process quality or outcomes, but there are exceptions. For example, volume of care provided (in other words, the number of procedures performed or the number of patients cared for) by an institution or clinician has often been found to relate to quality (Hannan et al., 1989, 1995; Kelly and Hellinger, 1986; Kitahata et al., 1996; Luft et al., 1979; Phibbs et al., 1996; Riley and Lubitz, 1985; Stone et al., 1992).
Another type of study does not provide direct evidence of quality of health care but is useful for identifying reasons for poor quality. Studies in which physi- cians report what they generally do or what they would do for a particular scenario can be informative, especially when physicians report practices that indicate poor quality. Although these studies do not describe care provided to individual patients, they can indicate a need for further education or other efforts to improve clinical practices.
Finally, we note that our search mechanism almost certainly missed articles with relevant data. Many studies not intended as quality-of-care studies provide
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
236 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
data that shed light on quality of care. Some of these were identified through our search, but it is likely that many others were not.
PROFILE OF QUALITY OF CARE IN THE UNITED STATES
We divided our review of quality in the United States into three categories: underuse (Table A-1), overuse (Table A-2), and misuse (Table A-3). Underuse indicates that a health care service for which the potential benefits outweigh the potential risks (i.e., necessary care) is not provided. Overuse indicates the re- verse—a health care service is provided when the potential risks outweigh the potential benefits (i.e., inappropriate care). Misuse occurs when otherwise appro- priate care is provided in a way that leads to or could lead to avoidable complica- tions. Examples of misuse include when an antibiotic appropriate to the patient’s infection is prescribed despite the fact that the patient has a documented allergy to the antibiotic, or when two drugs, each of which is appropriate for a patient’s condition, are prescribed despite contraindications to prescribing them together. An incorrect dose or dosing schedule is also considered misuse.
In each summary table, we list (and sometimes describe) the health care service for which quality is reported, the sample on which the report is based, the data source for the sample, the findings, and the reference. The tables report data from 73 articles.
Perhaps the most striking revelation to emerge from this review is the sur- prisingly small amount of systematic knowledge available on the quality of health care delivered in the United States. Even though health care is a huge industry that affects the lives of most Americans, we have only snapshots of information about particular conditions, types of surgery, and locations of care.
Gaps Between Ideal Care and Actual Care
The dominant finding of our review is that there are large gaps between the care people should receive and the care they do receive. This is true for preven- tive, acute, and chronic care, whether one goes for a checkup, a sore throat, or diabetic care. It is true whether one looks at overuse, underuse, or misuse. It is true in different types of health care facilities and for different types of health insurance. It is true for all age groups, from children to the elderly. And it is true whether one is looking at the whole country or a single city.
A few examples emphasize this point. An annual influenza vaccine is recom- mended as a preventive measure for all adults 65 years or older, a group at especially high risk for complications and death from influenza (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 1989, 1996). However, in 1993, only 52 percent of people in this age group in the United States received the vaccine; among people who had been to the doctor at least once that year, the percentage was slightly higher at 56 percent (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1995b).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX A 237
A major issue in acute care is the overuse of antibiotics, which has led to the development of strains of bacteria that are resistant to available antibiotics (Cen- ters for Disease Control and Prevention, 1994a). Antibiotics are almost never an appropriate treatment for people with a common cold because almost all colds are caused by a virus, for which antibiotics are not effective. However, in a study of Medicaid beneficiaries diagnosed with a cold in Kentucky during a one-year period from 1993 to 1994, 60 percent filled a prescription for an antibiotic (Mainous et al., 1996). In a national study of patient visits in 1992, 51 percent of adult patients and 44 percent of patients younger than 18 years old diagnosed with a common cold were treated with antibiotics (Gonzales et al., 1997; Nyquist et al., 1998).
Other types of medications are also not always used in the most appropriate manner. Among hospitalized elderly patients with depression who were dis- charged on antidepressant medication, 33 percent were on a dose below the recommended level (Wells et al., 1994b). In a study of 634 patients with depres- sion or depressive symptoms in Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles, 19 percent were treated with minor tranquilizers and no antidepressants (Wells et al., 1994a), despite the lack of evidence that tranquilizers work for depression and the risk that they will cause side effects or addiction (Depression Guideline Panel, 1993).
Patients with chronic conditions, for which certain routine examinations and tests are crucial in order to prevent complications, do not all get the care they need. Diabetes mellitus causes several complications that are less likely to occur with good care. One of these complications is an eye condition called diabetic retinopathy, which is the leading cause of new blindness among persons aged 20 to 74 in the United States. It is recommended that patients with insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus have an annual dilated eye examination (the clinician uses drops to enlarge the pupil to see behind it more easily) starting five years after diagnosis and that patients with non-insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus have the exam annually starting at the time of diagnosis. In a national study in 1989, only 49 percent of adults with either type of diabetes had undergone a dilated eye exami- nation in the past year (66 percent in the past two years), and 61 percent had undergone any type of eye exam in the past year (79 percent in the past two years). Twenty percent of diabetics had no eye exam in the past two years. Among diabetics who were at particularly high risk for vision loss because they already had retinopathy or because they had had diabetes for a long time, 61 percent and 57 percent, respectively, had a dilated examination in the past year (Brechner et al., 1993).
Sometimes surgery is performed on people who do not need it. A study of seven managed care organizations revealed that about 16 percent of hysterecto- mies performed during a one-year period from 1989 to 1990 were carried out for inappropriate reasons. An additional 25 percent were done for reasons of uncer- tain clinical benefit (Bernstein et al., 1993b). There are also examples of patients who need surgery but do not receive it. In a study of four hospitals, 43 percent of
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
238 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
patients with a positive exercise stress test demonstrating the need for coronary angiography had received it within 3 months; 56 percent had received it within 12 months (Laouri et al., 1997).
Adverse events are injuries caused by medical management of a disease rather than by the disease itself. A review in New York State in 1984 found that 1.0 percent of hospitalizations had an adverse event due to negligence (Brennan et al., 1991). A study of two Boston hospitals found an adjusted rate of prevent- able adverse drug events of 1.8 per 100 non-obstetric hospital admissions; 20 percent of these events were life-threatening (Bates et al., 1995).
Not all studies have found such poor quality. In a study of patients from 10 academic medical centers who had cataract surgery, 2 percent had the surgery for inappropriate reasons (Tobacman et al., 1996). In a study of patients in New York State who underwent coronary artery bypass graft surgery, 1.6 percent had sur- gery for inappropriate reasons (Leape et al., 1996). Nonetheless, the majority of studies described in the tables show much room for improving quality.
How Managed Care Affects Quality
Many have been quick to conclude that managed care is responsible for much of the poor quality care found in the U.S. health care system. However, studies published in the research literature neither clearly confirmed nor refuted this conclusion. Some studies find that managed care organizations provide better care than fee-for-service; some find that fee-for-service provides better care; still others find that the care is about the same (Miller and Luft, 1993, 1994). Results vary depending on the setting, the type of care assessed, and the methodology.
Examining how managed care affects quality is complicated by the research approach, which has generally lumped together managed care organizations with- out distinguishing them by type (e.g., group- and staff-model health maintenance organizations, independent practice associations, preferred provider organiza- tions, point-of-service plans) or by features (e.g., comprehensiveness of the ben- efits package, nonprofit versus for-profit status). For purposes of examining qual- ity, it would be more useful to assess the effect of specific characteristics of managed care organizations. For example, including immunizations in a benefits package may have a larger impact on immunization rates than whether the care is offered by a managed care organization or a fee-for-service provider.
A final important constraint on examining managed care’s affect on quality is the pace of change in this industry. Indeed, managed care is changing so rapidly (Landon et al., 1998) that most currently available studies are already out of date. We do not have a quality measurement system that enables timely assess- ment of the rapid changes occurring in the health care marketplace. Even the most widely used systems (e.g., the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set, described below) are far from universal and do not include both managed care and fee-for-service.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX A 239
Trends in Quality-of-Care Assessment
Because the Technical Advisory Panel specifically requested an update on studies published in 1997–1998, we examined these studies as a group. There are several notable findings. First, few of these later studies reported on overuse of care. By contrast, our original review produced many examples of overuse. These early studies were based principally on the UCLA/RAND appropriateness method (Brook, 1994), which was one of the key methods used for quality assessment in the late 1980s and early 1990s. We do not know why the number of appropriate- ness studies has declined in recent years. Perhaps the many studies published throughout the prior decade convinced researchers that a great deal of inappropri- ate care is being provided, and they saw no need to make the same point over and over again. Or perhaps researchers now prefer other types of research questions and methodologies.
Most of the recent studies provided examples of underuse. The findings are similar to those in the original review. For most types of care that researchers choose to study, we find that although many people do receive high quality care, many others do not. For example, a national study found that smoking status of adult patients was known by about two-thirds of primary care physicians after seeing their adult patients (Thorndike et al., 1998). Most preventive screening tests in the various studies were performed on more than half of the studied population but far from all. Blood pressure screening was particularly high (88 percent at last visit in one study [Kottke et al., 1997]), and in at least one study, cholesterol screening was high as well (84 percent) (Davis et al., 1998). Papani- colaou tests also appear to be provided to a large percentage of eligible women (Kottke et al., 1997). Quality continues to vary for acute care as well. The vast majority of hospitalized patients with pneumonia had timely oxygenation mea- surements (89 percent), but a lower percentage received blood cultures before antibiotics (57 percent) (Meehan et al., 1997).
Most of the studies of underuse were in chronic care. Mental health care falls below standards, with 70 percent of schizophrenics in one study receiving poor symptom management, and 79 percent of those experiencing medication side effects receiving poor management of them (Young et al., 1998). Cardiac care was the major area in which quality-of-care studies were conducted over the past decade, and the care patterns documented in the earlier studies continue among the recent ones. Excellent clinical research has shown repeatedly that certain medications should and should not be used for people with myocardial infarctions or unstable angina, yet several quality-of-care studies show that many patients are still not getting proper treatments (e.g., Berger et al., 1998; Krumholz et al., 1998; Simpson et al., 1997; Soumerai et al., 1998). As mentioned above, one study with particularly striking results found that only 21 percent of eligible patients with a heart attack received beta blockers within 90 days of hospital discharge (Soumerai et al., 1997). Although patients with cardiovascular dis-
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
240 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
ease—a subset of the population that unambiguously needs cholesterol testing— had very high rates of cholesterol testing (96 percent), a much lower percentage of these patients received comprehensive treatment when their tests were abnor- mal (McBride et al., 1998).
Other Sources of Information About Quality of Care
In this paper, we have described reports of quality that have appeared in the research literature. There are also some systems that measure quality in select sectors of the United States, most notably the National Committee for Quality Assurance’s (NCQA) Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS). HEDIS is a performance measurement tool designed to help purchasers and consumers evaluate managed care plans and to hold plans accountable for the quality of their services. In 1996, more than 330 plans—over half the U.S. plans representing more than three-quarters of all commercial managed care enroll- ees—were reporting HEDIS measures on their commercial enrollees. Average adherence rates for select indicators made publicly available by NCQA fell pri- marily in the 60 to 70 percent range, with the extremes at 38 percent for diabetic eye exams (past year) and 84 percent for initiation of prenatal care in the first trimester (Thompson et al., 1998). Thus, HEDIS’s findings are consistent with those of the studies we have reported. Whether assessing quality as part of a research study or as part of a marketplace tool, the evidence repeatedly shows that quality falls short of standards.
CONCLUSIONS
There is good reason to be proud of the U.S. health care system, and evi- dence from international studies does not show consistent superiority elsewhere in the world (Gray et al., 1990; Pilpel et al., 1992; McGlynn et al., 1994; Froehlich et al., 1997; Meijler et al., 1997; Tamblyn et al., 1997; Wong et al., 1997). The United States is responsible for many important advances in health care technol- ogy, and state-of-the-art care is available in both large and small communities throughout the country. However, just because outstanding care is available does not mean that it is always provided or that everyone has access to such care. Most people in the studies reported here did receive excellent care. What is notable is that many did not.
The quality of health care provided in the United States varies among hospi- tals, cities, and states. Whether the care is preventive, acute, or chronic, it fre- quently does not meet professional standards. We can do much better. The solu- tion is not simply a matter of spending more money on health care. A large part of our quality problem is the amount of inappropriate care provided in this country. Eliminating such nonbeneficial and potentially harmful care would generate large savings in human and financial costs. However, there are also many examples of
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX A 241
people who receive either too little or technically poor care; fixing these prob- lems may increase expenditures.
Some people might conclude that quality is good enough based on the evi- dence we have presented in this report—in other words, that the standards used in the various studies are too high. We would disagree with such a conclusion.
Clinicians and health plans that are motivated to improve the quality of care they deliver can use information on quality to focus their improvement efforts. For example, a group of all cardiothoracic surgeons practicing in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, using continuous quality improvement and other tech- niques to improve their practices, reduced their combined mortality rates by 24 percent (O’Connor et al., 1996). Government action also has the potential to spur improvement. In New York State (NYS), risk-adjusted mortality for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery decreased 41 percent from 4.17 percent in 1989 (when the NYS Department of Health began disseminating information regarding the outcomes of CABG surgery) to 2.45 percent in 1992 (Hannan et al., 1994). Between 1987 (before the NYS reporting program began) and 1992, unad- justed 30-day mortality rates following CABG declined by 33 percent in NYS Medicare patients, compared with a 19 percent decline nationwide, giving NYS the lowest statewide risk-adjusted CABG mortality rate in the country (Peterson et al., 1998).
If quality-of-care information is made available regularly and in an interpret- able form, consumers and large purchasers can use it to make informed decisions when choosing among clinicians and plans, which will, in turn, give providers an added incentive to improve quality. Policy makers can also use information about quality of care to determine the impact of public and private changes in the health care marketplace. We are currently experiencing a dramatic shift in the organiza- tion and financing of health services delivery in the United States. The private sector has been the driving force behind this transformation, but the public sector is beginning to use its market power as well. Incentives to move Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries into managed care represent one of many examples of public sector change.
Although quality assessment organizations, accreditation organizations, and government agencies are currently doing work to measure quality of care, most of this activity has begun during the past decade. The rapid development of the field is encouraging, but it is confined to organizations that cover specific sections of the country or restrict themselves to certain segments of the health care market- place. Their work, as well as the findings of individual studies such as those listed in Tables A-1 to A-3, provides some evidence of the situation throughout the country.
But changes in the U.S. health care delivery system are occurring more rapidly than evaluations of them can be performed. Much of the information concerning the relation between the organization of the health care system and quality of care is already outdated. At present, the United States has only a
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
242 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
patchwork of systems that measure quality, with little uniformity, breadth, or ability to produce rapid results. Furthermore, these systems do not yet assess most providers of health care in the United States. There is no system that pro- vides a comprehensive assessment of quality of care for the nation—including how quality varies by population subgroups (e.g., gender, age, race/ethnicity, income, region of country, size of community) and how quality is changing over time. Efforts such as HEDIS could eventually lead to development of a compre- hensive, national quality assessment system, but such a system may not develop rapidly unless there is an organized effort to ensure that it does.
The United States cannot afford to let this situation continue. A systematic strategy for routine monitoring and reporting on quality, as well as the informa- tion systems needed to support such activities, will be essential if we are to preserve the best of the American health care system while striving to improve the efficiency with which high-quality services are provided.
This strategy could be organized by the federal government, the private sector, or a public–private partnership. It could involve coordination among all three. But in any case, the strategy will need to cover the aspects of quality that patients, purchasers, and providers care about; it will need to collect data in a way that is manageable, reasonable, and affordable; and it will need to produce infor- mation in a format that is useful for making a variety of decisions.
The United States is capable of implementing a quality measurement system that can provide the multiple participants in the health care system with the information they need to ensure delivery of high-quality care. In light of the changes that the health care system has been experiencing, a strategy to measure and consequently to improve quality is needed now.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Partial funding was provided by the National Coalition on Health Care and the Institute of Medicine. We are indebted to Allison L. Diamant, M.D., M.S.P.H., Mark Chassin, M.D., M.P.P., M.P.H., Janet Corrigan, Ph.D., Molla Donaldson, D.Ph., Rachel Spilka, Ph.D., and Joseph H. Triebwasser, M.D., for comments on drafts of this paper. We are also indebted to James Tebow, Ph.D., Lauren N. Nguyen, M.P.H., Yuko Sano, A.B., Sinaroth Sor, M.D., and Myra Wong, A.B., for document and research assistance.
REFERENCES
Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry. 1998. Qual- ity First: Better Health Care for All Americans. Final Report to the President of the United States. Washington, D.C.
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research. 1994. Acute Low Back Problems in Adults. Clinical Practice Guideline #14.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX A 243
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research. 1996. Helping Smokers Quit, Guide for Primary Care Clinicians, Number 18, AHCPR Publication Number 96-0693.
American Academy of Pediatrics. 1988. Guidelines for Health Supervision II. Elk Grove Village, Ill. ———. 1994. 1994 Red Book. Report of the Committee on Infectious Diseases. Elk Grove Village,
Ill. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists Committee on Obstetric Practice. 1996. Pre-
vention of Early-Onset Group B Streptococcal Disease in Newborns. Washington, D.C.: Ameri- can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Technical Bulletin Number 170–July 1992. 1993. International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics 42:55-9.
Bates, D.W., D.J. Cullen, N. Laird, et al. 1995. Incidence of Adverse Drug Events and Potential Adverse Drug Events. Journal of the American Medical Association 274:29–34.
Berger, A.K., D.W. Edris, J.A. Breall, et al. 1998. Resource Use and Quality of Care for Medicare Patients with Acute Myocardial Infarction in Maryland and the District of Columbia: Analysis of Data from the Cooperative Cardiovascular Project. American Heart Journal 135: 349–56.
Bernstein, S.J., L.H. Hilborne, L.L. Leape, et al. 1993a. The Appropriateness of Use of Coronary Angiography in New York State. Journal of the American Medical Association 269:766–9.
Bernstein, S.J., E.A. McGlynn, A.L. Siu, et al. 1993b. The Appropriateness of Hysterectomy: A Comparison of Care in Seven Health Plans. Journal of the American Medical Association 269:2398–402.
Brechner, R.J., C.C. Cowie, L.J. Howie, W.H. Herman, J.C. Will, and M.I. Harris. 1993. Ophthalmic Examination among Adults with Diagnosed Diabetes Mellitus. Journal of the American Medi- cal Association 270:1714–8.
Brennan, T.A., L.L. Leape, N.M. Laird, et al. 1991. Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients. New England Journal of Medicine 324:370–6.
Bronstein, J.M., V.A. Johnson, C.A. Fargason, Jr. 1997. Impact of Care Setting on Cost and Quality under Medicaid. Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved 8: 202–16.
Brook, R.H., M.R. Chassin, and A. Fink. 1986. A Method for Detailed Assessment of the Appropri- ateness of Medical Technologies. International Journal Technology Assessment in Health Care 2:53–63.
Brook, R.H. 1994 The RAND/UCLA Appropriateness Method. In: McCormick KA, Moore SR, Siegel RA, eds. Clinical Practice Guideline Development: Methodology Perspectives, AHCPR Pub. No. 95-0009, Rockville, MD: U.S. Public Health Service 59–70.
Carey, T.S., K. Weis, and C. Homer. 1991. Prepaid versus Traditional Medicaid Plans: Lack of Effect on Pregnancy Outcomes and Prenatal Care. Health Services Research 26(2):165–81.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 1993a. Mammography and Clinical Breast Examina- tions among Women Aged 50 Years and Older-Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 1992. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 42:737–41.
———. 1993b. Physician and Other Health-Care Professional Counseling of Smokers to Quit— United States, 1991. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 42:854–7.
———. 1993c. State-Specific Changes in Cholesterol Screening-Behavioural Risk Factor Surveil- lance System, 1988–91. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports 42:663–7.
———. 1994a. Addressing Emerging Infectious Disease Threats: A Prevention Strategy for the United States. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 43(RR-5):1–18.
———. 1994b. Adults Taking Action to Control Their Blood Pressure-United States, 1990. Morbid- ity and Mortality Weekly Report 43:509–17.
———. 1995a. Recommended Childhood Immunization Schedule-United States, 1995. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 44(RR-5):1–9.
———. 1995b. Influenza and Pneumococcal Vaccination Coverage Levels among Persons Aged > 65 Years—United States, 1973–1993. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 44:506–15.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
244 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
———. 1996. Trends in Cancer Screening–United States, 1987 and 1992. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 45:57–61.
———. 1997. National, State, and Urban Area Vaccination Coverage Levels among Children Aged 19–35 Months–United States, January–December 1995. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Re- port 46:176–82.
Chassin, M.R., J. Kosecoff, R.E. Park, et al. 1987. Does Inappropriate Use Explain Geographic Variations in the Use of Health Care Services? A Study of Three Procedures. Journal of the American Medical Association 258:2533–7.
Cullen, D.J., B.J. Sweitzer, D.W. Bates, E. Burdick, A. Edmondson, L.L. Leape. 1997. Preventable Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients: A Comparative Study of Intensive Care and General Care Units. Critical Care Medicine. 25:1289–97.
Davis, K.C., M.E. Cogswell, S. Lee, R. Rothenberg, J.P. Koplan. 1998. Lipid Screening in a Man- aged Care Population. Public Health Services 113:346–50.
Depression Guideline Panel. 1993. Depression in Primary Care. Volume 2: Treatment of Major Depression. Clinical Practice Guideline Number 5. Pub. no. (PHS) 93-0551. Rockville, Md.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Donabedian, A. 1980. Explorations in Quality Assessment and Monitoring, Volume 1: The Defini- tion of Quality and Approaches to Its Assessment. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Health Administration Press.
Dowell, S.F., and B. Schwartz. 1997. Resistant Pneumococci: Protecting Patients through Judicious Use of Antibiotics. American Family Physician 55:1647–54.
Draper, D., K.L. Kahn, E.J. Reinisch, et al. 1990. Studying the Effects of the DRG-Based Prospec- tive Payment System on Quality of Care. Design, Sampling, and Fieldwork. Journal of the American Medical Association 264:1956–61.
Dubois, R.W., and R.H. Brook. 1988. Preventable Deaths: Who, How Often, and Why? Annals of Internal Medicine 109:582–9.
Ellerbeck, E.F., S.F. Jencks, M.J. Radford, et al. 1995. Quality of Care for Medicare Patients with Acute Myocardial Infarction: A Four-State Pilot Study from the Cooperative Cardiovascular Project. Journal of the American Medical Association 273:1509–14.
Franks, P., C.M. Clancy, M.R. Gold. 1993a. Health Insurance and Mortality: Evidence from a Na- tional Cohort. Journal of the American Medical Association 270:737–41.
Franks, P., C.M. Clancy, M.R. Gold, P.A. Nutting. 1993b. Health Insurance and Subjective Health Status: Data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey. American Journal of Public Health 83:1295–9.
Froehlich, F., I. Pache, B. Bumand, et al. 1997. Underutilization of Upper Gastrointestinal Endos- copy. Gastroenterology 112:690–7.
Gonzales, R., J.F. Steiner, and M.A. Sande. 1997. Antibiotic Prescribing for Adults With Colds, Upper Respiratory Tract Infections, and Bronchitis by Ambulatory Care Physicians. Journal of the American Medical Association 278:901–4.
Gray, D., J.R. Hampton, S.J. Bernstein, J. Kosecoff, and R.H. Brook. 1990. Audit of Coronary Angiography and Bypass Surgery. Lancet 335:1317–20.
Greenfield, S., D.M. Blanco, R.M. Elashoff, and P.A. Ganz. 1987. Patterns of Care Related to Age of Breast Cancer Patients. Journal of the American Medical Association 257:2766–70.
Greenspan, A.M., H.R. Kay, B.C. Berger, R.M. Greenberg, A.J. Greenspon, and M.S. Gaughan. 1988. Incidence of Unwarranted Implantation of Permanent Cardiac Pacemakers in a Large Medical Population. New England Journal of Medicine 318:158–63.
Guadagnoli, E., C.L. Shapiro, J.C. Weeks, et al. 1998. The Quality of Care for Treatment of Early Stage Breast Carcinoma: Is It Consistent with National Guidelines? Cancer 83:302–9.
Hand, R., S. Sener, J. Imperato, et al. 1991. Hospital Variables Associated With Quality of Care for Breast Cancer Patients. Journal of the American Medical Association 266:3429–32.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX A 245
Hannan, E.L. H. Kilburn, M. Racz, E. Shields, and M.R. Chassin. 1994. Improving the Outcomes of Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery in New York State. Journal of the American Medical Asso- ciation 271:761–6.
Hannan, E.L., J.F. O’Donnell, H. Kilburn, Jr., H.R. Bernard, A. Yazici. 1989. Investigation of the Relationship between Volume and Mortality for Surgical Procedures Performed in New York State Hospitals. Journal of the American Medical Association 262:503–10.
Hannan, E.L., A.L. Siu, D. Kumar, H. Kilburn, Jr., M.R. Chassin. 1995. The Decline in Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery Mortality in New York State: The Role of Surgeon Volume. Journal of the American Medical Association 273:209–13.
Hilborne, L.H., L.L. Leape, S.J. Bernstein, et al. 1993. The Appropriateness of Use of Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty in New York State. Journal of the American Medical Association. 269:761–5.
Hillner, B.E., M.K. McDonald, L. Penberthy, et al. 1997. Measuring Standards of Care for Early Breast Cancer in an Insured Population. Journal of Clinical Oncology 15:1401–8.
Homer, C.J., P. Szilagyi, L. Rodewald, et al. 1996. Does Quality of Care Affect Rates of Hospitaliza- tion for Childhood Asthma? Pediatrics 98:18–23.
Joint National Committee on Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure. 1993. The Fifth Report of the Joint National Committee on Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure (JNC V). Archives of Internal Medicine 153:154–83.
Kahan, J.P., S.J. Bernstein, L.L. Leape, et al. 1994. Measuring the Necessity of Medical Procedures. Medical Care 32:357–65.
Kahn, K.L., W.H. Rogers, L.V. Rubenstein, et al. 1990. Measuring Quality of Care with Explicit Process Criteria before and after Implementation of the DRG-Based Prospective Payment Sys- tem. Journal of the American Medical Association 264:1969–73.
Kelly, J.V., F.J. Hellinger. 1986. Physician and Hospital Factors Associated with Mortality of Surgi- cal Patients. Medical Care 24:785–800.
Kitahata, M.M., T.D. Koepsell, R.A. Deyo, C.L. Maxwell, W.T. Dodge, and E.H. Wagner. 1996. Physicians’ Experience with the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome as a Factor in Pa- tients’ Survival. New England Journal of Medicine 334:701–6.
Kleinman, L.C., J. Kosecoff, R.W. Dubois, and R.H. Brook. 1994. The Medical Appropriateness of Tympanostomy Tubes Proposed for Children Younger than 16 Years in the United States. Journal of the American Medical Association 271:1250–5.
Klinkman, M.S., D.W. Gorenflo, and T.S. Ritsema. 1997. The Effects of Insurance Coverage on the Quality of Prenatal Care. Archives of Family Medicine 6:557–66.
Kogan, M.D., G.R. Alexander, M. Kotelchuck, D.A. Nagey, and B.W. Jack. 1994. Comparing Moth- ers’ Reports on the Content of Prenatal Care Received with Recommended National Guidelines for Care. Public Health Reports 109:637–46.
Kottke, T.E., L.I. Solberg, M.L. Brekke, et al. 1997. Delivery Rates for Preventive Services in 44 Midwestern Clinics. Mayo Clinic Proceedings 72: 515–23.
Krumholz, H.M., M.J. Radford, E.F. Ellerbeck, et al. 1995. Aspirin in the Treatment of Acute Myocardial Infarction in Elderly Medicare Beneficiaries: Patterns of Use and Outcomes. Cir- culation 92:2841–7.
———. 1996. Aspirin for Secondary Prevention after Acute Myocardial Infarction in the Elderly: Prescribed Use and Outcomes. Annals of Internal Medicine 124:292–8.
Krumholz, H.M., D.M. Philbin, Y. Wang, et al. 1998. Trends in the Quality of Care with Medicare Beneficiaries Admitted to the Hospital with Unstable Angina. Journal of the American College of Cardiology 31: 957–63.
Landon, B.E., I.B. Wilson, and P.D. Cleary. 1998. A Conceptual Model of the Effects of Health Care Organizations on the Quality of Medical Care. Journal of the American Medical Association 279:1377–82.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
246 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Laouri, M., R.L. Kravitz, S.J. Bernstein, et al. 1997. Underuse of Coronary Angiography: Applica- tion of a Clinical Method. International Journal for Quality in Health Care 9:5–22.
Lazovich D., E. White, D.B. Thomas, R.E. Moe. 1991. Underutilization of Breast-Conserving Sur- gery and Radiation Therapy Among Women With Stage I or II Breast Cancer. Journal of the American Medical Association 266:3433–8.
Leape, L.L., T.A. Brennan, N. Laird, et al., 1991. The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II. New England Journal of Medicine 324:377–84.
Leape, L.L., L.H. Hilbome, R.E. Park, et al. 1993. The Appropriateness of Use of Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery in New York State. Journal of the American Medical Association 269:753–60.
Leape, L.L., L.L. Hilbome, J.S. Schwartz, et al. 1996. The Appropriateness of Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery in Academic Medical Centers. Annals of Internal Medicine 125:8–18.
Legorreta. A.P., J. Christian-Herman, R.D. O’Connor, et al. 1998. Compliance with National Asthma Management Guidelines and Specialty Care: A Health Maintenance Organization Experience. Archives of Internal Medicine 158: 457–64.
Lieu, T.A., J.C. Mohle-Boetani, G.T. Ray, L.M. Ackerson, D.L. Walton. 1998. Neonatal Group B Streptococcal Infection in a Managed Care Population. Obstetrics and Gynecology 92: 21–7.
Liu, Z., K.L. Shilkret, L. Finelli. 1998. Initial Drug Regimens for the Treatment of Tuberculosis: Evaluation of Physician Prescribing Practices in New Jersey. Chest 113:1446-51.
Lohr, K.N. Ed. 1990. Medicare: A Strategy for Quality Assurance. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press.
Luft, H.S., J.P. Bunker, A.C. Enthoven. 1979. Should Operations Be Regionalized? The Empirical Relation between Surgical Volume and Mortality. New England Journal of Medicine 301:1364– 9.
Lurie, N., N.B. Ward, M.F. Shapiro, R.H. Brook. 1984. Termination of Medical Benefits: Does it Affect Health? New England Journal of Medicine 311:480–4.
Lurie, N., N.B. Ward, M.F. Shapiro, et al. 1986. Termination of Medical Benefits: A Follow-Up Study One Year Later. New England Journal of Medicine 314:1266–8.
Mainous, A.G., W.J.-Hueston, and J.R. Clark. 1996. Antibiotics and Upper Respiratory Infection: Do Some Folks Think There Is a Cure for the Common Cold? Journal of Family Practice 42:357–61.
McBride, P.M., H.G. Schrott, M.B. Plane, G. Underbakke, R.L. Brown. 1998. Primary Care Practice Adherence to National Cholesterol Education Program Guidelines for Patients with Coronary Heart Disease. Archives of Internal Medicine 158:1238–44.
McCaig, L.F., and J.M. Hughes. 1995. Trends in Antimicrobial Drug Prescribing among Office- Based Physicians in the United States. Journal of the American Medical Association 273:214– 9.
McGlynn, E.A., C.D. Naylor, G.M. Anderson, et al. 1994. Comparison of the Appropriateness of Coronary Angiography and Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery between Canada and New York State. Journal of the American Medical Association 272:934–40.
Meehan, T.P., J. Hennen, M.J. Radford, M.K. Petrillo, P. Elstein, and D.J. Ballard. 1995. Process and Outcome of Care for Acute Myocardial Infarction among Medicare Beneficiaries in Connecti- cut: A Quality Improvement Demonstration Project. Annals of Internal Medicine 122:928–36.
Meehan, T.P., M.J. Fine, H.M. Krumholz, et al. 1997. Quality of Care, Process and Outcomes in Elderly Patients with Pneumonia. Journal of the American Medical Association 278:2080–4
Meijler, A.P., H. Rigter, S.J. Bernstein, et al. 1997. The Appropriateness of Intention to Treat Deci- sions for Invasive Therapy in Coronary Artery Disease in the Netherlands. Heart 77:219–24.
Miller, R.H., and H.S. Luft. 1993. Managed Care: Past Evidence and Potential Trends. Frontiers of Health Services Management 9:3–37.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX A 247
———. 1994. Managed Care Plan Performance since 1980: A Literature Analysis. Journal of the American Medical Association 271:1512–9.
Murata, P.J., E.A. McGlynn, A.L. Siu, et al. 1994. Quality Measures for Prenatal Care: A Compari- son of Care in Six Health Care Plans. Archives of Family Medicine 3:41–9.
NIH Consensus Conference Treatment of Early-Stage Breast Cancer. 1991. Journal of the American Medical Association 265:391–5.
National Library of Medicine. 1997a. Medical subject headings, Annotated Alphabetic List, 1998. Bethesda, Md.: U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, National Library of Medicine; Washington, D.C.
———. 1997b. Medical Subject Headings, Tree Structures, 1998. Bethesda, Md.: U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, National Library of Medicine; Washington, D.C.
Nyquist, A., R. Gonzales, J.F. Steiner, and M.A. Sande. 1998. Antibiotic Prescribing for Children With Colds, Upper Respiratory Tract Infections, and Bronchitis. Journal of the American Medi- cal Association 279:875–7.
O’Connor, G.T., S.K. Plume, E.M. Olmstead, et al. 1996. A Regional Intervention to Improve the Hospital Mortality Associated With Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery. Journal of the American Medical Association 275:841–6.
Payne, S.M., C. Donahue, P. Rappo, et al. 1995. Variations in Pediatric Pneumonia and Bronchitis/ Asthma Admission Rates. Is Appropriateness a Factor? Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 149:162–9.
Peterson, E.D., E.R. DeLong, J.G. Jollis, L.H. Muhlbaier, and D.B. Mark. 1998. The Effects of New York’s Bypass Surgery Provider Profiling on Access to Care and Patient Outcomes in the Elderly. Journal of the American College of Cardiology 32:993–9.
Phibbs, C.S., J.M. Bronstein, E. Buxton, and R.H. Phibbs. 1996. The Effects of Patient Volume and Level of Care at the Hospital of Birth on Neonatal Mortality. Journal of the American Medical Association 276:1054–9.
Pilpel, D., G.M. Fraser, J. Kosecoff, S. Weitzman, and R.H. Brook. 1992. Regional Differences in Appropriateness of Cholecystectomy in a Prepaid Health Insurance System. Public Health Review 20:61–74.
Retchin, S.M., and J. Preston. 1991. Effects of Cost Containment on the Care of Elderly Diabetics. Archives of Internal Medicine 151:2244–8.
Regier, D.A., W.E. Narrow, D.S. Rae, R.W. Maderscheid, B.Z. Locke, and F.K. Goodwin. 1993. The de facto US Mental and Addictive Disorders Service System. Archives of General Psychiatry 50:85–94.
Riley, G., J. Lubitz. 1985. Outcomes of Surgery among the Medicare Aged: Surgical Volume and Mortality. Health Care Financing Review 7:37–47.
Schucker, B., J.T. Wittes, N.C. Santanello, et al. 1991. Change in Cholesterol Awareness and Action. Archives of Internal Medicine 151:666–73.
Schuster, M.A., E.A. McGlynn, R.H. Brook. 1998. How Good Is the Quality of Health Care in the United States? Milbank Quarterly 76:517–63.
Shekelle, P.G., I. Coulter, E.L. Hurwitz, et al. 1998. Congruence Between Decisions to Initiate Chiropractic Spinal Manipulation for Low Back Pain and Appropriateness Criteria in North America. Annals of Internal Medicine 129:9–17.
Simon, G.E., and M. VonKorff. 1995. Recognition, Management, and Outcomes of Depression in Primary Care. Archives of Family Medicine 4:99–105.
Simpson, R.J. Jr., R.R. Weiser. S. Naylor, C.A. Sueta, A.K. Metts. 1997. Improving Care for Un- stable Angina Patients in a Multiple Hospital Project Sponsored by a Federally Designated Quality Improvement Organization. American Journal of Cardiology. 80(8B):80H–4H.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
248 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Sorlie, P.D., N.J. Johnson, E. Backlund, D.D. Bradham. 1994. Mortality in the Uninsured Compared with that in Persons with Public and Private Insurance. Archives of Internal Medicine 154:2409– 16.
Soumerai, S.B., T.D. McLaughlin, E. Hertzmark, G. Thibault, and L. Goldman. 1997. Adverse Outcomes of Underuse of Beta-Blockers in Elderly Survivors of Acute Myocardial Infarction. Journal of the American Medical Association 277:115–21.
Soumerai, S.B., T.J. McLauglin, J.H. Gurwitz, et al. 1998. Effect of Local Medical Opinion Leaders on Quality of Care for Acute Myocardial Infarction: A Randomized Controlled Trial. Journal of the American Medical Association 279:1358–63.
Starfield, B., N.R. Powe, J.R. Weiner, et al. 1994. Costs vs Quality in Different Types of Primary Care Settings. Journal of the American Medical Association 272:1903–8.
Stone, V., G. Seage, T. Hertz, and A. Epstein. 1992. The Relation between Hospital Experience and Mortality for Patients with AIDS. Journal of the American Medical Association 268:2655–61.
Stoner, T.J., B. Dowd, W. P.Carr, G. Maldonado, T.R. Church, J. Mandel. 1998. Do Vouchers Improve Breast Cancer Screening Rates? Results from a Randomized Trial. Health Services Research. 33:11–28.
Summary of the Second Report of the National Cholesterol Education Program Expert Panel on Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Cholesterol in Adults (Adult Treatment Panel II). 1993. Journal of the American Medical Association 626: 3015–23.
Tamblyn, R., L. Berkson, W.D. Dauphinee, et al. 1997. Unnecessary Prescribing of NSAIDs and the Management of NSAID-Related Gastropathy in Medical Practice. Annals of Internal Medicine 127:429–38.
Thamer, M., N.F. Ray, S.C. Henderson, et al. 1998. Influence of the NIH Consensus Conference on Helicobacter Pylori on Physician Prescribing Among a Medicaid Population. Medical Care 36:646–60.
Thompson, J.W., J. Bost, F. Ahmed, C.E. Ingalls and C. Sennett. 1998. The NCQA’s Quality Com- pass: Evaluating Managed Care in the United States. Health Affairs 17:152–8.
Thorndike, AX, N.A. Rigotti, R.S. Stafford, and D.E. Singer. 1998. National Patterns in the Treat- ment of Smokers by Physicians. Journal of the American Medical Association 279:604–8.
Tobacman, J.K., P. Lee, B. Zimmerman, H. Kolder, L. Hilborne, and R.H. Brook. 1996. Assessment of Appropriateness of Cataract Surgery at Ten Academic Medical Centers in 1990. Ophthal- mology 103:207–15.
Udvarhelyi, I.S., K. Jennison, R.S. Phillips, and A.M. Epstein. 1991. Comparison of the Quality of Ambulatory Care for Fee-for-Service and Prepaid Patients. Annals of Internal Medicine 115:394–400.
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force. 1989. Guide to Clinical Preventive Services. Baltimore: Will- iam & Wilkins.
———. 1996. Guide to Clinical Preventive Services. Baltimore: William & Wilkins. Weiner, J.P., S.T. Parente, D.W. Garnick, J. Fowles, A.G. Lawthers, and H. Palmer. 1995. Variation
in Office-Based Quality: A Claims-Based Profile of Care Provided to Medicare Patients with Diabetes. Journal of the American Medical Association 273:1503–8.
Wells, K.B., R.D. Hays, M.A. Burnam, et al. 1989. Detection of Depressive Disorder for Patients Receiving Prepaid or Fee-for-Service Care: Results from the Medical Outcomes Study. Journal of the American Medical Association 262:3298–302.
Wells, K., W. Katon, B. Rogers, and P. Camp. 1994a. Use of Minor Tranquilizers and Antidepres- sant Medications by Depressed Outpatients: Results from the Medical Outcomes Study. Ameri- can Journal of Psychiatry 151:694–700.
Wells, K.B., G. Norquist, B. Benjamin, W. Rogers, K. Kahn, and R. Brook. 1994b. Quality of Antidepressant Medications Prescribed at Discharge to Depressed Elderly Patients in General Medical Hospitals before and after Prospective Payment System. General Hospital Psychiatry 16:4–15.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX A 249
Wells, K.B., W.H. Rogers, L.M. Davis, et al. 1993. Quality of Care for Hospitalized Depressed Elderly Patients before and after Implementation of the Medicare Prospective Payment System. American Journal of Psychiatry 150:1799–805.
Winslow, C.M., J.B. Kosecoff, M. Chassin, D.E. Kanouse, and R.H. Brook. 1988. The Appropriate- ness of Performing Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery. Journal of the American Medical Asso- ciation 260:505–9.
Wong, J.H., J.M. Findlay, and M.E. Suarez-Almazor. 1997. Regional Performance of Carotid Endar- terectomy: Appropriateness, Outcomes, and Risk Factors for Complications. Stroke 28:891–8.
Young, A.S., G. Sullivan, M.A. Bumam, R.H. Brook. 1998. Measuring the Quality of Outpatient Treatment for Schizophrenia. Archives of General Psychiatry 55:611–7.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
250 T
A B
L E
A -1
E xa
m pl
es o
f Q
ua li
ty o
f H
ea lt
h C
ar e
in th
e U
ni te
d S
ta te
s— U
nd er
us e:
D id
P at
ie nt
s R
ec ei
ve th
e C
ar e
T he
y S
ho ul
d H
av e
R ec
ei ve
d?
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
P R
E V
E N
T IV
E C
A R
E Im
m u
n iz
at io
n s
C hi
ld ho
od V
ac ci
ne s
T hr
ee P
ol io
; fo
ur D
ip ht
he ri
a, T
et an
us ,
C hi
ld re
n 19
–3 5
m on
th s
ol d
N at
io na
l Im
m un
iz at
io n
74 %
r ec
ei ve
d al
l th
e C
D C
, 19
97 P
er tu
ss is
; on
e M
ea sl
es ,
M um
ps ,
R ub
el la
; in
3 1,
99 7
ho us
eh ol
ds f
ro m
S ur
ve y
(N IS
), 1
99 5.
va cc
in es
. (I
f th
re e
do se
s of
an d
th re
e H
ae m
op hi
lu s
in fl
ue nz
ae t
yp e
b a
na ti
on al
ly r
ep re
se nt
at iv
e H
ib a
re n
ot i
nc lu
de d,
t he
(H ib
) by
1 8
m on
th s
ol d.
( T
hr ee
t o
fo ur
sa m
pl e
of t
he U
ni te
d S
ta te
s pe
rc en
ta ge
i s
76 %
.) do
se s
of H
ib a
re r
ec om
m en
de d,
d ep
en di
ng (U
.S .)
. on
f or
m ul
at io
n; t
hr ee
H ep
at it
is B
v ir
us va
cc in
es [
H B
V ]
ar e
al so
r ec
om m
en de
d bu
t w
er e
no t
in cl
ud ed
i n
th is
p ar
ti cu
la r
st ud
y. )
(A m
er ic
an A
ca de
m y
of P
ed ia
tr ic
s [A
A P
], 19
94 ;
C en
te rs
f or
D is
ea se
C on
tr ol
a nd
P re
ve nt
io n
[C D
C ],
1 99
5a ).
In fl
ue nz
a V
ac c i
ne A
nn ua
l va
c c in
a t io
n of
a ll
p e o
pl e
≥ 6
5 A
pp ro
xi m
a t e l
y 8,
00 0
a d ul
ts N
a t io
na l
H e a
lt h
In te
rv ie
w 52
% r
e c e i
ve d
a n nu
a l C
D C
, 19
95 b
ye a r
s ol
d is
r e c
om m
en de
d (U
.S .
P re
ve nt
iv e
≥ 65
y e a
rs o
ld f
ro m
a S
ur ve
y (N
H IS
), 1
99 3.
in fl
ue nz
a va
c c in
e . S
e r vi
c e s
T a s
k F
or c e
[ U
S P
S T
F ],
1 98
9) .
sa m
pl e
of p
e o pl
e T
hi s
re c o
m m
en da
ti on
h a s
s in
c e b
e e n
re pr
e s e n
ta ti
ve o
f th
e U
.S .
re it
e r a t
e d (
U S
P S
T F
,1 99
6) .
c i vi
li a n
, no
ni ns
ti tu
ti on
a l iz
e d po
pu la
ti on
.
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
F ro
m a
s am
pl e
of 7
,9 97
M a i
le d
su rv
e y s
w it
h ph
on e
72 %
o f
pe op
le ≥
6 5
ye a r
s K
ot tk
e ra
nd om
ly s
e l e c
te d
pa ti
e n ts
fo ll
ow -u
p of
p a t
ie nt
s w
ho ha
d a n
i nf
lu e n
z a v
a c c i
ne i
n e t
a l .,
19 97
≥ 20
y e a
rs o
ld w
ho h
ad vi
si te
d on
e of
4 4
c l in
ic s
th e
pr io
r ye
a r .
vi si
te d
a c l
in ic
d ur
in g
th e
fr om
A ug
us t
1, t
o
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
251 st
ud y
pe ri
od ,
6, 83
0 (8
5% )
S ep
te m
be r
9, 1
99 4,
i n
th e
co m
pl et
ed s
ur ve
ys .
M in
ne ap
ol is
-S t.
P au
l m
et ro
po li
ta n
ar ea
w it
h co
nt ra
ct s
w it
h on
e of
t w
o m
an ag
ed c
ar e
co m
pa ni
es .
P ne
um oc
oc ca
l V
ac ci
ne O
ne -t
im e
va cc
in at
io n
fo r
al l
pe op
le ≥
6 5
A pp
ro xi
m at
el y
8, 00
0 ad
ul ts
N H
IS ,
19 93
28 %
r ec
ei ve
d C
D C
, 19
95 b
ye ar
s ol
d is
r ec
om m
en de
d (U
S P
S T
F ,
≥ 65
y ea
rs o
ld f
ro m
a pn
eu m
oc oc
ca l
va cc
in e.
19 89
). I
n 19
96 ,
th e
re co
m m
en da
ti on
w as
sa m
pl e
of p
eo pl
e m
od if
ie d
to s
pe ci
fy o
ne -t
im e
va cc
in at
io n
re pr
es en
ta ti
ve o
f th
e U
.S .
fo r
al l
im m
un oc
om pe
te nt
i nd
iv id
ua ls
≥ 6
5 ci
vi li
an ,
no ni
ns ti
tu ti
on al
iz ed
ye ar
s ol
d (U
S P
S T
F ,
19 96
). po
pu la
ti on
.
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
F ro
m a
s am
pl e
of 7
,9 97
M ai
le d
su rv
ey s
w it
h ph
on e
36 %
o f
pe op
le ≥
6 5
ye ar
s K
ot tk
e ra
nd om
ly s
el ec
te d
pa ti
en ts
fo ll
ow -u
p of
p at
ie nt
s w
ho ol
d ha
d ev
er h
ad a
et al
., 19
97 ≥
20 y
ea rs
o ld
w ho
h ad
vi si
te d
on e
of 4
4 cl
in ic
s pn
eu m
oc oc
ca l
va cc
in e.
vi si
te d
a cl
in ic
d ur
in g
th e
fr om
A ug
us t
1, t
o st
ud y
pe ri
od ,
6, 83
0 (8
5% )
S ep
te m
be r
9, 1
99 4,
i n
th e
co m
pl et
ed s
ur ve
ys .
M in
ne ap
ol is
-S t.
P au
l m
e t ro
po li
ta n
a r e a
w it
h c o
nt ra
c t s
w it
h on
e of
t w
o m
an ag
ed c
a r e
c o m
pa ni
e s .
C an
c e r
S c r
e e n
in g
B re
as t
C an
c e r
Sc re
e n in
g R
e c om
m en
da ti
on s
va ry
. In
1 98
9, t
he 21
,6 01
w om
en ≥
5 0
ye a r
s B
e h a v
io ra
l R
is k
F a c
to r
58 %
h ad
c li
ni c a
l br
e a st
C D
C ,
19 93
a U
S P
S T
F r
e c om
m en
de d
a n a
nn ua
l c l
in ic
a l ol
d fr
om a
s am
pl e
of p
e o pl
e S
ur ve
il la
nc e
S ys
te m
, 19
92 .
e x am
i n
th e
pr io
r ye
a r ;
br e a
st e
xa m
( C
B E
) fo
r w
om en
≥ 4
0 ye
a r s
re pr
e s e n
ta ti
ve o
f th
e U
.S .
46 %
h ad
m am
m og
ra ph
y in
ol d
a n d
m am
m og
ra ph
y e v
e r y
1– 2
ye a r
s fo
r po
pu la
ti on
( e x
c l ud
in g
th e
pr io
r ye
a r ;
40 %
h ad
w om
en 5
0– 75
y e a
rs o
ld (
U S
P S
T F
, 19
89 ).
A rk
a n sa
s a n
d W
yo m
in g,
bo th
e xa
m in
a t io
ns i
n th
e
c o nt
in ue
s
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
252 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
In 1
99 6,
i t
re co
m m
en de
d m
am m
og ra
ph y
an d
in cl
ud in
g th
e D
is tr
ic t
pr io
r ye
ar .
ev er
y 1–
2 ye
ar s
w it
h or
w it
ho ut
a nn
ua l
of C
ol um
bi a)
. cl
in ic
al b
re as
t ex
am f
or w
om en
5 0–
69 ye
ar s
ol d
(U S
P S
T F
, 19
96 ).
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
F ro
m a
s am
pl e
of 7
,9 97
M ai
le d
su rv
ey s
w it
h ph
on e
72 %
o f
w om
en ≥
5 0
ye ar
s K
ot tk
e ra
nd om
ly s
el ec
te d
pa ti
en ts
fo ll
ow -u
p of
p at
ie nt
s w
ho ol
d ha
d a
br ea
st et
al .,
19 97
≥ 20
y ea
rs o
ld w
ho h
ad vi
si te
d on
e of
4 4
cl in
ic s
ex am
in at
io n
in t
he p
ri or
vi si
te d
a cl
in ic
d ur
in g
th e
fr om
A ug
us t
1, t
o tw
o ye
ar s;
6 8%
o f
w om
en st
ud y
pe ri
od ,
6, 83
0 (8
5% )
S ep
te m
be r
9, 1
99 4,
i n
th e
50 y
ea rs
o r
ol de
r ha
d a
co m
pl et
ed s
ur ve
ys .
M in
ne ap
ol is
-S t.
P au
l m
am m
og ra
m i
n th
e pr
io r
m et
ro po
li ta
n ar
ea w
it h
tw o
ye ar
s. co
nt ra
ct s
w it
h on
e of
t w
o m
an ag
ed c
ar e
co m
pa ni
es .
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
22 1
w om
en >
5 0
ye ar
s ol
d. In
te rv
ie w
s ur
ve y
of w
om en
38 %
o f
w om
en h
ad n
ot S
to ne
r et
a l.
, in
f a r
m h
ou se
ho ld
s re
c e iv
e d a
m am
m og
ra m
i n
19 98
ra nd
om ly
s am
pl e d
f ro
m s
ix th
e pr
io r
18 m
on th
s. so
ut he
rn M
in ne
so ta
c o un
ti e s
, 19
92 .
C e r
v i c a
l C
an c e
r Sc
re e n
in g
W om
en w
it h
a n i
nt a c
t ut
e r us
( ha
vi ng
a W
om en
≥ 1
8 ye
a r s
ol d
w it
h N
H IS
, 19
92 .
67 %
h ad
a P
a p s
m e a
r in
C D
C ,
19 96
c e rv
ix )
sh ou
ld h
av e
a P
a p a n
ic ol
a o u
(P a p
) a n
i nt
a c t
ut e r
us f
ro m
a th
e pr
io r
3 ye
a r s.
sm e a
r a f
te r
in it
ia ti
on o
f se
xu a l
i nt
e r c o
ur se
sa m
pl e
of 1
28 ,4
12 p
eo pl
e a n
d e v
e r y
1– 3
ye a r
s th
e r e a
ft e r
. S
om e
re pr
e s e n
ta ti
ve o
f th
e U
.S .
or ga
ni z a
ti on
s re
c o m
m en
d st
a r ti
ng P
ap c i
vi li
a n ,
no ni
ns ti
tu ti
on a l
iz e d
sm e a
rs f
or a
ll w
om en
w ho
h av
e re
a c he
d po
pu la
ti on
. 18
y e a
rs o
ld ,
re ga
rd le
ss o
f se
xu a l
h is
to ry
(U S
P S
T F
, 19
89 ).
T he
se r
e c om
m en
da ti
on s
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
253 ha
ve s
in ce
b ee
n re
it er
at ed
( U
S P
S T
F ,
19 96
).
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
F ro
m a
s am
pl e
of 7
,9 97
M ai
le d
su rv
ey s
w it
h ph
on e
84 %
o f
w om
en h
ad a
P ap
K ot
tk e
ra nd
om ly
s el
ec te
d pa
ti en
ts fo
ll ow
-u p
of p
at ie
nt s
w ho
sm ea
r in
t he
p ri
or t
w o
et al
., 19
97 ≥
20 y
ea rs
o ld
w ho
h ad
vi si
te d
on e
of 4
4 cl
in ic
s ye
ar s.
vi si
te d
a cl
in ic
d ur
in g
th e
fr om
A ug
us t
1, t
o st
ud y
pe ri
od ,
6, 83
0 (8
5% )
S ep
te m
be r
9, 1
99 4,
i n
th e
co m
pl et
ed s
ur ve
ys .
M in
ne ap
ol is
-S t.
P au
l m
et ro
po li
ta n
ar ea
w it
h co
nt ra
ct s
w it
h on
e of
t w
o m
an ag
ed c
ar e
co m
pa ni
es .
C ol
on C
an ce
r Sc
re en
in g
R ec
om m
en da
ti on
s va
ry .
In 1
98 0,
t he
A du
lt s
≥ 40
y ea
rs o
ld f
ro m
N H
IS ,
19 92
14 %
o f
m en
a nd
1 5%
o f
C D
C ,
19 96
A m
er ic
an C
an ce
r S
oc ie
ty r
ec om
m en
de d
a sa
m pl
e of
1 28
,4 12
p eo
pl e
w om
en h
ad F
O B
T i
n th
e an
nu al
f ec
al o
cc ul
t bl
oo d
te st
in g
(F O
B T
) re
pr es
en ta
ti ve
o f
th e
U .S
. pr
io r
ye ar
; 44
% o
f m
en a
nd st
ar ti
ng a
t 50
y ea
rs o
ld .
S om
e ot
he r
ci vi
li an
, no
ni ns
ti tu
ti on
al iz
ed 43
% o
f w
om en
h ad
e ve
r or
ga ni
za ti
on s
m ad
e si
m il
ar po
pu la
ti on
. ha
d F
O B
T ;
11 %
o f
m en
re co
m m
en da
ti on
s. I
n 19
89 ,
th e
U S
P S
T F
an d
7% o
f w
om en
h ad
di d
no t
m ak
e re
co m
m en
da ti
on s
(U S
P S
T F
, pr
oc to
si gm
oi do
sc op
y in
t he
19 89
), b
ut i
n 19
96 ,
it r
e c om
m en
de d
a n nu
a l pr
io r
3 ye
a r s.
F O
B T
, si
gm oi
do sc
op y
(p e r
io di
c i ty
un sp
e c if
ie d)
, or
b ot
h st
a r ti
ng a
t 50
y e a
rs ol
d (U
S P
S T
F ,
19 96
).
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
25 0
w om
en 4
0– 65
y e a
rs M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds f
or 51
% –5
9% o
f w
om en
h ad
U dv
a r he
ly i
ol d
w ho
h ad
n o
m a j
or pa
ti e n
ts f
ro m
f ou
r gr
ou p
F O
B T
e ve
ry 2
y e a
rs o
r e t
a l.
, 19
91 il
ln e s
se s,
w ho
r e c
e i ve
d pr
a c ti
c e s
in M
a s sa
c h us
e t ts
, fl
e x ib
le s
ig m
oi do
sc op
y pr
im a r
y c a
re a
t on
e of
t he
N ov
em be
r 1,
1 98
5, t
o e v
e r y
5 ye
a r s.
gr ou
p pr
a c ti
c e s,
a nd
w ho
O c t
ob e r
3 1,
1 98
7. w
e r e
e l ig
ib le
f or
p re
ve nt
iv e
c a re
. c o
nt in
ue s
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
254 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
C ar
d ia
c R
is k
F ac
to rs
Sm ok
in g
C ou
ns el
in g
T he
U S
P S
T F
r ec
om m
en ds
a c
om pl
et e
8, 77
8 sm
ok er
s ≥
18 y
ea rs
N H
IS ,
19 91
. 37
% o
f sm
ok er
s w
ho h
ad a
C D
C ,
19 93
b hi
st or
y of
t ob
ac co
u se
a s
w el
l as
t ob
ac co
ol d
fr om
a s
am pl
e of
vi si
t w
it h
a ph
ys ic
ia n
or ce
ss at
io n
co un
se li
ng o
n a
re gu
la r
ba si
s 43
,7 32
p eo
pl e
ot he
r he
al th
c ar
e (U
S P
S T
F ,
19 89
, 19
96 ).
T he
A ge
nc y
fo r
re pr
es en
ta ti
ve o
f th
e U
.S .
pr of
es si
on al
d ur
in g
th e
H ea
lt h
C ar
e P
ol ic
y an
d R
es ea
rc h
(A H
C P
R )
ci vi
li an
, no
ni ns
ti tu
ti on
al iz
ed pr
io r
ye ar
h ad
b ee
n ad
vi se
d re
co m
m en
ds t
ha t
pr im
ar y
ca re
p hy
si ci
an s
po pu
la ti
on .
to q
ui t
sm ok
in g.
id en
ti fy
p at
ie nt
s’ s
m ok
in g
st at
us a
nd co
un se
l sm
ok er
s at
e ve
ry v
is it
( A
H C
P R
, 19
96 ).
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
F ro
m a
s am
pl e
of 7
,9 97
M ai
le d
su rv
ey s
w it
h ph
on e
53 %
o f
sm ok
er s
w er
e as
ke d
K ot
tk e
ra nd
om ly
s el
ec te
d pa
ti en
ts fo
ll ow
-u p
of p
at ie
nt s
w ho
th ei
r sm
ok in
g st
at us
. 47
% et
al .,
19 97
≥ 20
y ea
rs o
ld w
ho h
ad vi
si te
d on
e of
4 4
cl in
ic s
of s
m ok
er s
w er
e ad
vi se
d to
vi si
te d
a cl
in ic
d ur
in g
th e
fr om
A ug
us t
1, t
o qu
it .
st ud
y pe
ri od
, 6,
83 0
(8 5%
) S
ep te
m be
r 9,
1 99
4, i
n th
e c o
m pl
e t e d
s ur
ve ys
. M
in ne
a p ol
is -S
t. P
a u l
m e t
ro po
li ta
n a r
e a w
it h
c o nt
ra c t
s w
it h
on e
of t
w o
m an
ag ed
c a r
e c o
m pa
ni e s
.
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
A n
a t io
na ll
y re
pr e s
e n ta
ti ve
N a t
io na
l A
m bu
la to
ry P
hy si
c i a n
s kn
ew t
he T
ho rn
di ke
sa m
pl e
of 3
,2 54
p hy
si c i
a n s
M ed
ic a l
C a r
e S
ur ve
y pa
ti e n
t’ s
sm ok
in g
st a t
us a
t e t
a l .,
19 98
re pr
e s e n
ti ng
1 45
,7 16
a du
lt (N
A M
C S
), 1
99 1–
19 95
. 66
% o
f a l
l pa
ti e n
t vi
si ts
. pa
ti e n
t am
bu la
to ry
c a r
e (T
he p
e r c e
nt a g
e fo
r vi
si ts
. pr
im a r
y c a
re p
hy si
c i a n
s ra
ng ed
f ro
m a
bo ut
6 1%
t o
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
255 67
% ,
de pe
nd in
g on
t he
ye ar
.) S
m ok
in g
co un
se li
ng w
as p
ro vi
de d
at 2
2% o
f vi
si ts
o f
kn ow
n sm
ok er
s. (T
he p
er ce
nt ag
e fo
r pr
im ar
y ca
re p
hy si
ci an
s ra
ng ed
f ro
m 2
0% t
o 38
% .)
B lo
od C
ho le
st er
ol S
cr ee
ni ng
In 1
98 8,
t he
N at
io na
l H
ea rt
, L
un g,
a nd
3, 70
0 ad
ul ts
≥ 1
8 ye
ar s
ol d
T el
ep ho
ne s
ur ve
y by
t he
65 %
o f
ad ul
ts h
ad e
ve r
ha d
S ch
uc ke
r B
lo od
I ns
ti tu
te r
ec om
m en
de d
ro ut
in e
fr om
a r
ep re
se nt
at iv
e N
at io
na l
H ea
rt ,
L un
g, a
nd a
bl oo
d ch
ol es
te ro
l te
st ;
et al
., 19
91 ch
ol es
te ro
l sc
re en
in g
at l
ea st
e ve
ry 5
y ea
rs sa
m pl
e of
t he
n on
-A fr
ic an
B lo
od I
ns ti
tu te
, 19
90 .
51 %
h ad
t he
t es
t in
t he
st ar
ti ng
a t
20 y
ea rs
o ld
. In
1 98
9, t
he A
m er
ic an
U .S
. po
pu la
ti on
. pr
io r
ye ar
; an
d an
U S
P S
T F
r ec
om m
en de
d pe
ri od
ic s
cr ee
ni ng
ad di
ti on
al 1
4% h
ad i
t pr
io r
fo r
m id
dl e-
ag ed
m en
( U
S P
S T
F ,
19 89
), a
nd to
t ha
t. 3
5% h
ad n
ev er
h ad
in 1
99 6,
i t
re co
m m
en de
d pe
ri od
ic a
bl oo
d ch
ol es
te ro
l te
st .
sc re
en in
g fo
r m
en 3
5– 65
y ea
rs o
ld a
nd w
om en
4 5–
65 y
ea rs
o ld
. T
re at
m en
t in
cl ud
es d
ie ta
ry t
he ra
py ,
ph ys
ic al
a ct
iv it
y, or
l ip
id -l
ow er
in g
m ed
ic at
io ns
d ep
en di
ng on
t he
p a t
ie nt
( N
a t io
na l
C ho
le st
e r ol
E du
c a ti
on P
ro gr
am [
N C
E P
], 1
99 3)
.
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
A du
lt s
≥ 20
y e a
rs o
ld f
ro m
C D
C ’s
B e h
a v io
ra l
R is
k T
he s
ta te
-s pe
c i fi
c ra
te s
of C
D C
, 19
93 c
a sa
m pl
e of
p e o
pl e
F a c
to r
S ur
ve il
la nc
e S
ys te
m ,
a d ul
ts w
ho h
ad c
ho le
st e r
ol re
pr e s
e n ta
ti ve
o f
th e
U .S
. 19
91 .
sc re
e n in
g in
t he
p ri
or 5
po pu
la ti
on (
e x c l
ud in
g ye
a r s
ra ng
ed f
ro m
5 7%
t o
W yo
m in
g, K
a n sa
s, a
nd 70
% .
c o nt
in ue
s
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
256 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
N ev
ad a,
a nd
i nc
lu di
ng t
he D
is tr
ic t
of C
ol um
bi a)
(s am
pl e
si ze
s fo
r in
di vi
du al
st at
es r
an ge
f ro
m 6
70 t
o 3,
19 0
pe op
le ).
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
F ro
m a
s am
pl e
of 7
,9 97
M ai
le d
su rv
ey s
w it
h ph
on e
68 %
h ad
h ad
t he
ir K
ot tk
e ra
nd om
ly s
el ec
te d
pa ti
en ts
fo ll
ow -u
p of
p at
ie nt
s w
ho ch
ol es
te ro
l m
ea su
re d
du ri
ng et
al .,
19 97
≥ 20
y ea
rs o
ld w
ho h
ad vi
si te
d on
e of
4 4
cl in
ic s
th e
pr io
r 5
ye ar
s. vi
si te
d a
cl in
ic d
ur in
g th
e fr
om A
ug us
t 1,
t o
st ud
y pe
ri od
, 6,
83 0
(8 5%
) S
ep te
m be
r 9,
1 99
4, i
n th
e co
m pl
et ed
s ur
ve ys
. M
in ne
ap ol
is -S
t. P
au l
m et
ro po
li ta
n ar
ea w
it h
co nt
ra ct
s w
it h
on e
of t
w o
m an
ag ed
c ar
e co
m pa
ni es
. B
lo od
C ho
le st
er ol
S cr
ee ni
ng a
nd T
re at
m en
t S
am e
a s a
bo ve
. 1,
00 4
pe op
le 4
0– 64
y e a
rs M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds f
ro m
t hr
e e 84
% w
e r e
sc re
e n e d
f or
D a v
is e
t a l
., ol
d fr
om a
s am
pl e
th a t
h a d
si te
s of
a m
an ag
ed c
a r e
e l e v
a t e d
c ho
le st
e r ol
l e v
e l s
19 98
be e n
e nr
ol le
d c o
nt in
uo us
ly pl
a n (
S ou
th F
lo ri
da ;
a t l
e a st
o nc
e du
ri ng
t he
fo r
a t l
e a st
5 y
e a rs
a nd
h ad
Ja c k
so nv
il le
, F
lo ri
da ;
a n d
6- ye
a r p
e r io
d. 8
6% w
it h
a a t
l e a
st o
ne o
ut pa
ti e n
t vi
si t
A tl
a n ta
, G
e o rg
ia ),
J a n
ua ry
di a g
no si
s of
du ri
ng t
he s
tu dy
p e r
io d.
1, 1
98 8,
t o
D e c
em be
r 31
, hy
pe rc
ho le
st e r
ol em
ia w
e r e
19 93
. tr
e a te
d w
it h
di e t
t he
ra py
, c h
ol e s
te ro
l- lo
w e r
in g
dr ug
s, or
b ot
h.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
257
co nt
in ue
s
B lo
od P
re ss
ur e
Sc re
en in
g In
1 98
9, t
he U
S P
S T
F r
ec om
m en
de d
bl oo
d F
ro m
a s
am pl
e of
7 ,9
97 M
ai le
d su
rv ey
s w
it h
ph on
e 88
% h
ad b
lo od
p re
ss ur
e K
ot tk
e pr
es su
re m
ea su
re m
en ts
f or
n or
m ot
en si
ve ra
nd om
ly s
el ec
te d
pa ti
en ts
fo ll
ow -u
p of
p at
ie nt
s w
ho m
ea su
re d
at t
he m
os t
et al
., 19
97 pa
ti en
ts ≥
2 1
ye ar
s ol
d ev
er y
2 ye
ar s
if ≥
20 y
ea rs
o ld
w ho
h ad
vi si
te d
on e
of 4
4 cl
in ic
s re
ce nt
v is
it .
th ei
r la
st d
ia st
ol ic
a nd
s ys
to li
c bl
oo d
vi si
te d
a cl
in ic
d ur
in g
th e
fr om
A ug
us t
1, t
o pr
es su
re s
w er
e be
lo w
8 5
m m
H g
an d
14 0
st ud
y pe
ri od
, 6,
83 0
(8 5%
) S
ep te
m be
r 9,
1 99
4, i
n th
e m
m H
g, r
es pe
ct iv
el y,
a nd
a nn
ua ll
y if
t he
ir co
m pl
et ed
s ur
ve ys
. M
in ne
ap ol
is -S
t. P
au l
la st
d ia
st ol
ic w
as 8
5– 89
m m
H g
(U S
P S
T F
, m
et ro
po li
ta n
ar ea
w it
h 19
89 ).
I n
19 96
, th
es e
re co
m m
en da
ti on
s co
nt ra
ct s
w it
h on
e of
t w
o w
er e
m od
if ie
d to
s pe
ci fy
a pp
ar en
tl y
m an
ag ed
c ar
e co
m pa
ni es
. no
rm ot
en si
ve p
at ie
nt s
(U S
P S
T F
, 19
96 ).
G en
er al
P re
ve n
ti ve
C ar
e W
el l-
C hi
ld C
ar e
T he
A A
P r
ec om
m en
ds r
ou ti
ne h
is to
ry ,
A ll
c hi
ld re
n w
ho h
ad t
he ir
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f ro
m F
or e
ac h
ty pe
o f
cl in
ic al
S ta
rf ie
ld ph
ys ic
al e
xa m
in at
io n,
s cr
ee ni
ng t
es ts
, an
d se
co nd
b ir
th da
y du
ri ng
t he
ph ys
ic ia
ns ’
of fi
ce s,
se tt
in g,
t he
s tu
dy r
ep or
ts et
al .,
19 94
an ti
ci pa
to ry
g ui
da nc
e th
ro ug
ho ut
fi rs
t ha
lf o
f th
e st
ud y
ye ar
, co
m m
un it
y he
al th
c en
te rs
, th
e av
er ag
e pe
rc en
ta ge
o f
ch il
dh oo
d (A
A P
, 19
88 ).
an d
al l
2- ye
ar -o
ld s
w it
h an
d ho
sp it
al o
ut pa
ti en
t te
ch ni
ca l
qu al
it y
in di
ca to
rs ot
it is
m ed
ia o
r as
th m
a, f
ro m
fa ci
li ti
es s
am pl
ed f
ro m
fo r
w el
l- ch
il d
ca re
t ha
t a
sa m
pl e
of 2
,0 24
p at
ie nt
s M
ar yl
an d
M ed
ic ai
d cl
ai m
s w
er e
no t
m et
. E
ac h
av er
ag e
of 1
35 p
ro vi
de rs
. da
ta ,
19 88
. fe
ll i
n th
e 35
% –6
5% r
a n ge
.
W e l
l- A
du lt
C ar
e P
a t ie
nt s
sh ou
ld h
av e
pr e v
e n ti
ve h
e a lt
h A
ll a
du lt
s w
it h
a s th
m a ,
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
F or
e a c
h ty
pe o
f c l
in ic
a l S
ta rf
ie ld
vi si
ts e
ve ry
1 –3
y e a
rs w
he n
19 –6
4 ye
a r s
hy pe
rt e n
si on
, a n
d di
a b e t
e s se
tt in
g, t
he s
tu dy
r e p
or ts
e t a l
., 19
94 ol
d a n
d e v
e r y
ye a r
w he
n ≥
65 y
e a rs
o ld
fr om
a s
am pl
e of
2 ,0
24 th
e a v
e r a g
e pe
rc e n
ta ge
o f
(U S
P S
T F
, 19
89 ).
pa ti
e n ts
o f
13 5
pr ov
id e r
s. te
c h ni
c a l
qu a l
it y
in di
c a to
rs fo
r w
e l l-
a d ul
t c a
re t
ha t
w e r
e no
t m
e t .
E a c
h a v
e r a g
e fe
ll i
n th
e 45
% –5
5% r
a n ge
.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
258 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
A C
U T
E C
A R
E P
n eu
m on
ia P
ne um
on ia
: H
os pi
ta l
C ar
e In
cl ud
es d
oc um
en ta
ti on
o f
to ba
cc o
us e/
1, 40
8 pa
ti en
ts h
os pi
ta li
ze d
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f or
52 %
–9 0%
o f
pa ti
en ts
w it
h K
ah n
et a
l. ,
no nu
se a
nd l
ow er
-e xt
re m
it y
ed em
a; b
lo od
w it
h pn
eu m
on ia
f ro
m a
M ed
ic ar
e pa
ti en
ts f
ro m
2 97
pn eu
m on
ia r
ec ei
ve d
19 90
pr es
su re
r ea
di ng
s; o
xy ge
n th
er ap
y or
na ti
on al
ly r
ep re
se nt
at iv
e ho
sp it
al s
in f
iv e
st at
es ap
pr op
ri at
e co
m po
ne nt
s of
in tu
ba ti
on f
or h
yp ox
ic p
at ie
nt s.
sa m
pl e
of 7
,1 56
p at
ie nt
s (C
al if
or ni
a, F
lo ri
da ,
ca re
. ho
sp it
al iz
ed w
it h
an y
of In
di an
a, P
en ns
yl va
ni a,
fi ve
c on
di ti
on s
(c on
ge st
iv e
T ex
as ),
J ul
y 1,
1 98
5, t
o he
ar t
fa il
ur e,
a cu
te Ju
ne 3
0, 1
98 6.
m yo
ca rd
ia l
in fa
rc ti
on ,
pn eu
m on
ia ,
st ro
ke ,
hi p
fr ac
tu re
) (D
ra pe
r et
a l.
, 19
90 ).
In cl
ud es
v ar
io us
c om
po ne
nt s
of 1,
34 3
pa ti
en ts
≥ 6
5 ye
ar s
N at
io na
l M
ed ic
ar e
cl ai
m s
89 %
h ad
o xy
ge na
ti on
M ee
ha n
pn eu
m on
ia c
a r e
c o ns
is te
nt w
it h
pr e v
a i li
ng ol
d ho
sp it
a l iz
e d w
it h
da ta
a nd
m ed
ic a l
r e c
or ds
, a s
se ss
m en
t w
it hi
n 24
h ou
rs e t
a l .,
19 97
st a n
da rd
s of
c a r
e . pn
eu m
on ia
. O
c t ob
e r 1
, 19
94 ,
to of
h os
pi ta
l a r
ri va
l, 7
6% S
ep te
m be
r 30
, 19
95 re
c e iv
e d a
nt ib
io ti
c s w
it hi
n 8
ho ur
s of
a rr
iv a l
, 69
% h
ad bl
oo d
c u lt
ur e s
w it
hi n
24 ho
ur s
of a
rr iv
a l ,
a n d
57 %
ha d
bl oo
d c u
lt ur
e s c
ol le
c t e d
be fo
re i
ni ti
a l a
nt ib
io ti
c a d
m in
is tr
a t io
n.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
259
co nt
in ue
s
O ti
ti s
M ed
ia O
ti ti
s M
ed ia
: T
re at
m en
t In
cl ud
es v
ar io
us c
om po
ne nt
s of
o ti
ti s
46 4
ch il
dr en
≥ 3
y ea
rs o
ld M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
ro m
F or
e ac
h ty
pe o
f cl
in ic
al S
ta rf
ie ld
m ed
ia c
ar e
co ns
is te
nt w
it h
pr ev
ai li
ng di
ag no
se d
w it
h ot
it is
m ed
ia ph
ys ic
ia ns
’ of
fi ce
s, se
tt in
g, t
he s
tu dy
r ep
or ts
et al
., 19
94 st
an da
rd s
of c
ar e.
fr om
a s
am pl
e of
2 ,0
24 co
m m
un it
y he
al th
c en
te rs
, th
e av
er ag
e pe
rc en
ta ge
o f
pa ti
en ts
o f
13 5
pr ov
id er
s. an
d ho
sp it
al o
ut pa
ti en
t te
ch ni
ca l
qu al
it y
in di
ca to
rs fa
ci li
ti es
s am
pl ed
f ro
m fo
r ot
it is
m ed
ia t
ha t
w er
e M
ar yl
an d
M ed
ic ai
d cl
ai m
s no
t m
et .
E ac
h av
er ag
e fe
ll da
ta ,
19 88
. in
t he
1 0%
–4 0%
r an
ge .
H ip
F ra
ct u
re s
H ip
F ra
ct ur
e: H
os pi
ta l
C ar
e In
cl ud
es d
oc um
en ta
ti on
o f
m en
ta l
st at
us 1,
40 4
pa ti
en ts
h os
pi ta
li ze
d M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
or 67
% –9
4% o
f pa
ti en
ts w
it h
K ah
n et
a l.
, an
d pe
da l
or l
eg p
ul se
, se
ru m
p ot
as si
um w
it h
hi p
fr ac
tu re
f ro
m a
M ed
ic ar
e pa
ti en
ts f
ro m
2 97
hi p
fr ac
tu re
r ec
ei ve
d 19
90 le
ve l,
e le
ct ro
ca rd
io gr
am .
na ti
on al
ly r
ep re
se nt
at iv
e ho
sp it
al s
in f
iv e
st at
es ap
pr op
ri at
e co
m po
ne nt
s of
sa m
pl e
of 7
,1 56
p at
ie nt
s (C
al if
or ni
a, F
lo ri
da ,
ca re
. ho
sp it
al iz
ed w
it h
an y
of In
di an
a, P
en ns
yl va
ni a,
fi ve
c on
di ti
on s
(c on
ge st
iv e
T ex
as ),
J ul
y 1,
1 98
5, t
o he
ar t
fa il
ur e,
a cu
te Ju
ne 3
0, 1
98 6.
m yo
ca rd
ia l
in fa
rc ti
on ,
pn eu
m on
ia ,
st ro
ke ,
hi p
fr a c
tu re
) (D
ra pe
r e t
a l.
, 19
90 ).
U r i
n ar
y T
ra c t
I n
fe c t
io n
s U
ri na
ry T
ra c t
I nf
e c ti
on s:
D ia
gn os
is T
he p
ro vi
si on
o f
a ur
in e
c u lt
ur e
in 53
5 e p
is od
e s o
f U
T I
fr om
M ed
ic a i
d c l
a i m
s fr
om 52
% r
e c e i
ve d
a ur
in e
B ro
ns te
in di
a g no
si ng
a u
ri na
ry t
ra c t
i nf
e c ti
on (
U T
I) 46
5 c h
il dr
e n w
ho r
e c e i
ve d
A la
ba m
a , J
ul y
1, 1
98 9,
t o
c u lt
ur e .
e t a l
., 19
97 is
c on
si st
e n t
w it
h pr
e v a i
li ng
s ta
nd a r
ds o
f am
bu la
to ry
c a r
e fo
r U
T Is
Ju ne
3 0,
1 99
3. c a
re .
ou t
of a
s am
pl e
of 1
47 ,3
56 ch
il dr
e n <
8 y
e a rs
o ld
w it
h
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
260 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
co nt
in uo
us M
ed ic
ai d
co ve
ra ge
( ex
cl us
iv e
of ch
il dr
en w
it h
M ed
ic ai
d be
ca us
e of
S up
pl em
en ta
l S
ec ur
it y
In co
m e)
f or
a ll
1 2
m on
th s
of 1
99 2.
P re
gn an
cy a
n d
D el
iv er
y P
re na
ta l
C ar
e: M
ed ic
al H
is to
ry ,
P hy
si ca
l E
xa m
in at
io n,
a nd
L ab
or at
or y
T es
ts In
cl ud
es v
ar io
us c
om po
ne nt
s of
p re
na ta
l 9,
92 4
w om
en w
ho h
ad l
iv e
N at
io na
l M
at er
na l
an d
80 %
w er
e as
ke d
ab ou
t K
og an
e t
al .,
ca re
c on
si st
en t
w it
h pr
ev ai
li ng
s ta
nd ar
ds bi
rt hs
i n
19 88
f ro
m a
In fa
nt H
ea lt
h S
ur ve
y he
al th
h is
to ry
d ur
in g
th e
19 94
of c
ar e.
na ti
on al
ly r
ep re
se nt
at iv
e (N
M IH
S ),
1 98
8. fi
rs t
or s
ec on
d vi
si t.
9 8%
sa m
pl e
of t
he U
.S .
ha d
th ei
r w
ei gh
t an
d he
ig ht
po pu
la ti
on (
ex cl
ud in
g S
ou th
m ea
su re
d, 9
6% h
ad b
lo od
D ak
ot a
an d
M on
ta na
, an
d pr
es su
re m
ea su
re d,
a nd
in cl
ud in
g th
e D
is tr
ic t
of 86
% r
ec ei
ve d
a ph
ys ic
al o
r C
ol um
bi a )
. pe
lv ic
e xa
m in
a t io
n du
ri ng
th e
fi rs
t or
s e c
on d
vi si
t. 79
% r
e c e i
ve d
bl oo
d te
st s
a n d
93 %
r e c
e i ve
d ur
in a l
ys is
d ur
in g
th e
fi rs
t or
s e c
on d
vi si
t. 5
6% re
c e iv
e d a
ll o
f th
e e v
a l ua
ti on
s li
st e d
a bo
ve du
ri ng
t he
f ir
st o
r se
c o nd
vi si
t.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
261
co nt
in ue
s
P re
na ta
l C
ar e:
C ou
ns el
in g
A bo
ut N
ut ri
ti on
, W
ei gh
t G
ai n,
S ub
st an
ce U
se ,
an d
B re
as tf
ee di
ng In
cl ud
es v
ar io
us c
om po
ne nt
s of
p re
na ta
l S
am e
as a
bo ve
. S
am e
as a
bo ve
. 97
% w
er e
co un
se le
d ab
ou t
K og
an e
t al
., ca
re c
on si
st en
t w
it h
pr ev
ai li
ng s
ta nd
ar ds
vi ta
m in
s, 9
3% w
er e
19 94
of c
ar e.
co un
se le
d ab
ou t
di et
, an
d 72
% w
er e
co un
se le
d ab
ou t
pr op
er w
ei gh
t ga
in d
ur in
g pr
eg na
nc y
du ri
ng a
t le
as t
on e
pr en
at al
v is
it .
68 %
w er
e co
un se
le d
to r
ed uc
e or
e li
m in
at e
al co
ho l
co ns
um pt
io n,
6 9%
t o
re du
ce o
r el
im in
at e
sm ok
in g,
a nd
6 5%
t o
st op
us e
of i
ll eg
al d
ru gs
d ur
in g
at l
ea st
o ne
p re
na ta
l vi
si t.
53 %
w er
e co
un se
le d
ab ou
t br
ea st
fe ed
in g
du ri
ng a
t le
as t
on e
pr en
at al
v is
it .
32 %
r ec
ei ve
d al
l of
t he
co un
se li
ng l
is te
d ab
ov e
du ri
ng a
t le
a s t
on e
pr e n
a t a l
vi si
t. P
re na
ta l
C ar
e : S
c r e e
ni ng
T e s
ts In
c l ud
e s t
e s ts
t o
sc re
e n f
or a
ne m
ia ,
R a n
do m
s am
pl e
of 5
86 M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds f
or A
m on
g si
x H
M O
s, w
om en
M ur
a t a
a s ym
pt om
a t ic
b a c
te ri
ur ia
, sy
ph il
is ,
w om
en w
ho h
ad a
l iv
e bi
rt h
pa ti
e n ts
f ro
m s
ix H
M O
s in
re c e
iv e d
6 4%
–9 5%
e t a l
., 19
94 go
no rr
he a ,
h e p
a t it
is B
, ru
be ll
a im
m un
it y,
fr om
2 4,
17 0
bi rt
hs t
ha t
si x
st a t
e s (
A ri
z o na
, (a
ve ra
ge 8
2% )
of s
e v e n
a n d
R h
fa c t
or a
nd a
nt ib
od y.
oc c u
rr e d
d ur
in g
th e
st ud
y C
a l if
or ni
a , C
ol or
a d o,
re c o
m m
en de
d ro
ut in
e pe
ri od
. M
a s sa
c h us
e t ts
, M
in ne
so ta
, pr
e n a t
a l s
c r e e
ni ng
t e s
ts .
O re
go n)
, A
ug us
t 1,
1 98
9, to
J ul
y 31
, 19
90 .
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
262 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
P re
na ta
l C
ar e:
O th
er R
ou ti
ne P
re na
ta l
C ar
e In
cl ud
es f
ir st
p re
na ta
l vi
si t
du ri
ng f
ir st
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
A m
on g
si x
H M
O s,
w om
en M
ur at
a tr
im es
te r,
a cc
ur at
e de
te rm
in at
io n
of re
ce iv
ed 7
8% –8
7% et
al .,
19 94
ge st
at io
na l
ag e,
s cr
ee ni
ng f
or i
nh er
it ed
(a ve
ra ge
8 4%
) of
f iv
e di
so rd
er s,
m ea
su re
m en
t of
s ym
ph ys
is –
pr oc
es se
s of
r ou
ti ne
fu nd
al h
ei gh
t, a
nd b
lo od
p re
ss ur
e pr
en at
al c
ar e.
m ea
su re
m en
t.
P re
na ta
l C
ar e:
P re
gn an
cy C
om pl
ic at
io ns
In cl
ud es
d ia
gn os
ti c
an d
tr ea
tm en
t S
am e
as a
bo ve
. S
am e
as a
bo ve
. A
m on
g si
x H
M O
s, w
om en
M ur
at a
in te
rv en
ti on
s af
te r
ab no
rm al
s cr
ee ni
ng t
es t
re ce
iv ed
5 4%
–7 7%
et al
., 19
94 re
su lt
s, a
nd c
ar e
to m
it ig
at e
ef fe
ct s
of of
c ar
e fo
r co
m pl
ic at
io ns
pr eg
na nc
y- in
du ce
d hy
pe rt
en si
on a
nd of
p re
gn an
cy .
ge st
at io
na l
di ab
et es
.
P re
na ta
l C
ar e:
P ro
te in
ur ia
U ri
ne i
s c h
e c ke
d fo
r pr
ot e i
n to
e va
lu a t
e In
pa ti
e n t
re c o
rd s
fo r
2, 33
6 M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds f
or T
e s ti
ng w
a s p
ro vi
de d
a t C
a r e y
e t
a l .,
fo r
th e
pr e s
e n c e
o f
pr e e
c l am
ps ia
, a
se ri
ou s
w om
en f
ro m
a s
am pl
e of
pa ti
e n ts
s am
pl e d
f ro
m 75
% –8
3% o
f vi
si ts
. 19
91 co
m pl
ic a t
io n
of p
re gn
an cy
. 2,
87 8
bi rt
hs i
n 19
85 ;
M ed
ic a i
d c l
a i m
s fi
le s
fo r
F ol
lo w
-u p
w a s
p e r
fo rm
ed pr
e n a t
a l c
a r e
re c o
rd s
fo r
w om
en a
nd c
hi ld
re n
fo r
41 %
–6 5%
o f
pa ti
e n ts
82 3
of t
he se
w om
en .
e n ro
ll e d
i n
A id
t o
F am
il ie
s w
it h
pr ot
e i nu
ri a .
w it
h D
e p e n
de nt
C hi
ld re
n (A
F D
C )
in t
w o
co m
m un
it ie
s in
C a l
if or
ni a
a n d
tw o
c o m
m un
it ie
s in
M is
so ur
i, 1
98 5.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
263
co nt
in ue
s
P re
na ta
l C
ar e:
R ec
or di
ng o
f G
es ta
ti on
al A
ge In
cl ud
es a
c om
po ne
nt o
f pr
en at
al c
ar e
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
G es
ta ti
on al
a ge
w as
C ar
ey e
t al
., co
ns is
te nt
w it
h pr
ev ai
li ng
s ta
nd ar
ds o
f re
co rd
ed a
t 78
% –9
5% o
f 19
91 ca
re .
vi si
ts .
P re
na ta
l C
ar e:
A ss
es sm
en t
of F
et al
H ea
rt T
on es
a ft
er 1
8 W
ee ks
o f
G es
ta ti
on In
cl ud
es a
c om
po ne
nt o
f pr
en at
al c
ar e
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
F et
al h
ea rt
t on
es w
er e
C ar
ey e
t al
., co
ns is
te nt
w it
h pr
ev ai
li ng
s ta
nd ar
ds o
f as
se ss
ed a
t 81
% –9
3% o
f 19
91 ca
re .
vi si
ts .
P re
na ta
l C
ar e:
F ol
lo w
-u p
fo r
L ow
H em
at oc
ri t
L ow
h em
at oc
ri t
in di
ca te
s an
em ia
. S
am e
as a
bo ve
. S
am e
as a
bo ve
. F
ol lo
w -u
p w
as p
er fo
rm ed
C ar
ey e
t al
., fo
r 32
% –5
1% o
f pa
ti en
ts 19
91 w
it h
lo w
h em
at oc
ri t.
P re
na ta
l C
ar e:
F ol
lo w
-u p
fo r
H ig
h B
lo od
P re
ss ur
e In
cl ud
es a
c om
po ne
nt o
f pr
en at
al c
ar e
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
F ol
lo w
-u p
w as
p er
fo rm
ed C
ar ey
e t
al .,
co ns
is te
nt w
it h
pr ev
ai li
ng s
ta nd
ar ds
o f
fo r
31 %
–5 3%
o f
pa ti
en ts
19 91
ca re
. w
it h
hi gh
b lo
od p
re ss
ur e.
P re
na ta
l C
ar e :
P hy
si c a
l E
x a m
in at
io n
In c l
ud e s
v a r
io us
c om
po ne
nt s
of p
re na
ta l
26 7
w om
en r
e c e i
vi ng
M ed
ic a l
r e c
or ds
f ro
m s
e v e n
99 %
h ad
b lo
od p
re ss
ur e
K li
nk m
an c a
re c
on si
st e n
t w
it h
pr e v
a i li
ng s
ta nd
a r ds
ro ut
in e ,
l ow
-r is
k pr
e n a t
a l pr
iv a t
e a n
d ho
sp it
a l -b
a s e d
a s se
ss e d
a t
e a c h
v is
it .
93 %
e t a l
., 19
97 of
c a r
e . c a
re w
e r e
ra nd
om ly
pr e n
a t a l
c a r
e si
te s
in ha
d fu
nd a l
h e i
gh t
a s se
ss e d
se le
c t e d
, w
it h
st ra
ti fi
c a ti
on W
a s ht
e n a w
C ou
nt y,
a t e
a c h
vi si
t a f
te r
20 w
e e ks
by i
ns ur
a n c e
t yp
e M
ic hi
ga n,
f or
w om
en ge
st a t
io n.
(M ed
ic a i
d, h
e a lt
h re
c e iv
in g
c a re
b e t
w e e
n m
a i nt
e n a n
c e o
rg a n
iz a t
io n,
Ja nu
a r y
1, 1
99 1,
a nd
fe e –
fo r-
se rv
ic e )
. D
e c em
be r
31 ,
19 92
.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
264 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
P re
na ta
l C
ar e:
L ab
or at
or y
Sc re
en in
g T
es ts
In cl
ud es
v ar
io us
c om
po ne
nt s
of p
re na
ta l
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
P at
ie nt
s re
ce iv
ed a
n K
li nk
m an
ca re
c on
si st
en t
w it
h pr
ev ai
li ng
s ta
nd ar
ds av
er ag
e of
8 1%
–8 3%
et al
., 19
97 of
c ar
e. (d
ep en
di ng
o n
in su
ra nc
e ty
pe )
of r
ec om
m en
de d
la bo
ra to
ry s
cr ee
ni ng
t es
ts .
D el
iv er
y: N
eo na
ta l
G ro
up B
S tr
ep to
co cc
al (
G B
S) D
is ea
se T
he A
m er
ic an
C ol
le ge
o f
O bs
te tr
ic ia
ns a
nd 81
w om
en w
it h
R O
M ≥
1 8
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f ro
m t
w o
88 %
r ec
ei ve
d an
a nt
ib io
ti c
L ie
u et
a l.
, G
yn ec
ol og
is ts
r ec
om m
en ds
i nt
ra pa
rt um
ho ur
s fr
om a
m on
g al
l H
M O
h os
pi ta
ls (
in w
hi ch
ef fe
ct iv
e ag
ai ns
t G
B S
, 37
% 19
98 an
ti bi
ot ic
s fo
r w
om en
w it
h ru
pt ur
e of
w om
en w
it h
de li
ve ri
es pr
ot oc
ol s
si m
il ar
t o
A C
O G
re ce
iv ed
a nt
ib io
ti cs
w it
hi n
m em
br an
es (
R O
M )
fo r
18 h
ou rs
o r
m or
e du
ri ng
t he
s tu
dy p
er io
d. gu
id el
in es
h ad
b ee
n 20
h ou
rs o
f R
O M
( m
ed ia
n to
p re
ve nt
n eo
na ta
l G
ro up
B S
tr ep
to co
cc al
ad op
te d)
i n
S an
F ra
nc is
co du
ra ti
on o
f R
O M
w as
3 1
(G B
S )
in fe
ct io
n (A
C O
G ,
19 93
, 19
96 ).
an d
O ak
la nd
, C
al if
or ni
a, ho
ur s)
. fo
r w
om en
w ho
d el
iv er
ed fr
om J
an ua
ry t
o Ju
ne 1
99 5.
C H
R O
N IC
C A
R E
A st
h m
a A
du lt
A st
hm a
C ar
e In
c l ud
e s v
a r io
us c
om po
ne nt
s of
a st
hm a
A du
lt s
≥ 18
y e a
rs o
ld i
n a
M ed
ic a l
r e c
or ds
f ro
m F
or e
a c h
ty pe
o f
c l in
ic a l
S ta
rf ie
ld c a
re c
on si
st e n
t w
it h
pr e v
a i li
ng s
ta nd
a r ds
gr ou
p of
3 93
a du
lt s
a n d
ph ys
ic ia
ns ’
of fi
c e s,
se tt
in g,
t he
s tu
dy r
e p or
ts e t
a l .,
19 94
of c
a r e .
c h il
dr e n
d ia
gn os
e d w
it h
c o m
m un
it y
he a l
th c
e n te
rs ,
th e
a v e r
a g e
pe rc
e n ta
ge o
f a s
th m
a , f
ro m
a s
am pl
e of
a n d
ho sp
it a l
o ut
pa ti
e n t
te c h
ni c a
l qu
a l it
y in
di c a
to rs
2, 02
4 pa
ti e n
ts o
f 13
5 fa
c i li
ti e s
s am
pl e d
f ro
m fo
r a d
ul t
a s th
m a
th a t
w e r
e pr
ov id
e r s.
M a r
yl a n
d M
ed ic
a i d
c l a i
m s
no t
m e t
. E
a c h
of t
he da
ta ,
19 88
. a v
e r a g
e s w
a s l
oc a t
e d i
n th
e 40
% –4
5% r
a n ge
. B
e t w
e e n
5% a
nd 3
5% o
f c a
re w
a s in
a p pr
op ri
a t e .
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
265
co nt
in ue
s
C hi
ld ho
od A
st hm
a C
ar e
In cl
ud es
v ar
io us
c om
po ne
nt s
of a
st hm
a C
hi ld
re n
< 1
8 ye
ar s
ol d
in S
am e
as a
bo ve
. F
or e
ac h
ty pe
o f
cl in
ic al
S ta
rf ie
ld ca
re c
on si
st en
t w
it h
pr ev
ai li
ng s
ta nd
ar ds
a gr
ou p
of 3
93 a
du lt
s an
d se
tt in
g, t
he s
tu dy
r ep
or ts
et al
., 19
94 of
c ar
e. ch
il dr
en d
ia gn
os ed
w it
h th
e av
er ag
e pe
rc en
ta ge
o f
as th
m a,
f ro
m a
s am
pl e
of te
ch ni
ca l
qu al
it y
in di
ca to
rs 2,
02 4
pa ti
en ts
o f
13 5
fo r
ch il
dh oo
d as
th m
a th
at pr
ov id
er s.
w er
e no
t m
et .
E ac
h of
t he
av er
ag es
w as
l oc
at ed
i n
th e
30 %
–4 0%
r an
ge .
B et
w ee
n 0%
a nd
2 0%
o f
ca re
w as
in ap
pr op
ri at
e.
A st
hm a
C ar
e In
cl ud
es v
ar io
us c
om po
ne nt
s of
a st
hm a
5, 58
0 pa
ti en
ts ≥
1 4
ye ar
s S
ur ve
y of
p at
ie nt
s fr
om 72
% o
f pa
ti en
ts w
it h
se ve
re L
eg or
re ta
ca re
c on
si st
en t
w it
h pr
ev ai
li ng
s ta
nd ar
ds ol
d w
ho w
er e
pr es
cr ib
ed m
ul ti
pl e
si te
s of
a h
ea lt
h as
th m
a ha
d a
st er
oi d
et al
., 19
98 of
c ar
e. as
th m
a m
ed ic
at io
ns .
m ai
nt en
an ce
o rg
an iz
at io
n in
ha le
r, 2
6% o
f pa
ti en
ts in
C al
if or
ni a,
1 99
6. ne
ed in
g da
il y
m ed
ic at
io ns
ha d
a pe
ak f
lo w
m et
er a
t ho
m e,
a nd
4 2%
w er
e ad
vi se
d ab
ou t
se lf
– m
an ag
em en
t to
ol s.
D ia
b e t
e s M
e l li
tu s
D ia
be te
s M
e l li
tu s:
D il
at e d
E y e
E x a
m in
at io
n A
nn ua
l di
la te
d e y
e e x
am in
a t io
n to
s c r
e e n
2, 39
2 a d
ul ts
≥ 1
8 ye
a r s
ol d
N H
IS ,
19 89
. 49
% h
ad a
d il
a t e d
e ye
B re
c h ne
r fo
r re
ti no
pa th
y st
a r ti
ng a
t ti
m e
of w
it h
ID D
M (
12 4
pa ti
e n ts
), e x
am in
a t io
n in
t he
p ri
or e t
a l .,
19 93
di a g
no si
s of
n on
-i ns
ul in
-d e p
e n de
nt N
ID D
M t
re a t
e d w
it h
in su
li n
ye a r
; 66
% h
ad a
n di
a b e t
e s m
e l li
tu s
(N ID
D M
) a n
d 5
ye a r
s (9
22 p
a t ie
nt s)
, a n
d N
ID D
M ex
am in
a t io
n in
t he
p ri
or 2
a f te
r di
a g no
si s
of i
ns ul
in -d
e p e n
de nt
no t
tr e a
te d
w it
h in
su li
n ye
a r s;
6 1%
a nd
5 7%
o f
di a b
e t e s
m e l
li tu
s (I
D D
M ).
(1 ,3
46 p
a t ie
nt s)
f ro
m a
pa ti
e n ts
a t
hi gh
r is
k of
sa m
pl e
of 8
4, 57
2 pe
op le
vi si
on l
os s
be c a
us e
of a
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
266 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
re pr
es en
ta ti
ve o
f th
e U
.S .
hi st
or y
of r
et in
op at
hy o
r of
ci vi
li an
, no
ni ns
ti tu
ti on
al iz
ed lo
ng d
ur at
io n
of d
ia be
te s,
po pu
la ti
on .
re sp
ec ti
ve ly
, ha
d an
ex am
in at
io n
in t
he p
ri or
ye ar
.
D ia
be te
s M
el li
tu s:
A ny
E ye
E xa
m in
at io
n D
il at
ed e
ye e
xa m
in at
io n
is r
ec om
m en
de d,
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
61 %
h ad
a n
ey e
B re
ch ne
r as
d es
cr ib
ed a
bo ve
, bu
t an
y ey
e ex
am in
at io
n in
t he
p ri
or et
al .,
19 93
ex am
in at
io n
is a
ls o
re po
rt ed
t o
de te
rm in
e ye
ar ;
79 %
h ad
a n
w he
th er
t he
re w
as a
ny e
ff or
t to
a ss
es s
fo r
ex am
in at
io n
in t
he p
ri or
re ti
no pa
th y.
2 ye
ar s.
D ia
be te
s M
el li
tu s:
E ye
E xa
m b
y O
ph th
al m
ol og
is t
D il
at ed
e ye
e xa
m in
at io
n is
r ec
om m
en de
d, 97
,3 88
M ed
ic ar
e pa
ti en
ts A
ll M
ed ic
ar e
cl ai
m s
da ta
54 %
d id
n ot
h av
e an
W ei
ne r
as d
es cr
ib ed
a bo
ve ,
bu t
an e
xa m
in at
io n
by ≥
65 y
ea rs
o ld
d ia
gn os
ed (P
ar ts
A a
nd B
) fr
om t
hr ee
ex am
in at
io n
by a
n et
al .,
19 95
a n o
ph th
a l m
ol og
is t
se rv
e s a
s a
pr ox
y fo
r a
w it
h di
a b e t
e s m
e l li
tu s.
st a t
e s (
A la
ba m
a , I
ow a ,
op ht
ha lm
ol og
is t
du ri
ng t
he di
la te
d e y
e e x
am in
a t io
n. M
a r yl
a n d)
, su
bm it
te d
fr om
pr io
r ye
a r .
Ju ly
1 ,
19 90
, to
J un
e 30
, 19
91 .
D ia
be te
s M
e l li
tu s:
P hy
si c a
l E
x a m
in at
io n
In c l
ud e s
v a r
io us
c om
po ne
nt s
of d
ia be
te s
29 2
pa ti
e n ts
≥ 6
5 ye
a r s
ol d
N a t
io na
l M
ed ic
a r e
92 %
–9 6%
h ad
t he
ir w
e i gh
t R
e t c h
in a
nd c a
re c
on si
st e n
t w
it h
pr e v
a i li
ng s
ta nd
a r ds
w it
h di
a b e t
e s m
e l li
tu s.
C om
pe ti
ti on
E va
lu a t
io n,
re c o
rd e d
a t
le a s
t on
c e a
ft e r
P re
st on
, of
c a r
e . w
it h
m ed
ic a l
r e c
or ds
f ro
m di
a g no
si s.
7 0%
( fo
r bo
th 19
91 8
H M
O s
a n d
11 3
fe e –
fo r-
H M
O a
nd F
F S
p ro
vi de
rs )
se rv
ic e
pr ov
id e r
s fo
r ha
d a
pe ri
ph e r
a l v
a s c u
la r
pa ti
e n ts
d ra
w n
fr om
ex am
in a t
io n.
9 4%
–9 6%
h ad
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
267
co nt
in ue
s
en ro
ll m
en t
li st
s of
p at
ie nt
s bl
oo d
pr es
su re
r ec
or de
d at
w it
h st
ar t-
up d
at es
b et
w ee
n le
as t
an nu
al ly
. 30
% –4
8% Ja
nu ar
y 19
83 ,
an d
M ay
ha d
a fu
nd us
co pi
c 19
84 ;
re co
rd s
w er
e ex
am in
at io
n or
r ef
er ra
l to
ab st
ra ct
ed f
ro m
t he
s ta
rt -u
p an
o ph
th al
m ol
og is
t w
it hi
n da
te t
o M
ar ch
3 1,
1 98
6. 2
ye ar
s of
d ia
gn os
is .
58 %
– 63
% h
ad t
on om
et ry
pe rf
or m
ed .
D ia
be te
s M
el li
tu s:
H em
og lo
bi n
A 1C
97 ,3
88 M
ed ic
ar e
pa ti
en ts
A ll
M ed
ic ar
e cl
ai m
s da
ta 84
% d
id n
ot r
ec ei
ve a
W ei
ne r
H em
og lo
bi n
A 1C
( or
g ly
co sy
la te
d ≥
65 y
ea rs
o ld
d ia
gn os
ed (P
ar ts
A a
nd B
) fr
om t
hr ee
he m
og lo
bi n
A 1C
t es
t et
al .,
19 95
he m
og lo
bi n)
i s
a bl
oo d
te st
t ha
t re
fl ec
ts w
it h
di ab
et es
m el
li tu
s. st
at es
( A
la ba
m a,
I ow
a, du
ri ng
t he
p ri
or y
ea r.
th e
m et
ab ol
ic c
on tr
ol o
f di
ab et
es .
T he
t es
t M
ar yl
an d)
, su
bm it
te d
fr om
sh ou
ld b
e pe
rf or
m ed
a t
le as
t on
ce a
y ea
r Ju
ly 1
, 19
90 ,
to J
un e
30 ,
fo r
di ab
et ic
s. 19
91 .
D ia
be te
s M
el li
tu s:
C ho
le st
er ol
S cr
ee ni
ng S
am e
as a
bo ve
. S
am e
as a
bo ve
. 45
% d
id n
ot r
ec ei
ve b
lo od
W ei
ne r
It i
s re
co m
m en
de d
th at
t ot
al c
ho le
st er
ol b
e ch
ol es
te ro
l sc
re en
in g
et al
., 19
95 m
ea su
re d
at l
ea st
o nc
e a
ye ar
f or
d ia
be ti
cs .
du ri
ng t
he p
ri or
y ea
r
D ia
be te
s M
e l li
tu s:
L ab
or at
or y
St ud
ie s
an d
F ol
lo w
-u ps
In c l
ud e s
v a r
io us
c om
po ne
nt s
of d
ia be
te s
29 2
pa ti
e n ts
≥ 6
5 ye
a r s
ol d
N a t
io na
l M
ed ic
a r e
74 %
–8 9%
h ad
u ri
na ly
si s
R e t
c h in
a nd
c a re
c on
si st
e n t
w it
h pr
e v a i
li ng
s ta
nd a r
ds w
it h
di a b
e t e s
m e l
li tu
s. C
om pe
ti ti
on E
va lu
a t io
n, pe
rf or
m ed
. 75
% –9
5% h
ad P
re st
on ,
of c
a r e .
w it
h m
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds f
ro m
c r e a
ti ni
ne o
r se
ru m
u re
a 19
91 8
H M
O s
a n d
11 3
fe e –
fo r-
ni tr
og en
d e t
e r m
in ed
a t
le a s
t se
rv ic
e pr
ov id
e r s
fo r
a n nu
a l ly
a ft
e r d
ia gn
os is
. pa
ti e n
ts d
ra w
n fr
om 82
% –8
3% h
ad a
n e n
ro ll
m en
t li
st s
of p
a t ie
nt s
e l e c
tr oc
a r di
og ra
m w
it h
st a r
t- up
d a t
e s b
e t w
e e n
pe rf
or m
ed w
it hi
n 6
m on
th s
Ja nu
a r y
19 83
, a n
d M
ay of
d ia
gn os
is .
91 %
–9 5%
h ad
19 84
; re
c o rd
s w
e r e
a t l
e a st
o ne
r e p
e a te
d bl
oo d
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
268 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
ab st
ra ct
ed f
ro m
t he
s ta
rt -u
p gl
uc os
e w
it hi
n 12
m on
th s
da te
t o
M ar
ch 3
1, 1
98 6.
of d
ia gn
os is
. 84
% –9
0% w
ho w
er e
no t
ta ki
ng i
ns ul
in ha
d bl
oo d
gl uc
os e
re co
rd ed
at l
ea st
e ve
ry 1
2 m
on th
s. 74
% (
fo r
bo th
H M
O a
nd F
F S
p ro
vi de
rs )
w ho
w er
e ta
ki ng
i ns
ul in
h ad
b lo
od gl
uc os
e re
co rd
ed a
t le
as t
ev er
y 6
m on
th s.
D ia
be te
s M
el li
tu s:
I nf
lu en
za V
ac ci
ne In
cl ud
es d
ia be
te s
ca re
c on
si st
en t
w it
h S
am e
as a
bo ve
. S
am e
as a
bo ve
. 19
% –6
2% r
ec ei
ve d
an R
et ch
in a
nd pr
ev ai
li ng
s ta
nd ar
ds o
f ca
re .
in fl
ue nz
a va
cc in
at io
n. P
re st
on ,
19 91
D ia
be te
s M
e l li
tu s
In c l
ud e s
v a r
io us
c om
po ne
nt s
of d
ia be
te s
36 8
a d ul
ts ≥
1 8
ye a r
s ol
d M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds f
ro m
F or
e a c
h c l
in ic
a l s
e t ti
ng ,
S ta
rf ie
ld c a
re c
on si
st e n
t w
it h
pr e v
a i li
ng s
ta nd
a r ds
di a g
no se
d w
it h
di a b
e t e s
, ph
ys ic
ia n
of fi
c e s,
th e
st ud
y re
po rt
s th
e e t
a l .,
19 94
of c
a r e .
fr om
a s
am pl
e of
2 ,0
24 co
m m
un it
y he
a l th
c e n
te rs
, a v
e r a g
e pe
rc e n
ta ge
o f
pa ti
e n ts
o f
13 5
pr ov
id e r
s. a n
d ho
sp it
a l o
ut pa
ti e n
t te
c h ni
c a l
qu a l
it y
in di
c a to
rs fa
c i li
ti e s
s am
pl e d
f ro
m fo
r di
a b e t
e s t
ha t
w e r
e no
t M
a r yl
a n d
M ed
ic a i
d c l
a i m
s m
e t .
E a c
h a v
e r a g
e w
a s da
ta ,
19 88
. lo
c a te
d in
t he
4 0%
–6 0%
ra ng
e .
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
269
co nt
in ue
s
P ep
ti c
U lc
er D
is ea
se P
ep ti
c U
lc er
D is
ea se
: T
re at
m en
t P
eo pl
e w
it h
H .
py lo
ri p
ep ti
c ul
ce r
di se
as e
A bo
ut 3
,5 71
M ed
ic ai
d C
om pu
te ri
ze d
in pa
ti en
t, 11
% o
f pa
ti en
ts r
ec ei
ve d
T ha
m er
(P U
D )
sh ou
ld b
e pr
es cr
ib ed
a nt
im ic
ro bi
al be
ne fi
ci ar
ie s
≥ 18
y ea
rs o
ld ou
tp at
ie nt
, an
d an
ti m
ic ro
bi al
s w
it hi
n fi
ve et
al .,
19 98
th er
ap y
fo r
th e
in fe
ct io
n, a
s st
ro ng
ly w
ho r
ec ei
ve d
ca re
f or
P U
D ph
ar m
ac eu
ti ca
l cl
ai m
s fi
le s
da ys
o f
a P
U D
e nc
ou nt
er .
re co
m m
en de
d by
t he
N at
io na
l In
st it
ut es
o f
an d
w ho
w er
e no
t re
ce iv
in g
of t
he P
en ns
yl va
ni a
H ea
lt h
C on
se ns
us D
ev el
op m
en t
no ns
te ro
id al
M ed
ic ai
d P
ro gr
am ,
M ar
ch C
on fe
re nc
e in
F eb
ru ar
y 19
94 .
an ti
in fl
am m
at or
y dr
ug s.
19 94
, to
F eb
ru ar
y 19
96 .
H yp
er te
n si
on H
yp er
te ns
io n:
T re
at m
en t
H yp
er te
ns io
n (h
ig h
bl oo
d pr
es su
re )
is a
24 6
pa ti
en ts
> 3
0 ye
ar s
ol d
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f or
41 %
–5 4%
o f
pa ti
en ts
h ad
U dv
ar he
ly i
le ad
in g
ri sk
f ac
to r
fo r
co ro
na ry
h ea
rt w
it h
ch ro
ni c
un co
m pl
ic at
ed pa
ti en
ts f
ro m
f ou
r gr
ou p
th ei
r hy
pe rt
en si
on et
a l.
, 19
91 di
se as
e, c
on ge
st iv
e he
ar t
fa il
ur e,
s tr
ok e,
hy pe
rt en
si on
. pr
ac ti
ce s
in M
as sa
ch us
et ts
, co
nt ro
ll ed
( m
ea n
bl oo
d ru
pt ur
ed a
or ti
c an
eu ry
sm ,
re na
l di
se as
e, N
ov em
be r
1, 1
98 5,
t o
pr es
su re
< 1
50 /9
0) .
an d
re ti
no pa
th y,
a ll
o f
w hi
ch c
on tr
ib ut
e to
O ct
ob er
3 1,
1 98
7. hi
gh m
or bi
di ty
a nd
m or
ta li
ty (
U .S
. P
re ve
nt iv
e S
er vi
ce s
T as
k F
or ce
, 19
89 ).
T hi
s w
as r
ei te
ra te
d in
1 99
6 (U
.S .
P re
ve nt
iv e
S er
vi ce
s T
as k
F or
ce ,
19 96
).
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
N at
io na
ll y
re pr
es en
ta ti
ve N
at io
na l
H ea
lt h
an d
55 %
o f
pe op
le w
it h
Jo in
t sa
m pl
e of
U .S
. a d
ul ts
w it
h N
ut ri
ti on
E xa
m in
a t io
n hy
pe rt
e n si
on h
ad b
lo od
N a t
io na
l hy
pe rt
e n si
on (
sa m
pl e
si z e
S ur
ve y
II I,
1 98
8– 19
91 .
pr e s
su re
u nd
e r c
on tr
ol C
om m
it te
e no
t a v
a i la
bl e )
. (b
lo od
p re
ss ur
e <
1 60
/9 5
on on
o ne
o c c
a s io
n a n
d D
e t e c
ti on
, re
po rt
e d c
ur re
nt ly
t a k
in g
19 93
an ti
hy pe
rt e n
si ve
m ed
ic a t
io ns
); 2
1% w
he n
us in
g st
ri c t
c ri
te ri
a (b
lo od
pr e s
su re
< 1
40 /9
0 a n
d re
po rt
e d c
ur re
nt ly
t a k
in g
an ti
hy pe
rt e n
si ve
m ed
ic a t
io ns
).
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
270 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
8, 69
7 ad
ul ts
≥ 1
8 ye
ar s
ol d
N H
IS ,
19 90
. 89
% o
f ad
ul ts
w it
h C
D C
, 19
94 b
di ag
no se
d w
it h
hy pe
rt en
si on
r ec
ei ve
d hy
pe rt
en si
on f
ro m
a s
am pl
e ad
vi ce
f ro
m a
p hy
si ci
an of
3 6,
61 0
pe op
le ab
ou t
co nt
ro ll
in g
re pr
es en
ta ti
ve o
f th
e U
.S .
hy pe
rt en
si on
( i.
e. ,
ta ki
ng po
pu la
ti on
. an
ti hy
pe rt
en si
ve m
ed ic
at io
n, d
ec re
as in
g sa
lt in
ta ke
, lo
si ng
w ei
gh t,
o r
ex er
ci si
ng );
8 0%
r ep
or te
d ta
ki ng
a t
le as
t on
e ac
ti on
t o
co nt
ro l
hy pe
rt en
si on
.
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
59 3
ad ul
ts ≥
1 8
ye ar
s ol
d M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
ro m
F or
e ac
h ty
pe o
f cl
in ic
al S
ta rf
ie ld
di ag
no se
d w
it h
ph ys
ic ia
n of
fi ce
s, se
tt in
g, t
he s
tu dy
r ep
or ts
et al
., 19
94 hy
pe rt
en si
on ,
fr om
a co
m m
un it
y he
al th
c en
te rs
, th
e av
er ag
e pe
rc en
ta ge
o f
sa m
pl e
of 2
,0 24
p at
ie nt
s of
an d
ho sp
it al
o ut
pa ti
en t
te ch
ni ca
l qu
al it
y in
di ca
to rs
13 5
pr ov
id e r
s. fa
c i li
ti e s
s am
pl e d
f ro
m fo
r hy
pe rt
e n si
on t
ha t
w e r
e M
a r yl
a n d
M ed
ic a i
d c l
a i m
s no
t m
e t .
E a c
h a v
e r a g
e fe
ll da
ta ,
19 88
. in
t he
4 0%
–5 5%
r a n
ge .
M en
ta l
H ea
lt h
D ep
re ss
io n:
D e t
e c ti
on In
c l ud
e s d
ia gn
os ti
c c r
it e r
ia c
on si
st e n
t w
it h
65 0
pa ti
e n ts
w it
h c u
rr e n
t M
ed ic
a l O
ut c o
m e s
S tu
dy i
n 44
% –5
1% o
f de
pr e s
se d
W e l
ls e
t a l
., pr
e v a i
li ng
s ta
nd a r
ds o
f c a
re .
de pr
e s si
ve d
is or
de r
fr om
a th
re e
c i ti
e s (
B os
to n,
pa ti
e n ts
w ho
v is
it e d
g e n
e r a l
19 89
sa m
pl e
of 2
2, 46
2 a d
ul t
C hi
c a go
, L
os A
ng e l
e s );
m ed
ic a l
c li
ni c i
a n s
ha d
th e i
r pa
ti e n
ts w
ho v
is it
e d o
ne qu
e s ti
on na
ir e s
c om
pl e t
e d de
pr e s
si on
d e t
e c te
d du
ri ng
la rg
e H
M O
; se
ve ra
l F
e b ru
a r y
to O
c t ob
e r 1
98 6;
th e
vi si
t. 7
8% –9
4% o
f
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
271
co nt
in ue
s
m ul
ti sp
ec ia
lt y,
m ix
ed -g
ro up
ph on
e in
te rv
ie w
s co
m pl
et ed
de pr
es se
d pa
ti en
ts w
ho pr
ac ti
ce s;
s in
gl e-
sp ec
ia li
st M
ay t
o D
ec em
be r
19 86
. vi
si te
d m
en ta
l he
al th
sm al
l gr
ou p
pr ac
ti ce
s; o
r sp
ec ia
li st
s ha
d th
ei r
so lo
p ra
ct ic
e pr
ov id
er s
in de
pr es
si on
d et
ec te
d du
ri ng
ea ch
c it
y du
ri ng
t he
s tu
dy th
e vi
si t.
pe ri
od .
D ep
re ss
io n:
T re
at m
en t
In cl
ud es
v ar
io us
c om
po ne
nt s
of d
ep re
ss io
n S
am e
as a
bo ve
. S
am e
as a
bo ve
. 50
% –5
8% o
f de
pr es
se d
W el
ls e
t al
., ca
re c
on si
st en
t w
it h
pr ev
ai li
ng s
ta nd
ar ds
pa ti
en ts
w ho
v is
it ed
g en
er al
19 89
of c
ar e.
m ed
ic al
c li
ni ci
an s
re ce
iv ed
ap pr
op ri
at e
ca re
( th
e de
pr es
si on
w as
d et
ec te
d, an
d th
ey w
er e
co un
se le
d or
re fe
rr ed
t o
a m
en ta
l he
al th
sp ec
ia li
st o
r an
ot he
r cl
in ic
ia n
w as
n ot
ed t
o be
pr ov
id in
g th
e m
aj or
it y
of th
e pa
ti en
t’ s
ca re
). 8
3% –
93 %
o f
de pr
es se
d pa
ti en
ts w
ho v
is it
e d m
en ta
l he
a l th
sp e c
ia li
st s
re c e
iv e d
a p pr
op ri
a t e
c a re
. D
ep re
ss io
n: A
dm is
si on
A ss
e s sm
e n t
In c l
ud e s
v a r
io us
c om
po ne
nt s
of d
e p re
ss io
n 1,
19 8
pa ti
e n ts
h os
pi ta
li z e
d M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds f
or A
s pa
rt o
f a d
m is
si on
W e l
ls e
t a l
., c a
re c
on si
st e n
t w
it h
pr e v
a i li
ng s
ta nd
a r ds
w it
h de
pr e s
si on
, M
ed ic
a r e
pa ti
e n ts
f ro
m 2
97 a s
se ss
m en
t, 2
3% o
f pa
ti e n
ts 19
93 of
c a r
e . re
pr e s
e n ta
ti ve
o f
a l l
ho sp
it a l
s in
f iv
e st
a t e s
di d
no t
ha ve
a de
qu a t
e M
ed ic
a r e
e l de
rl y
pa ti
e n ts
(C a l
if or
ni a ,
F lo
ri da
, ps
yc ho
lo gi
c a l
a s se
ss m
en t,
ho sp
it a l
iz e d
i n
ge ne
ra l
In di
a n a ,
P e n
ns yl
va ni
a , 26
% d
id n
ot h
a v e
c o gn
it iv
e m
ed ic
a l h
os pi
ta ls
w it
h a
T e x
a s ),
J ul
y 1,
1 98
5, t
o a s
se ss
m en
t, 5
0% d
id n
ot di
sc ha
rg e
di a g
no si
s of
Ju ne
3 0,
1 98
6. ha
ve a
ss e s
sm en
t of
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
272 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
de pr
es si
on .
ps yc
ho si
s, 1
9% d
id n
ot ha
ve d
oc um
en ta
ti on
o f
ps yc
hi at
ri c
hi st
or y,
4 7%
di d
no t
ha ve
d oc
um en
ta ti
on of
w he
th er
p at
ie nt
h ad
a hi
st or
y of
s ui
ci de
a tt
em pt
s or
i de
at io
n, 2
4% d
id n
ot ha
ve d
oc um
en ta
ti on
o f
pr io
r or
c ur
re nt
m ed
ic at
io n
us e,
a nd
4 5%
d id
n ot
h av
e do
cu m
en ta
ti on
t ha
t he
ar t
so un
ds w
er e
ex am
in ed
. M
ea n
nu m
be r
of co
m po
ne nt
s of
n eu
ro lo
gi c
ex am
in at
io n
(a ss
es sm
en t
of pu
pi ls
, de
ep t
en do
n re
fl e x
e s ,
a n d
ga it
) pe
rf or
m ed
w a s
1 .4
.
M en
ta l/
A d
d ic
ti ve
D is
or d
e r In
c l ud
e s d
ia gn
os ti
c c r
it e r
ia a
nd t
re a t
m en
t P
eo pl
e w
it h
m en
ta l
or N
a t io
na l
In st
it ut
e of
M en
ta l
29 %
o f
pe op
le w
it h
a n y
R eg
ie r
e t a l
., c o
ns is
te nt
w it
h pr
e v a i
li ng
s ta
nd a r
ds o
f a d
di c t
iv e
di so
rd e r
f ro
m a
H e a
lt h’
s E
pi de
m io
lo gi
c m
en ta
l or
a dd
ic ti
ve 19
93 c a
re .
sa m
pl e
of 2
0, 29
1 a d
ul ts
C a t
c h m
en t
A re
a st
ud y
di so
rd e r
r e c
e i ve
d so
m e
≥ 18
y e a
rs o
ld .
in te
rv ie
w s,
1 98
0– 19
85 .
pr of
e s si
on a l
o r
vo lu
nt a r
y m
en ta
l he
a l th
s e r
vi c e
du ri
ng t
he p
ri or
1 2
m on
th s,
a s d
id 3
2% o
f pe
op le
w it
h a n
y di
so rd
e r e
xc e p
t
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
273
co nt
in ue
s
su bs
ta nc
e us
e, 3
7% o
f pe
op le
w it
h an
y m
en ta
l di
so rd
er w
it h
co m
or bi
d su
bs ta
nc e
us e,
2 4%
o f
pe op
le w
it h
su bs
ta nc
e us
e (e
.g .,
al co
ho l)
, 64
% o
f pe
op le
w it
h sc
hi zo
ph re
ni a,
46 %
o f
pe op
le w
it h
an y
af fe
ct iv
e di
so rd
er (
e. g.
, de
pr es
si on
), 3
3% o
f pe
op le
w it
h an
y an
xi et
y di
so rd
er (e
.g .,
ob se
ss iv
e- co
m pu
ls iv
e) ,
70 %
o f
pe op
le w
it h
so m
at iz
at io
n, 3
1% o
f pe
op le
w it
h an
ti so
ci al
p er
so na
li ty
di so
rd er
, an
d 17
% o
f pe
op le
w it
h se
ve re
c og
ni ti
ve im
pa ir
m en
t. Sc
hi zo
ph re
ni a:
T re
at m
en t
In cl
ud es
v ar
io us
c om
po ne
nt s
of 22
4 pa
ti en
ts f
ro m
a r
an do
m P
at ie
nt i
nt er
vi ew
s an
d 70
% o
f pa
ti en
ts w
it h
Y ou
ng sc
hi z o
ph re
ni a
c a re
c on
si st
e n t
w it
h sa
m pl
e of
p a t
ie nt
s 18
–6 5
m ed
ic a l
r e c
or ds
f ro
m a
si gn
if ic
a n t
ps yc
ho ti
c e t
a l .,
19 98
pr e v
a i li
ng s
ta nd
a r ds
o f
c a re
. ye
a r s
ol d
w it
h sc
hi z o
ph re
ni a
V e t
e r a n
s A
ff a i
rs M
ed ic
a l sy
m pt
om s
re c e
iv e d
p oo
r or
s c h
iz oa
ff e c
ti ve
d is
or de
r C
e n te
r c l
in ic
a nd
a m
an ag
em en
t of
t he
ir w
ho h
ad b
e e n
tr e a
te d
a t t
he c o
m m
un it
y m
en ta
l he
a l th
sy m
pt om
s, a
nd 7
9% o
f c l
in ic
f or
> 3
m on
th s,
h a d
c e nt
e r c
li ni
c du
ri ng
a pa
ti e n
ts w
it h
si gn
if ic
a n t
be e n
h os
pi ta
li z e
d <
2 1
da ys
3- m
on th
p e r
io d
in e
a r ly
m ed
ic a t
io n
si de
e ff
e c ts
du ri
ng t
he p
ri or
3 m
on th
s, 19
96 .
(a ka
th is
ia ,
pa rk
in so
ni sm
, a n
d ha
d >
1 vi
si t
w it
h a
ta rd
iv e
dy sk
in e s
ia )
re c e
iv e d
ps yc
hi a t
ri st
d ur
in g
th e
po or
m an
ag em
en t
of t
he sa
m pl
in g
pe ri
od .
si de
e ff
e c ts
. 35
% o
f pa
ti e n
ts w
it h
se ve
re
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
274 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
di sa
bi li
ty w
er e
no t
re ce
iv in
g ca
se m
an ag
em en
t. 57
% o
f pa
ti en
ts i
n cl
os e
co nt
ac t
w it
h fa
m il
y m
em be
rs h
ad n
o co
m m
un ic
at io
n be
tw ee
n th
e cl
in ic
a nd
t he
f am
il y.
C an
ce r
B re
as t
C an
ce r:
D ia
gn os
is P
at ie
nt s
w it
h br
ea st
c an
ce r
ha ve
b et
te r
5, 76
6 ne
w ly
d ia
gn os
ed D
at a
su bm
it te
d to
A m
er ic
an T
he a
ve ra
ge r
at e
ac ro
ss H
an d
et a
l. ,
ou tc
om es
i f
di ag
no si
s is
m ad
e at
a n
ea rl
y pa
ti en
ts w
it h
hi st
ol og
ic al
ly C
an ce
r S
oc ie
ty ,
Il li
no is
ho sp
it al
s of
p at
ie nt
s 19
91 st
ag e.
co nf
ir m
ed b
re as
t ca
nc er
. D
iv is
io n,
C hi
ca go
, by
9 9
di ag
no se
d w
it h
ca nc
er a
t a
ho sp
it al
s ou
t of
1 04
I ll
in oi
s la
te s
ta ge
( II
b th
ro ug
h IV
) ho
sp it
al s
w it
h ac
ti ve
c an
ce r
w as
1 8%
. re
gi st
ri es
, 19
88 .
B re
as t
C an
c e r:
D ia
gn os
is P
a t ie
nt s
w it
h br
e a st
c a n
c e r
ha ve
b e t
te r
2, 95
8 ne
w ly
d ia
gn os
e d S
am e
a s a
bo ve
. T
he a
ve ra
ge r
a t e
a c ro
ss H
a n d
e t a
l. ,
ou tc
om e s
i f
ho rm
on e
re c e
pt or
l e v
e l s
in pa
ti e n
ts w
it h
hi st
ol og
ic a l
ly ho
sp it
a l s
of p
a t ie
nt s
w ho
19 91
tu m
or t
is su
e a r
e de
te rm
in ed
. c o
nf ir
m ed
S ta
ge I
I– IV
di d
no t
ha ve
a h
or m
on e
br e a
st c
a n c e
r. re
c e pt
or t
e s t
w a s
1 1%
.
D ia
gn os
is s
ho ul
d be
m ad
e w
it h
fi ne
n e e
dl e
91 8
in su
re d
w om
en ≤
6 4
D a t
a c o
ll e c
te d
by V
ir gi
ni a
92 %
h ad
i ni
ti a l
b io
ps y
H il
ln e r
a s pi
ra ti
on ,
c y to
lo gy
, li
m it
e d i
nc is
io na
l ye
a r s
ol d
w it
h lo
c a l/
C a n
c e r
R e g
is tr
y fr
om 5
0 pr
io r
to t
ot a l
m a s
te c t
om y.
e t a l
., 19
97 bi
op sy
, or
d e f
in it
iv e
w id
e lo
c a l
e x c i
si on
. re
gi on
a l i
nv a s
iv e
br e a
st ho
sp it
a l s
th a t
r e p
re se
nt e d
c a nc
e r S
ta ge
I o
r II
. 85
% o
f V
ir gi
ni a
ho sp
it a l
be ds
, a n
d c l
a i m
s da
ta f
ro m
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
275
co nt
in ue
s
T ri
go n
B lu
e C
ro ss
B lu
e S
hi el
d of
V ir
gi ni
a, 1
98 9–
19 91
.
B re
as t
C an
ce r:
T re
at m
en t
In cl
ud es
v ar
io us
c om
po ne
nt s
of b
re as
t 19
9 w
om en
5 0–
69 y
ea rs
o ld
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f ro
m s
ev en
67 %
o f
w om
en ≥
7 0
ye ar
s G
re en
fi el
d ca
nc er
t re
at m
en t
co ns
is te
nt w
it h
pr ev
ai li
ng an
d 17
5 w
om en
≥ 7
0 ye
ar s
ho sp
it al
s in
s ou
th er
n ol
d re
ce iv
ed a
pp ro
pr ia
te et
a l.
, 19
87 st
an da
rd s
of c
ar e.
ol d
w it
h ad
en oc
ar ci
no m
a of
C al
if or
ni a,
f or
w om
en w
it h
tr ea
tm en
t, c
om pa
re d
w it
h th
e br
ea st
r ec
ei vi
ng p
ri m
ar y
br ea
st c
an ce
r di
ag no
se d
in 83
% o
f w
om en
5 0–
69 y
ea rs
ca nc
er m
an ag
em en
t at
a 19
80 ,
to 1
98 2.
ol d.
A ft
er c
on tr
ol li
ng f
or pa
rt ic
ip at
in g
ho sp
it al
. co
m or
bi di
ty ,
ho sp
it al
, an
d ca
nc er
s ta
ge ,
a di
ff er
en ce
i n
ap pr
op ri
at en
es s
re la
te d
to ag
e pe
rs is
te d.
B re
as t
co ns
er va
ti on
, de
fi ne
d as
e xc
is io
n of
8, 09
5 w
om en
w it
h a
fi rs
t D
at a
fr om
t he
S ea
tt le
-P ug
et 34
% h
ad b
re as
t- co
ns er
vi ng
L az
ov ic
h th
e tu
m or
a nd
s ur
ro un
di ng
t is
su e,
w it
h pr
im ar
y br
ea st
c an
ce r,
S ou
nd c
an ce
r re
gi st
ry ,
su rg
er y.
et al
., 19
91 ax
il la
ry d
is se
ct io
n, f
ol lo
w ed
b y
ra di
at io
n S
ta ge
I o
r II
. w
hi ch
c ov
er s
ca nc
er c
as es
th er
ap y,
w as
p re
fe ra
bl e
to m
as te
ct om
y fo
r in
1 3
w es
te rn
W as
hi ng
to n
th e
m aj
or it
y of
w om
en w
it h
S ta
ge I
o r
II co
un ti
es a
nd i
s pa
rt o
f th
e br
e a st
c a n
c e r,
a s
su pp
or te
d by
c li
ni c a
l S
ur ve
il la
nc e ,
E pi
de m
io lo
gy ,
tr ia
ls a
nd a
1 99
0 N
IH C
on se
ns us
a n d
E nd
R e s
ul ts
( S
E E
R )
C on
fe re
nc e
(N IH
C on
se ns
us C
on fe
re nc
e , pr
og ra
m o
f th
e N
a t io
na l
19 91
). C
a n c e
r In
st it
ut e ,
1 98
3– 19
89 .
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
2, 65
7 w
om en
w it
h c o
m pl
e t e
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
85 %
r e c
e i ve
d ra
di a t
io n
re c o
rd s
ou t
of 2
,7 31
w om
en th
e r a p
y. w
it h
a fi
rs t
pr im
a r y
br e a
st c a
nc e r
, S
ta ge
I o
r II
, w
ho un
de rw
e n t
br e a
st -c
on se
rv in
g su
rg e r
y.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
276 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
4, 31
1 ne
w ly
d ia
gn os
ed D
at a
su bm
it te
d to
A m
er ic
an T
he a
ve ra
ge r
at e
ac ro
ss H
an d
et a
l. ,
pa ti
en ts
w it
h hi
st ol
og ic
al ly
C an
ce r
S oc
ie ty
, Il
li no
is ho
sp it
al s
of p
at ie
nt s
w ho
19 91
co nf
ir m
ed S
ta ge
I –I
I br
ea st
D iv
is io
n, C
hi ca
go ,
by 9
9 di
d no
t re
ce iv
e ra
di ot
he ra
py ca
nc er
. ho
sp it
al s
ou t
of 1
04 I
ll in
oi s
af te
r pa
rt ia
l m
as te
ct om
y ho
sp it
al s
w it
h ac
ti ve
c an
ce r
w as
4 8%
. re
gi st
ri es
, 19
88 .
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
91 8
in su
re d
w om
en ≤
6 4
D at
a co
ll ec
te d
by V
ir gi
ni a
86 %
r ec
ei ve
d lo
ca l
br ea
st H
il ln
er ye
ar s
ol d
w it
h lo
ca l/
re gi
on al
C an
ce r
R eg
is tr
y fr
om 5
0 ra
di at
io n
fo ll
ow in
g et
al .,
19 97
in va
si ve
b re
as t
ca nc
er S
ta ge
ho sp
it al
s th
at r
ep re
se nt
ed lu
m pe
ct om
y. I
or I
I. 85
% o
f V
ir gi
ni a
ho sp
it al
be ds
a nd
c la
im s
da ta
f ro
m T
ri go
n B
lu e
C ro
ss B
lu e
S hi
el d
of V
ir gi
ni a,
1 98
9– 19
91 .
P a t
ie nt
s w
it h
br e a
st c
a n c e
r ha
ve b
e t te
r 2,
24 8
ne w
ly d
ia gn
os e d
D a t
a su
bm it
te d
to A
m e r
ic a n
T he
a ve
ra ge
r a t
e a c
ro ss
H a n
d e t
a l.
, ou
tc om
e s i
f a d
ju va
nt t
he ra
py i
s gi
ve n
to pa
ti e n
ts w
it h
hi st
ol og
ic a l
ly C
an c e
r S
oc ie
ty ,
Il li
no is
ho sp
it a l
s of
p a t
ie nt
s w
ho 19
91 pa
ti e n
ts w
it h
S ta
ge I
I ne
op la
sm s.
c o nf
ir m
ed S
ta ge
I I
br e a
st D
iv is
io n,
C hi
c a go
, by
9 9
di d
no t
re c e
iv e
a d ju
va nt
c a nc
e r .
ou t
of 1
04 I
ll in
oi s
ho sp
it a l
s th
e r a p
y w
a s 4
4% .
w it
h a c
ti ve
c a n
c e r
re gi
st ri
e s ,
19 88
.
P re
m en
op au
sa l,
n od
e – po
si ti
ve w
om en
w it
h 91
8 in
su re
d w
om en
≤ 6
4 D
a t a
c o ll
e c te
d by
V ir
gi ni
a 83
% o
f pr
em en
op au
sa l
H il
ln e r
lo c a
l/ re
gi on
a l b
re a s
t c a
nc e r
s ho
ul d
re c e
iv e
ye a r
s ol
d w
it h
lo c a
l/ C
a n c e
r R
e g is
tr y
fr om
5 0
w om
en w
it h
a t l
e a st
o ne
e t a l
., 19
97 ad
ju va
nt c
he m
ot he
ra py
. re
gi on
a l i
nv a s
iv e
br e a
st ho
sp it
a l s
th a t
r e p
re se
nt e d
po si
ti ve
a xi
ll a r
y no
de c a
nc e r
S ta
ge I
o r
II .
85 %
o f
V ir
gi ni
a ho
sp it
a l re
c e iv
e d a
dj uv
an t
be ds
, a n
d c l
a i m
s da
ta f
ro m
ch em
ot he
ra py
.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
277
co nt
in ue
s
T ri
go n
B lu
e C
ro ss
B lu
e S
hi el
d of
V ir
gi ni
a, 1
98 9,
to 1
99 1.
P at
ie nt
s w
it h
br ea
st c
an ce
r ha
ve b
et te
r 4,
31 1
ne w
ly d
ia gn
os ed
D at
a su
bm it
te d
to A
m er
ic an
T he
a ve
ra ge
r at
e ac
ro ss
H an
d et
a l.
, ou
tc om
es i
f ax
il la
ry l
ym ph
n od
e di
ss ec
ti on
pa ti
en ts
w it
h hi
st ol
og ic
al ly
C an
ce r
S oc
ie ty
, Il
li no
is ho
sp it
al s
of p
at ie
nt s
w ho
19 91
is d
on e
as p
ar t
of t
he s
ur gi
ca l
tr ea
tm en
t co
nf ir
m ed
S ta
ge I
-I I
br ea
st D
iv is
io n,
C hi
ca go
, by
9 9
di d
no t
ha ve
a l
ym ph
n od
e w
it h
S ta
ge I
a nd
I I
ne op
la sm
s. ca
nc er
ho sp
it al
s ou
t of
1 04
I ll
in oi
s di
ss ec
ti on
w as
9 %
. ho
sp it
al s
w it
h ac
ti ve
c an
ce r
re gi
st ri
es ,
19 88
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
91 8
in su
re d
w om
en ≤
6 4
D at
a co
ll ec
te d
by V
ir gi
ni a
88 %
u nd
er w
en t
ax il
la ry
H il
ln er
ye ar
s ol
d w
it h
lo ca
l/ C
an ce
r R
eg is
tr y
fr om
5 0
no de
d is
se ct
io n.
et al
., 19
97 re
gi on
al i
nv as
iv e
br ea
st ho
sp it
al s
th at
r ep
re se
nt ed
ca nc
er S
ta ge
I o
r II
. 85
% o
f V
ir gi
ni a
ho sp
it al
be ds
, an
d cl
ai m
s da
ta f
ro m
T ri
go n
B lu
e C
ro ss
B lu
e S
hi el
d of
V ir
gi ni
a, 1
98 9–
91 .
W om
en w
it h
e a rl
y st
a g e
br e a
st c
a r c i
no m
a 1,
29 2
w om
en w
ho M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds ,
pa ti
e n t
84 %
–8 6%
r e c
e i ve
d G
ua da
gn ol
i (T
N M
S ta
ge s
I a n
d II
) w
ho u
nd e r
go un
de rw
e n t
br e a
st -c
on se
rv in
g su
rv ey
s, a
nd p
hy si
c i a n
ra di
a t io
n th
e r a p
y a f
te r
e t a
l. ,
19 98
br e a
st -c
on se
rv in
g su
rg e r
y sh
ou ld
t he
n su
rg e r
y fr
om a
s am
pl e
of su
rv e y
s fo
r pa
ti e n
ts f
ro m
br e a
st -c
on se
rv in
g su
rg e r
y. re
c e iv
e ra
di a t
io n
th e r
a p y.
2, 57
5 w
om en
w it
h e a
rl y-
18 M
a s sa
c h us
e t ts
h os
pi ta
ls st
a g e
br e a
st c
a r c i
no m
a , fr
om a
s tr
a t if
ie d
ra nd
om ex
c l ud
in g
pa ti
e n ts
f or
w ho
m sa
m pl
e of
2 0,
f ro
m na
ti on
a l r
e c om
m en
da ti
on s
S ep
te m
be r
19 93
, to
w e r
e no
t li
ke ly
t o
a p pl
y. S
ep te
m be
r 19
95 ,
a n d
fr om
30 M
in ne
so ta
h os
pi ta
ls ,
fr om
J a n
ua ry
1 99
3, t
o D
e c em
be r
19 93
.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
278 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
F or
e ar
ly -s
ta ge
b re
as t
ca rc
in om
a (T
N M
2, 55
9 w
om en
w ho
h ad
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
81 %
–9 4%
u nd
er w
en t
G ua
da gn
ol i
S ta
ge s
I an
d II
), a
xi ll
ar y
ly m
ph n
od e
ax il
la ry
l ym
ph n
od e
ax il
la ry
l ym
ph n
od e
et a
l. ,
19 98
di ss
ec ti
on s
ho ul
d be
p er
fo rm
ed .
di ss
ec ti
on f
ro m
a s
am pl
e of
di ss
ec ti
on .
2, 57
5 w
om en
w it
h ea
rl y-
st ag
e br
ea st
c ar
ci no
m a,
ex cl
ud in
g pa
ti en
ts f
or w
ho m
na ti
on al
r ec
om m
en da
ti on
s w
er e
no t
li ke
ly t
o ap
pl y.
F or
e ar
ly -s
ta ge
b re
as t
ca rc
in om
a (T
N M
22 8
pr em
en op
au sa
l w
om en
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
94 %
–9 7%
r ec
ei ve
d G
ua da
gn ol
i S
ta ge
s I
an d
II ),
p re
m en
op au
sa l
w om
en w
it h
po si
ti ve
l ym
ph n
od es
ch em
ot he
ra py
. et
a l.
, 19
98 w
it h
po si
ti ve
l ym
ph n
od es
s ho
ul d
re ce
iv e
fr om
a s
am pl
e of
2 ,5
75 ch
em ot
he ra
py .
w om
en w
it h
ea rl
y- st
ag e
br ea
st c
ar ci
no m
a, e
xc lu
di ng
pa ti
en ts
f or
w ho
m n
at io
na l
re co
m m
en da
ti on
s w
er e
no t
li ke
ly t
o a p
pl y.
F or
e a r
ly -s
ta ge
b re
a s t
c a rc
in om
a (T
N M
16 8
po st
m en
op au
sa l
w om
en S
am e
a s a
bo ve
. 59
% –6
3% r
e c e i
ve d
G ua
da gn
ol i
S ta
ge s
I a n
d II
), p
os tm
en op
au sa
l w
om en
w it
h po
si ti
ve l
ym ph
n od
e s ho
rm on
a l t
he ra
py .
e t a
l. ,
19 98
w it
h po
si ti
ve l
ym ph
n od
e s a
nd p
os it
iv e
a n d
po si
ti ve
e st
ro ge
n e s
tr og
en r
e c e p
to r
st a t
us s
ho ul
d re
c e iv
e re
c e pt
or s
ta tu
s fr
om a
ho rm
on a l
t he
ra py
. sa
m pl
e of
2 ,5
75 w
om en
w it
h e a
rl y-
st a g
e br
e a st
c a rc
in om
a , e
xc lu
di ng
pa ti
e n ts
f or
w ho
m n
a t io
na l
re c o
m m
en da
ti on
s w
e r e
no t
li ke
ly t
o a p
pl y.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
279
co nt
in ue
s
B re
as t
C an
ce r:
F ol
lo w
-u p
A nn
ua l
m am
m og
ra ph
y is
a pp
ro pr
ia te
f or
91 8
in su
re d
w om
en ≤
6 4
D at
a co
ll ec
te d
by V
ir gi
ni a
79 %
o f
w om
en h
ad a
H il
ln er
w om
en w
ho h
av e
ha d
lo ca
l/ re
gi on
al b
re as
t ye
ar s
ol d
w it
h lo
ca l/
re gi
on al
C an
ce r
R eg
is tr
y fr
om 5
0 m
am m
og ra
m w
it hi
n th
e et
al .,
19 97
ca nc
er .
in va
si ve
b re
as t
ca nc
er S
ta ge
ho sp
it al
s th
at r
ep re
se nt
ed fi
rs t
18 m
on th
s I
or I
I. 85
% o
f V
ir gi
ni a
ho sp
it al
po st
op er
at iv
el y.
be ds
, an
d cl
ai m
s da
ta f
ro m
T ri
go n
B lu
e C
ro ss
B lu
e S
hi el
d of
V ir
gi ni
a, 1
98 9–
19 91
.
C ar
d io
va sc
u la
r D
is ea
se C
ar di
ov as
cu la
r D
is ea
se :
B lo
od C
ho le
st er
ol T
es ti
ng C
li ni
ca l
tr ia
ls h
av e
sh ow
n a
30 %
–5 0%
60 3
pa ti
en ts
2 7–
70 y
ea rs
P hy
si ci
an s
ur ve
y, p
at ie
nt 96
% h
ad t
ot al
c ho
le st
er ol
M cB
ri de
re du
ct io
n in
m or
bi di
ty a
nd m
or ta
li ty
r at
es ol
d w
it h
C V
D .
su rv
ey ,
an d
m ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
le ve
ls ,
67 %
h ad
L D
L et
al .,
19 98
w it
h m
an ag
em en
t of
c ho
le st
er ol
l ev
el s
fo r
fr om
1 59
p hy
si ci
an s
in 4
5 va
lu es
, 90
% h
ad pa
ti en
ts w
it h
ca rd
io va
sc ul
ar d
is ea
se pr
im ar
y ca
re p
ra ct
ic es
i n
tr ig
ly ce
ri de
l ev
el s,
a nd
(C V
D ).
T he
A du
lt T
re at
m en
t P
an el
an d
ar ou
nd f
ou r
m id
w es
te rn
75 %
h ad
H D
L l
ev el
s (A
T P
-I I)
o f
th e
N at
io na
l C
ho le
st er
ol ci
ti es
: E
au C
la ir
e, re
co rd
ed i
n th
e pa
st 5
E du
ca ti
on P
ro gr
am r
ec om
m en
de d
W is
co ns
in ;
Io w
a C
it y,
ye ar
s. 7
2% w
it h
L D
L m
an ag
em en
t of
c ho
le st
er ol
i n
pa ti
en ts
w it
h Io
w a;
M ad
is on
, W
is co
ns in
; >
1 30
m g/
dL h
ad r
ec ei
ve d
C V
D w
it h
go a l
s of
L D
L l
e v e l
< 1
00 M
in ne
a p ol
is ,
M in
ne so
ta ;
di e t
c ou
ns e l
in g,
a nd
4 2%
m g/
dL a
nd t
ri gl
yc e r
id e
le ve
l <
2 00
m g/
dL A
ug us
t 19
93 ,
to F
e b ru
a r y
ha d
re c e
iv e d
c ho
le st
e r ol
– (N
C E
P ,
19 93
). 19
95 .
lo w
e r in
g m
ed ic
a t io
n; 5
8% w
it h
L D
L 1
00 –1
30 m
g/ dL
ha d
re c e
iv e d
d ie
t c o
un se
li ng
, a n
d 42
% h
ad re
c e iv
e d c
ho le
st e r
ol –
lo w
e r in
g m
ed ic
a t io
n.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
280 T
A B
L E
A -1
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
C or
on ar
y A
rt er
y D
is ea
se :
C or
on ar
y A
ng io
gr ap
hy C
or on
ar y
an gi
og ra
ph y
is a
m et
ho d
fo r
35 2
pa ti
en ts
w ho
m et
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f ro
m f
ou r
43 %
o f
pa ti
en ts
r ec
ei ve
d L
ao ur
i et
al .,
ev al
ua ti
ng c
or on
ar y
ar te
ry a
na to
m y
to ex
pl ic
it ly
d ef
in ed
c ri
te ri
a te
ac hi
ng h
os pi
ta ls
( th
re e
co ro
na ry
a ng
io gr
ap hy
19 97
de te
rm in
e w
he th
er a
p at
ie nt
i s
a ca
nd id
at e
fo r
ne ce
ss it
y of
c or
on ar
y pu
bl ic
, on
e pr
iv at
e) i
n L
os w
it hi
n 3
m on
th s
of t
he fo
r co
ro na
ry a
rt er
y by
pa ss
g ra
ft s
ur ge
ry o
r an
gi og
ra ph
y, f
ro m
a m
on g
A ng
el es
, C
al if
or ni
a an
d po
si ti
ve e
xe rc
is e
st re
ss t
es t;
pe rc
ut an
eo us
t ra
ns lu
m in
al c
or on
ar y
1, 35
0 po
si ti
ve e
xe rc
is e
pa ti
en t
te le
ph on
e in
te rv
ie w
s 56
% r
ec ei
ve d
co ro
na ry
an gi
op la
st y.
st re
ss t
es ts
i n
a ra
nd om
ly (w
it h
24 3
of t
he 3
52 an
gi og
ra ph
y w
it hi
n 12
se le
ct ed
s am
pl e
of 5
,8 50
pa ti
en ts
), J
an ua
ry 1
, 19
90 ,
m on
th s
of t
he p
os it
iv e
te st
. st
re ss
t es
ts .
to J
un e
30 ,
19 91
.
M yo
ca rd
ia l
In fa
rc ti
on (
M I)
: T
re at
m en
t w
it h
A sp
ir in
A sp
ir in
i s
an e
ff ec
ti ve
, in
ex pe
ns iv
e, a
nd 7,
91 7
M ed
ic ar
e pa
ti en
ts ≥
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f or
64 %
r ec
ei ve
d as
pi ri
n K
ru m
ho lz
sa fe
t re
at m
en t
fo r
a he
ar t
at ta
ck .
A sp
ir in
65 y
ea rs
o ld
h os
pi ta
li ze
d M
ed ic
ar e
be ne
fi ci
ar ie
s w
ho w
it hi
n th
e fi
rs t
2 da
ys o
f et
al .,
19 95
th er
ap y
re du
ce s
sh or
t- te
rm m
or ta
li ty
i n
w it
h he
ar t
at ta
ck w
ho w
er e
w er
e ho
sp it
al iz
ed i
n fo
ur ho
sp it
al iz
at io
n. pa
ti en
ts w
it h
su sp
ec te
d he
ar t
at ta
ck b
y “i
de al
” ca
nd id
at es
f or
st at
es (
A la
ba m
a, 23
% .
A sp
ir in
s ho
ul d
no t
be g
iv en
t o
tr ea
tm en
t w
it h
as pi
ri n,
w it
h C
on ne
ct ic
ut ,
Io w
a, pa
ti e n
ts w
it h
c e rt
a i n
c o nd
it io
ns (
e . g.
, no
p os
si bl
e c o
nt ra
in di
c a ti
on s
W is
c o ns
in ),
a s
pa rt
o f
th e
he m
or rh
a g ic
s tr
ok e ,
g a s
tr oi
nt e s
ti na
l to
a sp
ir in
t he
ra py
. C
oo pe
ra ti
ve C
a r di
ov a s
c u la
r bl
e e di
ng ).
P ro
je c t
P il
ot ,
Ju ne
1 ,
19 92
, to
F e b
ru a r
y 28
, 19
93 .
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
5, 49
0 M
ed ic
a r e
pa ti
e n ts
≥ S
am e
a s a
bo ve
. 76
% w
e r e
di sc
ha rg
e d w
it h
K ru
m ho
lz 65
y e a
rs o
ld h
os pi
ta li
z e d
in st
ru c t
io ns
t o
ta ke
a sp
ir in
. e t
a l .,
19 96
w it
h he
a r t
a t ta
c k w
ho w
e r e
P a t
ie nt
s w
ho w
e r e
a l iv
e a t
d is
c h a r
ge a
nd w
ho pr
e s c r
ib e d
a sp
ir in
a t
ha d
no c
on tr
a i nd
ic a t
io ns
t o
di sc
ha rg
e ha
d a
6- m
on th
a s pi
ri n
th e r
a p y.
m or
ta li
ty r
a t e
of 8
.4 %
, c o
m pa
re d
w it
h 17
% f
or
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
281
co nt
in ue
s
pa ti
en ts
n ot
p re
sc ri
be d
as pi
ri n.
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
7, 48
6 pa
ti en
ts w
ho w
er e
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
83 %
r ec
ei ve
d as
pi ri
n E
ll er
be ck
“i de
al ”
ca nd
id at
es f
or du
ri ng
h os
pi ta
li za
ti on
; 77
% et
al .,
19 95
tr ea
tm en
t w
it h
as pi
ri n
re ce
iv ed
a sp
ir in
p ri
or t
o or
du ri
ng i
ni ti
al h
os pi
ta li
za ti
on at
t im
e of
d is
ch ar
ge .
fr om
a s
am pl
e of
1 6,
12 4
M ed
ic ar
e pa
ti en
ts ho
sp it
al iz
ed w
it h
a pr
in ci
pa l
di ag
no si
s of
h ea
rt a
tt ac
k; 5,
84 1
pa ti
en ts
w ho
w er
e al
iv e
at d
is ch
ar ge
a nd
w ho
w er
e “i
de al
” ca
nd id
at es
f or
tr ea
tm en
t w
it h
as pi
ri n
pr io
r to
o r
at t
im e
of d
is ch
ar ge
, fr
om t
he s
am e
sa m
pl e.
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
18 7
pa ti
en ts
w it
h co
nf ir
m ed
M ed
ic ar
e m
or ta
li ty
d at
a 73
% r
ec ei
ve d
as pi
ri n
at M
ee ha
n he
ar t
at ta
ck w
ho w
er e
al iv
e is
su ed
b y
th e
H ea
lt h
C ar
e ti
m e
of d
is ch
ar ge
. et
al .,
19 95
a t d
is c h
a r ge
a nd
w ho
h ad
F in
an c i
ng A
dm in
is tr
a t io
n no
c on
tr a i
nd ic
a t io
ns t
o (H
C F
A )
a n d
m ed
ic a l
a s pi
ri n
th e r
a p y
fr om
a re
c o rd
s fo
r M
ed ic
a r e
sa m
pl e
of 3
00 M
ed ic
a r e
pa ti
e n ts
f ro
m s
ix h
os pi
ta ls
pa ti
e n ts
≥ 6
5 ye
a r s
ol d
in C
on ne
c t ic
ut ,
a s p
a r t
of ho
sp it
a l iz
e d w
it h
a pr
in c i
pa l
th e
M ed
ic a r
e H
os pi
ta l
di a g
no si
s of
h e a
rt a
tt a c
k. In
fo rm
a t io
n P
ro je
c t ,
O c t
ob e r
1 ,
19 88
, to
S ep
te m
be r
30 ,
19 91
.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
282
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
S ub
se t
of 2
,9 38
p at
ie nt
s M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
ro m
1 6
T he
m ed
ia n
pe rc
en ta
ge o
f S
ou m
er ai
w it
h ad
m it
ti ng
d ia
gn os
is o
f M
in ne
so ta
h os
pi ta
ls f
or el
ig ib
le p
at ie
nt s
≥ 65
y ea
rs et
al .,
19 98
M I.
pa ti
en ts
a dm
it te
d A
ug us
t 1,
ol d
re ce
iv in
g as
pi ri
n in
t he
19 95
, to
A pr
il 3
0, 1
99 6.
fi rs
t 48
h ou
rs o
f ho
sp it
al iz
at io
n w
as 7
7% .
U ns
ta bl
e A
ng in
a: T
re at
m en
t w
it h
A sp
ir in
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
38 4
pa ti
en ts
w ho
w er
e M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds a
nd 72
% r
ec ei
ve d
as pi
ri n
on K
ru m
ho lz
“i de
al ”
ca nd
id at
es f
or ad
m in
is tr
at iv
e da
ta f
or ad
m is
si on
( 66
% i
n 19
93 –
et al
., 19
98 tr
ea tm
en t
w it
h as
pi ri
n on
pa ti
en ts
w it
h M
ed ic
ar e
19 94
a nd
8 2%
i n
19 95
). ad
m is
si on
a nd
3 21
w ho
fr om
t hr
ee C
on ne
ct ic
ut 65
% w
er e
pr es
cr ib
ed w
er e
“i de
al ”
ca nd
id at
es f
or ho
sp it
al s,
1 99
3– 19
95 .
as pi
ri n
at d
is ch
ar ge
( 66
% as
pi ri
n at
d is
ch ar
ge ,
fr om
a in
1 99
3– 19
94 a
nd 7
9% i
n sa
m pl
e of
4 50
p at
ie nt
s ≥
65 19
95 ).
ye ar
s ol
d ho
sp it
al iz
ed w
it h
un st
ab le
a ng
in a.
U ns
ta bl
e A
ng in
a: T
re at
m e n
t w
it h
A sp
ir in
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
73 5
pa ti
e n ts
w ho
w e r
e M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds o
f 76
% r
e c e i
ve d
a s pi
ri n
S im
ps on
“ i de
a l ”
c a nd
id a t
e s f
or M
ed ic
a r e
be ne
fi c i
a r ie
s du
ri ng
t he
ir h
os pi
ta l
st a y
. e t
a l .,
19 97
tr e a
tm en
t w
it h
a s pi
ri n
di sc
ha rg
e d f
ro m
1 6
67 %
w e r
e pr
e s c r
ib e d
du ri
ng h
os pi
ta li
z a ti
on a
nd ho
sp it
a l s
in N
or th
C a r
ol in
a a s
pi ri
n a t
d is
c h a r
ge .
53 1
w ho
w e r
e “ i
de a l
” be
tw e e
n O
c t ob
e r 1
, 19
93 ,
c a nd
id a t
e s f
or a
sp ir
in a
t a n
d S
ep te
m be
r 30
, 19
94 .
di sc
ha rg
e , f
ro m
a s
am pl
e of
88 2
pa ti
e n ts
≥ 6
5 ye
a r s
ol d
w it
h un
st a b
le a
ng in
a .
T A
B L
E A
-1 C
on ti
nu ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
283 S
am e
as a
bo ve
. 2,
39 2
pa ti
en ts
w ho
w er
e M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
ro m
a cu
te 87
% r
ec ei
ve d
as pi
ri n
B er
ge r
“i de
al ”
ca nd
id at
es f
or ca
re h
os pi
ta ls
i n
M ar
yl an
d du
ri ng
t he
ir s
ta y.
7 7%
et al
., 19
98 as
pi ri
n du
ri ng
an d
th e
D is
tr ic
t of
re ce
iv ed
a sp
ir in
a t
ho sp
it al
iz at
io n
an d
1, 38
7 C
ol um
bi a
in M
ed ic
ar e’
s di
sc ha
rg e.
w ho
w er
e “i
de al
” N
at io
na l
C la
im s
H is
to ry
ca nd
id at
es f
or a
sp ir
in a
t F
il e
sa m
pl ed
d ur
in g
di sc
ha rg
e, f
ro m
a s
am pl
e of
Ja nu
ar y
19 94
, to
J ul
y 19
95 .
4, 30
0 pa
ti en
ts w
it h
M I.
M I:
T re
at m
en t
w it
h T
hr om
bo ly
ti cs
T hr
om bo
ly ti
cs a
re m
ed ic
at io
ns t
ha t
br ea
k 1,
10 5
pa ti
en ts
w ho
w er
e M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
or 70
% r
ec ei
ve d
th ro
m bo
ly ti
cs E
ll er
be ck
do w
n so
m e
of t
he a
cu te
b lo
ck ag
e in
t he
“i de
al ”
ca nd
id at
es f
or M
ed ic
ar e
be ne
fi ci
ar ie
s w
ho du
ri ng
h os
pi ta
li za
ti on
. et
al .,
19 95
bl oo
d ve
ss el
s th
at c
au se
s a
he ar
t at
ta ck
, tr
ea tm
en t
w it
h th
ro m
bo ly
ti c
w er
e ho
sp it
al iz
ed i
n fo
ur th
er eb
y re
du ci
ng i
nf ar
ct s
iz e
an d
li m
it in
g ag
en ts
f ro
m a
s am
pl e
of st
at es
( A
la ba
m a,
le ft
v en
tr ic
ul ar
d ys
fu nc
ti on
. T
hr om
bo ly
ti cs
16 ,1
24 M
ed ic
ar e
pa ti
en ts
C on
ne ct
ic ut
, Io
w a,
ha ve
b ee
n sh
ow n
to r
ed uc
e po
st -M
I ho
sp it
al iz
ed w
it h
a pr
in ci
pa l
W is
co ns
in ),
a s
pa rt
o f
th e
m or
ta li
ty b
y as
m uc
h as
2 5%
, th
ou gh
t he
y di
ag no
si s
of h
ea rt
a tt
ac k.
C oo
pe ra
ti ve
C ar
di ov
as cu
la r
sh ou
ld n
ot b
e gi
ve n
to p
at ie
nt s
w it
h ce
rt ai
n P
ro je
ct P
il ot
, Ju
ne 1
, 19
92 ,
co nd
it io
ns (
e. g.
, re
ce nt
h em
or rh
ag ic
to F
eb ru
ar y
28 ,
19 93
. st
ro ke
).
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
68 p
a t ie
nt s
w it
h c o
nf ir
m ed
M ed
ic a r
e m
or ta
li ty
d a t
a 43
% r
e c e i
ve d
th ro
m bo
ly ti
c s M
e e ha
n he
a r t
a t ta
c k w
ho h
ad n
o is
su e d
b y
H C
F A
a nd
du ri
ng h
os pi
ta li
z a ti
on e t
a l.
, 19
95 co
nt ra
in di
c a ti
on s
to m
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds f
or th
ro m
bo ly
ti c
th e r
a p y,
a nd
M ed
ic a r
e pa
ti e n
ts f
ro m
6 w
ho h
ad e
le c t
ro c a
rd io
– ho
sp it
a l s
in C
on ne
c t ic
ut ,
a s gr
a p hi
c in
di c a
ti on
s fo
r pa
rt o
f th
e M
ed ic
a r e
th ro
m bo
ly ti
c th
e r a p
y, f
ro m
H os
pi ta
l In
fo rm
a t io
n a
sa m
pl e
of 3
00 M
ed ic
a r e
P ro
je c t
, O
c t ob
e r 1
, 19
88 ,
to pa
ti e n
ts ≥
6 5
ye a r
s ol
d S
ep te
m be
r 30
, 19
91 .
c o nt
in ue
s
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
284
ho sp
it al
iz ed
w it
h a
pr in
ci pa
l di
ag no
si s
of h
ea rt
a tt
ac k.
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
24 5
pa ti
en ts
w ho
w er
e M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
ro m
a cu
te 60
% r
ec ei
ve d
th ro
m bo
ly ti
cs B
er ge
r “i
de al
” ca
nd id
at es
f or
ca re
h os
pi ta
ls i
n M
ar yl
an d
w it
hi n
1 ho
ur a
ft er
a rr
iv al
. et
al .,
19 98
th ro
m bo
ly ti
cs i
n th
e fi
rs t
an d
th e
D is
tr ic
t of
ho ur
o f
ar ri
va l
fr om
a C
ol um
bi a
in M
ed ic
ar e’
s sa
m pl
e of
4 ,3
00 p
at ie
nt s
N at
io na
l C
la im
s H
is to
ry w
it h
M I.
F il
e sa
m pl
ed d
ur in
g Ja
nu ar
y 19
94 ,
to J
ul y
19 95
.
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
S ub
se t
of 2
,9 38
p at
ie nt
s M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
ro m
1 6
T he
m ed
ia n
pe rc
en ta
ge o
f S
ou m
er ai
w it
h ad
m it
ti ng
d ia
gn os
is o
f M
in ne
so ta
h os
pi ta
ls f
or el
ig ib
le p
at ie
nt s
≥ 65
y ea
rs et
al .,
19 98
M I.
pa ti
en ts
a dm
it te
d A
ug us
t 1,
ol d
re ce
iv in
g th
ro m
bo ly
ti cs
19 95
, to
A pr
il 3
0, 1
99 6.
in t
he f
ir st
4 8
ho ur
s of
ho sp
it al
iz at
io n
w as
5 5%
.
M I:
R e p
e r fu
si on
( T
hr om
bo ly
si s/
P e r
c u ta
ne ou
s T
ra ns
lu m
in al
C or
on ar
y A
ng io
pl as
ty [
P T
C A
]) P
T C
A u
se s
a m
in ia
tu re
b a l
lo on
c a t
he te
r to
39 8
pa ti
e n ts
w ho
w e r
e M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds f
ro m
a c u
te 64
% r
e c e i
ve d
re pe
rf us
io n
B e r
ge r
de c r
e a se
s te
no si
s (b
lo c k
a g e )
i n
bl oo
d co
ns id
e r e d
“ id
e a l”
c a re
h os
pi ta
ls i
n M
a r yl
a n d
th e r
a p y
(t hr
om bo
ly si
s/ e t
a l .,
19 98
ve ss
e l s
su pp
ly in
g th
e he
a r t.
( T
hr om
bo ly
si s
c a nd
id a t
e s f
or r
e p e r
fu si
on an
d th
e D
is tr
ic t
of P
T C
A )
w it
hi n
12 h
ou rs
o f
is d
e s c r
ib e d
a bo
ve .)
fr om
a s
am pl
e of
4 ,3
00 C
ol um
bi a
in M
ed ic
a r e ’
s a r
ri va
l a t
h os
pi ta
l. pa
ti e n
ts w
it h
M I.
N a t
io na
l C
la im
s H
is to
ry F
il e
sa m
pl e d
d ur
in g
Ja nu
a r y
19 94
, to
J un
e 19
95 .
T A
B L
E A
-1 C
on ti
nu ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
285 M
I: T
re at
m en
t w
it h
H ep
ar in
H ep
ar in
i s
be ne
fi ci
al t
o pa
ti en
ts w
it h
he ar
t 9,
85 7
pa ti
en ts
w ho
w er
e M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
or 69
% r
ec ei
ve d
he pa
ri n
E ll
er be
ck at
ta ck
, th
ou gh
h ep
ar in
s ho
ul d
no t
be g
iv en
“i de
al ”
ca nd
id at
es f
or M
ed ic
ar e
be ne
fi ci
ar ie
s w
ho du
ri ng
h os
pi ta
li za
ti on
. et
al .,
19 95
to p
at ie
nt s
w it
h ce
rt ai
n co
nd it
io ns
( e.
g. ,
tr ea
tm en
t w
it h
he pa
ri n
fr om
w er
e ho
sp it
al iz
ed i
n fo
ur bl
ee di
ng d
is or
de rs
, st
ro ke
). a
sa m
pl e
of 1
6, 12
4 st
at es
( A
la ba
m a,
M ed
ic ar
e pa
ti en
ts C
on ne
ct ic
ut ,
Io w
a, ho
sp it
al iz
ed w
it h
a pr
in ci
pa l
W is
co ns
in ),
a s
pa rt
o f
th e
di ag
no si
s of
h ea
rt a
tt ac
k. C
oo pe
ra ti
ve C
ar di
ov as
cu la
r P
ro je
ct P
il ot
, Ju
ne 1
, 19
92 ,
to F
eb ru
ar y
28 ,
19 93
.
U ns
ta bl
e A
ng in
a: T
re at
m en
t w
it h
H ep
ar in
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
36 9
pa ti
en ts
w ho
w er
e M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds a
nd 24
% r
ec ei
ve d
in tr
av en
ou s
K ru
m ho
lz “i
de al
” ca
nd id
at es
f or
ad m
in is
tr at
iv e
da ta
f or
he pa
ri n
(2 0%
i n
19 93
t o
et al
., 19
98 tr
ea tm
en t
w it
h he
pa ri
n, pa
ti en
ts w
it h
M ed
ic ar
e fr
om 19
94 a
nd 3
2% i
n 19
95 ).
fr om
a s
am pl
e of
4 50
th re
e C
on ne
ct ic
ut h
os pi
ta ls
, O
f th
os e
re ce
iv in
g he
pa ri
n, pa
ti en
ts ≥
6 5
ye ar
s ol
d 19
93 –1
99 5.
51 %
h ad
a t
he ra
pe ut
ic ho
sp it
al iz
ed w
it h
un st
ab le
ac ti
va te
d pa
rt ia
l an
gi na
. th
ro m
bo pl
as ti
n ti
m e
(P T
T )
w it
hi n
24 h
ou rs
.
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
91 p
a t ie
nt s
w ho
w e r
e M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds o
f 63
% r
e c e i
ve d
he pa
ri n
S im
ps on
co ns
id e r
e d “
id e a
l” M
ed ic
a r e
be ne
fi c i
a r ie
s a d
m in
is te
re d
in tr
a v e n
ou sl
y. e t
a l .,
19 97
c a nd
id a t
e s f
or h
e p a r
in di
sc ha
rg e d
f ro
m 1
6 in
tr a v
e n ou
sl y
a d m
in is
te re
d, ho
sp it
a l s
in N
or th
C a r
ol in
a fr
om a
s am
pl e
of 8
82 be
tw e e
n O
c t ob
e r 1
, 19
93 ,
pa ti
e n ts
≥ 6
5 ye
a r s
ol d
w it
h a n
d S
ep te
m be
r 30
, 19
94 .
un st
a b le
a ng
in a .
c o nt
in ue
s
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
286
M I:
T re
at m
en t
w it
h In
tr av
en ou
s N
it ro
gl yc
er in
In tr
av en
ou s
ni tr
og ly
ce ri
n is
b en
ef ic
ia l
to 1,
75 4
pa ti
en ts
w ho
w er
e M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
or 74
% r
ec ei
ve d
in tr
av en
ou s
E ll
er be
ck pa
ti en
ts w
it h
he ar
t at
ta ck
w ho
h av
e “i
de al
” ca
nd id
at es
f or
M ed
ic ar
e be
ne fi
ci ar
ie s
w ho
ni tr
og ly
ce ri
n du
ri ng
et al
., 19
95 pe
rs is
te nt
c he
st p
ai n,
a lt
ho ug
h in
tr av
en ou
s tr
ea tm
en t
w it
h in
tr av
en ou
s w
er e
ho sp
it al
iz ed
i n
fo ur
ho sp
it al
iz at
io n.
ni tr
og ly
ce ri
n sh
ou ld
n ot
b e
gi ve
n to
ni tr
og ly
ce ri
n fr
om a
s am
pl e
st at
es (
A la
ba m
a, pa
ti en
ts w
it h
ce rt
ai n
co nd
it io
ns (
e. g.
, sh
oc k
of 1
6, 12
4 M
ed ic
ar e
pa ti
en ts
C on
ne ct
ic ut
, Io
w a,
or h
yp ot
en si
on o
n ad
m is
si on
). ho
sp it
al iz
ed w
it h
a pr
in ci
pa l
W is
co ns
in ),
a s
pa rt
o f
di ag
no si
s of
h ea
rt a
tt ac
k. C
oo pe
ra ti
ve C
ar di
ov as
cu la
r P
ro je
ct P
il ot
, Ju
ne 1
, 19
92 ,
to F
eb ru
ar y
28 ,
19 93
.
M I:
S m
ok in
g C
es sa
ti on
A dv
ic e
S m
ok er
s w
it h
co ro
na ry
a rt
er y
di se
as e
w ho
1, 69
1 sm
ok er
s w
ho w
er e
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
28 %
r ec
ei ve
d sm
ok in
g E
ll er
be ck
st op
s m
ok in
g ha
ve a
b et
te r
pr og
no si
s th
an “i
de al
” ca
nd id
at es
f or
ce ss
at io
n ad
vi ce
p ri
or t
o or
et al
., 19
95 th
os e
w ho
k ee
p sm
ok in
g; a
t th
e ti
m e
of sm
ok in
g ce
ss at
io n
ad vi
ce at
t im
e of
d is
ch ar
ge .
he ar
t at
ta ck
, th
es e
sm ok
er s
ar e
m os
t fr
om a
s am
pl e
of 1
6, 12
4 su
sc e p
ti bl
e to
a dv
ic e
a b ou
t c e
ss a t
io n
of M
ed ic
a r e
pa ti
e n ts
sm ok
in g.
ho sp
it a l
iz e d
w it
h a
pr in
c i pa
l di
a g no
si s
of h
e a rt
a tt
a c k.
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
55 1
pa ti
e n ts
w ho
w e r
e M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds f
ro m
a c u
te 41
% r
e c e i
ve d
sm ok
in g
B e r
ge r
sm ok
e r s
fr om
a s
am pl
e of
c a re
h os
pi ta
ls i
n M
a r yl
a n d
c e ss
a t io
n a d
vi c e
. e t
a l .,
19 98
4, 30
0 pa
ti e n
ts w
it h
M I.
a n d
th e
D is
tr ic
t of
C ol
um bi
a in
M ed
ic a r
e ’ s
N a t
io na
l C
la im
s H
is to
ry F
il e
sa m
pl e d
du ri
ng J
a n ua
ry 1
99 4,
t o
Ju ly
19 95
.
T A
B L
E A
-1 C
on ti
nu ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
287 U
ns ta
bl e
A ng
in a:
S m
ok in
g C
es sa
ti on
A dv
ic e
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
13 3
pa ti
en ts
w ho
w er
e M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds o
f 23
% r
ec ei
ve d
sm ok
in g
S im
ps on
id en
ti fi
ed a
s sm
ok er
s, f
ro m
M ed
ic ar
e be
ne fi
ci ar
ie s
ce ss
at io
n co
un se
li ng
. et
al .,
19 97
a sa
m pl
e of
8 82
p at
ie nt
s ≥
di sc
ha rg
ed f
ro m
1 6
65 y
ea rs
o ld
w it
h un
st ab
le ho
sp it
al s
in N
or th
C ar
ol in
a an
gi na
. be
tw ee
n O
ct ob
er 1
, 19
93 ,
an d
S ep
te m
be r
30 ,
19 94
.
M I:
T re
at m
en t
w it
h A
ng io
te ns
in -C
on ve
rt in
g E
nz ym
e (A
C E
) In
hi bi
to rs
A C
E i
nh ib
it or
s ca
n re
du ce
p os
t- M
I 1,
47 3
pa ti
en ts
w ho
w er
e M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
or 59
% r
ec ei
ve d
A C
E E
ll er
be ck
m or
ta li
ty i
n pa
ti en
ts w
it h
le ft
v en
tr ic
ul ar
“i de
al ”
ca nd
id at
es f
or M
ed ic
ar e
be ne
fi ci
ar ie
s w
ho in
hi bi
to rs
p ri
or t
o or
a t
et al
., 19
95 dy
sf un
ct io
n, a
lt ho
ug h
A C
E i
nh ib
it or
s tr
ea tm
en t
w it
h A
C E
w er
e ho
sp it
al iz
ed i
n fo
ur ti
m e
of d
is ch
ar ge
. sh
ou ld
n ot
b e
gi ve
n to
p at
ie nt
s w
it h
in hi
bi to
rs f
ro m
a s
am pl
e of
st at
es (
A la
ba m
a, ce
rt ai
n co
nd it
io ns
( e.
g. ,
ao rt
ic s
te no
si s)
. 16
,1 24
M ed
ic ar
e pa
ti en
ts C
on ne
ct ic
ut ,
Io w
a, ho
sp it
al iz
ed w
it h
a pr
in ci
pa l
W is
co ns
in ),
a s
pa rt
o f
di ag
no si
s of
h ea
rt a
tt ac
k. C
oo pe
ra ti
ve C
ar di
ov as
cu la
r P
ro je
ct P
il ot
, Ju
ne 1
, 19
92 ,
to F
eb ru
ar y
28 ,
19 93
.
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
40 7
pa ti
en ts
w ho
w er
e M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
ro m
a cu
te 65
% r
ec ei
ve d
A C
E B
er ge
r c o
ns id
e r e d
“ id
e a l”
c a re
h os
pi ta
ls i
n M
a r yl
a n d
in hi
bi to
rs f
or l
ow e
je c t
io n
e t a l
., 19
98 c a
nd id
a t e s
f or
A C
E an
d th
e D
is tr
ic t
of fr
a c ti
on (
E F
). in
hi bi
to rs
f ro
m a
s am
pl e
of C
ol um
bi a
in M
ed ic
a r e ’
s 4,
30 0
pa ti
e n ts
w it
h M
I. N
a t io
na l
C la
im s
H is
to ry
F il
e sa
m pl
e d d
ur in
g Ja
nu a r
y 19
94 ,
to J
ul y
19 95
.
U ns
ta bl
e A
ng in
a: T
re at
m e n
t w
it h
A C
E I
nh ib
it or
s S
am e
a s a
bo ve
. 17
7 pa
ti e n
ts w
ho w
e r e
M ed
ic a l
r e c
or ds
o f
39 %
r e c
e i ve
d a n
A C
E S
im ps
on co
ns id
e r e d
“ id
e a l”
M ed
ic a r
e be
ne fi
c i a r
ie s
in hi
bi to
r du
ri ng
e t a l
., 19
97 c a
nd id
a t e s
f or
a n
A C
E di
sc ha
rg e d
f ro
m 1
6 ho
sp it
a l iz
a t io
n. 4
2%
c o nt
in ue
s
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
288
in hi
bi to
r du
ri ng
ho sp
it al
s in
N or
th C
ar ol
in a
re ce
iv ed
a n
A C
E i
nh ib
it or
ho sp
it al
iz at
io n
an d
12 7
w ho
be tw
ee n
O ct
ob er
1 ,
19 93
, at
d is
ch ar
ge .
w er
e “i
de al
” ca
nd id
at es
f or
an d
S ep
te m
be r
30 ,
19 94
. an
A C
E i
nh ib
it or
a t
di sc
ha rg
e, f
ro m
a s
am pl
e of
88 2
pa ti
en ts
≥ 6
5 ye
ar s
ol d
w it
h un
st ab
le a
ng in
a.
M I:
T re
at m
en t
w it
h B
et a
B lo
ck er
s B
et a
bl oc
ke r
th er
ap y
ca n
re du
ce p
os t-
M I
2, 97
6 pa
ti en
ts w
ho w
er e
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f or
45 %
r ec
ei ve
d be
ta b
lo ck
er s
E ll
er be
ck m
or ta
li ty
b y
as m
uc h
as 2
5% ,
al th
ou gh
“i de
al ”
ca nd
id at
es f
or M
ed ic
ar e
be ne
fi ci
ar ie
s w
ho pr
io r
to o
r at
t im
e of
et al
., 19
95 be
ta b
lo ck
er s
sh ou
ld n
ot b
e gi
ve n
to tr
ea tm
en t
w it
h be
ta w
er e
ho sp
it al
iz ed
i n
fo ur
di sc
ha rg
e. pa
ti en
ts w
it h
ce rt
ai n
co nd
it io
ns (
e. g.
, lo
w bl
oc ke
rs f
ro m
a s
am pl
e of
st at
es (
A la
ba m
a, le
ft v
en tr
ic ul
ar e
je ct
io n
fr ac
ti on
, 16
,1 24
M ed
ic ar
e pa
ti en
ts C
on ne
ct ic
ut ,
Io w
a, pu
lm on
ar y
ed em
a) .
ho sp
it al
iz ed
w it
h a
pr in
ci pa
l W
is co
ns in
), a
s pa
rt o
f di
ag no
si s
of h
ea rt
a tt
ac k.
C oo
pe ra
ti ve
C ar
di ov
as cu
la r
P ro
je c t
P il
ot ,
Ju ne
1 ,
19 92
, to
F e b
ru a r
y 28
, 19
93 .
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
3, 73
7 M
ed ic
a r e
pa ti
e n ts
≥ N
ew J
e r se
y M
ed ic
a r e
21 %
r e c
e i ve
d be
ta b
lo c k
e r s
S ou
m e r
a i 65
y e a
rs o
ld w
it h
pr in
c i pa
l ho
sp it
a l a
dm is
si on
s a n
d w
it hi
n 90
d ay
s of
d is
c h a r
ge ;
e t a l
., 19
97 di
a g no
si s
of h
e a rt
a tt
a c k
e n ro
ll m
en t
da ta
, 19
86 –
ad ju
st e d
m or
ta li
ty r
a t e
fo r
w ho
w e r
e e l
ig ib
le f
or 19
92 ;
N e w
J e r
se y
M ed
ic a i
d pa
ti e n
ts w
it h
tr e a
tm en
t w
a s tr
e a tm
en t
w it
h be
ta dr
ug u
ti li
z a ti
on a
nd 43
% l
ow e r
t ha
n th
a t o
f bl
oc ke
rs ,
fr om
a s
ta te
w id
e e n
ro ll
m en
t fi
le s,
1 98
6– pa
ti e n
ts w
it ho
ut t
re a t
m en
t. c o
ho rt
o f
5, 33
2 pe
op le
w ho
19 91
; N
e w J
e r se
y P
ro gr
am ha
d su
rv iv
e d a
h e a
rt a
tt a c
k of
P ha
rm a c
y A
ss is
ta nc
e fo
r fo
r a t
l e a
st 3
0 da
ys a
nd th
e A
ge d
a n d
D is
a b le
d dr
ug
T A
B L
E A
-1 C
on ti
nu ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
289 w
ho h
ad p
re sc
ri pt
io n
dr ug
ut il
iz at
io n
da ta
, 19
86 –1
99 1.
co ve
ra ge
.
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
10 4
pa ti
en ts
w it
h co
nf ir
m ed
M ed
ic ar
e m
or ta
li ty
d at
a 41
% r
ec ei
ve d
be ta
b lo
ck er
s M
ee ha
n he
ar t
at ta
ck w
ho w
er e
al iv
e is
su ed
b y
H C
F A
a nd
at t
im e
of d
is ch
ar ge
. et
al .,
19 95
at d
is ch
ar ge
a nd
w ho
h ad
m ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f or
no c
on tr
ai nd
ic at
io ns
t o
be ta
M ed
ic ar
e pa
ti en
ts f
ro m
6 bl
oc ke
rs f
ro m
a s
am pl
e of
ho sp
it al
s in
C on
ne ct
ic ut
, as
30 0
M ed
ic ar
e pa
ti en
ts ≥
6 5
pa rt
o f
th e
M ed
ic ar
e ye
ar s
ol d
ho sp
it al
iz ed
w it
h H
os pi
ta l
In fo
rm at
io n
a pr
in ci
pa l
di ag
no si
s of
P ro
je ct
, O
ct ob
er 1
, 19
88 ,
to he
ar t
at ta
ck .
S ep
te m
be r
30 ,
19 91
.
M I:
T re
at m
en t
w it
h B
et a
B lo
ck er
s S
am e
as a
bo ve
. S
ub se
t of
2 ,9
38 p
at ie
nt s
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f ro
m 1
6 T
he m
ed ia
n pe
rc en
ta ge
o f
S ou
m er
ai w
it h
ad m
it ti
ng d
ia gn
os is
o f
M in
ne so
ta h
os pi
ta ls
f or
el ig
ib le
p at
ie nt
s re
ce iv
in g
et al
., 19
98 M
I. pa
ti en
ts a
dm it
te d
A ug
us t
1, be
ta b
lo ck
er s
in t
he f
ir st
4 8
19 95
, to
A pr
il 3
0, 1
99 6.
ho ur
s of
h os
pi ta
li za
ti on
w as
7 8%
.
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
30 2
pa ti
e n ts
w ho
w e r
e M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds f
ro m
a c u
te 60
% r
e c e i
ve d
be ta
b lo
c k e r
s B
e r ge
r c o
ns id
e r e d
“ id
e a l”
c a re
h os
pi ta
ls i
n M
a r yl
a n d
a t d
is c h
a r ge
. e t
a l .,
19 98
c a nd
id a t
e s f
or b
e t a
bl oc
ke rs
a n d
th e
D is
tr ic
t of
a t d
is c h
a r ge
f ro
m a
s am
pl e
C ol
um bi
a in
M ed
ic a r
e ’ s
of 4
,3 00
p a t
ie nt
s w
it h
M I.
N a t
io na
l C
la im
s H
is to
ry F
il e
sa m
pl e d
d ur
in g
Ja nu
a r y
19 94
, to
J ul
y 19
95 .
U ns
ta bl
e A
ng in
a: T
re at
m e n
t w
it h
B e t
a B
lo c k
e r s
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
81 5
pa ti
e n ts
w ho
w e r
e M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds o
f 45
% r
e c e i
ve d
be ta
b lo
c k e r
s S
im ps
on “ i
de a l
” c a
nd id
a t e s
f or
b e t
a M
ed ic
a r e
be ne
fi c i
a r ie
s du
ri ng
h os
pi ta
li z a
ti on
. e t
a l .,
19 97
c o nt
in ue
s
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
290
bl oc
ke rs
d ur
in g
di sc
ha rg
ed f
ro m
s ix
te en
38 %
r ec
ei ve
d be
ta b
lo ck
er s
ho sp
it al
iz at
io n
an d
58 9
w ho
ho sp
it al
s in
N or
th C
ar ol
in a
at d
is ch
ar ge
. w
er e
“i de
al ”
ca nd
id at
es f
or be
tw ee
n O
ct ob
er 1
, 19
93 ,
be ta
b lo
ck er
s at
d is
ch ar
ge ,
an d
S ep
te m
be r
30 ,
19 94
. fr
om a
s am
pl e
of 8
82 pa
ti en
ts ≥
6 5
ye ar
s ol
d w
it h
un st
ab le
a ng
in a.
M I:
H os
pi ta
l C
ar e
In cl
ud es
d oc
um en
ta ti
on o
f ex
am in
at io
n of
1, 43
7 pa
ti en
ts h
os pi
ta li
ze d
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f or
64 %
–6 8%
o f
pa ti
en ts
w it
h K
ah n
et a
l. ,
ju gu
la r
ve in
s an
d al
co ho
li sm
/s m
ok in
g w
it h
ac ut
e m
yo ca
rd ia
l M
ed ic
ar e
pa ti
en ts
f ro
m 2
97 ac
ut e
m yo
ca rd
ia l
in fa
rc ti
on 19
90 ha
bi ts
. in
fa rc
ti on
f ro
m a
n at
io na
ll y
ho sp
it al
s in
f iv
e st
at es
re ce
iv ed
a pp
ro pr
ia te
re pr
es en
ta ti
ve s
am pl
e of
(C al
if or
ni a,
F lo
ri da
, co
m po
ne nt
s of
c ar
e. 7,
15 6
pa ti
en ts
h os
pi ta
li ze
d In
di an
a, P
en ns
yl va
ni a,
w it
h an
y of
f iv
e co
nd it
io ns
T ex
as ),
J ul
y 1,
1 98
5, t
o (c
on ge
st iv
e he
ar t
fa il
ur e,
Ju ne
3 0,
1 98
6. a c
ut e
m yo
c a rd
ia l
in fa
rc ti
on ,
pn eu
m on
ia ,
st ro
ke ,
hi p
fr a c
tu re
) (D
ra pe
r e t
a l.
, 19
90 ).
U ns
ta bl
e A
ng in
a: L
ow -C
ho le
st e r
ol D
ie t
In c l
ud e s
c a r
e fo
r un
st a b
le a
ng in
a 63
7 di
sc ha
rg e d
p a t
ie nt
s M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds o
f 38
% w
e r e
pr e s
c r ib
e d a
S im
ps on
co ns
is te
nt w
it h
pr e v
a i li
ng s
ta nd
a r ds
o f
w ho
w e r
e “ i
de a l
” M
ed ic
a r e
be ne
fi c i
a r ie
s lo
w -c
ho le
st e r
ol d
ie t
a t e t
a l .,
19 97
c a re
. c a
nd id
a t e s
f or
a l
ow –
di sc
ha rg
e d f
ro m
1 6
di sc
ha rg
e . c h
ol e s
te ro
l di
e t ,
fr om
a ho
sp it
a l s
in N
or th
C a r
ol in
a sa
m pl
e of
8 82
p a t
ie nt
s ≥
a n d
S ep
te m
eb e r
3 0,
1 99
4. 65
y e a
rs o
ld w
it h
un st
a b le
a n gi
na .
T A
B L
E A
-1 C
on ti
nu ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
291 U
ns ta
bl e
A ng
in a:
L ip
id -L
ow er
in g
D ru
gs In
cl ud
es c
ar e
fo r
un st
ab le
a ng
in a
63 7
pa ti
en ts
w ho
w er
e S
am e
as a
bo ve
. 16
% r
ec ei
ve d
li pi
d- S
im ps
on co
ns is
te nt
w it
h pr
ev ai
li ng
s ta
nd ar
ds o
f “i
de al
” ca
nd id
at es
f or
a lo
w er
in g
dr ug
s at
et al
., 19
97 ca
re .
li pi
d- lo
w er
in g
dr ug
a t
di sc
ha rg
e. di
sc ha
rg e,
f ro
m a
s am
pl e
of 88
2 pa
ti en
ts ≥
6 5
ye ar
s ol
d w
it h
un st
ab le
a ng
in a.
C on
ge st
iv e
H ea
rt F
ai lu
re :
H os
pi ta
l C
ar e
In cl
ud es
d oc
um en
ta ti
on o
f pa
st s
ur ge
ry 1,
46 5
pa ti
en ts
h os
pi ta
li ze
d S
am e
as a
bo ve
. 66
% –9
7% o
f pa
ti en
ts w
it h
K ah
n et
a l.
, an
d lu
ng e
xa m
in at
io n,
b lo
od p
re ss
ur e
w it
h co
ng es
ti ve
h ea
rt co
ng es
ti ve
h ea
rt f
ai lu
re 19
90 re
ad in
gs ,
el ec
tr oc
ar di
og ra
m ,
se ru
m fa
il ur
e fr
om a
n at
io na
ll y
re ce
iv ed
a pp
ro pr
ia te
po ta
ss iu
m l
ev el
, ox
yg en
t he
ra py
o r
re pr
es en
ta ti
ve s
am pl
e of
co m
po ne
nt s
of c
ar e.
in tu
ba ti
on f
or h
yp ox
ic p
at ie
nt s.
7, 15
6 pa
ti en
ts h
os pi
ta li
ze d
w it
h an
y of
f iv
e co
nd it
io ns
(c on
ge st
iv e
he ar
t fa
il ur
e, ac
ut e
m yo
ca rd
ia l
in fa
rc ti
on ,
pn eu
m on
ia ,
st ro
ke ,
hi p
fr ac
tu re
) (D
ra pe
r et
a l.
, 19
90 ).
St ro
k e :
H os
pi ta
l C
ar e
In c l
ud e s
d oc
um en
ta ti
on o
f pr
e v io
us s
tr ok
e 1,
44 2
pa ti
e n ts
h os
pi ta
li z e
d S
am e
a s a
bo ve
. 38
% –9
4% o
f pa
ti e n
ts w
it h
K ah
n e t
a l.
, a n
d ga
g re
fl e x
, bl
oo d
pr e s
su re
r e a
di ng
s, w
it h
st ro
ke f
ro m
a st
ro ke
r e c
e i ve
d a p
pr op
ri a t
e 19
90 e l
e c tr
oc a r
di og
ra m
, se
ru m
p ot
a s si
um l
e v e l
. sa
m pl
e of
7 ,1
56 p
a t ie
nt s
c o m
po ne
nt s
of c
a r e .
ho sp
it a l
iz e d
w it
h a n
y of
fi ve
c on
di ti
on s
(c on
ge st
iv e
he a r
t fa
il ur
e , a
c u te
m yo
c a rd
ia l
in fa
rc ti
on ,
pn eu
m on
ia ,
st ro
ke ,
hi p
fr a c
tu re
) (D
ra pe
r e t
a l.
, 19
90 ).
a I f
a de
sc ri
pt io
n in
t he
f ir
st c
ol um
n ha
s no
c it
at io
n, i
t is
c ov
er ed
b y
th e
ci ta
ti on
i n
th e
re fe
re nc
e co
lu m
n. b
W e
co nt
ac te
d th
e au
th or
s of
s om
e of
t he
a rt
ic le
s to
cl ar
if y
de ta
il s
re la
te d
to t
he s
am pl
e an
d to
t he
d at
a an
al ys
is .
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
292 T
A B
L E
A -2
E xa
m pl
es o
f Q
ua li
ty o
f A
cu te
H ea
lt h
C ar
e in
t he
U ni
te d
S ta
te s—
O ve
ru se
: D
id P
at ie
nt s
R ec
ei ve
I na
pp ro
pr ia
te C
ar e?
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
A n
ti b
io ti
c U
se C
om m
on C
ol d
A lm
os t
al l
co ld
s ar
e ca
us ed
b y
a vi
ru s,
f or
1, 43
9 pa
ti en
ts w
it h
2, 17
1 K
en tu
ck y
M ed
ic ai
d cl
ai m
s In
6 0%
o f
en co
un te
rs f
or M
ai no
us w
hi ch
a nt
ib io
ti cs
a re
n ot
a n
ef fe
ct iv
e ou
tp at
ie nt
a nd
e m
er ge
nc y
da ta
, Ju
ly 1
, 19
93 ,
to J
un e
th e
co m
m on
c ol
d, p
at ie
nt s
et al
., 19
96 tr
ea tm
en t.
de pa
rt m
en t
vi si
ts f
or t
he 30
, 19
94 .
fi ll
ed p
re sc
ri pt
io ns
f or
co m
m on
c ol
d (a
cu te
an ti
bi ot
ic s.
na so
ph ar
yn gi
ti s)
f ro
m a
ra nd
om s
am pl
e of
5 0,
00 0
pa ti
en ts
w it
h at
l ea
st o
ne cl
ai m
f or
c ar
e by
a ph
ys ic
ia n,
d en
ti st
, or
op to
m et
ri st
.
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
P at
ie nt
s ≥
18 y
ea rs
o ld
w it
h N
at io
na l
A m
bu la
to ry
51 %
o f
pa ti
en ts
d ia
gn os
ed G
on za
le s
a d
ia gn
os is
o f
th e
co m
m on
M ed
ic al
C ar
e S
ur ve
y w
it h
a co
ld w
er e
tr ea
te d
et al
., 19
97 c o
ld ,
e x c l
us iv
e of
a du
lt s
(N A
M C
S ),
1 99
2. w
it h
a n ti
bi ot
ic s.
w it
h un
de rl
yi ng
l un
g di
se a s
e , f
ro m
a n
a t io
na ll
y re
pr e s
e n ta
ti ve
s am
pl e
of 1,
52 9
ph ys
ic ia
ns re
pr e s
e n ti
ng 2
8, 78
7 a d
ul t
pa ti
e n t
am bu
la to
ry c
a r e
vi si
ts .
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
293
co nt
in ue
s
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
C hi
ld re
n ≤
18 y
ea rs
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
A nt
ib io
ti cs
w er
e pr
es cr
ib ed
N yq
ui st
di ag
no se
d w
it h
co m
m on
at 4
4% o
f vi
si ts
o f
pa ti
en ts
et al
., 19
98 co
ld s
fr om
a t
ot al
o f
53 1
w it
h co
m m
on c
ol ds
pe di
at ri
c of
fi ce
v is
it s
w it
h a
pr im
ar y
di ag
no si
s of
c ol
d, up
pe r
re sp
ir at
or y
tr ac
t in
fe ct
io n
(U R
I) ,
or br
on ch
it is
, ex
cl us
iv e
of ch
il dr
en w
it h
un de
rl yi
ng lu
ng d
is ea
se ,
fr om
a s
am pl
e re
pr es
en ta
ti ve
o f
th e
U .S
. po
pu la
ti on
.
U pp
er R
es pi
ra to
ry T
ra ct
I nf
ec ti
on A
nt im
ic ro
bi al
d ru
gs d
o no
t sh
or te
n th
e P
hy si
ci an
s w
ho p
ar ti
ci pa
te d
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
16 %
o f
al l
an ti
m ic
ro bi
al M
cC ai
g an
d co
ur se
o f
vi ra
l U
R I,
n or
d o
th ey
p re
ve nt
fr om
a n
at io
na ll
y dr
ug p
re sc
ri pt
io ns
( an
H ug
he s,
se co
nd ar
y ba
ct er
ia l
in fe
ct io
ns .
re pr
es en
ta ti
ve s
am pl
e of
es ti
m at
ed 1
7, 92
2, 00
0 19
95 3,
00 0
of fi
ce -b
as ed
pr es
cr ip
ti on
s na
ti on
al ly
) ph
ys ic
ia ns
. w
er e
w ri
tt en
f or
u pp
er re
sp ir
at or
y tr
ac t
in fe
ct io
ns in
1 99
2.
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
P a t
ie nt
s ≥
18 y
e a rs
o ld
w it
h S
am e
a s a
bo ve
. 52
% o
f pa
ti e n
ts d
ia gn
os e d
G on
z a le
s a
di a g
no si
s of
U R
I, w
it h
a U
R I
w e r
e tr
e a te
d e t
a l .,
19 97
ex c l
us iv
e of
a du
lt s
w it
h w
it h
a n ti
bi ot
ic s.
un de
rl yi
ng l
un g
di se
a s e ,
fr om
a n
a t io
na ll
y re
pr e s
e n ta
ti ve
s am
pl e
of 1,
52 9
ph ys
ic ia
ns re
pr e s
e n ti
ng 2
8, 78
7 a d
ul t
pa ti
e n t
am bu
la to
ry c
a r e
vi si
ts .
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
294 T
A B
L E
A -2
C on
ti nu
ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
C hi
ld re
n ≤
18 y
ea rs
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
A nt
ib io
ti cs
w er
e pr
es cr
ib ed
N yq
ui st
di ag
no se
d w
it h
U R
Is f
ro m
at 4
6% o
f vi
si ts
o f
pa ti
en ts
et al
., 19
98 a
to ta
l of
5 31
p ed
ia tr
ic w
it h
U R
Is .
of fi
ce v
is it
s w
it h
a pr
im ar
y di
ag no
si s
of c
ol d,
U R
I, o
r br
on ch
it is
, ex
cl us
iv e
of ch
il dr
en w
it h
un de
rl yi
ng lu
ng d
is ea
se ,
fr om
a s
am pl
e re
pr es
en ta
ti ve
o f
th e
U .S
. po
pu la
ti on
.
P ha
ry ng
it is
, N
as al
C on
ge st
io n,
C om
m on
C ol
d, a
nd O
th er
U pp
er R
es pi
ra to
ry T
ra ct
I nf
ec ti
on s
S in
ce m
os t
of t
he se
c on
di ti
on s
ar e
vi ra
l, P
hy si
ci an
s w
ho p
ar ti
ci pa
te d
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
O ve
r 70
% o
f pa
ti en
ts D
ow el
l an
d an
ti bi
ot ic
s ha
ve n
o be
ne fi
t. fr
om a
n at
io na
ll y
re ce
iv ed
a nt
ib io
ti c
S ch
w ar
tz ,
re pr
es en
ta ti
ve s
am pl
e of
pr es
cr ip
ti on
s fo
r ph
ar yn
gi ti
s 19
97 3,
00 0
of fi
ce -b
as ed
(e xc
lu di
ng s
tr ep
to co
cc al
), ph
ys ic
ia ns
. ov
e r 5
0% r
e c e i
ve d
th em
f or
rh in
it is
, a n
d ov
e r 3
0% re
c e iv
e d t
he m
f or
a no
ns pe
c i fi
c U
R I,
c ou
gh ,
or c o
ld .
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
295
co nt
in ue
s
B ro
nc hi
ti s
M os
t ca
se s
of b
ro nc
hi ti
s ar
e ca
us ed
b y
a P
at ie
nt s
≥ 18
y ea
rs o
ld w
it h
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
66 %
o f
pa ti
en ts
d ia
gn os
ed G
on za
le s
vi ru
s, f
or w
hi ch
a nt
ib io
ti cs
a re
n ot
a n
a di
ag no
si s
of b
ro nc
hi ti
s, w
it h
br on
ch it
is w
er e
tr ea
te d
et al
., 19
97 ef
fe ct
iv e
tr ea
tm en
t. ex
cl us
iv e
of a
du lt
s w
it h
w it
h an
ti bi
ot ic
s. un
de rl
yi ng
l un
g di
se as
e, fr
om a
n at
io na
ll y
re pr
es en
ta ti
ve s
am pl
e of
1, 52
9 ph
ys ic
ia ns
re pr
es en
ti ng
2 8,
78 7
ad ul
t pa
ti en
t am
bu la
to ry
c ar
e vi
si ts
.
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
C hi
ld re
n ≤
18 y
ea rs
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
A nt
ib io
ti cs
w er
e pr
es cr
ib ed
N yq
ui st
di ag
no se
d w
it h
br on
ch it
is at
7 5%
o f
vi si
ts o
f pa
ti en
ts et
al .,
19 98
fr om
a t
ot al
o f
53 1
pe di
at ri
c w
it h
br on
ch it
is .
of fi
ce v
is it
s w
it h
a pr
im ar
y di
ag no
si s
of c
ol d,
U R
I, o
r br
on ch
it is
, ex
cl us
iv e
of ch
il dr
en w
it h
un de
rl yi
ng lu
ng d
is ea
se ,
fr om
a s
am pl
e re
pr e s
e n ta
ti ve
o f
th e
U .S
. po
pu la
ti on
.
R e s
p ir
at or
y Il
ln e s
s P
ne um
on ia
H os
pi ta
l a d
m is
si on
s fo
r pn
eu m
on ia
a re
44 5
ho sp
it a l
a dm
is si
on s
of M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds f
or p
a t ie
nt s
9. 4%
o f
a d m
is si
on s
w e r
e P
a y ne
e t
a l .,
c o ns
id e r
e d a
pp ro
pr ia
te w
he n,
f or
e xa
m pl
e , c h
il dr
e n <
1 8
ye a r
s ol
d fr
om 1
2 ho
sp it
a l s
in f
iv e
in a p
pr op
ri a t
e . 19
95 a
pa ti
e n t
fa il
s to
i m
pr ov
e w
it h
ou tp
a t ie
nt a d
m it
te d
w it
h pn
eu m
on ia
. c o
m m
un it
ie s
in B
os to
n a n
d or
a l m
ed ic
a t io
n or
h a s
a p
le ur
a l e
ff us
io n
ne a r
by s
ub ur
bs ,
Ju ly
1 ,
or a
n em
py em
a . 19
85 ,
to J
un e
30 ,
19 86
.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
296
B ro
n ch
it is
/A st
h m
a H
os pi
ta l
ad m
is si
on s
fo r
br on
ch it
is /a
st hm
a 1,
03 8
ho sp
it al
a dm
is si
on s
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
4. 4%
o f
ad m
is si
on s
w er
e P
ay ne
e t
al .,
ar e
co ns
id er
ed a
pp ro
pr ia
te w
he n,
f or
of c
hi ld
re n
< 1
8 ye
ar s
ol d
in ap
pr op
ri at
e. 19
95 ex
am pl
e, a
p at
ie nt
h as
f ai
le d
to i
m pr
ov e
ad m
it te
d w
it h
br on
ch it
is /
w it
h ou
tp at
ie nt
t he
ra py
o r
ha s
a as
th m
a. pn
eu m
ot ho
ra x.
O ti
ti s
M ed
ia U
se o
f T
ym pa
no st
om y
T ub
es In
di ca
ti on
s fo
r ty
m pa
no st
om y
tu be
6, 42
9 ch
il dr
en <
1 6
ye ar
s In
te rv
ie w
s w
it h
ph ys
ic ia
ns ’
41 %
o f
tu be
i ns
er ti
on s
w er
e K
le in
m an
pl ac
em en
t in
cl ud
e re
fr ac
to ry
m id
dl e
ea r
ol d
w it
h re
cu rr
en t
ac ut
e of
fi ce
s ta
ff a
t ap
pr op
ri at
e, 3
2% e
qu iv
oc al
, et
al .,
19 94
in fe
ct io
n an
d ch
ro ni
c m
as to
id it
is .
ot it
is m
ed ia
a nd
/o r
ot ol
ar yn
go lo
gy p
ra ct
ic es
an d
27 %
i na
pp ro
pr ia
te .
If pe
rs is
te nt
o ti
ti s
m ed
ia w
it h
fr om
4 9
st at
es a
nd t
he ex
te nu
at in
g cl
in ic
al ef
fu si
on w
ho w
er e
in su
re d
D is
tr ic
t of
C ol
um bi
a, ci
rc um
st an
ce s
w er
e ta
ke n
in h
ea lt
h pl
an s
re qu
ir in
g Ja
nu ar
y 1,
1 99
0, t
o Ju
ly 3
0, in
to a
cc ou
nt ,
42 %
o f
tu be
pr ec
er ti
fi ca
ti on
b y
a 19
91 ;
ad di
ti on
al i
nt er
vi ew
s in
se rt
io ns
w er
e ap
pr op
ri at
e, ut
il iz
a t io
n re
vi e w
f ir
m .
w e r
e c o
nd uc
te d
w it
h 35
% e
qu iv
oc a l
, a n
d 23
% ot
ol a r
yn go
lo gi
st s
to in
a p pr
op ri
a t e .
de te
rm in
e th
e e x
is te
nc e
of e x
te nu
a t in
g c l
in ic
a l c i
rc um
st a n
c e s.
T A
B L
E A
-2 C
on ti
nu ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
297
co nt
in ue
s
D ep
re ss
io n
D ep
re ss
io n:
T re
at m
en t
T he
re i
s no
e vi
de nc
e th
at m
in or
63 4
pa ti
en ts
w it
h cu
rr en
t M
ed ic
al O
ut co
m es
S tu
dy 19
% o
f pa
ti en
ts w
er e
W el
ls e
t al
., tr
an qu
il iz
er s
ar e
ef fe
ct iv
e fo
r de
pr es
si on
, de
pr es
si ve
d is
or de
r or
(M O
S )
in t
hr ee
c it
ie s
tr ea
te d
w it
h m
in or
19 94
a bu
t th
er e
is e
vi de
nc e
th at
a nt
id ep
re ss
an t
de pr
es si
ve s
ym pt
om s
fr om
(B os
to n,
C hi
ca go
, L
os tr
an qu
il iz
er s;
1 2%
w er
e m
ed ic
at io
ns a
re e
ff ec
ti ve
f or
d ep
re ss
io n.
a sa
m pl
e of
2 2,
39 9
ad ul
t A
ng el
es );
q ue
st io
nn ai
re s
tr ea
te d
w it
h an
ti de
pr es
sa nt
pa ti
en ts
w ho
v is
it ed
o ne
co m
pl et
ed F
eb ru
ar y
to m
ed ic
at io
ns ;
11 %
w er
e la
rg e
H M
O o
r se
ve ra
l O
ct ob
er 1
98 6;
p ho
ne tr
ea te
d w
it h
a co
m bi
na ti
on m
ul ti
sp ec
ia lt
y, m
ix ed
-g ro
up in
te rv
ie w
s co
m pl
et ed
M ay
of m
in or
t ra
nq ui
li ze
rs a
nd pr
ac ti
ce s
in e
ac h
ci ty
d ur
in g
to D
ec em
be r
19 86
. an
ti de
pr es
sa nt
m ed
ic at
io ns
; th
e st
ud y
pe ri
od .
59 %
r ec
ei ve
d ne
it he
r.
D ep
re ss
io n:
A dm
is si
on A
pp ro
pr ia
te r
ea so
ns f
or a
dm is
si on
i nc
lu de
1, 19
8 pa
ti en
ts h
os pi
ta li
ze d
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f or
93 %
w er
e ad
m it
te d
fo r
W el
ls e
t al
., de
pr es
si on
, m
ed ic
al c
on di
ti on
m er
it in
g w
it h
de pr
es si
on ,
M ed
ic ar
e pa
ti en
ts f
ro m
2 97
cl ea
rl y
or p
os si
bl y
19 93
ac ut
e ca
re ,
co m
or bi
d m
aj or
p sy
ch ia
tr ic
re pr
es en
ta ti
ve o
f al
l ho
sp it
al s
in f
iv e
st at
es ap
pr op
ri at
e re
as on
s, a
nd 7
% di
so rd
er ,
or m
ed ic
al r
ea so
ns p
re cl
ud in
g M
ed ic
ar e
el de
rl y
pa ti
en ts
(C al
if or
ni a,
F lo
ri da
, w
er e
ad m
it te
d fo
r ou
tp at
ie nt
c ar
e fo
r de
pr es
si on
. ho
sp it
al iz
ed i
n ge
ne ra
l In
di an
a, P
en ns
yl va
ni a,
in ap
pr op
ri at
e re
as on
s. m
ed ic
al h
os pi
ta ls
w it
h a
T ex
as ),
J ul
y 1,
1 98
5, t
o di
sc ha
rg e
di ag
no si
s of
Ju ne
3 0,
1 98
6. de
pr e s
si on
. H
ys te
r e c t
om y
H y s
te re
c t om
y H
ys te
re c t
om y
is t
he s
ur gi
c a l
re m
ov a l
o f
64 2
w om
en ≥
2 0
ye a r
s ol
d M
ed ic
a l r
e c or
ds f
or p
a t ie
nt s
16 %
o f
hy st
e r e c
to m
ie s
w e r
e B
e r ns
te in
th e
ut e r
us .
w ho
u nd
e r w
e n t
fr om
s e v
e n m
an ag
ed c
a r e
in a p
pr op
ri a t
e , 2
5% w
e r e
e t a l
., 19
93 b
no ne
m e r
ge nc
y, or
ga ni
z a ti
on s,
A ug
us t
1, e q
ui vo
c a l,
a nd
5 8%
w e r
e no
no nc
ol og
ic 19
89 ,
to J
ul y
31 ,
19 90
. a p
pr op
ri a t
e . hy
st e r
e c to
m ie
s.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
298
C ar
d io
va sc
u la
r D
is ea
se C
or on
ar y
A rt
er y
D is
ea se
: C
or on
ar y
A ng
io gr
ap hy
C or
on ar
y an
gi og
ra ph
y is
a m
et ho
d fo
r R
an do
m s
am pl
e of
1 ,3
35 M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
ro m
1 5
4% o
f co
ro na
ry B
er ns
te in
ev al
ua ti
ng c
or on
ar y
ar te
ry a
na to
m y
to pa
ti en
ts w
ho h
ad c
or on
ar y
no nf
ed er
al h
os pi
ta ls
an gi
og ra
ph ie
s w
er e
et al
., 19
93 a
de te
rm in
e w
he th
er a
p at
ie nt
i s
a ca
nd id
at e
an gi
og ra
ph y.
pr ov
id in
g co
ro na
ry in
ap pr
op ri
at e,
2 0%
w er
e fo
r co
ro na
ry a
rt er
y by
pa ss
g ra
ft s
ur ge
ry o
r an
gi og
ra ph
y in
N ew
Y or
k eq
ui vo
ca l,
a nd
7 6%
w er
e pe
rc ut
an eo
us t
ra ns
lu m
in al
c or
on ar
y S
ta te
, se
le ct
ed t
hr ou
gh a
ap pr
op ri
at e.
an gi
op la
st y.
st ra
ti fi
ed r
an do
m s
am pl
e (f
or l
oc at
io n,
v ol
um e
of co
ro na
ry a
ng io
gr ap
hy ,
an d
au th
or iz
at io
n to
p er
fo rm
co ro
na ry
a rt
er y
by pa
ss g
ra ft
su rg
er y)
, 19
90 .
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
R an
do m
s am
pl e
of 1
,6 77
M ed
ic ar
e ph
ys ic
ia n
cl ai
m s
17 %
o f
co ro
na ry
C ha
ss in
ca se
s of
c or
on ar
y fr
om t
hr ee
s it
es s
el ec
te d
in ap
pr op
ri at
e, 9
% w
er e
et a
l. ,
19 87
a n gi
og ra
ph y.
fr om
1 3
si te
s in
e ig
ht s
ta te
s e q
ui vo
c a l,
a nd
7 4%
w e r
e (A
ri z o
na ,
C a l
if or
ni a ,
a p pr
op ri
a t e .
C ol
or a d
o, I
ow a ,
M a s
sa c h
us e t
ts ,
M on
ta na
, P
e n ns
yl va
ni a ,
S ou
th C
a r ol
in a )
, 19
81 .
T A
B L
E A
-2 C
on ti
nu ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
299
co nt
in ue
s
C or
on ar
y A
rt er
y D
is ea
se :
C or
on ar
y A
rt er
y B
yp as
s G
ra ft
( C
A B
G )
In C
A B
G s
ur ge
ry ,
da m
ag ed
b lo
od v
es se
ls S
tr at
if ie
d ra
nd om
s am
pl e
of M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds f
ro m
t hr
ee 14
% o
f C
A B
G s
ur ge
ri es
W in
sl ow
su pp
ly in
g th
e he
ar t
ar e
re pl
ac ed
w it
h 38
6 pa
ti en
ts w
ho u
nd er
w en
t ho
sp it
al s
(e xc
lu di
ng w
er e
in ap
pr op
ri at
e, 3
0% et
al .,
19 88
ve ss
el s
fr om
e ls
ew he
re i
n th
e bo
dy .
C A
B G
s ur
ge ry
i n
th e
th re
e V
et er
an s
A dm
in is
tr at
io n,
w er
e eq
ui vo
ca l,
a nd
5 6%
ho sp
it al
s. ot
he r
go ve
rn m
en ta
l, a
nd w
er e
ap pr
op ri
at e.
sp ec
ia lt
y ho
sp it
al s)
s el
ec te
d th
ro ug
h a
st ra
ti fi
ed r
an do
m sa
m pl
e (f
or s
iz e
an d
te ac
hi ng
s ta
tu s)
i n
a w
es te
rn st
at e
as p
ar t
of t
he N
at io
na l
In st
it ut
es o
f H
ea lt
h C
on se
ns us
D ev
el op
m en
t P
ro gr
am ,
19 79
, 19
80 ,
an d
19 82
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
R an
do m
s am
pl e
of 1
,1 56
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f or
p at
ie nt
s 1.
6% o
f C
A B
G s
ur ge
ri es
L ea
pe e
t al
., pa
ti en
ts w
ho h
ad i
so la
te d
fr om
1 2
A ca
de m
ic M
ed ic
al w
er e
in ap
pr op
ri at
e, 7
% 19
96 C
A B
G s
ur ge
ry .
C en
te r
C on
so rt
iu m
h os
pi ta
ls w
er e
eq ui
vo ca
l, a
nd 9
2% in
1 0
st at
es (
C al
if or
ni a,
w er
e ap
pr op
ri at
e. Io
w a,
L ou
is ia
na ,
M ar
yl an
d, M
as sa
ch us
et ts
, M
in ne
so ta
, N
e w H
am ps
hi re
, N
e w Y
or k,
N or
th C
a r ol
in a ,
P e n
ns yl
va ni
a ) ,
19 90
.
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
R a n
do m
s am
pl e
of 1
,3 38
M ed
ic a l
r e c
or ds
f ro
m 1
5 2.
4% o
f C
A B
G s
ur ge
ri e s
L e a
pe e
t a l
., pa
ti e n
ts w
ho h
ad i
so la
te d
no nf
e d e r
a l h
os pi
ta ls
w e r
e in
a p pr
op ri
a t e ,
7 %
19 93
C A
B G
s ur
ge ry
. pr
ov id
in g
C A
B G
p ro
c e du
re w
e r e
e q ui
vo c a
l, a
nd 9
1% in
N ew
Y or
k S
ta te
, se
le c t
e d w
e r e
a p pr
op ri
a t e .
th ro
ug h
a st
ra ti
fi e d
r a n
do m
sa m
pl e
(f or
l oc
a t io
n a n
d vo
lu m
e of
C A
B G
op e r
a t io
ns ),
1 99
0.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
300
C or
on ar
y A
rt er
y D
is ea
se :
P er
cu ta
ne ou
s T
ra ns
lu m
in al
C or
on ar
y A
ng io
pl as
ty (
P T
C A
) P
T C
A u
se s
a m
in ia
tu re
b al
lo on
c at
he te
r to
R an
do m
s am
pl e
of 1
,3 06
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f ro
m 1
5 4%
o f
P T
C A
s w
er e
H il
bo rn
e de
cr ea
se s
te no
si s
(b lo
ck ag
e) i
n bl
oo d
pa ti
en ts
w ho
h ad
P T
C A
. no
nf ed
er al
h os
pi ta
ls in
ap pr
op ri
at e,
3 8%
w er
e et
al .,
19 93
ve ss
el s
su pp
ly in
g th
e he
ar t.
pr ov
id in
g P
T C
A i
n N
ew eq
ui vo
ca l,
a nd
5 8%
w er
e Y
or k
S ta
te ,
se le
ct ed
ap pr
op ri
at e.
th ro
ug h
a st
ra ti
fi ed
r an
do m
sa m
pl e
(f or
l oc
at io
n an
d vo
lu m
e of
P T
C A
), 1
99 0.
M yo
ca rd
ia l
In fa
rc ti
on (
M I)
: P
er m
an en
t C
ar di
ac P
ac em
ak er
P ac
em ak
er s
he lp
r eg
ul ar
iz e
ab no
rm al
h ea
rt M
ed ic
ar e
pa ti
en ts
w ho
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f ro
m s
ix 20
% o
f pa
ce m
ak er
G re
en sp
an ra
te s
an d
rh yt
hm s.
un de
rw en
t a
to ta
l of
3 82
un iv
er si
ty t
ea ch
in g
im pl
an ta
ti on
s w
er e
et a
l. ,
19 88
pa ce
m ak
er i
m pl
an ta
ti on
s. ho
sp it
al s,
1 1
un iv
er si
ty –
in ap
pr op
ri at
e, 3
6% w
er e
af fi
li at
ed h
os pi
ta ls
, an
d 13
eq ui
vo ca
l, a
nd 4
4% w
er e
co m
m un
it y
ho sp
it al
s in
ap pr
op ri
at e.
P hi
la de
lp hi
a C
ou nt
y, Ja
nu ar
y 1,
t o
Ju ne
3 0,
19 83
.
M I:
T re
at m
e n t
w it
h L
id oc
ai ne
L id
oc a i
ne p
ro ph
yl a x
is u
se d
to p
re ve
nt S
ub se
t of
2 ,9
38 p
a t ie
nt s
M ed
ic a l
r e c
or ds
f ro
m T
he m
ed ia
n pe
rc e n
ta ge
o f
S ou
m e r
a i ve
nt ri
c u la
r fi
br il
la ti
on i
n pa
ti e n
ts t
re a t
e d w
it h
a d m
it ti
ng d
ia gn
os is
o f
si xt
e e n
M in
ne so
ta h
os pi
ta ls
pa ti
e n ts
i ne
li gi
bl e
fo r
e t a l
., 19
98 fo
r pr
ob ab
le M
I ha
s be
e n s
ho w
n to
M I.
fo r
pa ti
e n ts
a dm
it te
d li
do c a
in e
w ho
r e c
e i ve
d it
i n
in c r
e a se
m or
ta li
ty .
A ug
us t
1, 1
99 5,
t o
A pr
il th
e fi
rs t
48 h
ou rs
o f
30 ,
19 96
. ho
sp it
a l iz
a t io
n w
a s 1
2% .
T A
B L
E A
-2 C
on ti
nu ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
301
co nt
in ue
s
M I:
A vo
id an
ce o
f C
al ci
um C
ha nn
el B
lo ck
er s
fo r
P at
ie nt
s w
it h
a C
on tr
ai nd
ic at
io n
C al
ci um
c ha
nn el
b lo
ck er
s sh
ou ld
n ot
b e
78 5
pa ti
en ts
w it
h cl
ea r
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f or
21 %
o f
th os
e fo
r w
ho m
E ll
er be
ck gi
ve n
to p
at ie
nt s
w it
h ce
rt ai
n co
nd it
io ns
co nt
ra in
di ca
ti on
t o
ca lc
iu m
M ed
ic ar
e be
ne fi
ci ar
ie s
w ho
ca lc
iu m
c ha
nn el
b lo
ck er
s et
al .,
19 95
(e .g
., lo
w l
ef t
ve nt
ri cu
la r
ej ec
ti on
f ra
ct io
n, ch
an ne
l bl
oc ke
rs f
ro m
a w
er e
ho sp
it al
iz ed
i n
fo ur
w er
e co
nt ra
in di
ca te
d ev
id en
ce o
f sh
oc k,
o r
pu lm
on ar
y ed
em a
sa m
pl e
of 1
6, 12
4 M
ed ic
ar e
st at
es (
A la
ba m
a, re
ce iv
ed t
he m
. du
ri ng
h os
pi ta
li za
ti on
). pa
ti en
ts h
os pi
ta li
ze d
w it
h a
C on
ne ct
ic ut
, Io
w a,
pr in
ci pa
l di
ag no
si s
of h
ea rt
W is
co ns
in ),
a s
pa rt
o f
th e
at ta
ck .
C oo
pe ra
ti ve
C ar
di ov
as cu
la r
P ro
je ct
P il
ot ,
Ju ne
1 ,
19 92
, to
F eb
ru ar
y 28
, 19
93 .
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
22 0
pa ti
en ts
w it
h a
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f ro
m a
cu te
18 %
o f
th os
e fo
r w
ho m
B er
ge r
co nt
ra in
di ca
ti on
f or
c al
ci um
ca re
h os
pi ta
ls i
n M
ar yl
an d
ca lc
iu m
b lo
ck er
s w
er e
et al
., 19
98 ch
an ne
l bl
oc ke
rs (
i. e.
, a
le ft
an d
th e
D is
tr ic
t of
co nt
ra in
di ca
te d
re ce
iv ed
ve nt
ri cu
la r
ej ec
ti on
f ra
ct io
n C
ol um
bi a
in M
ed ic
ar e’
s th
em .
< 4
0% )
f ro
m a
s am
pl e
of N
at io
na l
C la
im s
H is
to ry
4, 30
0 pa
ti en
ts w
it h
M I.
F il
e sa
m pl
ed d
ur in
g Ja
nu ar
y 19
94 ,
to J
ul y
19 95
.
U ns
ta bl
e A
ng in
a: A
vo id
an ce
o f
C al
ci um
C ha
nn el
B lo
ck er
s fo
r P
at ie
nt s
w it
h a
C on
tr ai
nd ic
at io
n S
am e
a s a
bo ve
. 21
8 pa
ti e n
ts w
it h
M ed
ic a l
r e c
or ds
o f
62 %
o f
th os
e fo
r w
ho m
S im
ps on
co nt
ra in
di c a
ti on
s fo
r M
ed ic
a r e
be ne
fi c i
a r ie
s c a
lc iu
m b
lo ck
e r s
w e r
e e t
a l .,
19 97
c a lc
iu m
c ha
nn e l
b lo
c k in
g di
sc ha
rg e d
f ro
m 1
6 co
nt ra
in di
c a te
d re
c e iv
e d dr
ug s,
f ro
m a
s am
pl e
of ho
sp it
a l s
in N
or th
C a r
ol in
a th
em .
88 2
pa ti
e n ts
≥ 6
5 ye
a r s
ol d
be tw
e e n
O c t
ob e r
1 ,
19 93
, w
it h
un st
a b le
a ng
in a .
a n d
S ep
te m
be r
30 ,
19 94
.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
302
C ar
ot id
A rt
er ie
s C
ar ot
id E
nd ar
te re
ct om
y C
ar ot
id e
nd ar
te re
ct om
y is
a p
ro ce
du re
t ha
t R
an do
m s
am pl
e of
1 ,3
02 M
ed ic
ar e
ph ys
ic ia
n cl
ai m
s 32
% o
f ca
ro ti
d C
ha ss
in op
en s
up s
te no
ti c
(b lo
ck ed
) ca
ro ti
d ar
te ri
es ca
se s
of c
ar ot
id da
ta a
nd m
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds en
da rt
er ec
to m
ie s
w er
e et
al .,
19 87
(w hi
ch s
up pl
y bl
oo d
to t
he b
ra in
). en
da rt
er ec
to m
y. fr
om t
hr ee
s it
es s
el ec
te d
in ap
pr op
ri at
e, 3
2% w
er e
fr om
t hi
rt ee
n si
te s
in e
ig ht
eq ui
vo ca
l, a
nd 3
5% w
er e
st at
es (
A ri
zo na
, C
al if
or ni
a, ap
pr op
ri at
e. C
ol or
ad o,
I ow
a, M
as sa
ch us
et ts
, M
on ta
na ,
P en
ns yl
va ni
a, S
ou th
C ar
ol in
a) ,
19 81
.
G as
tr oi
n te
st in
al D
is ea
se U
pp er
G as
tr oi
nt es
ti na
l T
ra ct
E nd
os co
py E
nd os
co py
e na
bl es
v is
ua li
za ti
on o
f th
e R
an do
m s
am pl
e of
1 ,5
85 S
am e
as a
bo ve
. 17
% o
f up
pe r
C ha
ss in
ga st
ro in
te st
in al
t ra
ct ,
an d
pe rm
it s
bi op
sy ca
se s
of u
pp er
ga st
ro in
te st
in al
t ra
ct et
al .,
19 87
a n d
br us
h c y
to lo
gi c
e x am
in a t
io n.
ga st
ro in
te st
in a l
t ra
c t e n
do sc
op ie
s w
e r e
e n do
sc op
y. in
a p pr
op ri
a t e ,
1 1%
w e r
e e q
ui vo
c a l,
a nd
7 2%
w e r
e a p
pr op
ri a t
e .
C at
ar ac
ts C
at ar
ac t
Su rg
e r y
C a t
a r a c
t su
rg e r
y is
a c
om m
on ly
p e r
fo rm
ed 1,
02 0
pa ti
e n ts
w ho
M ed
ic a l
r e c
or ds
f or
p a t
ie nt
s 2%
o f
c a ta
ra c t
s ur
ge ri
e s T
ob a c
m an
su rg
e r y
in a
du lt
s ≥
65 y
e a rs
o ld
. C
a t a r
a c t
un de
rw e n
t a
to ta
l of
1 ,1
39 fr
om 1
0 a c
a d em
ic m
ed ic
a l w
e r e
in a p
pr op
ri a t
e , 7
% e t
a l.
1 99
6 su
rg e r
y sh
ou ld
n ot
b e
pe rf
or m
ed o
n pe
op le
c a ta
ra c t
s ur
ge ri
e s .
c e nt
e r s,
1 99
0. w
e r e
e q ui
vo c a
l, a
nd 9
1% w
it h
c e rt
a i n
c o nd
it io
ns (
e . g.
, m
a c ul
a r w
e r e
a p pr
op ri
a t e .
de ge
ne ra
ti on
o r
di a b
e t ic
r e t
in op
a t hy
).
T A
B L
E A
-2 C
on ti
nu ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
303 L
ow B
ac k
P ai
n C
hi ro
pr ac
ti c
Sp in
al M
an ip
ul at
io n
A H
C P
R h
as c
on cl
ud ed
t ha
t sp
in al
A r
an do
m s
am pl
e of
1 0
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
o f
pa ti
en ts
In it
ia ti
on o
f sp
in al
S he
ke ll
e m
an ip
ul at
io n
ha st
en s
re co
ve ry
f ro
m a
cu te
pa ti
en ts
p er
o ff
ic e
(9 20
fr om
9 2
ch ir
op ra
ct ic
o ff
ic es
m an
ip ul
at io
n w
as et
a l.
, 19
98 lo
w b
ac k
pa in
n ot
c au
se d
by s
uc h
pa ti
en ts
) w
ho s
ou gh
t in
o r
ne ar
M ia
m i,
F lo
ri da
; in
ap pr
op ri
at e
in 2
0% –4
0% co
nd it
io ns
a s
fr ac
tu re
, tu
m or
, in
fe ct
io n,
ch ir
op ra
ct ic
c ar
e fo
r lo
w M
in ne
ap ol
is -S
t. P
au l,
of c
as es
, un
ce rt
ai n
in 2
0% –
an d
ca ud
a eq
ui na
s yn
dr om
e (A
H C
P R
, ba
ck p
ai n
fo r
th e
fi rs
t ti
m e
M in
ne so
ta ;
P or
tl an
d, 30
% o
f ca
se s,
a nd
19 94
). du
ri ng
t he
s tu
dy p
er io
d. O
re go
n; a
nd S
an D
ie go
, ap
pr op
ri at
e in
4 0%
–5 4%
o f
C al
if or
ni a;
w ho
s ou
gh t
ca re
ca se
s (d
ep en
di ng
o n
ci ty
). fo
r th
e fi
rs t
ti m
e be
tw ee
n Ja
nu ar
y 1,
1 98
5, a
nd D
ec em
be r
31 ,
19 91
.
a I f
a de
sc ri
pt io
n in
t he
f ir
st c
ol um
n ha
s no
c it
at io
n, i
t is
c ov
er ed
b y
th e
ci ta
ti on
i n
th e
re fe
re nc
e co
lu m
n. b
W e
co nt
ac te
d th
e au
th or
s of
s om
e of
t he
a rt
ic le
s to
cl ar
if y
de ta
il s
re la
te d
to t
he s
am pl
e an
d to
t he
d at
a an
al ys
is .
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
304 T
A B
L E
A -3
E xa
m pl
es o
f Q
ua li
ty o
f H
ea lt
h C
ar e
in t
he U
ni te
d S
ta te
s M
is us
e: D
id P
at ie
nt s
R ec
ei ve
A pp
ro pr
ia te
C ar
e in
a M
an ne
r T
ha t
C ou
ld H
av e
C au
se d
H ar
m ?
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
P re
ve n
ta b
le D
ea th
s E
va lu
at io
n of
p re
ve nt
ab le
d ea
th s
A d
ea th
i s
co ns
id er
ed p
re ve
nt ab
le w
he n
18 2
pa ti
en ts
w ho
d ie
d in
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f or
p at
ie nt
s 14
% o
f de
at hs
r es
ul te
d fr
om D
ub oi
s an
d th
e pa
ti en
t re
ce iv
ed p
oo r
ca re
, an
d th
e ho
sp it
al s
fr om
s tr
ok e,
fr om
1 2
ho sp
it al
s, 1
98 5.
in ad
eq ua
te d
ia gn
os is
o r
B ro
ok ,
19 88
po or
c ar
e pr
ob ab
ly r
es ul
te d
in t
he p
at ie
nt ’s
pn eu
m on
ia ,
or h
ea rt
a tt
ac k.
tr ea
tm en
t an
d co
ul d
ha ve
de at
h. be
en p
re ve
nt ed
.
A d
ve rs
e E
ve n
ts A
dv er
se E
ve nt
s A
n ad
ve rs
e ev
en t
is a
n in
ju ry
t ha
t is
ca us
ed b
y m
ed ic
al m
an ag
em en
t ra
th er
t ha
n th
e un
de rl
yi ng
d is
ea se
a nd
t ha
t pr
ol on
gs ho
sp it
al iz
at io
n, p
ro du
ce s
a di
sa bi
li ty
a t
di sc
ha rg
e, o
r bo
th .
30 ,1
21 m
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds 51
r an
do m
ly s
el ec
te d
ac ut
e T
he re
w er
e 1,
13 3
ad ve
rs e
B re
nn an
fr om
a w
ei gh
te d
sa m
pl e
of ca
re ,
no np
sy ch
ia tr
ic ev
en ts
a nd
2 80
n eg
li ge
nt et
a l.
, 19
91 31
,4 29
r e c
or ds
o f
ho sp
it a l
s in
N e w
Y or
k ev
en ts
d ur
in g
19 84
ho sp
it a l
iz e d
p a t
ie nt
s fr
om a
S ta
te ,
19 84
. a d
m is
si on
s, r
e p re
se nt
in g
a po
pu la
ti on
o f
2, 67
1, 86
3 3.
7% s
ta te
w id
e in
c i de
nc e
no np
sy ch
ia tr
ic d
is c h
a r ge
d ra
te o
f a d
ve rs
e e v
e n ts
, a n
d pa
ti e n
ts .
a 1.
0% s
ta te
w id
e in
c i de
nc e
ra te
o f
a d ve
rs e
e v e n
ts d
ue to
n e g
li ge
nc e .
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
305
co nt
in ue
s
S am
e as
a bo
ve .
30 ,1
21 m
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds 51
r an
do m
ly s
el ec
te d
ac ut
e 17
% o
f ad
ve rs
e ev
en ts
L ea
pe e
t al
., fr
om a
w ei
gh te
d sa
m pl
e of
ca re
, no
np sy
ch ia
tr ic
re su
lt in
g fr
om o
pe ra
ti on
s 19
91 31
,4 29
r ec
or ds
o f
ho sp
it al
s in
N ew
Y or
k an
d 37
% o
f ot
he r
ad ve
rs e
ho sp
it al
iz ed
p at
ie nt
s fr
om a
S ta
te ,
19 84
. ev
en ts
w er
e du
e to
po pu
la ti
on o
f 2,
67 1,
86 3
ne gl
ig en
ce ;
47 %
o f
no np
sy ch
ia tr
ic d
is ch
ar ge
d ph
ys ic
ia n
er ro
rs l
ea di
ng t
o pa
ti en
ts .
ad ve
rs e
ev en
ts w
er e
du e
to ne
gl ig
en ce
.
A dv
er se
D ru
g E
ve nt
s S
am e
as a
bo ve
. 4,
03 1
ad ul
t no
no bs
te tr
ic M
ed ic
al r
ec or
ds a
nd r
ep or
ts T
he re
w er
e 1.
8 pr
ev en
ta bl
e B
at es
e t
al .,
ad m
is si
on s
to a
s tr
at if
ie d
of h
os pi
ta l
st af
f fo
r 2
ad ve
rs e
dr ug
s ev
en ts
19 95
ra nd
om s
am pl
e of
1 1
te rt
ia ry
c ar
e ho
sp it
al s
in (A
D E
s) p
er 1
00 a
dm is
si on
s m
ed ic
al a
nd s
ur gi
ca l
un it
s B
os to
n, F
eb ru
ar y
to J
ul y
(a dj
us te
d ra
te ),
o f
w hi
ch in
t w
o ho
sp it
al s.
19 93
. 20
% w
er e
li fe
t hr
ea te
ni ng
, 43
% w
er e
se ri
ou s,
a nd
3 7%
w er
e si
gn if
ic an
t. T
he re
w er
e an
a dd
it io
na l
5. 5
po te
nt ia
l A
D E
s pe
r 10
0 ad
m is
si on
s (a
dj us
te d
ra te
).
S am
e a s
a bo
ve .
4, 03
1 pa
ti e n
ts a
dm it
te d
to C
a s e –
in ve
st ig
a t io
n re
po rt
s T
he re
w e r
e 19
p re
ve nt
a b le
C ul
le n
5 in
te ns
iv e
c a re
u ni
ts (
3 (i
nc lu
di ng
s ta
ff i
nt e r
vi e w
s, or
p ot
e n ti
a l A
D E
s pe
r 10
00 e t
a l.
, 19
97 m
ed ic
a l ,
2 su
rg ic
a l )
a n d
6 m
ed ic
a l r
e c or
d re
vi e w
, e t
c . )
pa ti
e n t
da ys
i n
th e
IC U
s. ge
ne ra
l c a
re u
ni ts
( 4
fo r
pa ti
e n ts
a dm
it te
d T
he re
w e r
e 10
p re
ve nt
a b le
m ed
ic a l
, 2
su rg
ic a l
) be
tw e e
n F
e b ru
a r y
a n d
Ju ly
or p
ot e n
ti a l
A D
E s
pe r
10 00
se le
c t e d
f ro
m a
s tr
a t if
ie d
19 93
. pa
ti e n
t da
ys i
n ge
ne ra
l c a
re ra
nd om
s am
pl e
of u
ni ts
i n
un it
s. R
a t e s
a dj
us te
d fo
r 2
te rt
ia ry
c a r
e ho
sp it
a l s
in nu
m be
r of
m ed
ic a t
io ns
p e r
B os
to n.
pa ti
e n t
sh ow
ed n
o si
gn if
ic a n
t di
ff e r
e n c e
s fo
r th
e tw
o se
tt in
gs .
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
306
M en
ta l
H ea
lt h
D ep
re ss
io n:
T re
at m
en t
In cl
ud es
t re
at m
en t
co ns
is te
nt w
it h
1, 19
8 pa
ti en
ts h
os pi
ta li
ze d
M ed
ic al
r ec
or ds
f or
33 %
o f
pa ti
en ts
d is
ch ar
ge d
W el
ls e
t al
., pr
ev ai
li ng
s ta
nd ar
ds o
f ca
re .
w it
h de
pr es
si on
, M
ed ic
ar e
pa ti
en ts
f ro
m w
it h
an ti
de pr
es sa
nt s
ha d
19 94
b re
pr es
en ta
ti ve
o f
al l
29 7
ho sp
it al
s in
f iv
e st
at es
do se
s be
lo w
r ec
om m
en de
d M
ed ic
ar e
el de
rl y
pa ti
en ts
(C al
if or
ni a,
F lo
ri da
, le
ve l.
ho sp
it al
iz ed
i n
ge ne
ra l
In di
an a,
P en
ns yl
va ni
a, m
ed ic
al h
os pi
ta ls
w it
h a
T ex
as ),
J ul
y 1,
1 98
5, t
o di
sc ha
rg e
di ag
no si
s of
Ju ne
3 0,
1 98
6. de
pr es
si on
.
In cl
ud es
t re
at m
en t
co ns
is te
nt w
it h
64 p
at ie
nt s
w it
h m
aj or
P at
ie nt
s ur
ve ys
a nd
A m
on g
pa ti
en ts
w it
h m
aj or
S im
on a
nd pr
ev ai
li ng
s ta
nd ar
ds o
f ca
re .
de pr
es si
on f
ro m
a s
am pl
e in
te rv
ie w
s, p
hy si
ci an
de pr
es si
on w
ho r
ec ei
ve d
V on
K or
ff ,
of 2
,5 92
c on
se cu
ti ve
su rv
ey s,
a nd
c om
pu te
ri ze
d an
ti de
pr es
sa nt
m ed
ic at
io ns
, 19
95 pr
im ar
y ca
re p
at ie
nt s
18 –6
5 ph
ar m
ac y
re co
rd s
fr om
3 78
% r
ec ei
ve d
do sa
ge s
ye ar
s ol
d w
ho a
tt en
de d
on e
pr im
ar y
ca re
c li
ni cs
o f
w it
hi n
th e
re co
m m
en de
d of
t he
s tu
dy c
li ni
c s .
G ro
up H
e a lt
h C
oo pe
ra ti
ve ra
ng e s
. of
P ug
e t S
ou nd
i n
W a s
hi ng
to n.
T A
B L
E A
-3 C
on ti
nu ed
H ea
lt h
C ar
e S
er vi
ce a
S am
pl e
D es
cr ip
ti on
D at
a S
ou rc
e Q
ua li
ty o
f C
ar e
R ef
er en
ce b
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
307 T
u b
er cu
lo si
s T
ub er
cu lo
si s:
T re
at m
en t
P eo
pl e
in fe
ct ed
w it
h tu
be rc
ul os
is (
T B
) in
1, 23
0 cu
lt ur
e- po
si ti
ve T
B D
at a
fr om
t he
T ub
er cu
lo si
s 36
% o
f pa
ti en
ts w
er e
no t
L iu
e t
al .,
ar ea
s w
it h
≥ 4%
i so
ni az
id r
es is
ta nc
e pa
ti en
ts ,
98 %
o f
w ho
m C
on tr
ol P
ro gr
am ,
N ew
in it
ia ll
y tr
ea te
d w
it h
fo ur
19 98
sh ou
ld b
e tr
ea te
d w
it h
a fo
ur -d
ru g
w er
e in
c ou
nt ie
s fo
r w
hi ch
Je rs
ey D
ep ar
tm en
t of
or m
or e
dr ug
s. re
gi m
en .
a fo
ur -d
ru g
re gi
m en
i s
H ea
lt h
an d
S en
io r
S er
vi ce
s, re
co m
m en
de d.
19 94
t o
19 95
.
a I f
a de
sc ri
pt io
n in
t he
f ir
st c
ol um
n ha
s no
c it
at io
n, i
t is
c ov
er ed
b y
th e
ci ta
ti on
i n
th e
re fe
re nc
e co
lu m
n. b
W e
co nt
ac te
d th
e au
th or
s of
s om
e of
t he
a rt
ic le
s to
cl ar
if y
de ta
il s
re la
te d
to t
he s
am pl
e an
d to
t he
d at
a an
al ys
is .
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
308 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
APPENDIX: Search Strategy for January 1997–July 1998 MEDLINE PLUS Search
Medical Subject Heading Boolean Search Type (MeSH) Search Term Tree Numbera Operator
Subject Quality of health care N4.761 or Subject Guideline adherence N4.761.337 or Explode exact Outcome and process assessment, N4.761.761.559
subjectb health care Subject Professional review organization N4.761.673 or Subject Quality indicators, health care N4.761.789 and Language English and Date 1997, 1998
NOTE: As Boolean operators, “or” means that articles with one search term and/or another search term are included, and “and” means that articles must have both search terms (or strings of search terms) to be included. For this search, articles with any of the Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) were included, and only articles in English and from 1997 or 1998 were included. aTree Number is a National Library of Medicine alphanumerical code for indexing MeSH terms. bThe “Explode” search function includes the MeSH category as well as all the subcategorical branches connected to it. It is equivalent to typing out the MeSH term and each of its subcategorical branches separately. The subcategories included when exploding “Outcome and Process Assess- ment, Health Care” are: Outcome Assessment, Treatment Outcome, Medical Futility, Treatment Failure, and Process Assessment.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
309
Appendix B
Redesigning Health Care with Insights from the Science of Complex Adaptive Systems
Paul Plsek
The task of building the 21st-century health care system is large and com- plex. In this appendix, we will lay a theoretical framework for approaching the design of complex systems and discuss the practical implications.
SYSTEMS THINKING
A “system” can be defined by the coming together of parts, interconnections, and purpose (see, for example, definitions proposed by von Bertalanffy [1968] and Capra [1996]). While systems can be broken down into parts which are interesting in and of themselves, the real power lies in the way the parts come together and are interconnected to fulfill some purpose.
The health care system of the United States consists of various parts (e.g., clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, laboratories) that are interconnected (via flows of patients and information) to fulfill a purpose (e.g., maintaining and improving health). Similarly, a thermostat and fan are a “system.” Both parts can be under- stood independently, but when they are interconnected, they fulfill the purpose of maintaining a comfortable temperature in a given space.
The intuitive notion of various system “levels,” such as the microsystem and macrosystem, has to do with the number and strength of interconnections be- tween the elements of the systems. For example, a doctor’s office or clinic can be described as a microsystem. It is small and self-contained, with relatively few interconnections. Patients, physicians, nurses, and office staff interact to produce
Consultant, Paul E. Plsek and Associates, Inc., Roswell, Georgia.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
310 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
diagnoses, treatments, and information. In contrast, the health care system in a community is a macrosystem. It consists of numerous microsystems (doctor’s offices, hospitals, long-term care facilities, pharmacies, Internet websites, and so on) that are linked to provide continuity and comprehensiveness of care. Simi- larly, a thermostat and fan comprise a relatively simple microsystem. Combine many of these, along with various boiler, refrigerant, and computer-control micro- systems, and one has a macrosystem that can maintain an office building environ- ment.
A distinction can also be made between systems that are largely mechanical in nature and those that are naturally adaptive (see Table B-1). The distinctions between mechanical and naturally adaptive systems are fundamental and key to the task of system design. In mechanical systems, we can know and predict in great detail what each of the parts will do in response to a given stimulus. Thus, it is possible to study and predict in great detail what the system will do in a variety of circumstances. Complex mechanical systems rarely exhibit surprising, emergent behavior. When they do—for example, an airplane explosion or com- puter network crash—experts study the phenomenon in detail to design surprise out of future systems.
In complex adaptive systems, on the other hand, the “parts” (in the case of the U.S. health care system, this includes human beings) have the freedom and ability to respond to stimuli in many different and fundamentally unpredictable ways. For this reason, emergent, surprising, creative behavior is a real possibility. Such behavior can be for better or for worse; that is, it can manifest itself as either innovation or error. Further, such emergent behavior can occur at both the micro- system and macrosystem levels. The evolving relationship of trust between a patient and clinician is an example of emergence at the microsystem level. The AIDS epidemic is an example of emergence that affects the macrosystem of care.
TABLE B-1 Mechanical Versus Naturally Adaptive Systems
Type of System Mechanical Naturally Adaptable
Simple Thermostat and fan Patient giving history information to a physician
Complex Office building heating, ventilation U.S. health care and air conditioning
The distinction between mechanical and naturally adaptive systems is obvi- ous when given some thought. However, many system designers do not seem to take this distinction into account. Rather, they design complex human systems as if the parts and interconnections were predictable in their behavior, although
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX B 311
fundamentally, they are not. When the human parts do not act as expected or hoped for, we say that people are being “unreasonable” or “resistant to change,” their behavior is “wrong” or “inappropriate.” The system designer’s reaction typically is to specify behavior in even more detail via laws, regulations, struc- tures, rules, guidelines, and so on. The unstated goal seems to be to make the human parts act more mechanical.
RECONCILING MECHANICAL AND ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS THINKING
This apparently misguided thinking arises from traditional science. In the Renaissance, Galileo, Newton, and others gave us the image of the clockwork universe (Capra, 1996). The paradigm of science for the last several hundred years has been one of reductionism; that is, further study of the parts of systems will lead to deeper understanding and predictability. Indeed, this tradition has led to great advances in knowledge.
Reductionist thinking has also been applied to organizations. Taylor (1911) introduced “scientific management” a century ago and changed our view of sys- tems of work. Taylorism resulted in huge gains in productivity through the intro- duction of scientific study of time and motion in work. Taylor believed that if workers would do their work in the “one best way,” everyone would benefit (Kanigel, 1997). These ideas form a continuing and deeply held paradigm today (Morgan, 1997; Zimmerman et al., 1998; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998).
Mechanical systems thinking does work in many situations when applied to human systems, and it has led to great progress in the past century. It is precisely because mechanical systems thinking works in many situations that it has become such a strongly held paradigm.
Organizational theorist Ralph Stacey (1996) provides a way to think about this seeming paradox (Figure B-1). Zimmerman et al. (1998) further describe this concept and provides several examples of its application in health care. In the lower left portion of the diagram are issues in which there is a high degree of certainty (as to outcomes from actions) and a high degree of agreement (among the people involved in taking the actions). Here, mechanical systems thinking with detailed plans and controls is appropriate. An example in health care is a surgical team doing routine gall bladder surgery. Through experience and the accumulation of knowledge, there is a high degree of certainty about the surgical procedures that lead to successful outcomes. The members of the surgical team agree on the way they will operate. In a good surgical team, everyone’s actions need to be relatively predictable and somewhat mechanical. Someone who be- haved unpredictably would be expelled from the team. In this area it is important to fully specify behavior and reduce variation, and there are many such issues at both the micro- and macrosystem level in health care.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
312 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
For other issues in human systems for which there is very little certainty and very little agreement (the area in the upper right of Figure B-1), chaos reigns and is to be avoided. A riot in the streets is an example.
Mechanical systems thinking (as intuitively applied by people designing and managing organizational systems) seems to allow only these two possibilities; it is necessary to plan and control, or there will be chaos. This seems so obvious to our mechanical-thinking mental model that it may not always be consciously acknowledged. Complex adaptive systems thinking allows for a third possibility.
There are many issues in human systems that lie in a “zone of complexity” (Langton, 1989; Zimmerman et al., 1998). These are issues for which there are only modest levels of certainty and agreement. Examples of such issues in health care might include: How should health care be financed? What is the best way to deliver primary care? For such issues there are many different models that have been successful in some situations and less successful in others; that is, only a modest level of “certainty” exists regarding what actions lead to what outcomes. Further, well-meaning, rational, intelligent people might not always agree as to the approach or outcome, meaning that there are only modest levels of agree- ment. For the most part the issues associated with designing the 21st-century health care system are in the zone of complexity where it would be more appro- priate to use the paradigm of a complex adaptive system.
THE SCIENCE OF COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS
A complex adaptive system (CAS) is a collection of individual agents that have the freedom to act in ways that are not always predictable and whose actions
FIGURE B-1 Stacey Diagram: Zone of complexity. SOURCE: Stacey, 1996.
Low
Low
High
High
Certainty About Outcomes
Professional/Social Agreement About Outcomes
Chaos
Plan and Control
Zone of Complexity
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX B 313
are interconnected such that one agent’s actions changes the context for other agents. Such systems have been the focus of intense study across a variety of scientific fields over the past 40 years (see Waldrop, 1992; Lewin, 1992; Wheatley, 1992; Kelly, 1994; Gell-Mann, 1995; Zimmerman et al., 1998; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). A major center of such research is the Santa Fe Institute, which includes several Nobel Prize winners among its faculty and associates (see Gell-Mann, 1995, p. xiv). Examples of systems that have been studied as a CAS include the human body’s immune system (Varela and Coutinho, 1991); the mind (Morowitz and Singer, 1995); a colony of social insects such as termites or ants (Wilson, 1971); the stock market (Mandelbrot, 1999); and almost any collection of human beings (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998; Stacey, 1996; Zimmerman, et al. 1998).
The study of such systems reveals a number of properties. Although the list below is not a comprehensive description of the field, it illustrates some key elements of a way of thinking about complex organizational systems such as health care.
• Adaptable elements. The elements of the system can change themselves. Examples include antibiotic-resistant organisms and anyone who learns. In machines, change must be imposed, whereas under the right conditions in CAS, change can happen from within.
• Simple rules. Complex outcomes can emerge from a few simple rules that are locally applied.
• Nonlinearity. Small changes can have large effects; for example, a large program in an organization might have little actual impact, yet a rumor could touch off a union organizing effort.
• Emergent behavior, novelty. Continual creativity is a natural state of the system. Examples are ideas that spring up in the mind and the behavior of the stock market. In machines, new behavior is relatively rare, but in CAS it is an inherent property of the system.
• Not predictable in detail. Forecasting is inherently an inexact, yet bounded, art. For example, in weather forecasting, the fundamental laws govern- ing pressure and temperature in gases are nonlinear. For this reason, despite reams of data and very powerful supercomputers, detailed, accurate long-range weather forecasting is fundamentally not possible. However, weather forecasting (and forecasting in general in any CAS) is bounded in the sense that we can make generally true statements about things like the average temperatures in a given season and place. The behavior of a machine is predictable in detail; it is just a matter of more study (reductionism). In a CAS, because the elements are change- able, the relations nonlinear, and the behavior creative and emergent, the only way to know what a CAS will do is to observe it.
• Inherent order. Systems can be orderly even without central control. Self- organization is the key idea in complexity science (Kaufmann, 1995; Holland,
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
314 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
1998; Prigogine, 1967, 1980). For example, termites build the largest structures on earth when compared with the height of the builders, yet there is no CEO termite. Similarly, there is no central controller for the stock market, the Internet, or the food supply of New York City.
• Context and embeddedness. Systems exist within systems, and this mat- ters. For example, global stock markets are linked such that if the currency of Thailand falls, the U.S. stock market reacts. In a machine, one can extract the parts and characterize the response of a part to a stimulus. Although one can study the parts of a CAS independently, its context matters in fundamental ways.
• Co-evolution. A CAS moves forward through constant tension and bal- ance. Fires, though destructive, are essential to a healthy, mature forest. Compe- tition is good for industries. Tension, paradox, uncertainty, and anxiety are healthy things in a CAS. In machine thinking, they are to be avoided.
COMPLEXITY THINKING APPLIED TO THE DESIGN OF THE 21ST-CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
With challenges that naturally fall in the zone of complexity, such as the design of the 21st-century health care system, it is not surprising if the system does not act like a machine. CAS science and the Stacey diagram suggest addi- tional metaphors to assist our thinking. Box-B-1 highlights some key ideas that emerge from the application of CAS science to the challenges of designing the 21st-century health care system.
Biological Approach and Evolutionary Design
It is more helpful to think like a farmer than an engineer or architect in designing a health care system. Engineers and architects need to design every detail of a system. This approach is possible because the responses of the compo- nent parts are mechanical and, therefore, predictable. In contrast, the farmer knows that he or she can do only so much. The farmer uses knowledge and
BOX B-1 Key Elements in an Approach to Complex Adaptive System Design
• Use biological metaphors to guide thinking. • Create conditions in which the system can evolve naturally over time. • Provide simple rules and minimum specifications. • Set forth a good enough vision and create a wide space for natural creativity to
emerge from local actions within the system.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX B 315
evidence from past experience, and desires an optimum crop. However, in the end, the farmer simply creates the conditions under which a good crop is possible. The outcome is an emergent property of the natural system and cannot be pre- dicted in detail.
CAS science suggests that we cannot hope to understand a priori what a CAS will do or how to optimize it. A design cannot be completed on paper. Past attempts to do this in health care have not succeeded in part because they may not have been satisfactory designs, but mainly because a new understanding of “de- sign” is needed.
Complex biological species (for example, human beings) get to be the way they are through evolutionary processes such as genetic mutation, and random variation. Changes that are useful to survival tend to persist. In a parallel manner, Holland (1995) points out that CAS need two processes in order to evolve: (1) processes that generate variation and (2) processes that “prune” the resulting evolutionary tree. Translating this insight to the task of designing the 21st-cen- tury health care system means combining the many ways to generate and test ideas with ways to enhance the spread of “good” ideas and impede the spread of “not so good” ideas. (Just as in biological evolution, seemingly harmful genetic variations do not die out completely in a generation; a not-so-fit characteristic might prove highly fit when combined with some other characteristic that evolves in a later generation.) These notions of evolutionary design are intuitively behind rapid-cycle plan-do-study-act (PDSA) improvement methods, which have been widely used in health care (Berwick, 1998).
Simple Rules, Good Enough Vision, and Wide Space for Innovation
A somewhat surprising finding from research on CAS is that relatively simple rules can lead to complex, emergent, innovative system behavior. For example, astrophysicists point out that all of the beauty and complexity we see in the universe emerges from two simple rules: (1) gravitational attraction and (2) the nonhomogeneity of matter in the early universe. In mathematics, the complexity and beauty of the Mandelbrot set (fractal mathematics) come from a very simple equation that is executed recursively. Reynolds (1987) showed that complex flocking, herding, and schooling behavior in animals could emerge from having each animal, such as a single fish in a school, apply three simple rules: (1) avoid collisions, (2) match speeds with your neighbors, and (3) move toward the center of mass of your neighbors. No central controller or director is needed; each animal can simply apply the rules locally. The behavior of the system emerges from the interactions, and this behavior is successful in avoiding predators. Hol- land (1998) shows how simple rules lead to emergent complexity in game theory, which models many situations in human interactions.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
316 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
This idea of simple rules is counterintuitive to mechanical-systems thinking, in which if one needs a complex outcome, one needs a complex machine. There have been several past attempts to set out a complex set of rules to govern health care. When these have not yielded desired results, our instincts have been to create even more rules. CAS science asserts that these instincts take us in exactly the wrong direction.
The concept of complex system design using simple rules has also been demonstrated in organizations. The credit card company VISA built a trillion dollar business with very little central control. The banks that issue credit cards agree to only a few simple rules regarding card numbering, card appearance, electronic interface standards, and so forth. They are free to innovate and com- pete in all other aspects. There is no central control on new service development, and banks can go after each other’s customers (Waldrop, 1996). In their study of high-tech firms, Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) found that the most successful firms had fewer rules, structures, and policies than their less successful competi- tors. Finally, the Internet is another example of a CAS. The few simple rules have to do with Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML), site naming conventions, and so on. Innovation is occurring daily in this arena. Zimmerman et al. (1998) provide several examples from early work applying these principles in the VHA, Inc. health care systems.
Again, the concept of simple rules clearly links to notions based on evolu- tionary genetics, game theory, innovation theory, and other sciences that are embracing new ideas about complexity. The concept provides wide boundaries for beginning the work of self-organization.
It is liberating to realize that the task of complex system design does not itself need to be complex. Although it has been suspected intuitively that it may not be possible to design in detail something as complex as the U.S. health care system, there is no need to fall victim to chaos. The answer is to create the conditions for self-organization through simple rules under which massive and diverse experimentation can happen.
Simple rules for human CAS tend to be of three types: (1) general direction pointing, (2) prohibitions, and (3) resource or permission providing. A good set of simple rules might include all three types. These three types of rules tend to match the predispositions of many systems designers. Those who would focus on leadership and aim setting are drawn to the simple rules of the first type.
Those who are drawn to regulation and boundary setting are comfortable with the second type. Those who would focus on incentives and resources are drawn to the third type. The theory honors all three points of view and suggests that it is best to have only a few such rules, so that no one point of view domi- nates.
Self-organizing innovation occurring in the health care system suggests that there is an implicit set of simple rules already in place. Experience in the fields of
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX B 317
creativity and innovation suggests that changing these underlying rules might result in great innovation (Plsek, 1999).
Because the parts of a CAS are adaptable and embedded within a unique context, every change within a CAS can stimulate other changes that we could not expect. This approach to system design can never provide the assurance that is possible in a mechanical system. This is the nature of CAS. Therefore, rather than agonizing over plans, the goal is to generate a “good enough plan” and begin to observe what happens. Then, modifications can occur in an evolutionary fash- ion.
CONCLUSION
Complexity science provides a new paradigm to guide system design. Some key questions raised by a CAS-inspired approach to redesigning health care for the 21st century include:
• How can conditions in the health care system be established to allow many new ideas to emerge and mix into the existing system, while maintaining discipline to do just a little bit of nurturing, see what happens, then decide what to do next?
• How can diverse people be brought together, information shared, and forums convened among those to stimulate creative connections who do not normally come together to do so (similar to genetic cross-over and mutation)?
• How can desirable variation (innovation) be separated from the variation that ought to be reduced (error and waste)?
• What are the few simple rules that might guide the local development of the 21st-century health care system?
• What is the implicit, existing set of simple rules from which current innovations in health care emerge?
• How can these existing, implicit rules and underlying assumptions be modified?
• How can communication infrastructures be set up to disseminate the new simple rules?
• How can infrastructures be established in public policy to encourage ex- perimentation and innovation under the new simple rules?
• How can experimentation be made highly visible so that the “fitness” of each evolution can be judged to quickly spread the best ideas?
• What is a “good enough plan” to begin the change? • Who should take on the role of continuing to evolve the plan as the CAS
plays itself out?
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
318 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES
Complex Systems Science
Arthur B.W. Increasing returns and the new world of business. Harvard Business Review. 74(4): 100–109, 1996.
Axelrod R.M. The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collabora- tion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Axelrod R.M. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 1984. Briggs J. Fractals: The Patterns of Chaos. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992. Brockman J. The Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution. New York: Simon and Schuster,
1995. Capra F. The Web of Life: The New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems. New York: Anchor
Books, 1996. Cohen J. and Stewart I. The Collapse of Chaos: Discovering Simplicity in a Complex World. New
York: Viking Penguin, 1994. Dickinson M.H, Farley C.T, Full R.J, et al. How animals move: An integrative view. Science.
288(5463): 100–106, 2000. Gabaix X. Zipf’s law and the growth of cities. AEA Papers and Proceedings: New Ideas on Eco-
nomic Growth. 89(2): 129–132, 1999. Gell-Mann M. The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and Complex. New York: W. H.
Freeman, 1995. Gladwell M. The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference. Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 2000. Goodwin B. How the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution of Complexity. New York: Touch-
stone, 1994. Holland J.H. Emergence: From Chaos to Order. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1998. Holland J.H. Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley,
1995. Holldobler B. and Wilson E.O. Journey of the Ants: A Story of Scientific Exploration. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. Horgan J. From complexity to perplexity. Scientific American. 272(6):104–109, 1995. Johnson G. Of mice and elephants: A matter of scale. The New York Times. January 12, 1999. F1. Johnson G. Mindless creatures, acting mindfully: A few simple rules give rise to complex behavior.
The New York Times. March 23, 1999. D1. Kauffman S.A. Antichaos and adaptation. Scientific American. 265(2):78-84, 1991. Kauffman S.A. At Home in the Universe. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1995. Langton C.G. Artificial Life. Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, Proceedings,
Vol. 6. Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1989. Lewin R. Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos. New York: Macmillan, 1992. Lorenz E. The Essence of Chaos. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993. Lovelock J. Gaia as seen through the atmosphere. Atmospheric Environment. 6:579. 1972. Mandelbrot B. A fractal walk on Wall Street. Scientific American. 280(2), 70–73, 1999. Mitchell M. An Introduction to Genetic Algorithms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. Morowitz H.J. Metaphysics, meta-metaphor, and magic. Complexity. 3(4), 1998, 19–20. Morowitz H.J. and Singer J.L. The Mind, the Brain, and Complex Adaptive Systems. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1995. Prigogine I. Dissipative structures in chemical systems. In Claesson S. (ed.). Fast Reactions and
Primary Processes in Chemical Kinetics. New York: Interscience, 1967. Prigogine I. From Being to Becoming. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1980. Prigogine I. and Stengers I. Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature. New York:
Bantam, 1984.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX B 319
Resnick M. Turtles, Termites, and Traffic Jams: Explorations in Massively Parallel Microworlds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
Reynolds C.W. Flocks, herds, and schools: A distributed behavioral model. Computer Graphics. 21(4):25–34, 1987.
Stewart I. and Cohen J. Figments of Reality: The Evolution of the Curious Mind. Cambridge, En- gland: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Valente T.W. Network Models of the Diffusion of Innovations. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1995. von Bertalanffy L. General Systems Theory: Foundations, Development, and Applications, Revised
Edition. New York: George Braziller Publishers, 1968. Waldrop MM. Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1992. Wilson E.O. The Insect Societies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. Wyles J.S., Kimbel G. and Wilson A.C. Birds, behavior, and anatomical evolution. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences. 80(14):4394-4397, 1983.
Clinical Applications of Complexity Science
Armoni A. Use of neural networks in medical diagnosis. MD Computing. 15(2):100–4, 1998. Bassingthwaighte J.B., Liebovitch L.S., and West B.J. Fractal Physiology. Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press, 1994. Coffey D.S. Self-organization, complexity, and chaos: The new biology of medicine. Nature Medi-
cine. 4(8):882–885, 1998. Cole C.R., Blackstone E.H., Pashkow F.J., et al. Heart-rate recovery immediately following exercise
as a predictor of mortality. The New England Journal of Medicine. 341:1351–1357, 1999. Dardik I.I. The origin of disease and health, heart waves: The single solution to heart rate variability
and ischemic preconditioning. Frontier Perspectives. 6(2):18–32, 1997. Fogel D.B., Wasson E.C., Boughton E.M., and Porto V.W. A step toward computer-assisted mam-
mography using evolutionary programming and neural networks. Cancer Letters. 119:93-97, 1997.
Goertzel B. The complex mind/brain: The Psynet model of mental structure and dynamics. Complex- ity. 3(4): 51–58, 1998.
Goldberger A.L. Nonlinear dynamics for clinicians: Chaos theory, fractals, and complexity at the bedside. Lancet. 347:1312–14, 1996.
Goldberger A.L. Fractal variability versus pathologic periodicity: Complexity loss and stereotypy in disease. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine. 40(4):543–561, 1997.
Goldberger A.L., Rigney D.R., and West B.J. Chaos and fractals in human physiology. Scientific American. 262:42–49, 1990.
Goodwin J.S. Chaos, and the limits of modern medicine. JAMA. 278:1399–40, 1997. Ivanov P.C., Amaral L.A.N., Goldberger A.L., et al. Multifractality in human heartbeat dynamics.
Nature. 399:461–465, 1999. Lipsitz L.A. and Goldberger A.L. Loss of complexity and aging: Potential applications of fractals
and chaos theory to senescene. JAMA. 267:1806–1809, 1999. Nelson T.R., West B.J., and Goldberger A.L. The fractal lung: Universal and species-related fractal
patterns. Experientia. 46:251–254, 1990. Pikkujamsa S.M., Makikallio T.H., Sourander L.F., et al. Cardiac interbeat interval dynamics from
childhood to senescence: Comparison of conventional and new measures based on fractals and chaos theory. Circulation. 100:393–399, 1999.
Regaldo A. A gentle scheme for unleashing chaos. Science. 268:1848, 1995. Schmidt G., Malick M., Barthel P., et al. Heart-rate turbulence after ventricular premature beats as a
predictor of mortality after acute myocardial infarction. Lancet. 353:1390–1396, 1999.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
320 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Streufert S. and Satish U. Complexity theory: Predictions based on the confluence of science-wide and behavioral theories. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 27(23):2096–2116, 1997.
Varela F. and Coutinho A. Second generation immune networks. Immunology Today. 12(5):159– 166, 1991.
Varela F., Thompson E., and Rosch E. The Embodied Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. Wagner C.D., Nafz B., Persson P.B. Chaos and blood pressure control. Cardiovascular Research.
31:380–7, 1996. Weibel ER. Fractal geometry: A design principle for living organisms. American Journal of Physiol-
ogy. 261:361–369, 1991.
Organizational Applications of Complexity Science
Anderson RA and McDaniel RR. RN participation in organizational decision making and improve- ments in resident outcomes. Health Care Management Review. 24(1):7–16, 1999.
Baskin K. Corporate DNA: Learning from Life. Boston: Butterworth Heinemann, 1998. Baskin K., Goldstein J, and Lindberg C. Merging, de-merging, and emerging at Deaconess Billings
Clinic. The Physician Executive. 20–5, 2000 Begun J.W. Chaos and complexity: Frontiers of organizational science. Journal of Management
Inquiry. 3(3):29–335, 1994. Beinhocker E.D. Robust adaptive strategies. Sloan Management Review. 40(3):95–106, 1999. Beckman J.D. Change has changed: What the organism can teach the organization. Health Care
Forum Journal. 60–62, 1998. Beckman J.D. Embracing paradox: What the organism can teach the organization. Health Care
Forum Journal. 66–68, 1998. Berwick D.M. Developing and testing changes in delivery of care. Annals of Internal Medicine.
128:651–656, 1998. Brown S.L. and Eisenhardt K.M. Competing on the Edge: Strategy as Structured Chaos. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998. Clippinger J.H. The Biology of Business: Decoding the Natural Laws of Enterprise. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1999. Davidson S.N. Healthy chaos. Health Care Forum Journal. March–April:64–7, 1998. Dooley K.J., Johnson T.L., and Bush D.H. TQM, chaos, and complexity. Human Systems Manage-
ment. 14: 287–302, 1995. Dooley K.J. A complex adaptive systems model of organizational change. Nonlinear Dynamics,
Psychology, and Life Science. 1(1):69–97, 1997. Eisenhardt K.M. and Brown S.L. Time pacing: Competing in markets that won’t stand still. Harvard
Business Review. March–April:59–69, 1998. Eisenhardt K.M. and Brown S.L. Patching: Restitching business portfolios in dynamic markets.
Harvard Business Review. May–June:72–82, 1999. Eisenhardt K.M. and Galunic D.C. Coevolving: At last, a way to make synergies work. Harvard
Business Review. 78(1):91–101, 2000. Eoyang G.H. Coping With Chaos: Seven Simple Tools. Cheyenne, WY: Lagumo, 1997. Goldstein J. The Unshackled Organization: Facing the Challenge of Unpredictability Through Spon-
taneous Reorganization. Portland, OR: Productivity Press, 1994. Hamel G. Strategy as revolution. Harvard Business Review. 74(4):69–82, 1996. Hamel G. Strategy innovation and the quest for value. Sloan Management Review. 39(2):7–14, 1998. Hock D. The Birth of the Chaordic Age. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 1999. Hurst D. and Zimmerman BJ. From life cycle to ecocycle: A new perspective on the growth, matu-
rity, destruction, and renewal of complex systems. Journal of Management Inquiry. 3(4):339– 354, 1995.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX B 321
Kanigel.R. The One Best Way: Fredrick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency. New York: Viking, 1997.
Kelly K. Out of Control: The Rise of Neo-Biological Civilization. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1994.
Kelly S. and Allison M.A. The Complexity Advantage: How the Science of Complexity Can Help Your Business Achieve Peak Performance. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999.
Khurana A. Managing complex production processes. Sloan Management Review. 40(2):85–97, 1999. Krackhardt D. and Hanson J.R. Informal networks: The company behind the chart. Harvard Business
Review. July–August:104–111, 1993. Kuo R.J. and Xue K.C. Fuzzy neural networks with application to sales forecasting. Fuzzy Sets and
Systems. 108(2):123–143, 1999. Lane D. and Maxfield R. Strategy under complexity: Fostering generative relationships. Long Range
Planning. 29(2):215–231, 1996. Lewin R. It’s a jungle out there. New Scientist. November 29:30–34, 1997. Lewin R., Parker T., and Regine B. Complexity theory and the organization: Beyond the metaphor.
Complexity. 3(4):36–38. Lewin R. and Regine B. The Soul at Work: Embracing Complexity Science for Business Success.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000. Lin G.Y.J. and Solberg J.J. Integrated shop floor control using autonomous agents. IIE Transactions.
24(3):57–71, 1992. Lindberg C. and Taylor J. From the science of complexity to leading in uncertain times. Journal of
Innovative Management. Summer:22–34, 1997. Lindberg C., Herzog A., Merry M., Goldstein J. Life at the edge of chaos. The Physician Executive.
January-February: 6–20, 1998. Lissack M. and Roos J. The Next Common Sense: Mastering Corporate Complexity through Coher-
ence. London: Nicholas Brealey, 1999. Lorange P. and Probst G.J.B. Joint ventures as self-organizing ventures: A key to successful joint
venture design and implementation. Columbia Journal of World Business. Summer:71–77, 1987.
McWinney W., Webber J.B., Smith D.M., and Novokowsky B.J. Creating Paths of Change: Manag- ing Issues and Resolving Problems in Organizations. Venice, CA: Enthusion Press, 1996.
Morgan G. Images of Organization, 2nd Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997. Parker D. and Stacey R.D. Chaos, Management, and Economics: The Implications of Non-Linear
Thinking. Bournemouth, England: Bourne Press, 1994. Pascale R.T. Surfing the edge of chaos. Sloan Management Review. 40(3):83–95, 1999. Petrich C.H. Organizational science: Oxymoron or opportunity? Complexity. 3(4):23–26, 1998. Petzinger T. Self-organization will free employees to act like bosses. Wall Street Journal. January 3,
1997. D1. Petzinger T. A new model for the nature of business: It’s alive! Forget the mechanical, today’s
leaders embrace the biological. Wall Street Journal. February 26, 1999. B1. Petzinger T. The New Pioneers: The Men and Women Who Are Transforming the Workplace and
Marketplace. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999. Plsek P.E. Innovative thinking for the improvement of medical systems. Annals of Internal Medicine
131(6),438–444, 1999. Plsek P.E. and Kilo C.M. From resistance to attraction: A different approach to change. Physician
Executive. 25(6):40-46,1999. Resnick M. Unblocking the traffic jams in corporate thinking. Complexity. 3(4):27-30, 1998. Roy B. Using agents to make and manage markets across a supply web. Complexity. 3(4):31–35,
1998. Sanders T.I. Strategic Thinking and the New Science: Planning in the Midst of Chaos, Complexity,
and Change. New York: Free Press, 1998.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
322 CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
Senge P.M. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. New York: Doubleday, 1990.
Sherman H. and Schultz R. Open Boundaries: Creating Innovation Through Complexity. Reading: MA: Perseus Books, 1998.
Spear S. and Bowen H.K. Decoding the DNA of the Toyota Production System. Harvard Business Review. 77(5):97–106, 1999.
Stacey R.D. Complexity and Creativity in Organizations. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 1996. Stacey R.D. Strategic Management and Organizational Dynamics. London: Pitmann Publishing,
1996. Taylor F.W. The Principles of Scientific Management. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1911. Waldrop M.M. The trillion dollar vision of Dee Hock. Fast Company. October–November:75–86,
1996. Wells S.J. Forget the formal training: Try chatting at the water cooler. The New York Times, May 10,
1998. Wheatley M.J. Leadership and the New Science: Learning about Organization from an Orderly
Universe. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 1992. Wieck K.E. Sense Making in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995. Zastocki D.K. A toolbox for managing in turbulent environments. Journal of Innovative Manage-
ment. Summer:24–33, 1999. Zimmerman B.J. Chaos and nonequilibrium: The flip side of strategic processes. Organizational
Development Journal. 11(1):31–38, 1993. Zimmerman B.J., Lindberg C, and Plsek PE. Edgeware: Insights from Complexity Science for Health
Care Leaders. Dallas, TX: VHA Publishing, 1998. Zimmerman B.J. Complexity science: A route through hard times and uncertainty. The Health Fo-
rum Journal. 42(2):42–46, 96, 1999.
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
323
A
Access to care studies, 235 to medical knowledge-base, 31
Accidental injury, IOM definition of, 45 Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
Education, 214 ACP Journal Club, 145 Action steps, 89-110
needed now, 2-4 Actual care and ideal care, gaps between in
U.S., 236-238 Acute care. See also Inappropriate acute care;
Priority conditions hip fractures, 259 otitis media, 259 pneumonia, 227, 258 pregnancy and delivery, 260-264 underuse of, 258-264 urinary tract infections, 259-260
Acute myocardial infarction, 102 Adaptable elements, in complex adaptive
systems, 313 Adapting existing payment methods
blended, 200-201 capitation, 200 fee-for-service, 199
Index
shared-risk (budget) arrangements, 201 to support quality improvement, 199-201
Adaptive systems thinking, reconciling with mechanical, 311-312
Adjusted clinical groups (ACGs), 195-196 Administrative management personnel,
retraining nonclinical, 212 Administrative transactions, potential benefits
of information technology for, 167-168 Adult respiratory distress symptom, 77 Adverse events, misuse leading to, 304-305 Adverse risk selection
adjusted clinical groups (ACGs), 195-196 blocking quality improvement in current
payment methods, 195-197 clinical risk groups (CRGs), 196 diagnostic cost groups (DCGs), 196
Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry, 6, 24, 39, 231
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research. See Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), 10, 105
Center for Organization and Delivery Studies, 105
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
324 INDEX
Evidence-Based Practice Centers, 14, 145, 150-151
Integrated Delivery System Research Network, 105
National Guideline Clearinghouse, 151, 157 recommendations to, 10, 12, 19-20, 90-91,
182, 184, 208 Translating Research into Practice, 155
Agenda for crossing the chasm, 5-20 building organizational supports for change,
11-12 establishing a new environment for care,
13-20 establishing aims for the 21st-century health
care system, 5-7 formulating new rules to redesign and
improve care, 7-9 taking the first steps, 9-11
Agenda for the future, 33-35 Aging of the population, 26 Aims for the 21st-century health care system,
5-6, 39-54 conflicts among, 53-54 effectiveness, 6, 46-48 efficiency, 6, 52-53 equity, 6, 53 establishing, 5-7 patient-centeredness, 6, 48-51 safety, 5, 44-46 timeliness, 6, 51-52
Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias, 91, 103 American Academy of Physicians, 158 American Association of Colleges of Nursing,
214 American Association of Colleges of
Osteopathic Medicine, 214 American Association of Health Plans, 151,
157 American Board of Medical Specialties, 214 American College of Physicians, 150, 158 American College of Physicians’ Journal Club,
150 American Customer Satisfaction Index, 46 American Diabetes Association, 158 American Medical Association, 151, 157, 159,
214 Code of Ethics, 45
American National Standards Institute, Healthcare Informatics Standards Board, 172
American Nurses Association, 214
American Nurses Credentialing Center, 214 American Osteopathic Association, 214 American Society for Testing and Material, 172 American Standards Committee, 172 American Thoracic Society, 192 Annual contracting arrangements, blocking
quality improvement in current payment methods, 197
Antibiotic use, inappropriate acute care involving, 292-295
Anticipation of needs, 8, 62, 80-81 current approach—react to needs, 81 new rule—anticipate needs, 81
Anxiety. See also Depression and anxiety disorders
relieving, 50 Applications of priority conditions, 96-103
organize and coordinate care around patient needs, 98-100
provide a common base for the development of information technology, 101
reduce suboptimization in payment, 101-102 simplify quality measurement, evaluation of
performance, and feedback, 102-103 synthesize the evidence base and delineate
practice guidelines, 97-98 Arthritis, 91, 103 Assets, providing for positive change, 13 Association of American Medical Colleges,
214 Asthma, 91, 103
chronic care of, 264-265 inappropriate acute care of, 296
Automated clinical information, 170-176 financial requirements, 174-175 human factors issues, 175-176 privacy concerns and need for standards,
171-174
B
Back problems, 91, 103 Balanced Budget Act, 174 Baldrige Award. See Malcolm Baldrige
National Quality Award Barriers to quality improvement in current
payment methods, 191-199 adverse risk selection, 195-197 annual contracting arrangements, 197 perverse payment mechanisms, 191-195
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 325
up-front investments required by provider groups, 197-199
“Batch size of one,” 125 Behavioral change, patients’ need for, 28 Benefits of information technology, 166-170 Bill of Rights, 64 Biological approach, 314-315 Biomedical research, increasing investments in,
25 Blended payment methods
adapting, 200-201 incentives of current, 188-189
British Medical Journal, 150 Bronchitis, inappropriate acute care of, 296 Budget approaches, incentives of current, 186-
187 Building organizational supports for change,
11-12 Bureau of Health Professionals, 214 Bureau of Primary Health Care, Quality Center,
91 Buyers Health Care Action Group, 200
C
Cancer, 91, 103 chronic care, 274-279 screening, 251-253
Cancerfacts.com, 55 Capitation payment, adapting, 200 Cardiac care problems, findings about, 227 Cardiac rehabilitation, 170 Cardiac risk factors, 254-257 Cardiovascular disease
chronic care of, 279-291 inappropriate acute care of, 298-301
Care processes establishing new environment for, 13-20 redesigning, 11, 117-127
Carotid arteries, inappropriate acute care of, 302
Case histories chronic care (using partnership to improve),
107 Henry L. (HIV positive), 69 hospital emergency department (improving
timeliness of services), 107 Mary Chao (diabetes educator), 75 Maureen Waters (care as it could be), 54-56 Ms. Martinez (failed care), 41-44, 49, 51 patient-centered primary care (reorganizing
staff), 107-108 Pearl Clayton (mental health), 81
Cataracts, inappropriate acute care of, 302 Center for Organization and Delivery Studies,
105 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 156 Centers of Excellence, 100, 106 Change
building organizational supports for, 11-12 in the health care environment, responding
to, 138 leadership for managing, 137-140 providing assets and encouragement for
positive, 13 providing the resources needed to initiate,
103-108 Changes in Health Care Financing and
Organization Program, 105 CHESS database, 55 Chronic care
asthma, 264-265 cancer, 274-279 cardiovascular disease, 279-291 diabetes mellitus, 265-268 hypertension, 269-270 mental/addictive disorder, 272-274 mental health, 270-272 peptic ulcer disease, 269 underuse of, 264-291
Chronic conditions, 3-4. See also Priority conditions
health care for, 9 increase in, 26-27
Chronic heart failure, 97 Clinical care, potential benefits of information
technology for, 167-168 Clinical decision support system (CDSS), 151-
155 Clinical education and training
changes in health professional education required, 210
curricular changes required, 209-210 new or enhanced skills required by health
professionals, 209 opportunities for multidisciplinary training,
210-211 reasons for little change in traditional
clinical education, 213-214 retooling practicing clinicians, 211-212 retraining nonclinical administrative
management personnel, 212
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
326 INDEX
Clinical evidence, synthesizing, 148-152 Clinical Evidence, 150 Clinical expertise, access to necessary, 29 Clinical information, automated, 170-176 Clinical integration, 133 Clinical knowledge and skills, managing, 12,
128-130 Clinical risk groups (CRGs), 196 Clinical Roadmap team, 135 Clinicians
cooperation among, 9, 62, 83 recommendations to, 5, 8-9, 34 retooling practicing, 211-212
Co-evolution, in complex adaptive systems, 314 Cochrane Collaboration, 13, 145, 149-150 Code of Ethics, 45 Collaborative Review Groups, 149 Comfort. See Physical comfort Committee on the Quality of Health Care in
America, 1, 23-24, 31, 225 Technical Advisory Panel on the State of
Quality, 24 Communication, 50
enhanced patient and clinician, 31-32 Community health needs, identify and
prioritize, 138 Competency, ensuring continuing, 217 Complex adaptive systems (CAS), 309-317
adaptable elements, 313 co-evolution, 314 complexity thinking applied to design of the
21st-century health care system, 314-317 context and embeddedness, 314 emergent behavior, 313 health care organizations as, 63-66 inherent order, 313-314 non-predictable in detail, 313 nonlinearity, 313 novelty, 313 reconciling mechanical and adaptive
systems thinking, 311-312 science of complex adaptive systems, 312-
314 simple rules, 313 systems thinking, 309-311
Complex health care conditions, patients with, 122
Complexity thinking applied to design of the 21st-century health care system, 314-317
biological approach and evolutionary design, 314-315
good enough vision, 315-317 simple rules, 315-317 wide space for innovation, 315-317
Comprehensive national health information infrastructure, 176
Computer-aided decision support systems, 31 Computer-based clinical decision support
systems (CDSS), 152-155 Congress, recommendations to, 7, 11, 17, 166 Constraints on exploiting information
technology access to medical knowledge-base, 31 computer-aided decision support systems,
31 enhanced patient and clinician
communication, 31-32 reduction in errors, 31
Consumers potential benefits of information technology
for health of, 166-168 recommendations to, 5, 34
Context, in complex adaptive systems, 314 Continuous access, 68 Continuous flow, 125-126
redesigning care processes for, 124-126 Continuous healing relationships, care based
on, 8, 61, 66-69 Control, patient as the source of, 8, 61, 70-72 Cooperation, among clinicians, 9, 62, 83 Coordinating care, across patient conditions,
services, and settings over time, 12, 49- 50, 133-135
Coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery, 241
CPG Infobase, 157 Criteria
for identifying priority conditions, 103 for including studies, 234
Crossing the chasm, 5-20 building organizational supports for change,
11-12 establishing a new environment for care,
13-20 establishing aims for the 21st-century health
care system, 5-7 formulating new rules to redesign and
improve care, 7-9 taking the first steps, 9-11
Current payment methods barriers to quality improvement in, 191-199 incentives of, 184-191
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 327
Current Procedural Technology (CPT) coding, 199
Curricula, changes required, 209-210 Customization
based on patient needs and values, 8, 61, 69-70
mass, redesigning care processes for, 123- 124
D
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, 45 Deaths, misuse leading to preventable, 304 Decision making, evidence-based, 8, 62, 76-77 Decision support systems, computer-aided, 31,
152-155 Delineating practice guidelines, 97-98 Delivery systems
highly fragmented, 112-114 poorly organized, 28-30
Dementia. See Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias
Department of Health and Human Services, 171-172
Bureau of Health Professionals, 214 recommendations to, 5, 34, 40
Department of Veterans Affairs, 128, 171 Depression and anxiety disorders, 91, 97, 103
inappropriate acute care of, 297 Design for safety
designing procedures that can mitigate harm from errors, 123
designing procedures to make errors visible, 123
designing systems to prevent errors, 122-123 redesigning care processes for, 122-123
Developing effective teams, 12, 130-133 Diabetes Control and Complications Trial, 96 Diabetes mellitus, 91, 97, 103, 170
chronic care of, 265-268 Diabetes Quality Improvement Project, 158 Diagnosis, using computer-based clinical
decision support systems for, 152-154 Diagnosis related groups (DRGs), 187, 192 Diagnostic cost groups (DCGs), 196 Disease management programs, 99-100 “Doc Talk” form, 72 Domestic violence, 134 “Double-loop” learning, 136 Drugs, using computer-based clinical decision
support systems for prescribing of, 153
E
Education issues, 50 for the future health care workforce, 220
Educational institutions, recommendations to, 5, 34
Effectiveness, 46-48 21st-century health care system, 6
Efficiency, 52-53 improvements in, 164 21st-century health care system, 6
80/20 principle, system design using, 120-122 Embeddedness, in complex adaptive systems,
314 Emergent behavior, in complex adaptive
systems, 313 Emotional support, 50 Emphysema, 91, 103 Encouragement, providing for positive change,
13 Environment for care
aligning payment policies with quality improvement, 17-19
applying evidence to health care delivery, 13-15
establishing new, 13-20 focus and align environment toward the six
aims for improvement, 13 preparing the workforce, 19-20 provide assets and encouragement for
positive change, 13 using information technology, 15-17
Equity, 53 21st-century health care system, 6
Errors designing procedures to make visible, 123 designing systems to prevent, 122-123 reduction in, 31
“Essential technology,” 171 Evidence-Based Cardiovascular Medicine, 150 Evidence-based care, 28 Evidence-based decision making, 8, 62, 76-77,
145-163 background, 147-148 defining quality measures, 157-159 in health care delivery, 13-15, 145-163 making information available on the
Internet, 155-157 synthesizing clinical evidence, 148-152 using computer-based clinical decision
support systems, 152-155 Evidence-Based Medicine, 150
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
328 INDEX
Evidence-Based Mental Health, 150 Evidence-Based Nursing, 150 Evidence-Based Practice Centers, 14, 145, 150-
151 “Evidence formulary,” 150 Evolutionary design, 314-315 Executive branch, recommendations to, 17, 166 Expressed needs, respect for patients’, 49
F
FACCT|ONE, 158 Family, involvement of, 50 Fear, relieving, 50 Fee-for-service payment, adapting, 199 Financial requirements, for automated clinical
information, 174-175 Financial transactions, potential benefits of
information technology for, 167-168 First steps
applications of priority conditions, 96-103 criteria for identifying priority conditions, 103 providing the resources needed to initiate
change, 103-108 value of organizing around priority
conditions, 92-96 Follow-up, patients’ needs for greater, 28 Food and Drug Administration, 26, 156 Foundation for Accountability, 158 Free flow of information, 8, 62, 72-75 Friends, involvement of, 50 Funding over several years, to ensure sustained
and stable funding source, 104
G
Gall bladder disease, 91, 103 Gastrointestinal disease, inappropriate acute
care of, 302 General preventive care, 257 Genomics, 2 Good enough vision, 315-317 Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 105
H
Harm from errors, designing procedures that can mitigate, 123
Harris Poll results, 46, 166-167
Healing relationships, care based on continuous, 8, 61, 66-69
Health care conditions, patients with rare or complex, 122
Health care constituencies, recommendations to, 5, 34
Health care delivery, applying evidence to, 13- 15
Health care environment, obtaining resources and responding to changes in, 138
Health Care Financing Administration, 196 Centers of Excellence, 100, 106 Foundation for Accountability, 158 Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center
demonstration, 188 Office of Research and Development, 106 Peer Review Organizations, 158 recommendations to, 19, 182
Health care needs, of medium predictability, 121-122
Health care organizations as complex adaptive systems, 63-66 key challenges for the redesign of, 117-137 recommendations to, 6, 8-9, 34, 39-40 recommendations to leaders of, 17, 166
Health Care Quality Innovation Fund, 11 recommendations to, 91-92, 103-106, 166
Health care system, for the 21st-century, 6, 23- 60
Health care trustees and management, recommendations to, 5, 34
HEALTH database, 233 Health informatics associations and vendors,
recommendations to, 17, 166 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act, 173 Health Plan Employer Data and Information
Set (HEDIS), 157, 159, 240, 242 Health Planning and Administration, HEALTH
database, 233 Health professional education, changes
required, 210 Health professionals
new or enhanced skills required by, 209 recommendations to, 5, 34
Health professions, recommendations to, 5, 34 Health Resources Services Administration,
Bureau of Primary Health Care, 91 Healthcare Informatics Standards Board, 172 HealthTopics, 157 Heart failure, 102
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 329
High cholesterol, 91, 103 High Level 7, 172 Hip fractures, acute care of, 259 HIV/AIDS, 91, 97, 103, 134 Homeostasis, 137 Human factors issues, with automated clinical
information, 175-176 Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML), 316 Hypertension, 91, 103
chronic care of, 269-270 Hysterectomy, inappropriate acute care
involving, 297
I
Ideal care and actual care, gaps between in U.S., 236-238
Identifying community health needs, 138 Immediate needs, 2-4 Immunizations, 250-251 Improvement of care
formulating new rules to, 7-9 six aims for, 6, 40-54
Inadequate quality of care constraints on exploiting information
technology, 30-33 growing complexity of science and
technology, 25-26 increase in chronic conditions, 26-27 poorly organized delivery system, 28-30 underlying reasons for, 25-33
Inappropriate acute care antibiotic use, 292-295 bronchitis/asthma, 296 cardiovascular disease, 298-301 carotid arteries, 302 cataracts, 302 depression, 297 gastrointestinal disease, 302 hysterectomy, 297 low back pain, 303 otitis media, 296 respiratory illness, 295 U.S. examples of, 292-303
Incentives of current payment methods, 184-191 blended methods, 188-189 budget approaches, 186-187 charted, 190 payment by unit of care, 187-188 per case payment, 187
Information, 50 about patients, their care, and outcomes, 95 automated clinical, 170-176 free flow of, 8, 62, 72-75 making available on the Internet, 155-157 patients’ need for, 28 strong focus on patient, 95
Information systems, supportive, 29 Information technology (IT), 164-180
automated clinical information, 170-176 constraints on exploiting, 30-33 making effective use of, 12, 127-128 need for a national health information
infrastructure, 176-177 potential benefits of, 166-170 provide a common base for the
development of, 101 using, 15-17
Infrastructure investments, 198-199 Inherent order, in complex adaptive systems,
313-314 Innovation, wide space for, 315-317 Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 91 Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, 172 Institute of Medicine (IOM), 13, 17, 23-24,
100, 103, 136-137, 165, 171, 191, 199 definition of accidental injury, 45 definition of quality, 232 National Roundtable on Health Care
Quality, 23 Quality of Health Care in America Project,
225 Technical Advisory Panel on the State of
Quality, 24, 226, 231-232, 234 Insurance coverage. See Equity Integrated Delivery System Research Network,
105 Integration of care, 49-50 Intensive care unit (ICU) patients, 77 Interdependence of changes, recognizing at all
levels, 139-140 Intermountain Health Care, 105, 128, 171, 191,
201 Internet, 16, 30-32, 65, 154-155, 167, 176, 316
making information available on, 155-157 secure applications, 127
Investing, in the workforce, 139 Involvement, of family and friends, 50 Ischemic heart disease, 91, 97, 103
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
330 INDEX
J
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 102, 157
Journal of Evidence-Based Health Care, 150
K
Kaiser-Permanente Health Plan, 105, 196 Key challenges for the redesign of health care
organizations, 117-137 coordinating care across patient conditions,
services, and settings over time, 12, 133-135
developing effective teams, 12, 130-133 incorporating performance and outcome
measurements for improvement and accountability, 12, 135-137
making effective use of information technologies, 12, 127-128
managing clinical knowledge and skills, 12, 128-130
redesigning care processes, 11, 117-127 Knowledge-base, access to medical, 31
L
LDS Hospital, 77 Leaders of health care organizations
multidisciplinary summit of, 19, 208 recommendations to, 17
Leadership for managing change, 137-140 help obtain resources and respond to
changes in health care environment, 138 identify and prioritize community health
needs, 138 invest in the workforce, 139 optimize performance of teams that provide
various services, 138-139 recognize the interdependence of changes at
all levels, 139-140 support reward and recognition systems, 139
Legal liability issues for the future health care workforce, 221 in workforce preparation, 218-219
Level of harm caused by poor quality, in the report on the state of quality, 227-228
Liaison Committee on Medical Education, 214 Licensure systems, 215-216 Low back pain, inappropriate acute care of, 303
M
Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award, 119, 136-137
Managed care, affect on quality in U.S., 238 Management, using computer-based clinical
decision support systems for, 152-154 Managing change, leadership for, 137-140 Managing clinical knowledge and skills, 12,
128-130 Mass customization, redesigning care processes
for, 123-124 Mechanical systems thinking, reconciling with
adaptive, 311-312 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), 10,
91, 103 Medical knowledge-base, access to, 31 Medical Subject Headings (MeSH), 233 Medicare and Medicaid, 150, 174, 187 Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center
demonstration, 188 Medicare Peer Review Organizations, 227 Medicine, distinct cultures of, 78 Medium predictability, health care needs of,
121-122 MEDLINE, 156-157, 233 MEDLINEplus, 156-157, 233 Mental/addictive disorder, chronic care of, 272-
274 Mental health
chronic care of, 270-272 misuse leading to, 306
Mergers, acquisitions, and affiliations, 3 Methodology
criteria for including studies, 234 in the review of the literature, 233-236 types of studies not included, 234-236
Midcourse corrections, public funding for mix of projects to permit, 105
Misuse, 304-307 adverse events, 304-305 correcting problems of, 193 mental health, 306 preventable deaths, 304 tuberculosis, 307 U.S. examples of, 304-307
Molecular medicine, 155 Monitoring, using computer-based clinical
decision support systems for, 152-153 Multidisciplinary summit, of leaders of health
care organizations, 19, 208
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 331
Multidisciplinary training, opportunities for, 210-211
Multiple institutions, comparisons of outcomes not included in quality report, 234-235
N
National Academies, The, 32, 166 National Cancer Institute, PDQ database, 72 National Center for Health Statistics, 91 National Coalition on Health Care (NCHC),
231, 233 National Committee for Quality Assurance,
103, 157-158 Health Plan Employer Data and Information
Set, 157, 159, 240, 242 National Committee on Vital and Health
Statistics, 173, 176 National Council of State Boards of Nursing,
214, 216 National Guideline Clearinghouse, 151, 157 National health information infrastructure, need
for, 176-177 National Health Services Centre for Reviews
and Dissemination, 150 National Institutes of Health, 2, 106, 156 National League for Nursing, 214 National Library of Medicine (NLM), 14, 55,
146, 172 Medical Subject Headings (MeSH), 233 MEDLINE, 156-157, 233
National Quality Forum, 10, 13-14, 90-91, 146, 159
National Quality Report, 6-7 National Research Council, 32, 166 National Roundtable on Health Care Quality,
23 Needs
anticipation of, 8, 62, 80-81 for further work, 228-229
Networking Health, 32 NOAH (New York Online Access to Health),
157 Nonclinical administrative management
personnel, retraining, 212 Nonlinearity, in complex adaptive systems,
313 Novelty, in complex adaptive systems, 313
O
Obtaining resources, in the health care environment, 138
Office of Research and Development, 106 On Lok Senior Health Services, 81 “Open-access” scheduling, 125 Organizational development, stages of, 112-117 Organizational supports for change, 11-12, 111-
144 key challenges for the redesign of health
care organizations, 117-137 leadership for managing change, 137-140 stages of organizational development, 112-
117 Organizing and coordinating care around
patient needs Centers of Excellence, 100, 106 disease management programs, 99-100
Organizing around priority conditions ensures availability of specialized expertise
to primary care practices, 95 includes strong focus on patient information
and self-management, 95 redesigns practice to incorporate regular
patient contact (regular follow-up), 94 relies on having good information about
patients, their care, and outcomes, 95 uses protocol providing explicit statement
of what needs to be done for patient, 94 ORYX system for hospitals, 157 Osteoarthritis, 170 Otitis media
acute care of, 259 inappropriate acute care of, 296
Outcome measurements, incorporating for improvement and accountability, 12, 135-137
Overuse problems correcting, 193 findings about, 226-227
P
PacifiCare Health System, 200 Pain relief. See Physical comfort Patient, as the source of control, 8, 61, 70-72 Patient-centeredness, 48-51
coordination and integration of care, 49-50 emotional support, relieving fear and
anxiety, 50
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
332 INDEX
information, communication, and education, 50
involvement of family and friends, 50 movement toward, 113, 115-116 physical comfort, 50 respect for patients’ values, preferences,
and expressed needs, 49 21st-century health care system, 6
Patient conditions, services, and settings, coordinating over time, 12, 133-135
Patient information and self-management, strong focus on, 95
Patient needs customization based on, 8, 61, 69-70 organizing and coordinating care around,
98-100 Patients
recommendations to, 5, 8-9, 34 values of, 70
Patients’ expectations from their health care, 63 anticipation, 63 beyond patient visits, 63 control, 63 cooperation, 63 individualization, 63 information, 63 safety, 63 science, 63 transparency, 63 value, 63
Payment, reduce suboptimization in, 101-102 Payment by unit of care, incentives of current,
187-188 Payment methods
adapting blended, 200-201 barriers to quality improvement in current,
191-199 incentives of current, 184-191
Payment policies, 181-206 adapting existing payment methods to
support quality improvement, 199-201 aligning with quality improvement, 17-19 barriers to quality improvement in current
payment methods, 191-199 incentives of current payment methods,
184-191 need for a new approach, 201-204
PDQ database, 72 Peer Review Organizations (PROs), 227 Peptic ulcer disease, chronic care of, 269 Per case payment, incentives of current, 187
Performance measurements, incorporating for improvement and accountability, 12, 135-137
Performance of teams, optimizing, 138-139 Perverse payment mechanisms
blocking quality improvement in current payment methods, 191-195
correcting problems of misuse, 193 correcting problems of overuse, 193 correcting problems of underuse, 193
Pharmaceutical firms, 2 Physical comfort, 50 Physicians’ reports, not included in quality
report, 235 Plan-do-study-act (PDSA) improvement
methods, 315 Planned care, 28 Pneumococcal vaccine, findings about, 227 Pneumonia, 102
acute care of, 227, 258 Policymakers, recommendations to, 5, 34 Poor quality, level of harm caused by, 227-228 Poorly organized delivery system
access to necessary clinical expertise, 29 evidence-based, planned care, 28 patients’ need for information and
behavioral change, 28 patients’ needs for more time, resources,
and follow-up, 28 supportive information systems, 29
Positive change, provide assets and encouragement for, 13
Potential benefits of information technology, 166-170
for administrative and financial transactions, 167-168
charted, 168 for clinical care, 167-168 for consumer health, 166-168 for professional education, 167, 169 for public health, 167, 169 for research, 167, 169
Practice guidelines delineate, 97-98 for synthesizing clinical evidence, 151-152
Practicing clinicians, retooling, 211-212 Predictable needs, patients with the most, 121 Preferences, respect for patients’, 49 Pregnancy and delivery, 102
acute care of, 260-264
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 333
Prescriptions, using computer-based clinical decision support systems for, 153
Preventable deaths, misuse leading to, 304 Preventive care
cancer screening, 251-253 cardiac risk factors, 254-257 general, 257 immunizations, 250-251 telemedicine technologies in, 170 underuse of, 250-257 using computer-based clinical decision
support systems for, 152-153 Primary care practices, availability of
specialized expertise to, 95 Prioritizing, community health needs, 138 Priority conditions
acute myocardial infarction, 102 Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias,
91, 103 applications of, 96-103 arthritis, 91, 103 asthma, 91, 103 back problems, 91, 103 cancer, 91, 103 cardiac rehabilitation, 170 chronic heart failure, 97 criteria for identifying, 103 depression and anxiety disorders, 91, 97,
103 diabetes, 91, 97, 103, 170 domestic violence, 134 emphysema, 91, 103 gall bladder disease, 91, 103 heart failure, 102 high cholesterol, 91, 103 HIV/AIDS, 91, 97, 103, 134 hypertension, 91, 103 ischemic heart disease, 91, 97, 103 organizing and coordinating care around
patient needs, 98-100 osteoarthritis, 170 pneumonia, 102 pregnancy and related conditions, 102 provide a common base for the
development of information technology, 101
reduce suboptimization in payment, 101- 102
simplify quality measurement, evaluation of performance, and feedback, 102-103
spinal cord injury, 97
stomach ulcers, 91, 103 stroke, 91, 97, 103 substance abuse, 97, 134 surgical procedures and complications, 102 synthesize the evidence base and delineate
practice guidelines, 97-98 Privacy concerns, with automated clinical
information, 171-174 Private purchasers, recommendations to, 5, 8-9,
17-18, 39-40, 61-62, 166, 182, 184 Production planning, redesigning care
processes for, 126-127 Professional education, potential benefits of
information technology for, 167, 169 Professional groups, recommendations to, 6,
39-40 Profile of quality of care in U.S., from the
review of the literature, 236-308 Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly
(PACE), 81 Protocol, providing explicit statement of what
needs to be done for patient, 94 Provider groups, up-front investments required
by, 197-199 Providing the resources needed to initiate
change, 103-108 funding over several years to ensure
sustained and stable funding source, 104 public funding for mix of projects to permit
midcourse corrections, 105 public support providing partial funding for
up-front costs health care organizations face implementing changes, 104-105
Public funding for mix of projects, to permit midcourse corrections, 105
Public health, potential benefits of information technology for, 167, 169
Public purchasers, recommendations to, 5, 8-9, 17-18, 39-40, 61-62, 166, 182, 184
Public support providing partial funding, for up-front costs health care organizations face implementing changes, 104-105
Purchasers, recommendations to, 5-6, 8-9, 17- 18, 34, 39-40, 61-62, 166, 182, 184
Q
Quality Center, 91 Quality Enhancement Research Initiative
(QUERI), 97, 106 Quality gap, 23-25
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
334 INDEX
Quality improvement adapting existing payment methods to
support, 199-201 aligning payment policies with, 17-19 impact on the bottom line, 198
Quality measures, defining, 157-159 Quality of care
conclusions about, 240-242 defining in the review of the literature, 232-
233 examples of inappropriate acute care, 292-
303 examples of misuse, 304-307 examples of underuse, 250-291 gaps between ideal care and actual care,
236-238 how managed care affects quality, 238 inadequate, 25-33 IOM definition of, 232 search strategy followed, 308 sources of information about, 240 as a system property, 4 trends in assessment of, 239-240
Quality of Health Care in America (QHCA) Project, 225
R
RAND Corporation, 24, 226 Rare health care conditions, patients with, 122 “Real-time tracking,” 137 Recommendations
to Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 10, 12, 19-20, 90-91, 182, 184, 208
to clinicians, 5, 8-9, 34 to Congress, 7, 11, 17, 166 to consumers, 5, 34 to Department of Health and Human
Services, 5, 34, 40 to educational institutions, 5, 34 to executive branch, 17, 166 to health care constituencies, 5, 34 to Health Care Financing Administration,
19, 182 to health care organizations, 6, 8-9, 34, 39-
40 to Health Care Quality Innovation Fund,
91-92, 103-106, 166 to health care trustees and management, 5,
34
to health informatics associations and vendors, 17, 166
to health professionals, 5, 34 to health professions, 5, 34 to leaders of health care organizations, 17,
166 to patients, 5, 8-9, 34 to policymakers, 5, 34 to private purchasers, 5, 8-9, 17-18, 39-40,
61-62, 166, 182, 184 to professional groups, 6, 39-40 to public purchasers, 5, 8-9, 17-18, 39-40,
61-62, 166, 182, 184 to purchasers, 5-6, 8-9, 17-18, 34, 39-40,
61-62, 166, 182, 184 to regulators, 5, 34 to secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services, 7, 14, 40, 146, 173
Redesigning care, formulating new rules to, 7-9 Redesigning care processes, 11, 117-127
continuous flow, 124-126 design for safety, 122-123 mass customization, 123-124 production planning, 126-127 system design using the 80/20 principle,
120-122 Redesigning health care organizations
coordinating care across patient conditions, services, and settings over time, 12, 133-135
developing effective teams, 12, 130-133 incorporating performance and outcome
measurements for improvement and accountability, 12, 135-137
key challenges for, 117-137 making effective use of information
technologies, 12, 127-128 managing clinical knowledge and skills, 12,
128-130 Reengineering principles, 127 Referral networks, well-defined, 113-114 Regular patient contact (regular follow-up),
redesigning practice to incorporate, 94 Regulation of the professions
ensuring continuing competency, 217 licensure systems, 215-216 scope-of-practice acts, 215-217
Regulators, recommendations to, 5, 34 Regulatory issues, for the future health care
workforce, 221
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 335
Report on the state of quality in the U.S., 225- 308
discussion of findings, 226-227 level of harm caused by poor quality, 227-
228 need for further work, 228-229 review of the literature, 226, 231-308
Research, potential benefits of information technology for, 167, 169
Research agenda for the future health care workforce
legal and regulatory issues, 221 training and education issues, 220 workforce supply issues, 221
Resources needed to initiate change, 103-108 obtaining in the health care environment,
138 patients’ needs for more, 28
Respiratory illness, inappropriate acute care of, 295
Responding to changes, in the health care environment, 138
Retooling practicing clinicians, 211-212 Retraining nonclinical administrative
management personnel, 212 Review of the literature
defining quality, 232-233 methodology, 233-236 profile of quality of care in U.S., 236-308 in the report on the state of quality, 226,
231-308 Reward and recognition systems, supporting,
139 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 105 Rules for 21st-century health care system, 7-9,
61-88 anticipation of needs, 8, 62, 80-81 care based on continuous healing
relationships, 8, 61, 66-69 contrasted with current approach, 67 cooperation among clinicians, 9, 62, 83 customization based on patient needs and
values, 8, 61, 69-70 evidence-based decision making, 8, 62, 76-
77 health care organizations as complex
adaptive systems, 63-66 need for transparency, 8, 62, 79-80 patient as the source of control, 8, 61, 70-72 safety as a system property, 8, 62, 78-79
shared knowledge and free flow of information, 8, 62, 72-75
waste continuously decreased, 9, 62, 81-83
S
Safety, 44-46 designing procedures that can mitigate harm
from errors, 123 designing procedures to make errors visible,
123 designing systems to prevent errors, 122-
123 redesigning care processes for, 122-123 as a system property, 8, 62, 78-79 21st-century health care system, 5
Satisfaction ratings, not included in quality report, 235
Science, growing complexity of, 25-26 Science of complex adaptive systems (CAS),
312-314 adaptable elements, 313 co-evolution, 314 context and embeddedness, 314 emergent behavior, 313 inherent order, 313-314 non-predictable in detail, 313 nonlinearity, 313 novelty, 313 simple rules, 313
Scope-of-practice acts, 215-217 Search strategy, 308 Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services, recommendations to, 7, 14, 40, 146, 173
Self-management, strong focus on patient, 95 Shared knowledge, 8, 62, 72-75 Shared-risk (budget) arrangements, adapting,
201 Simple rules, 315-317
in complex adaptive systems, 313 Simplifying quality measurement, evaluation of
performance, and feedback, 102-103 “Single-loop” learning, 136 Specialized expertise, availability to primary
care practices, 95 Spinal cord injury, 97 Stages of organizational development, 112-117
charted, 114-115 Stage 1—highly fragmented delivery
system, 112-114
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
336 INDEX
Stage 2—well-defined referral networks, 113-114
Stage 3—some movement toward patient- centered system, 113, 115-116
Stage 4—21st-century health care system envisioned, 115-117
Standards, need for, with automated clinical information, 171-174
State of Quality Panel, 226 Stomach ulcers, 91, 103 Stroke, 91, 97, 103 Structural measures, not included in quality
report, 235 Studies not included, 234-236
access to care studies, 235 comparisons of outcomes across multiple
institutions, 234-235 physicians reports, 235 satisfaction ratings, 235 structural measures, 235
Suboptimization in payment, reducing, 101-102 Substance abuse, 97, 134 Support, emotional, 50 Surgical procedures and complications, 102 Sustained and stable funding source, funding
over several years to ensure, 104 Synthesizing clinical evidence, 97-98, 148-152
practice guidelines, 151-152 systematic reviews, 148-151
System design using the 80/20 principle Level 1—most predictable needs, 121 Level 2—health care needs of medium
predictability, 121-122 Level 3—patients with rare or complex
health care conditions, 122 redesigning care processes for, 120-122
System properties, safety as, 8, 62, 78-79 Systematic reviews, for synthesizing clinical
evidence, 148-151 Systems thinking, 309-311
T
Teams developing effective, 12, 130-133 optimizing performance of, 138-139
Technical Advisory Panel on the State of Quality, 24, 226, 231-232, 234
Technology, growing complexity of, 25-26 Telemedicine technologies, 170
in preventive care, 170
Ten Commandments, 64 Time, patients’ needs for more, 28 Timeliness, 51-52
improvements in, 164 21st-century health care system, 6
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System, 2, 24, 44, 119, 122
Traditional clinical education, reasons for little change in, 213-214
Training issues, for the future health care workforce, 220
Translating Research into Practice, 155 Transparency, need for, 8, 62, 79-80 Tuberculosis, misuse leading to, 307 21st-century health care system, 6, 23-60, 39-
60, 66-83 agenda for the future, 33-35 anticipation of needs, 8, 62, 80-81 care based on continuous healing
relationships, 8, 61, 66-69 complexity thinking applied to design of,
314-317 contrasted with current approach, 67 cooperation among clinicians, 9, 62, 83 customization based on patient needs and
values, 8, 61, 69-70 effective, 6 efficient, 6 equitable, 6 establishing aims for, 5-7 evidence-based decision making, 8, 62, 76-77 need for transparency, 8, 62, 79-80 patient as the source of control, 8, 61, 70-72 patient-centered, 6 quality gap, 23-25 safe, 5 safety as a system property, 8, 62, 78-79 shared knowledge and free flow of
information, 8, 62, 72-75 six aims for improvement, 6, 40-54 timely, 6 underlying reasons for inadequate quality of
care, 25-33 vision of, 54-56, 115-117 waste continuously decreased, 9, 62, 81-83
U
UCLA/RAND appropriateness method, 239 Underlying reasons for inadequate quality of
care, 25-33
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 337
Underuse problems of acute care, 258-264 of chronic care, 264-291 correcting problems of, 193 findings about, 227 of preventive care, 250-257 U.S. examples of, 250-291
Up-front costs health care organizations face, public support providing partial funding for, 104-105
Up-front investments required by provider groups
blocking quality improvement in current payment methods, 197-199
infrastructure investments, 198-199 measuring impact of quality improvement
on the bottom line, 198 Urinary tract infections, acute care of, 259-260 U.S. General Accounting Office, 171 U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 227 USA Today survey, 155 Using computer-based clinical decision support
systems (CDSS) for diagnosis and management, 152-154 for prescribing of drugs, 153 for prevention and monitoring, 152-153
V
Values organizing around priority conditions, 92-
96 respect for patients’, 49
Veterans Health Administration (VHA), 97-98, 158. See also Department of Veterans Affairs
Quality Enhancement Research Initiative, 97, 106
Virginia Mason Medical Center, 72 Visa International, 65, 316 Vision, good enough, 315-317
W
Waste, continuously decreasing, 9, 62, 81-83 Wide space for innovation, 315-317 Workforce preparation, 19-20, 207-223
clinical education and training, 208-214 investing in, 139 legal liability issues, 218-219 regulation of the professions, 214-218 research agenda for the future health care
workforce, 219-221 Workforce supply issues, for the future of
health care, 221 World Wide Web, 30, 154
health information found on, 31 technologies based on, 211
Y
Year 2000 Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set, 157, 159
- Front Matter
- Reviewers
- Preface
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Contents
- Executive Summary
- 1 A New Health System for the 21st Century
- 2 Improving the 21st-Century Health Care System
- 3 Formulating New Rules to Redesign and Improve Care
- 4 Taking the First Steps
- 5 Building Organizational Supports for Change
- 6 Applying Evidence to Health Care Delivery
- 7 Using Information Technology
- 8 Aligning Payment Policies with Quality Improvement
- 9 Preparing the Workforce
- Appendix A Report of the Technical Panel on the State of Quality to the Quality of Health Care in America Committee
- Appendix B Redesigning Health Care with Insights from the Science of Complex Adaptive Systems
- Index
,
CONTRIBUTORS
DETAILS
All downloadable National Academies titles are free to be used for personal and/or non-commercial academic use. Users may also freely post links to our titles on this website; non-commercial academic users are encouraged to link to the version on this website rather than distribute a downloaded PDF to ensure that all users are accessing the latest authoritative version of the work. All other uses require written permission. (Request Permission)
This PDF is protected by copyright and owned by the National Academy of Sciences; unless otherwise indicated, the National Academy of Sciences retains copyright to all materials in this PDF with all rights reserved.
Visit the National Academies Press at nap.edu and login or register to get:
– Access to free PDF downloads of thousands of publications
– 10% off the price of print publications
– Email or social media notifications of new titles related to your interests
– Special offers and discounts
SUGGESTED CITATION
BUY THIS BOOK
FIND RELATED TITLES
This PDF is available at http://nap.nationalacademies.org/9728
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System (2000)
312 pages | 6 x 9 | HARDBACK
ISBN 978-0-309-06837-6 | DOI 10.17226/9728
Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donaldson, Editors; Committee on Quality of Health Care in America; Institute of Medicine
Institute of Medicine. 2000. To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/9728.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
To Err Is Human Building a Safer Health System
Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donaldson, Editors
Committee on Quality of Health Care in America
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS Washington, D.C.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS • 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. • Washington, DC 20418
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Insti- tute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.
Support for this project was provided by The National Research Council and The Commonwealth Fund. The views presented in this report are those of the Institute of Medicine Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America and are not necessarily those of the funding agencies.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
To err is human : building a safer health system / Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan, and Molla S. Donaldson, editors.
p. cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-309-06837-1 1. Medical errors—Prevention. I. Kohn, Linda T. II. Corrigan, Janet. III.
Donaldson, Molla S. R729.8.T6 2000 362.1—dc21 99-088993
Additional copies of this report are available for sale from the National Academy Press, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Box 285, Washington, DC 20055; call (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313 in the Washington metropolitan area, or visit the NAP on-line book- store at www.nap.edu.
The full text of this report is available on line at www.nap.edu/readingroom.
For more information about the Institute of Medicine, visit the IOM home page at www.iom.edu.
Copyright 2000 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
The serpent has been a symbol of long life, healing, and knowledge among almost all cultures and religions since the beginning of recorded history. The serpent adopted as a logotype by the Institute of Medicine is a relief carving from ancient Greece, now held by the Staatliche Museen in Berlin.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a man- date that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences.
The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. William A. Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engineering.
The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine.
The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sci- ences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Func- tioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the pub- lic, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. William A. Wulf are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council.
National Academy of Sciences National Academy of Engineering Institute of Medicine National Research Council
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA
WILLIAM C. RICHARDSON (Chair), President and CEO, W.K. Kellogg Foundation, Battle Creek, MI
DONALD M. BERWICK, President and CEO, Institute for Healthcare Improvement, Boston
J. CRIS BISGARD, Director, Health Services, Delta Air Lines, Inc., Atlanta LONNIE R. BRISTOW, Past President, American Medical Association,
Walnut Creek, CA CHARLES R. BUCK, Program Leader, Health Care Quality and Strategy
Initiatives, General Electric Company, Fairfield, CT CHRISTINE K. CASSEL, Professor and Chairman, Department of
Geriatrics and Adult Development, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York City
MARK R. CHASSIN, Professor and Chairman, Department of Health Policy, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York City
MOLLY JOEL COYE, Senior Vice President and Director, West Coast Office, The Lewin Group, San Francisco
DON E. DETMER, Dennis Gillings Professor of Health Management, University of Cambridge, UK
JEROME H. GROSSMAN, Chairman and CEO, Lion Gate Management Corporation, Boston
BRENT JAMES, Executive Director, Intermountain Health Care, Institute for Health Care Delivery Research, Salt Lake City, UT
DAVID McK. LAWRENCE, Chairman and CEO, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., Oakland, CA
LUCIAN LEAPE, Adjunct Professor, Harvard School of Public Health ARTHUR LEVIN, Director, Center for Medical Consumers, New York City RHONDA ROBINSON-BEALE, Executive Medical Director, Managed
Care Management and Clinical Programs, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, Southfield
JOSEPH E. SCHERGER, Associate Dean for Clinical Affairs, University of California at Irvine College of Medicine
ARTHUR SOUTHAM, Partner, 2C Solutions, Northridge, CA MARY WAKEFIELD, Director, Center for Health Policy and Ethics,
George Mason University GAIL L. WARDEN, President and CEO, Henry Ford Health System,
Detroit
v
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Study Staff
JANET M. CORRIGAN, Director, Division of Health Care Services, Director, Quality of Health Care in America Project
MOLLA S. DONALDSON, Project Co-Director LINDA T. KOHN, Project Co-Director TRACY McKAY, Research Assistant KELLY C. PIKE, Senior Project Assistant
Auxiliary Staff
MIKE EDINGTON, Managing Editor KAY C. HARRIS, Financial Advisor SUZANNE MILLER, Senior Project Assistant
Copy Editor
FLORENCE POILLON
vi
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
vii
Reviewers
This report has been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council’s Report Re-
view Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide can- did and critical comments that will assist the Institute of Medicine in mak- ing the published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and the draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. The commit- tee wishes to thank the following individuals for their participation in the review of this report:
GERALDINE BEDNASH, Executive Director, American Association of Colleges of Nursing, Washington, DC
PETER BOUXSEIN, Visiting Scholar, Institute of Medicine, Washington, DC
JOHN COLMERS, Executive Director, Maryland Health Care Cost and Access Commission, Baltimore
JEFFREY COOPER, Director, Partners Biomedical Engineering Group, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston
ROBERT HELMREICH, Professor, University of Texas at Austin
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
viii REVIEWERS
LOIS KERCHER, Vice President for Nursing, Sentara-Virginia Beach General Hospital, Virginia Beach, VA
GORDON MOORE, Associate Chief Medical Officer, Strong Health, Rochester, NY ALAN NELSON, Associate Executive Vice President, American College of
Physicians/American Society of Internal Medicine, Washington, DC LEE NEWCOMER, Chief Medical Officer, United HealthCare Corporation,
Minnetonka, MN MARY JANE OSBORN, University of Connecticut Health Center ELLISON PIERCE, Executive Director, Anesthesia Patient Safety
Foundation, Boston
Although the individuals acknowledged have provided valuable com- ments and suggestions, responsibility for the final contents of the report rests solely with the authoring committee and the Institute of Medicine.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
T o Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System. The title of this report encapsulates its purpose. Human beings, in all lines of work, make errors. Errors can be prevented by designing systems that make
it hard for people to do the wrong thing and easy for people to do the right thing. Cars are designed so that drivers cannot start them while in reverse because that prevents accidents. Work schedules for pilots are designed so they don’t fly too many consecutive hours without rest because alertness and performance are compromised.
In health care, building a safer system means designing processes of care to ensure that patients are safe from accidental injury. When agreement has been reached to pursue a course of medical treatment, patients should have the assurance that it will proceed correctly and safely so they have the best chance possible of achieving the desired outcome.
This report describes a serious concern in health care that, if discussed at all, is discussed only behind closed doors. As health care and the system that delivers it become more complex, the opportunities for errors abound. Correcting this will require a concerted effort by the professions, health care organizations, purchasers, consumers, regulators and policy-makers. Tradi- tional clinical boundaries and a culture of blame must be broken down. But most importantly, we must systematically design safety into processes of care.
This report is part of larger project examining the quality of health care
Preface
ix
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
x PREFACE
in America and how to achieve a threshold change in quality. The committee has focused its initial attention on quality concerns that fall into the category of medical errors. There are several reasons for this. First, errors are respon- sible for an immense burden of patient injury, suffering and death. Second, errors in the provision of health services, whether they result in injury or expose the patient to the risk of injury, are events that everyone agrees just shouldn’t happen. Third, errors are readily understandable to the American public. Fourth, there is a sizable body of knowledge and very successful experiences in other industries to draw upon in tackling the safety problems of the health care industry. Fifth, the health care delivery system is rapidly evolving and undergoing substantial redesign, which may introduce im- provements, but also new hazards. Over the next year, the committee will be examining other quality issues, such as problems of overuse and underuse.
The Quality of Health Care in America project is largely supported with income from an endowment established within the IOM by the Howard Hughes Medical Institute and income from an endowment established for the National Research Council by the Kellogg Foundation. The Common- wealth Fund provided generous support for a workshop to convene medi- cal, nursing and pharmacy professionals for input into this specific report. The National Academy for State Health Policy assisted by convening a focus group of state legislative and regulatory leaders to discuss patient safety.
Thirty-eight people were involved in producing this report. The Sub- committee on Creating an External Environment for Quality, under the di- rection of J. Cris Bisgard and Molly Joel Coye, dealt with a series of complex and sensitive issues, always maintaining a spirit of compromise and respect. Additionally the Subcommittee on Designing the Health System of the 21st Century, under the direction of Donald Berwick, had to balance the chal- lenges faced by health care organizations with the need to continually push out boundaries and not accept limitations. Lastly, under the direction of Janet Corrigan, excellent staff support has been provided by Linda Kohn, Molla Donaldson, Tracy McKay, and Kelly Pike.
At some point in our lives, each of us will probably be a patient in the health care system. It is hoped that this report can serve as a call to action that will illuminate a problem to which we are all vulnerable.
William C. Richardson, Ph.D. Chair November 1999
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
This report is the first in a series of reports to be produced by the Quality of Health Care in America project. The Quality of Health Care in America project was initiated by the Institute of Medicine in
June 1998 with the charge of developing a strategy that will result in a thresh- old improvement in quality over the next ten years.
Under the direction of Chairman William C. Richardson, the Quality of Health Care in America Committee is directed to:
• review and synthesize findings in the literature pertaining to the qual- ity of care provided in the health care system;
• develop a communications strategy for raising the awareness of the general public and key stakeholders of quality of care concerns and oppor- tunities for improvement;
• articulate a policy framework that will provide positive incentives to improve quality and foster accountability;
• identify characteristics and factors that enable or encourage provid- ers, health care organizations, health plans and communities to continuously improve the quality of care; and
• develop a research agenda in areas of continued uncertainty.
This first report on patient safety addresses a serious issue affecting the
Foreword
xi
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
xii FOREWORD
quality of health care. Future reports in this series will address other quality- related issues and cover areas such as re-designing the health care delivery system for the 21st Century, aligning financial incentives to reward quality care and the critical role of information technology as a tool for measuring and understanding quality. Additional reports will be produced throughout the coming year.
The Quality of Health Care in America project continues IOM’s long- standing focus on quality of care issues. The IOM National Roundtable on Health Care Quality described how variable the quality of health care is in this country and highlighted the urgent need for improving it. A recent re- port issued by the IOM National Cancer Policy Board concluded that there is a wide gulf between ideal cancer care and the reality that many Americans experience with cancer care.
The IOM will continue to call for a comprehensive and strong response to this most urgent issue facing the American people. This current report on patient safety further reinforces our conviction that we cannot wait any longer.
Kenneth I. Shine, M.D. President, Institute of Medicine November 1999
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
The Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America first and foremost acknowledges the tremendous contribution by the mem- bers of two subcommittees. Both subcommittees spent many hours
working through a set of exceedingly complex issues, ranging from topics related to expectations from the health care delivery system to the details of how reporting systems work. Although individual subcommittee members raised different perspectives on a variety of issues, there was no disagree- ment on the ultimate goal of making care safer for patients. Without the efforts of the two subcommittees, this report would not have happened. We take this opportunity to thank each and every subcommittee member for their contribution.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE
J. Cris Bisgard (Cochair), Delta Air Lines, Inc.; Molly Joel Coye, (Co- chair), The Lewin Group; Phyllis C. Borzi, The George Washington Univer- sity; Charles R. Buck, Jr., General Electric Company; Jon Christianson, Uni- versity of Minnesota; Charles Cutler, formerly of The Prudential HealthCare; Mary Jane England, Washington Business Group on Health; George J. Isham, HealthPartners; Brent James, Intermountain Health Care; Roz D.
Acknowledgments
xiii
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
xiv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Lasker, New York Academy of Medicine; Lucian Leape, Harvard School of Public Health; Patricia A. Riley, National Academy of State Health Policy; Gerald M. Shea, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; Gail L. Warden, Henry Ford Health System; A. Eugene Washington, University of California, San Francisco School of Medicine; and Andrew Webber, Consumer Coalition for Health Care Quality.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BUILDING THE 21ST CENTURY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
Don M. Berwick (Chair), Institute for Healthcare Improvement; Chris- tine K. Cassel, Mount Sinai School of Medicine; Rodney Dueck, HealthSystem Minnesota; Jerome H. Grossman, Lion Gate Management Corporation; John E. Kelsch, Consultant in Total Quality; Risa Lavizzo- Mourey, University of Pennsylvania; Arthur Levin, Center for Medical Con- sumers; Eugene C. Nelson, Hitchcock Medical Center; Thomas Nolan, As- sociates in Proc-ess Improvement; Gail J. Povar, Cameron Medical Group; James L. Reinertsen, CareGroup; Joseph E. Scherger, University of Califor- nia, Irvine; Stephen M. Shortell, University of California, Berkeley; Mary Wakefield, George Mason University; and Kevin Weiss, Rush Primary Care Institute.
A number of people willingly and generously gave their time and exper- tise as the committee and both subcommittees conducted their delibera- tions. Their contributions are acknowledged here.
Participants in the Roundtable on the Role of the Health Professions in Improving Patient Safety provided many useful insights reflected in the final report. They included: J. Cris Bisgard, Delta Air Lines, Inc.; Terry P. Clemmer, Intermountain Health Care; Leo J. Dunn, Virginia Common- wealth University; James Espinosa, Overlook Hospital; Paul Friedmann, Bay State Hospital; David M. Gaba, V.A. Palo Alto HCS; Larry A. Green, Ameri- can Academy of Family Physicians; Paul F. Griner, Association of American Medical Colleges; Charles Douglas Hepler, University of Florida; Carolyn Hutcherson, Health Policy Consultant; Lucian L. Leape, Harvard School of Public Health; William C. Nugent, Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical Center; Ellison C. Pierce Jr., Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation; Bernard Rosof, Huntington Hospital; Carol Taylor, Georgetown University; Mary Wakefield, George Mason University; and Richard Womer, Children’s Hos- pital of Philadelphia.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xv
We are also grateful to the state representatives who participated in the focus group on patient safety convened by the National Academy for State Health Policy, including: Anne Barry, Minnesota Department of Finance; Jane Beyer, Washington State House of Representatives; Maureen Booth, National Academy of State Health Policy Fellow; Eileen Cody, Washington State House of Representatives; John Colmers, Maryland Health Care Ac- cess and Cost Commission; Patrick Finnerty, Virginia Joint Commission on Health Care; John Frazer, Delaware Office of the Controller General; Lori Gerhard, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Health; Jeffrey Gregg, State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration; Frederick Heigel, New York Bureau of Hospital and Primary Care Services; John LaCour, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals; Maureen Maigret, Rhode Island Lieutenant Governor’s Office; Angela Monson, Oklahoma State Senate; Catherine Morris, New Jersey State Department of Health; Danielle Noe, Kansas Office of the Governor; Susan Reinhard, New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services; Trish Riley, National Academy for State Health Policy; Dan Rubin, Washington State Department of Health; Brent Ewig, ASTHO; Kathy Weaver, Indiana State Department of Health; and Robert Zimmerman, Pennsylvania Department of Health.
A number of people at the state health departments generously pro- vided information about the adverse event reporting program in their state. The committee thanks the following people for their time and help: Karen Logan, California; Jackie Starr-Bocian, Colorado; Julie Moore, Connecti- cut; Anna Polk, Florida; Mary Kabril, Kansas; Lee Kelly, Massachusetts; Vanessa Phipps, Mississippi; Nancy Garvey, New Jersey; Ellen Flink, New York; Kathryn Kimmet, Ohio; Larry Stoller, Jim Steel and Elaine Gibble, Pennsylvania; Laurie Round, Rhode Island; and Connie Richards, South Dakota. In addition, Renee Mallett at the Ohio Hospital Association also offered assistance.
From the Food and Drug Administration, the Committee especially rec- ognizes the contributions of Janet Woodcock, Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research; Ralph Lillie, Director, Office of Post-Marketing Drug Risk Assessment; Susan Gardner, Deputy Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health; Jerry Phillips, Associate Director, Medication Er- ror Program and Peter Carstenson, Senior Systems Engineer, Division of Device User Programs and System Analysis.
Assistance from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality came from John M. Eisenberg, Administrator; Gregg Meyer, Director of the Cen- ter for Quality Measurement and Improvement; Nancy Foster, Coordinator
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
xvi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
for Quality Activities and Marge Keyes, Project Officer. At the Health Care Financing Administration, Jeff Kang, Director, Clinical Standards and Qual- ity and Tim Cuerdon, Office of Clinical Standards and Quality were espe- cially helpful. At the Veterans Health Administration, Kenneth Kizer, former Undersecretary for Health and Ronald Goldman, Office of Performance and Quality shared their views on how to create a culture of safety inside large health care organizations.
Other individuals provided data, information and background that sig- nificantly contributed to the committee’s understanding of patient safety. The committee would like to particularly acknowledge the contributions of Charles Billings, now at Ohio State University and designer of the Aviation Safety Reporting System; Linda Blank at the American Board of Internal Medicine; Michael Cohen at the Institute for Safe Medication Practices; Linda Connell at the Aviation Safety Reporting System at NASA/Ames Re- search Center; Diane Cousins and Fay Menacker at U.S. Pharmacopeia, Martin Hatlie and Eleanor Vogt at the National Patient Safety Foundation; Henry Manasse and Colleen O’Malley at the American Society of Health- System Pharmacists; Cynthia Null at the Human Factors Research and Tech- nology Division at NASA/Ames Research Center; Eric Thomas, at the Uni- versity of Texas at Houston; Margaret VanAmringe at the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations; and Karen Williams at the National Pharmaceuticals Council.
A special thanks is offered to Randall R. Bovbjerg and David W. Shapiro for preparing a paper on the legal discovery of data reported to adverse event reporting systems. Their paper significantly contributed to Chapter 6 of this report, although the conclusions and findings are the full responsibil- ity of the committee (readers should not interpret their input as legal advice nor representing the views of their employing organizations).
A special thanks is also provided to colleagues at the IOM. Claudia Carl and Mike Edington provided assistance during the report review and prepa- ration stages. Ellen Agard and Mel Worth significantly contributed to the case study that is used in the report. Wilhelmine Miller expertly arranged the workshop with physicians, nurses and pharmacists and ensured a suc- cessful meeting. Suzanne Miller provided important assistance to the litera- ture review. Tracy McKay provided help throughout the project, from coor- dinating literature searches to overseeing the editing of the report. A special thanks is offered to Kelly Pike. Her outstanding support and attention to detail was critical to the success of this report. Her assistance was always offered with enthusiasm and good cheer.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xvii
Finally, the committee acknowledges the generous support from the National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine to conduct this work. Additionally, the committee thanks Brian Biles for his interest in this work and gratefully acknowledges the contribution of The Commonwealth Fund, a New York City-based private independent foundation. The views presented here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of The Commonwealth Fund, its directors, officers or staff.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
1 A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO IMPROVING PATIENT SAFETY 17 Patient Safety: A Critical Component of Quality, 18 Organization of the Report, 21
2 ERRORS IN HEALTH CARE: A LEADING CAUSE OF DEATH AND INJURY 26 Introduction, 27 How Frequently Do Errors Occur?, 29 Factors That Contribute to Errors, 35 The Cost of Errors, 40 Public Perceptions of Safety, 42
3 WHY DO ERRORS HAPPEN? 49 Why Do Accidents Happen?, 51 Are Some Types of Systems More Prone to Accidents?, 58 Research on Human Factors, 63 Summary, 65
Contents
xix
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
xx CONTENTS
4 BUILDING LEADERSHIP AND KNOWLEDGE FOR PATIENT SAFETY 69 Recommendations, 69 Why a Center for Patient Safety Is Needed, 70 How Other Industries Have Become Safer, 71 Options for Establishing a Center for Patient Safety, 75 Functions of the Center for Patient Safety, 78 Resources Required for a Center for Patient Safety, 82
5 ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS 86 Recommendations, 87 Review of Existing Reporting Systems in Health Care, 90 Discussion of Committee Recommendations, 101
6 PROTECTING VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS FROM LEGAL DISCOVERY 109 Recommendation, 111 Introduction, 112 The Basic Law of Evidence and Discoverability of Error-Related
Information, 113 Legal Protections Against Discovery of Information About Errors, 117 Statutory Protections Specific to Particular Reporting Systems, 121 Practical Protections Against the Discovery of Data on Errors, 124 Summary, 127
7 SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS FOR PATIENT SAFETY 132 Recommendations, 133 Current Approaches for Setting Standards in Health Care, 136 Performance Standards and Expectations for
Health Care Organizations, 137 Standards for Health Professionals, 141 Standards for Drugs and Devices, 148 Summary, 151
8 CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 155 Recommendations, 156 Introduction, 158
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CONTENTS xxi
Key Safety Design Concepts, 162 Principles for the Design of Safety Systems in
Health Care Organizations, 165 Medication Safety, 182 Summary, 197
APPENDIXES A Background and Methodology 205 B Glossary and Acronyms 210 C Literature Summary 215 D Characteristics of State Adverse Event Reporting Systems 254 E Safety Activities in Health Care Organizations 266
INDEX 273
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
To Err Is Human Building a Safer Health System
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
1
Executive Summary
T he knowledgeable health reporter for the Boston Globe, Betsy Lehman, died from an overdose during chemotherapy. Willie King had the wrong leg amputated. Ben Kolb was eight years old when he
died during “minor” surgery due to a drug mix-up.1
These horrific cases that make the headlines are just the tip of the ice- berg. Two large studies, one conducted in Colorado and Utah and the other in New York, found that adverse events occurred in 2.9 and 3.7 percent of hospitalizations, respectively.2 In Colorado and Utah hospitals, 6.6 percent of adverse events led to death, as compared with 13.6 percent in New York hospitals. In both of these studies, over half of these adverse events resulted from medical errors and could have been prevented.
When extrapolated to the over 33.6 million admissions to U.S. hospitals in 1997, the results of the study in Colorado and Utah imply that at least 44,000 Americans die each year as a result of medical errors.3 The results of the New York Study suggest the number may be as high as 98,000.4 Even when using the lower estimate, deaths due to medical errors exceed the number attributable to the 8th-leading cause of death.5 More people die in a given year as a result of medical errors than from motor vehicle accidents (43,458), breast cancer (42,297), or AIDS (16,516).6
Total national costs (lost income, lost household production, disability and health care costs) of preventable adverse events (medical errors result-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
2 TO ERR IS HUMAN
ing in injury) are estimated to be between $17 billion and $29 billion, of which health care costs represent over one-half.7
In terms of lives lost, patient safety is as important an issue as worker safety. Every year, over 6,000 Americans die from workplace injuries.8 Medi- cation errors alone, occurring either in or out of the hospital, are estimated to account for over 7,000 deaths annually.9
Medication-related errors occur frequently in hospitals and although not all result in actual harm, those that do, are costly. One recent study conducted at two prestigious teaching hospitals, found that about two out of every 100 admissions experienced a preventable adverse drug event, re- sulting in average increased hospital costs of $4,700 per admission or about $2.8 million annually for a 700-bed teaching hospital.10 If these findings are generalizable, the increased hospital costs alone of preventable adverse drug events affecting inpatients are about $2 billion for the nation as a whole.
These figures offer only a very modest estimate of the magnitude of the problem since hospital patients represent only a small proportion of the total population at risk, and direct hospital costs are only a fraction of total costs. More care and increasingly complex care is provided in ambulatory settings. Outpatient surgical centers, physician offices and clinics serve thou- sands of patients daily. Home care requires patients and their families to use complicated equipment and perform follow-up care. Retail pharmacies play a major role in filling prescriptions for patients and educating them about their use. Other institutional settings, such as nursing homes, provide a broad array of services to vulnerable populations. Although many of the available studies have focused on the hospital setting, medical errors present a prob- lem in any setting, not just hospitals.
Errors are also costly in terms of opportunity costs. Dollars spent on having to repeat diagnostic tests or counteract adverse drug events are dol- lars unavailable for other purposes. Purchasers and patients pay for errors when insurance costs and copayments are inflated by services that would not have been necessary had proper care been provided. It is impossible for the nation to achieve the greatest value possible from the billions of dollars spent on medical care if the care contains errors.
But not all the costs can be directly measured. Errors are also costly in terms of loss of trust in the system by patients and diminished satisfaction by both patients and health professionals. Patients who experience a longer hospital stay or disability as a result of errors pay with physical and psycho- logical discomfort. Health care professionals pay with loss of morale and frustration at not being able to provide the best care possible. Employers
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
and society, in general, pay in terms of lost worker productivity, reduced school attendance by children, and lower levels of population health status.
Yet silence surrounds this issue. For the most part, consumers believe they are protected. Media coverage has been limited to reporting of anec- dotal cases. Licensure and accreditation confer, in the eyes of the public, a “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.” Yet, licensing and accreditation processes have focused only limited attention on the issue, and even these minimal efforts have confronted some resistance from health care organiza- tions and providers. Providers also perceive the medical liability system as a serious impediment to systematic efforts to uncover and learn from errors.11
The decentralized and fragmented nature of the health care delivery system (some would say “nonsystem”) also contributes to unsafe conditions for patients, and serves as an impediment to efforts to improve safety. Even within hospitals and large medical groups, there are rigidly-defined areas of specialization and influence. For example, when patients see multiple pro- viders in different settings, none of whom have access to complete informa- tion, it is easier for something to go wrong than when care is better coordi- nated. At the same time, the provision of care to patients by a collection of loosely affiliated organizations and providers makes it difficult to implement improved clinical information systems capable of providing timely access to complete patient information. Unsafe care is one of the prices we pay for not having organized systems of care with clear lines of accountability.
Lastly, the context in which health care is purchased further exacerbates these problems. Group purchasers have made few demands for improve- ments in safety.12 Most third party payment systems provide little incentive for a health care organization to improve safety, nor do they recognize and reward safety or quality.
The goal of this report is to break this cycle of inaction. The status quo is not acceptable and cannot be tolerated any longer. Despite the cost pres- sures, liability constraints, resistance to change and other seemingly insur- mountable barriers, it is simply not acceptable for patients to be harmed by the same health care system that is supposed to offer healing and comfort. “First do no harm” is an often quoted term from Hippocrates.13 Everyone working in health care is familiar with the term. At a very minimum, the health system needs to offer that assurance and security to the public.
A comprehensive approach to improving patient safety is needed. This approach cannot focus on a single solution since there is no “magic bullet” that will solve this problem, and indeed, no single recommendation in this report should be considered as the answer. Rather, large, complex problems
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
4 TO ERR IS HUMAN
require thoughtful, multifaceted responses. The combined goal of the rec- ommendations is for the external environment to create sufficient pressure to make errors costly to health care organizations and providers, so they are compelled to take action to improve safety. At the same time, there is a need to enhance knowledge and tools to improve safety and break down legal and cultural barriers that impede safety improvement. Given current knowledge about the magnitude of the problem, the committee believes it would be irresponsible to expect anything less than a 50 percent reduction in errors over five years.
In this report, safety is defined as freedom from accidental injury. This definition recognizes that this is the primary safety goal from the patient’s perspective. Error is defined as the failure of a planned action to be com- pleted as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim. According to noted expert James Reason, errors depend on two kinds of failures: either the correct action does not proceed as intended (an error of execution) or the original intended action is not correct (an error of planning).14 Errors can happen in all stages in the process of care, from diagnosis, to treatment, to preventive care.
Not all errors result in harm. Errors that do result in injury are some- times called preventable adverse events. An adverse event is an injury result- ing from a medical intervention, or in other words, it is not due to the under- lying condition of the patient. While all adverse events result from medical management, not all are preventable (i.e., not all are attributable to errors). For example, if a patient has surgery and dies from pneumonia he or she got postoperatively, it is an adverse event. If analysis of the case reveals that the patient got pneumonia because of poor hand washing or instrument clean- ing techniques by staff, the adverse event was preventable (attributable to an error of execution). But the analysis may conclude that no error occurred and the patient would be presumed to have had a difficult surgery and re- covery (not a preventable adverse event).
Much can be learned from the analysis of errors. All adverse events resulting in serious injury or death should be evaluated to assess whether improvements in the delivery system can be made to reduce the likelihood of similar events occurring in the future. Errors that do not result in harm also represent an important opportunity to identify system improvements having the potential to prevent adverse events. Preventing errors means de- signing the health care system at all levels to make it safer. Building safety into processes of care is a more effective way to reduce errors than blaming individuals (some experts, such as Deming, believe improving processes is
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
the only way to improve quality15 ). The focus must shift from blaming indi- viduals for past errors to a focus on preventing future errors by designing safety into the system. This does not mean that individuals can be careless. People must still be vigilant and held responsible for their actions. But when an error occurs, blaming an individual does little to make the system safer and prevent someone else from committing the same error.
Health care is a decade or more behind other high-risk industries in its attention to ensuring basic safety. Aviation has focused extensively on build- ing safe systems and has been doing so since World War II. Between 1990 and 1994, the U.S. airline fatality rate was less than one-third the rate experi- enced in mid century.16 In 1998, there were no deaths in the United States in commercial aviation. In health care, preventable injuries from care have been estimated to affect between three to four percent of hospital patients.17 Al- though health care may never achieve aviation’s impressive record, there is clearly room for improvement.
To err is human, but errors can be prevented. Safety is a critical first step in improving quality of care. The Harvard Medical Practice Study, a seminal research study on this issue, was published almost ten years ago; other stud- ies have corroborated its findings. Yet few tangible actions to improve pa- tient safety can be found. Must we wait another decade to be safe in our health system?
RECOMMENDATIONS
The IOM Quality of Health Care in America Committee was formed in June 1998 to develop a strategy that will result in a threshold improvement in quality over the next ten years. This report addresses issues related to patient safety, a subset of overall quality-related concerns, and lays out a national agenda for reducing errors in health care and improving patient safety. Although it is a national agenda, many activities are aimed at prompt- ing responses at the state and local levels and within health care organiza- tions and professional groups.
The committee believes that although there is still much to learn about the types of errors committed in health care and why they occur, enough is known today to recognize that a serious concern exists for patients. Whether a person is sick or just trying to stay healthy, they should not have to worry about being harmed by the health system itself. This report is a call to action to make health care safer for patients.
The committee believes that a major force for improving patient safety
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
6 TO ERR IS HUMAN
is the intrinsic motivation of health care providers, shaped by professional ethics, norms and expectations. But the interaction between factors in the external environment and factors inside health care organizations can also prompt the changes needed to improve patient safety. Factors in the exter- nal environment include availability of knowledge and tools to improve safety, strong and visible professional leadership, legislative and regulatory initiatives, and actions of purchasers and consumers to demand safety im- provements. Factors inside health care organizations include strong leader- ship for safety, an organizational culture that encourages recognition and learning from errors, and an effective patient safety program.
In developing its recommendations, the committee seeks to strike a bal- ance between regulatory and market-based initiatives, and between the roles of professionals and organizations. No single action represents a complete answer, nor can any single group or sector offer a complete fix to the prob- lem. However, different groups can, and should, make significant contribu- tions to the solution. The committee recognizes that a number of groups are already working on improving patient safety, such as the National Patient Safety Foundation and the Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation.
The recommendations contained in this report lay out a four-tiered ap- proach:
• establishing a national focus to create leadership, research, tools and protocols to enhance the knowledge base about safety;
• identifying and learning from errors through immediate and strong mandatory reporting efforts, as well as the encouragement of voluntary ef- forts, both with the aim of making sure the system continues to be made safer for patients;
• raising standards and expectations for improvements in safety through the actions of oversight organizations, group purchasers, and pro- fessional groups; and
• creating safety systems inside health care organizations through the implementation of safe practices at the delivery level. This level is the ulti- mate target of all the recommendations.
Leadership and Knowledge
Other industries that have been successful in improving safety, such as aviation and occupational health, have had the support of a designated agency that sets and communicates priorities, monitors progress in achiev-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7
ing goals, directs resources toward areas of need, and brings visibility to important issues. Although various agencies and organizations in health care may contribute to certain of these activities, there is no focal point for rais- ing and sustaining attention to patient safety. Without it, health care is un- likely to match the safety improvements achieved in other industries.
The growing awareness of the frequency and significance of errors in health care creates an imperative to improve our understanding of the prob- lem and devise workable solutions. For some types of errors, the knowledge of how to prevent them exists today. In these areas, the need is for wide- spread dissemination of this information. For other areas, however, addi- tional work is needed to develop and apply the knowledge that will make care safer for patients. Resources invested in building the knowledge base and diffusing the expertise throughout the industry can pay large dividends to both patients and the health professionals caring for them and produce savings for the health system.
RECOMMENDATION 4.1 Congress should create a Center for Pa- tient Safety within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. This center should
• set the national goals for patient safety, track progress in meet- ing these goals, and issue an annual report to the President and Con- gress on patient safety; and
• develop knowledge and understanding of errors in health care by developing a research agenda, funding Centers of Excellence, evalu- ating methods for identifying and preventing errors, and funding dis- semination and communication activities to improve patient safety.
To make significant improvements in patient safety, a highly visible cen- ter is needed, with secure and adequate funding. The Center should estab- lish goals for safety; develop a research agenda; define prototype safety sys- tems; develop and disseminate tools for identifying and analyzing errors and evaluate approaches taken; develop tools and methods for educating con- sumers about patient safety; issue an annual report on the state of patient safety, and recommend additional improvements as needed.
The committee recommends initial annual funding for the Center of $30 to $35 million. This initial funding would permit a center to conduct activities in goal setting, tracking, research and dissemination. Funding should grow over time to at least $100 million, or approximately 1% of the $8.8 billion in health care costs attributable to preventable adverse events.18
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
8 TO ERR IS HUMAN
This initial level of funding is modest relative to the resources devoted to other public health issues. The Center for Patient Safety should be created within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality because the agency is already involved in a broad range of quality and safety issues, and has established the infrastructure and experience to fund research, educational and coordinating activities.
Identifying and Learning from Errors
Another critical component of a comprehensive strategy to improve pa- tient safety is to create an environment that encourages organizations to iden- tify errors, evaluate causes and take appropriate actions to improve perfor- mance in the future. External reporting systems represent one mechanism to enhance our understanding of errors and the underlying factors that con- tribute to them.
Reporting systems can be designed to meet two purposes. They can be designed as part of a public system for holding health care organizations accountable for performance. In this instance, reporting is often mandatory, usually focuses on specific cases that involve serious harm or death, may result in fines or penalties relative to the specific case, and information about the event may become known to the public. Such systems ensure a response to specific reports of serious injury, hold organizations and providers ac- countable for maintaining safety, respond to the public’s right to know, and provide incentives to health care organizations to implement internal safety systems that reduce the likelihood of such events occurring. Currently, at least twenty states have mandatory adverse event reporting systems.
Voluntary, confidential reporting systems can also be part of an overall program for improving patient safety and can be designed to complement the mandatory reporting systems previously described. Voluntary reporting systems, which generally focus on a much broader set of errors and strive to detect system weaknesses before the occurrence of serious harm, can pro- vide rich information to health care organizations in support of their quality improvement efforts.
For either purpose, the goal of reporting systems is to analyze the infor- mation they gather and identify ways to prevent future errors from occur- ring. The goal is not data collection. Collecting reports and not doing any- thing with the information serves no useful purpose. Adequate resources and other support must be provided for analysis and response to critical issues.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9
RECOMMENDATION 5.1 A nationwide mandatory reporting sys- tem should be established that provides for the collection of standard- ized information by state governments about adverse events that re- sult in death or serious harm. Reporting should initially be required of hospitals and eventually be required of other institutional and am- bulatory care delivery settings. Congress should
• designate the National Forum for Health Care Quality Mea- surement and Reporting as the entity responsible for promulgating and maintaining a core set of reporting standards to be used by states, including a nomenclature and taxonomy for reporting;
• require all health care organizations to report standardized in- formation on a defined list of adverse events;
• provide funds and technical expertise for state governments to establish or adapt their current error reporting systems to collect the standardized information, analyze it and conduct follow-up action as needed with health care organizations. Should a state choose not to implement the mandatory reporting system, the Department of Health and Human Services should be designated as the responsible entity; and
• designate the Center for Patient Safety to:
(1) convene states to share information and expertise, and to evaluate alternative approaches taken for implementing reporting programs, identify best practices for implementation, and assess the impact of state programs; and (2) receive and analyze aggregate reports from states to identify persistent safety issues that require more intensive analysis and/or a broader-based response (e.g., designing prototype systems or requesting a response by agencies, manufacturers or others).
RECOMMENDATION 5.2 The development of voluntary report- ing efforts should be encouraged. The Center for Patient Safety should
• describe and disseminate information on external voluntary re- porting programs to encourage greater participation in them and track the development of new reporting systems as they form;
• convene sponsors and users of external reporting systems to evaluate what works and what does not work well in the programs, and ways to make them more effective;
• periodically assess whether additional efforts are needed to ad- dress gaps in information to improve patient safety and to encourage
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
10 TO ERR IS HUMAN
health care organizations to participate in voluntary reporting pro- grams; and
• fund and evaluate pilot projects for reporting systems, both within individual health care organizations and collaborative efforts among health care organizations.
The committee believes there is a role both for mandatory, public re- porting systems and voluntary, confidential reporting systems. However, be- cause of their distinct purposes, such systems should be operated and main- tained separately. A nationwide mandatory reporting system should be established by building upon the current patchwork of state systems and by standardizing the types of adverse events and information to be reported. The newly established National Forum for Health Care Quality Measure- ment and Reporting, a public/private partnership, should be charged with the establishment of such standards. Voluntary reporting systems should also be promoted and the participation of health care organizations in them should be encouraged by accrediting bodies.
RECOMMENDATION 6.1 Congress should pass legislation to ex- tend peer review protections to data related to patient safety and quality improvement that are collected and analyzed by health care organizations for internal use or shared with others solely for pur- poses of improving safety and quality.
The committee believes that information about the most serious adverse events which result in harm to patients and which are subsequently found to result from errors should not be protected from public disclosure. However, the committee also recognizes that for events not falling under this category, fears about the legal discoverability of information may undercut motiva- tions to detect and analyze errors to improve safety. Unless such data are assured protection, information about errors will continue to be hidden and errors will be repeated. A more conducive environment is needed to encour- age health care professionals and organizations to identify, analyze, and re- port errors without threat of litigation and without compromising patients’ legal rights.
Setting Performance Standards and Expectations for Safety
Setting and enforcing explicit standards for safety through regulatory and related mechanisms, such as licensing, certification, and accreditation,
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11
can define minimum performance levels for health care organizations and professionals. Additionally, the process of developing and adopting stan- dards helps to form expectations for safety among providers and consumers. However, standards and expectations are not only set through regulations. The actions of purchasers and consumers affect the behaviors of health care organizations, and the values and norms set by health professions influence standards of practice, training and education for providers. Standards for patient safety can be applied to health care professionals, the organizations in which they work, and the tools (drugs and devices) they use to care for patients.
RECOMMENDATION 7.1 Performance standards and expecta- tions for health care organizations should focus greater attention on patient safety.
• Regulators and accreditors should require health care organiza- tions to implement meaningful patient safety programs with defined executive responsibility.
• Public and private purchasers should provide incentives to health care organizations to demonstrate continuous improvement in patient safety.
Health care organizations are currently subject to compliance with li- censing and accreditation standards. Although both devote some attention to issues related to patient safety, there is opportunity to strengthen such efforts. Regulators and accreditors have a role in encouraging and support- ing actions in health care organizations by holding them accountable for ensuring a safe environment for patients. After a reasonable period of time for health care organizations to develop patient safety programs, regulators and accreditors should require them as a minimum standard.
Purchaser and consumer demands also exert influence on health care organizations. Public and private purchasers should consider safety issues in their contracting decisions and reinforce the importance of patient safety by providing relevant information to their employees or beneficiaries. Purchas- ers should also communicate concerns about patient safety to accrediting bodies to support stronger oversight for patient safety.
RECOMMENDATION 7.2 Performance standards and expecta- tions for health professionals should focus greater attention on pa- tient safety.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
12 TO ERR IS HUMAN
• Health professional licensing bodies should
(1) implement periodic re-examinations and re-licensing of doc- tors, nurses, and other key providers, based on both competence and knowledge of safety practices; and (2) work with certifying and credentialing organizations to de- velop more effective methods to identify unsafe providers and take action.
• Professional societies should make a visible commitment to patient safety by establishing a permanent committee dedicated to safety improvement. This committee should
(1) develop a curriculum on patient safety and encourage its adop- tion into training and certification requirements; (2) disseminate information on patient safety to members through special sessions at annual conferences, journal articles and editori- als, newsletters, publications and websites on a regular basis; (3) recognize patient safety considerations in practice guidelines and in standards related to the introduction and diffusion of new technologies, therapies and drugs; (4) work with the Center for Patient Safety to develop commu- nity-based, collaborative initiatives for error reporting and analysis and implementation of patient safety improvements; and (5) collaborate with other professional societies and disciplines in a national summit on the professional’s role in patient safety.
Although unsafe practitioners are believed to be few in number, the rapid identification of such practitioners and corrective action are impor- tant to a comprehensive safety program. Responsibilities for documenting continuing skills are dispersed among licensing boards, specialty boards and professional groups, and health care organizations with little communica- tion or coordination. In their ongoing assessments, existing licensing, certifi- cation and accreditation processes for health professionals should place greater attention on safety and performance skills.
Additionally, professional societies and groups should become active leaders in encouraging and demanding improvements in patient safety. Set- ting standards, convening and communicating with members about safety, incorporating attention to patient safety into training programs and collabo-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13
rating across disciplines are all mechanisms that will contribute to creating a culture of safety.
RECOMMENDATION 7.3 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) should increase attention to the safe use of drugs in both pre- and post-marketing processes through the following actions:
• develop and enforce standards for the design of drug packaging and labeling that will maximize safety in use;
• require pharmaceutical companies to test (using FDA-approved methods) proposed drug names to identify and remedy potential sound-alike and look-alike confusion with existing drug names; and
• work with physicians, pharmacists, consumers, and others to establish appropriate responses to problems identified through post- marketing surveillance, especially for concerns that are perceived to require immediate response to protect the safety of patients.
The FDA’s role is to regulate manufacturers for the safety and effective- ness of their drugs and devices. However, even approved products can present safety problems in practice. For example, different drugs with simi- lar sounding names can create confusion for both patients and providers. Attention to the safety of products in actual use should be increased during approval processes and in post-marketing monitoring systems. The FDA should also work with drug manufacturers, distributors, pharmacy benefit managers, health plans and other organizations to assist clinicians in identi- fying and preventing problems in the use of drugs.
Implementing Safety Systems in Health Care Organizations
Experience in other high-risk industries has provided well-under- stood illustrations that can be used to improve health care safety. However, health care management and professionals have rarely provided specific, clear, high-level, organization-wide incentives to apply what has been learned in other industries about ways to prevent error and reduce harm within their own organizations. Chief Executive Officers and Boards of Trustees should be held accountable for making a serious, visible and on-going commitment to creating safe systems of care.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
14 TO ERR IS HUMAN
RECOMMENDATION 8.1 Health care organizations and the pro- fessionals affiliated with them should make continually improved pa- tient safety a declared and serious aim by establishing patient safety programs with defined executive responsibility. Patient safety pro- grams should
• provide strong, clear and visible attention to safety; • implement non-punitive systems for reporting and analyzing er-
rors within their organizations; • incorporate well-understood safety principles, such as standard-
izing and simplifying equipment, supplies, and processes; and • establish interdisciplinary team training programs for providers
that incorporate proven methods of team training, such as simulation.
Health care organizations must develop a culture of safety such that an organization’s care processes and workforce are focused on improving the reliability and safety of care for patients. Safety should be an explicit organizational goal that is demonstrated by the strong direction and involve- ment of governance, management and clinical leadership. In addition, a meaningful patient safety program should include defined program objec- tives, personnel, and budget and should be monitored by regular progress reports to governance.
RECOMMENDATION 8.2 Health care organizations should imple- ment proven medication safety practices.
A number of practices have been shown to reduce errors in the medi- cation process. Several professional and collaborative organizations inter- ested in patient safety have developed and published recommendations for safe medication practices, especially for hospitals. Although some of these recommendations have been implemented, none have been universally adopted and some are not yet implemented in a majority of hospitals. Safe medication practices should be implemented in all hospitals and health care organizations in which they are appropriate.
SUMMARY
This report lays out a comprehensive strategy for addressing a serious problem in health care to which we are all vulnerable. By laying out a con- cise list of recommendations, the committee does not underestimate the many barriers that must be overcome to accomplish this agenda. Significant
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15
changes are required to improve awareness of the problem by the public and health professionals, to align payment systems and the liability system so they encourage safety improvements, to develop training and education pro- grams that emphasize the importance of safety and for chief executive offic- ers and trustees of health care organizations to create a culture of safety and demonstrate it in their daily decisions.
Although no single activity can offer the solution, the combination of activities proposed offers a roadmap toward a safer health system. The pro- posed program should be evaluated after five years to assess progress in making the health system safer. With adequate leadership, attention and re- sources, improvements can be made. It may be part of human nature to err, but it is also part of human nature to create solutions, find better alternatives and meet the challenges ahead.
REFERENCES
1. Cook, Richard; Woods, David; Miller, Charlotte, A Tale of Two Stories: Contrast- ing Views of Patient Safety. Chicago: National Patient Safety Foundation, 1998.
2. Brennan, Troyen A.; Leape, Lucian L.; Laird, Nan M., et al. Incidence of adverse events and negligence in hospitalized patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I. N Engl J Med. 324:370–376, 1991. See also: Leape, Lucian L.; Brennan, Troyen A.; Laird, Nan M., et al. The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II. N Engl J Med. 324(6):377–384, 1991. See also: Thomas, Eric J.; Studdert, David M.; Burstin, Helen R., et al. Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado. Med Care forthcoming Spring 2000.
3. American Hospital Association. Hospital Statistics. Chicago. 1999. See also: Thomas, Eric J.; Studdert, David M.; Burstin, Helen R., et al. Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado. Med Care forthcoming Spring 2000. See also: Thomas, Eric J.; Studdert, David M.; Newhouse, Joseph P., et al. Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah and Colorado. Inquiry. 36:255–264, 1999.
4. American Hospital Association. Hospital Statistics. Chicago. 1999. See also: Brennan, Troyen A.; Leape, Lucian L.; Laird, Nan M., et al. Incidence of adverse events and negligence in hospitalized patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I. N Engl J Med. 324:370–376, 1991. See also: Leape, Lucian L.; Brennan, Troyen A.; Laird, Nan M., et al. The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II. N Engl J Med. 324(6):377–384, 1991.
5. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (National Center for Health Statis- tics). Deaths: Final Data for 1997. National Vital Statistics Reports. 47(19):27, 1999.
6. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (National Center for Health Statis- tics). Births and Deaths: Preliminary Data for 1998. National Vital Statistics Reports. 47(25):6, 1999.
7. Thomas, Eric J.; Studdert, David M.; Newhouse, Joseph P., et al. Costs of Medi- cal Injuries in Utah and Colorado. Inquiry. 36:255–264, 1999. See also: Johnson, W.G.;
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
16 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Brennan, Troyen A.; Newhouse, Joseph P., et al. The Economic Consequences of Medi- cal Injuries. JAMA. 267:2487–2492, 1992.
8. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The New OSHA: Reinventing Worker Safety and Health [Web Page]. Dec. 16, 1998. Available at: www.osha.gov/ oshinfo/reinvent.html.
9. Phillips, David P.; Christenfeld, Nicholas; and Glynn, Laura M. Increase in US Medication-Error Deaths between 1983 and 1993. The Lancet. 351:643–644, 1998.
10. Bates, David W.; Spell, Nathan; Cullen, David J., et al. The Costs of Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients. JAMA. 277:307–311, 1997.
11. Leape, Lucian; Brennan, Troyen; Laird, Nan; et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients, Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II. N Engl J Med. 324(6):377–384, 1991.
12. Milstein, Arnold, presentation at “Developing a National Policy Agenda for Im- proving Patient Safety,” meeting sponsored by National Patient Safety Foundation, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations and American Hospital As- sociation, July 15, 1999, Washington, D.C.
13. Veatch, Robert M., Cross-Cultural Perspectives in Medical Ethics: Readings. Bos- ton: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 1989.
14. Reason, James T., Human Error, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 15. Deming, W. Edwards, Out of the Crisis, Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Center for Advanced Engineering Study, 1993. 16. Berwick, Donald M. and Leape, Lucian L. Reducing Errors in Medicine. BMJ.
319:136–137, 1999. 17. Brennan, Troyen A.; Leape, Lucian L.; Laird, Nan M, et al. Incidence of Adverse
Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients. N Eng J Med. 324(6):370–376, 1991. See also: Thomas, Eric J.; Studdert, David M.; Newhouse, Joseph P., et al. Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah and Colorado. Inquiry. 36:255–264, 1999.
18. Thomas, Eric J.; Studdert, David M.; Newhouse, Joseph P., et al. Costs of Medi- cal Injuries in Utah and Colorado. Inquiry. 36:255–264, 1999.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
17
1
A Comprehensive Approach to
Improving Patient Safety
This report proposes a comprehensive approach for reducing medical errors and improving patient safety. The approach employs market and regulatory strategies, public and private strategies, and strategies
that are implemented inside health care organizations as well as in their ex- ternal environment. To achieve a threshold improvement in patient safety, all of these strategies must be employed in a balanced and complementary fashion.
This introductory chapter first discusses patient safety within the overall context of improving quality. The objective of the Quality of Health Care in America Project is to lay out a strategy for achieving a threshold improve- ment in quality over the coming decade. Patient safety is one of three do- mains of quality concerns. A general model of how the external environment influences health care organizations to improve different domains of quality is presented and the model is then discussed as it applies to patient safety, the focus of this first report of the Quality of Health Care in America Com- mittee. Second, the chapter provides a roadmap to the remainder of the report by briefly describing the chapters that follow.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
18 TO ERR IS HUMAN
EXTERNAL DRIVERS
Regulation and Legislation
Economic and Other Incentives
DOMAINS OF QUALITY (Care Processes)
Safe Practice Consistent with Current Medical Knowledge
Customization
External Drivers: Two categories of factors that can influence quality improvement—regulation and legislation, and economic and other incentives such as actions by purchasers and consumers or
professional and community values.
Safe: Freedom from accidental injury. Requires a larger role for regulation and oversight authority.
Practice Consistent with Current Medical Knowledge: Best practices, incorporating evidence-
based medicine.
Customization: Meeting customer-specific values and expectations. Requires a larger role for
creative, continuous improvement and innovation within organizations and marketplace reward.
FIGURE 1.1 A general model of the influence of the external environment on quality.
PATIENT SAFETY: A CRITICAL COMPONENT OF QUALITY
A general model of the influence of the environment on quality, as shown in Figure 1.1, contains two primary dimensions. The first dimension identifies domains of quality. These include: safe care, practice that is con- sistent with current medical knowledge and customization. The second di- mension identifies forces in the external environment that can drive quality improvement in the delivery system. These have been grouped into two broad categories: regulatory/legislative activities, and economic and other incentives.
Safety, the first domain of quality, refers to “freedom from accidental injury.” This definition is stated from the patient’s perspective. As discussed in chapter 2 of this report, health care is not as safe as it should be.
The second domain refers to the provision of services in a manner that is consistent with current medical knowledge and best practices. Currently,
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO IMPROVING PATIENT SAFETY 19
there is a great deal of variability in medical practice and, oftentimes, a lack of adherence to medical standards based on scientific evidence.1
The third domain exemplifies the ability to meet customer-specific val- ues and expectations, permitting the greatest responsiveness to individual values and preferences and maximum personalization or customization of care. Strong policy directives are difficult to implement in this area because of the variety of individual needs and preferences.
Previous work by the IOM categorized quality problems into misuse (avoidable complications that prevent patients from receiving full potential benefit of a service), overuse (potential for harm from the provision of a service exceeds the possible benefit) and underuse (failure to provide a ser- vice that would have produced a favorable outcome for the patient).2 Within this framework, issues of misuse are most likely to be addressed under safety concerns. Issues of overuse and underuse are most likely to be addressed under the domain of practice consistent with current medical knowledge.
Activities in the external environment are grouped under two general categories: (1) regulation and legislative action and (2) economic and other incentives (or barriers). Regulation and legislation include any form of pub- lic policy or legal influence, such as licensing or the liability system. Eco- nomic and other incentives constitute a broad category that includes the collective and individual actions of purchasers and consumers, the norms and values of health professionals, and the social values of the nation and local communities.
Regulation and legislative action can influence quality in health care or- ganizations in two ways. First, it can empower the chief executive officer and governance of health care organizations to take action internally to im- prove quality. It provides a call to action from the external environment that requires a response inside the organization, and lack of an appropriate re- sponse generally results in certain sanctions. Second, it requires all health care organizations to make minimum investments in systems for quality, thus creating a more level playing field throughout the industry. It should also be noted, however, that regulation and legislation can also create disincentives for quality, such as lax or conflicting standards.
Marketplace incentives direct the values, culture, and priorities of health care organizations and reward performance beyond the minimum. One way this can happen is by purchasers and consumers requesting and using infor- mation to direct their business to the best organizations and providers in a community. Both public and private purchasers can be a strong influence, although public purchasers (especially the Health Care Financing Adminis-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
20 TO ERR IS HUMAN
tration) are perceived as a potentially stronger force because of the size of the population they cover as a single purchaser and also because of the addi- tional demands they can bring through conditions of participation and other oversight responsibilities. In health care, efforts to make comparative per- formance data available in the public domain to assist purchasers and con- sumers in identifying high quality providers are just starting to emerge through activities such as the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) of the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) and the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans (CAHPs) survey from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).
Although purchasing activities are a major component of the market- place, health care is not driven by only economic factors. Incentives come from other directions as well, including the norms, values and standards of health professionals and social values of communities. Professional groups, such as medical societies, specialty groups and associations, play a role in defining norms and standards of practice, and setting expectations and val- ues, beginning with training and education and continuing into practice. Such standards and values not only influence the members of a profession, but also the expectations of consumers and others. Additionally, health pro- fessionals and health care organizations are expected to respond to social demands, such as caring for the uninsured or working collaboratively to improve health status in local communities. Media, advocacy, and others also influence organizational and professional behavior, but do so indirectly, often working through other parties that have direct influence, such as pur- chasers and consumers.
Activities in the external environment interact with each other in vari- ous ways for the different domains of quality. As noted by the curve in Fig- ure 1.1, the committee believes regulation and legislation play a particularly important role in assuring a basic level of safety for everyone using the health system. Economic, professional and other incentives can, and should, rein- force that priority. On the other hand, the customization of care to meet individual needs and preferences is more driven by economic and other in- centives, with regulation and legislation potentially playing a supportive or enabling role. Encouraging practice consistent with current medical knowl- edge is reflected as a joint responsibility.
The committee believes that a basic level of safety should be assured for all who use the health system and a strong regulatory component is critical to accomplishing this goal. In most industries, ensuring safety is a traditional role of public policy, enforced through regulation. A regulatory authority
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO IMPROVING PATIENT SAFETY 21
generally defines minimum levels of capability or expected performance. Through some type of monitoring mechanism (e.g., surveillance system, complaint or reporting system, inspections), problems can be identified and corrective action taken to maintain the minimum levels of performance.
However, the committee recognizes that regulation alone will not be sufficient for achieving a significant improvement in patient safety. Careful alignment of regulatory, economic, professional and other incentives in the external environment is critical if significant improvements in safety are to occur. In developing its recommendations, the committee sought a careful balance between the regulatory/legislative influences and the influence of economic and other incentives. The precise balance that will prove most successful in achieving safety improvements is unknown. Ongoing evalua- tion should assess whether the proper balance has been achieved relative to safety or if refinement is needed.
The committee’s strategy for improving patient safety is for the external environment to create sufficient pressure to make errors so costly in terms of ability to conduct business in the marketplace, market share and reputation that the organization must take action. The cost should be high enough that organizations and professionals invest the attention and resources necessary to improve safety. Such external pressures are virtually absent in health care today. The actions of regulatory bodies, group purchasers, consumers and professional groups are all critical to achieving this goal. At the same time, investments in an adequate knowledge base and tools to improve safety are also important to assist health care organizations in responding to this chal- lenge.
ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
Following is a brief description of each of the remaining chapters in the report. As a whole, these chapters lay out a rationale for taking strong ac- tions to improve patient safety; a comprehensive strategy for leveraging the actions of regulators, purchasers, consumers, and professionals; and a plan to bolster the knowledge base and tools necessary to improve patient safety.
Chapter 2 of this report, Errors in Health Care: A Leading Cause of Death and Injury, reviews the literature on errors to assess current under- standing of the magnitude of the problem and identifies a number of issues that inhibit attention to patient safety. A general lack of information on and awareness of errors in health care by purchasers and consumers makes it impossible for them to demand better care. The culture of medicine creates
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
22 TO ERR IS HUMAN
an expectation of perfection and attributes errors to carelessness or incom- petence. Liability concerns discourage the surfacing of errors and communi- cation about how to correct them. The lack of explicit and consistent stan- dards for patient safety creates gaps in licensing and accreditation and lets health care organizations function without some of the basic safety systems in place. The lack of any agency or organization with primary responsibility for patient safety prevents the dissemination of any cohesive message about patient safety. Given the gaps in the external environment, it should come as no surprise that the health care delivery system is not as responsive as it could be to concerns about patient safety. The external environment is not creating any requirement or demand for the delivery system to reduce medi- cal errors and improve the safety of patients.
Chapter 3, Why Do Errors Happen?, offers a discussion of several con- cepts in patient safety, including a number of definitions for terms used throughout this report. The chapter describes leading theory on why acci- dents happen and the types of errors that occur. It also explores why some systems are safer than others and the contribution of human factors prin- ciples to designing safer systems.
Chapters 4 through 8 of the report lay out a set of actions that the exter- nal environment can take to increase attention by the delivery system to issues of patient safety. They also identify a set of actions that the delivery system can pursue in response. The combination of proposed strategies seeks to build a national focus on patient safety, make more and better informa- tion available, set explicit standards for patient safety, and identify how health care organizations can put safety systems into practice.
Chapter 4, Building Leadership and Knowledge to Improve Patient Safety, discusses the need for a focal point for patient safety. The lack of a clear focal point makes it difficult to define priorities, call for action where needed, or produce a consistent message about safety. Other high-risk in- dustries can identify an agency or organization with accountability for moni- toring and communicating about safety problems. No such focal point ex- ists in health care. The chapter discusses the role of national leadership to set aims and to track progress over time in achieving these aims, the need to develop and fund a safety agenda, and approaches for improving dissemina- tion and outreach about safety to the marketplace and to regulators and policy makers.
Chapter 5, Error Reporting Systems, discusses reporting systems as one means for obtaining information about medical errors. A number of public and private reporting systems currently exist, some focused on very specific
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO IMPROVING PATIENT SAFETY 23
issues, such as medications, and others are more broad based. However, collecting reports on errors is only part of the picture. Analyzing and using the information is how improvements can occur. This chapter discusses the role and purpose of error reporting systems, how to maximize the availabil- ity and use of reports, and the contribution of existing reporting systems.
Chapter 6, Protecting Voluntary Error Reporting Systems from Legal Discovery, identifies the legal constraints on protecting data submitted to voluntary reporting systems. Health care organizations are concerned that sharing information about medical errors will expose them to litigation. The unwillingness to share such information means that errors remain hidden and the same errors may be repeated in different organizations. The chapter discusses the legal and practical options available for protecting data to let providers and health care organizations more openly discuss issues related to medical error and patient safety so that errors can be prevented before they result in serious harm or death.
Chapter 7, Setting Performance Standards and Expectations for Safety, discusses the need for explicit and consistent standards for patient safety. Such standards not only define minimum expected levels of performance, but also set expectations for purchasers and consumers. The roles of licens- ing and accrediting bodies are discussed relative to standards for health care organizations, professionals, and drugs and medical devices. The roles of purchasers and professional groups in setting expectations are also dis- cussed.
Chapter 8, Creating Safety Systems in Health Care Organizations, dis- cusses actions within the delivery system to improve patient safety. The goal for improving patient safety is to affect the delivery of care. Health care organizations have to make certain that systems are in place to ensure pa- tient safety, but they also have to build in mechanisms for learning about safety concerns and for continuous improvement. The chapter discusses the importance of an organizational commitment to safety and the need to in- corporate safety principles into operational processes.
Before proceeding further, it is useful to identify what this report is not. Three distinct issues that have been raised during various discussions on patient safety are not addressed here. First, the committee recognizes that a major force for improving patient safety is intrinsic motivation, that is, it is driven by the values and attitudes of health professionals and health care organizations. This report, however, focuses primarily on the external envi- ronment and the policy and market strategies that can be employed to en- courage actions by health professionals and health care organizations. It is
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
24 TO ERR IS HUMAN
hoped that actions in the external environment will lead to implementation of a specific set of actions within health care organizations. Although some health care organizations are already implementing the recommended ac- tions absent any incentives from the external environment, the external en- vironment can motivate a broader response.
Second, worker safety is often linked with patient safety. If workers are safer in their jobs, patients will be safer also. Sometimes, the actions needed to improve patient safety are ones that would also improve worker safety. Procedures for avoiding needlesticks or limiting long work hours are aimed at protecting workers but can also protect patients. Thus, although worker safety is not the focus of this report, the committee believes that creating a safe environment for patients will go a long way in addressing issues of worker safety as well.
The third issue is that of access to care. This report is focused on making the delivery of care safer for patients who have access to and are using the health care system. Safe care is an important part of quality care. Although safe care does not guarantee quality, it is a necessary prerequisite for the delivery of high-quality care. However, the committee also recognizes the relationship that exists between access and quality. When someone needs medical care, the worst quality is no care at all.
Access continues to be threatened in today’s health care marketplace. For many people the lack of insurance creates a significant barrier to access. The uninsured typically use fewer services than the insured, are more likely to report having cost and access problems, and are less likely to believe that they receive excellent care.3 However, access is not just a concern of the uninsured. Even people with insurance are growing uneasy about their ac- cess to care. Employers are reducing coverage for workers and their depen- dents.4 Inadequate coverage compromises access and creates inequities be- tween those who have complete coverage and full access and those who have partial coverage and partial access. Insufficient coverage also creates concerns about the affordability of care, either because services are not cov- ered at all or because significant out-of-pocket payments, such as copayments and deductibles, are involved. Although financial burden is a significant barrier to access, other factors interfere as well, such as poor transportation, language, and cultural barriers.5
When access to care is threatened, the ability to make a threshold change in quality is also threatened. Although it is not being addressed in this re- port, those dealing with overall quality concerns will also have to consider problems of access.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO IMPROVING PATIENT SAFETY 25
REFERENCES
1. Chassin, Mark R.; Galvin, Robert W.; and the National Roundtable on Health Care Quality. The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality. JAMA. 280(11):1000– 1005, 1998. See also: Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry. Quality First: Better Health Care for All Americans. U.S. Depart- ment of Health and Human Services. 1998.
2. Chassin, Mark R.; Galvin, Robert W.; and the National Roundtable on Health Care Quality. The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality. JAMA. 280(11):1000– 1005, 1998.
3. Berk, Marc L., and Schur, Claudia L. Measuring Access to Care: Improving Infor- mation for Policymakers. Health Affairs. 17(1):180–186, 1998. Also, Donelan, Karen; Blendon, Robert J.; Schoen, Cathy, et al. The Cost of Health System Change: Public Discontent in Five Nations. Health Affairs. 18(3):206–216, 1999.
4. Kronick, Richard, and Gilmer, Todd. Explaining the Decline in Health Insurance Coverage, 1979–1995. Health Affairs. 18(2):30–47, 1999.
5. Institute of Medicine. Access to Health Care in America. Michael Millman, ed. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
26
2 Errors in Health Care:
A Leading Cause of Death and Injury
H ealth care is not as safe as it should be. A substantial body of evi- dence points to medical errors as a leading cause of death and injury.
• Sizable numbers of Americans are harmed as a result of medical er- rors. Two studies of large samples of hospital admissions, one in New York using 1984 data and another in Colorado and Utah using 1992 data, found that the proportion of hospital admissions experiencing an adverse event, defined as injuries caused by medical management, were 2.9 and 3.7 per- cent,1 respectively. The proportion of adverse events attributable to errors (i.e., preventable adverse events) was 58 percent in New York, and 53 per- cent in Colorado and Utah.2
• Preventable adverse events are a leading cause of death in the United States. When extrapolated to the over 33.6 million admissions to U.S. hospi- tals in 1997, the results of these two studies imply that at least 44,000 and perhaps as many as 98,000 Americans die in hospitals each year as a result of medical errors.3 Even when using the lower estimate, deaths in hospitals due to preventable adverse events exceed the number attributable to the 8th-leading cause of death.4 Deaths due to preventable adverse events ex- ceed the deaths attributable to motor vehicle accidents (43,458), breast can- cer (42,297) or AIDS (16,516).5
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERRORS IN HEALTH CARE 27
• Total national costs (lost income, lost household production, disabil- ity, health care costs) are estimated to be between $37.6 billion and $50 billion for adverse events and between $17 billion and $29 billion for pre- ventable adverse events.6 Health care costs account for over one-half of the total costs. Even when using the lower estimates, the total national costs associated with adverse events and preventable adverse events represent ap- proximately 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively, of national health expen- ditures in 1996.7 In 1992, the direct and indirect costs of adverse events were slightly higher than the direct and indirect costs of caring for people with HIV and AIDS.8
• In terms of lives lost, patient safety is as important an issue as worker safety. Although more than 6,000 Americans die from workplace injuries every year,9,10 in 1993 medication errors are estimated to have accounted for about 7,000 deaths.11 Medication errors account for one out of 131 outpa- tient deaths and one out of 854 inpatient deaths.
• Medication-related errors occur frequently in hospitals; not all result in actual harm, but those that do are costly. One recent study conducted at two prestigious teaching hospitals found that almost two percent of admis- sions experienced a preventable adverse drug event, resulting in average increased hospital costs of $4,700 per admission or about $2.8 million annu- ally for a 700-bed teaching hospital.12 If these findings are generalizable, the increased hospital costs alone of preventable adverse drug events affecting inpatients are about $2 billion for the nation as a whole.
• Hospital patients represent only a fraction of the total population at risk of experiencing a medication-related error. In 1998, nearly 2.5 billion prescriptions were dispensed by U.S. pharmacies at a cost of about $92 bil- lion.13 Numerous studies document errors in prescribing medications,14,15
dispensing by pharmacists,16 and unintentional nonadherence on the part of the patient.17 Medication errors have the potential to increase as a major contributor to avoidable morbidity and mortality as new medications are introduced for a wider range of indications.
This chapter provides a summary of findings in the literature on the frequency and cost of health care errors and the factors that contribute to their occurrence.
INTRODUCTION
Although the literature pertaining to errors in health care has grown steadily over the last decade and some notable studies are particularly strong
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
28 TO ERR IS HUMAN
methodologically, we do not yet have a complete picture of the epidemiol- ogy of errors. Many studies focus on patients experiencing injury and pro- vide valuable insight into the magnitude of harm resulting from errors. Other studies, more limited in number, focus on the occurrence of errors, both those that result in harm and those that do not (sometimes called “near misses”). More is known about errors that occur in hospitals than in other health care delivery settings.
Synthesizing and interpreting the findings in the literature pertaining to errors in health care is complicated due to the absence of standardized no- menclature. For purposes of this report, the terms error and adverse event are defined as follows:
An error is defined as the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended (i.e., error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e., error of planning).18
An adverse event is an injury caused by medical management rather than the underlying condition of the patient. An adverse event attributable to error is a “preventable adverse event.”19 Negligent adverse events represent a subset of preventable adverse events that satisfy legal criteria used in determining negligence (i.e., whether the care provided failed to meet the standard of care reasonably expected of an average physician qualified to take care of the pa- tient in question).20
When a study in the literature has used a definition that deviates from the above definitions, it is noted below.
Medication-related error has been studied extensively for several rea- sons: it is one of the most common types of error, substantial numbers of individuals are affected, and it accounts for a sizable increase in health care costs.21–23 There are also methodologic issues: (1) prescription drugs are widely used, so it is easy to identify an adequate sample of patients who experience adverse drug events; (2) the drug prescribing process provides good documentation of medical decisions, and much of this documentation resides in automated, easily accessible databases; and (3) deaths attributable to medication errors are recorded on death certificates. There are probably other areas of health care delivery that have been studied to a lesser degree but may offer equal or greater opportunity for improvement in safety.
Efforts to assess the importance of various types of errors are currently hampered by the lack of a standardized taxonomy for reporting adverse events, errors, and risk factors.24,25 A limited number of studies focus di-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERRORS IN HEALTH CARE 29
rectly on the causes of adverse events, but attempts to classify adverse events according to “root causes” are complicated by the fact that several inter- locking factors often contribute to an error or series of errors that in turn result in an adverse event.26,27 In recent years, some progress toward a more standardized nomenclature and taxonomy has been made in the medication area, but much work remains to be done.28
The following discussion of the literature addresses four questions:
1. How frequently do errors occur? 2. What factors contribute to errors? 3. What are the costs of errors? 4. Are public perceptions of safety in health care consistent with the
evidence?
HOW FREQUENTLY DO ERRORS OCCUR?
For the most part, studies that provide insight into the incidence and prevalence of errors fall into two categories:
1. General studies of patients experiencing adverse events. These are stud- ies of adverse events in general, not studies limited to medication-related events. These studies are limited in number, but some represent large-scale, multi-institutional analyses. Virtually all studies in this category focus on hospitalized patients. With the exception of medication-related events dis- cussed in the second category, little if any research has focused on errors or adverse events occurring outside of hospital settings, for example, in ambu- latory care clinics, surgicenters, office practices, home health, or care admin- istered by patients, their family, and friends at home.
2. Studies of patients experiencing medication-related errors. There is an abundance of studies that fall into this category. Although many focus on errors and adverse events associated with ordering and administering medi- cation to hospitalized patients, some studies focus on patients in ambulatory settings.
Adverse Events
An adverse event is defined as an injury caused by medical management rather than by the underlying disease or condition of the patient.29 Not all, but a sizable proportion of adverse events are the result of errors. Numerous
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
30 TO ERR IS HUMAN
studies have looked at the proportion of adverse events attributable to medi- cal error. Due to methodologic challenges, far fewer studies focus on the full range of error—namely, those that result in injury and those that expose the patient to risk but do not result in injury.
The most extensive study of adverse events is the Harvard Medical Prac- tice Study, a study of more than 30,000 randomly selected discharges from 51 randomly selected hospitals in New York State in 1984.30 Adverse events, manifest by prolonged hospitalization or disability at the time of discharge or both, occurred in 3.7 percent of the hospitalizations. The proportion of adverse events attributable to errors (i.e., preventable adverse events) was 58 percent and the proportion of adverse events due to negligence was 27.6 percent. Although most of these adverse events gave rise to disability lasting less than six months, 13.6 percent resulted in death and 2.6 percent caused permanently disabling injuries. Drug complications were the most common type of adverse event (19 percent), followed by wound infections (14 per- cent) and technical complications (13 percent).31,32
The findings of the Harvard Medical Practice Study in New York have recently been corroborated by a study of adverse events in Colorado and Utah occurring in 1992.33 This study included the review of medical records pertaining to a random sample of 15,000 discharges from a representative sample of hospitals in the two states. Adverse events occurred in 2.9 percent of hospitalizations in each state. Over four out of five of these adverse events occurred in the hospital, the remaining occurred prior to admission in phy- sicians’ offices, patients’ homes or other non-hospital settings. The propor- tion of adverse events due to negligence was 29.2 percent, and the propor- tion of adverse events that were preventable was 53 percent.34 As was the case in the New York study, over 50 percent of adverse events were minor, temporary injuries. But the study in New York found that 13.6 percent of adverse events led to death, as compared with 6.6 percent in Colorado and Utah. In New York, about one in four negligent adverse events led to death, while in Colorado and Utah, death resulted in about 1 out of every 11 negli- gent adverse events. Factors that might explain the differences between the two studies include: temporal changes in health care, and differences in the states’ patient populations and health care systems.35
Both the study in New York and the study in Colorado and Utah identi- fied a subset of preventable adverse events that also satisfied criteria applied by the legal system in determining negligence. It is important to note that although some of these cases may stem from incompetent or impaired pro- viders, the committee believes that many could likely have been avoided had better systems of care been in place.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERRORS IN HEALTH CARE 31
Extrapolation of the results of the Colorado and Utah study to the over 33.6 million admissions to hospitals in the United States in 1997, implies that at least 44,000 Americans die in hospitals each year as a result of pre- ventable medical errors.36 Based on the results of the New York study, the number of deaths due to medical error may be as high as 98,000.37 By way of comparison, the lower estimate is greater than the number of deaths attrib- utable to the 8th-leading cause of death.38
Some maintain these extrapolations likely underestimate the occurrence of preventable adverse events because these studies: (1) considered only those patients whose injuries resulted in a specified level of harm; (2) im- posed a high threshold to determine whether an adverse event was prevent- able or negligent (concurrence of two reviewers); and (3) included only er- rors that are documented in patient records.39
Two studies that relied on both medical record abstraction and other information sources, such as provider reports, have found higher rates of adverse events occurring in hospitals. In a study of 815 consecutive patients on a general medical service of a university hospital, it was found that 36 percent had an iatrogenic illness, defined as any illness that resulted from a diagnostic procedure, from any form of therapy, or from a harmful occur- rence that was not a natural consequence of the patient’s disease.40 Of the 815 patients, nine percent had an iatrogenic illness that threatened life or produced considerable disability, and for another two percent, iatrogenic illness was believed to contribute to the death of the patient.
In a study of 1,047 patients admitted to two intensive care units and one surgical unit at a large teaching hospital, 480 (45.8 percent) were identified as having had an adverse event, where adverse event was defined as “situa- tions in which an inappropriate decision was made when, at the time, an appropriate alternative could have been chosen.”41 For 185 patients (17.7 percent), the adverse event was serious, producing disability or death. The likelihood of experiencing an adverse event increased about six percent for each day of hospital stay.
Some information on errors can also be gleaned from studies that focus on inpatients who died or experienced a myocardial infarction or postsurgi- cal complication. In a study of 182 deaths in 12 hospitals from three condi- tions (cerebrovascular accident, pneumonia, or myocardial infarction), it was found that at least 14 percent and possibly as many as 27 percent of the deaths might have been prevented.42 A 1991 analysis of 203 incidents of cardiac arrest at a teaching hospital,43 found that 14 percent followed an iatrogenic complication and that more than half of these might have been prevented. In a study of 44,603 patients who underwent surgery between
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
32 TO ERR IS HUMAN
1977 and 1990 at a large medical center, 2,428 patients (5.4 percent) suf- fered complications and nearly one-half of these complications were attrib- utable to error.44 Another 749 died during the same hospitalization; 7.5 per- cent of these deaths were attributed to error.
Patients who died during surgery requiring general anesthesia have been the focus of many studies over the last few decades. Anesthesia is an area in which very impressive improvements in safety have been made. As more and more attention has been focused on understanding the factors that contrib- ute to error and on the design of safer systems, preventable mishaps have declined.45–48 Studies, some conducted in Australia, the United Kingdom and other countries, indicate that, today, anesthesia mortality rates are about one death per 200,000–300,000 anesthetics administered, compared with two deaths per 10,000 anesthetics in the early 1980s.49 The gains in anesthe- sia are very impressive and were accomplished through a variety of mecha- nisms, including improved monitoring techniques, the development and widespread adoption of practice guidelines, and other systematic approaches to reducing errors.50
Lastly, some studies have relied on incident reporting systems to iden- tify and analyze errors. For example, in Australia, 324 general practitioners participating voluntarily in an incident reporting system reported a total of 805 incidents during October 1993 through June 1995, of which 76 percent were preventable and 27 percent had the potential for severe harm.51 These studies provide information on the types of errors that occur but are not useful for estimating the incidence of errors, because the population at risk (i.e., the denominator) is generally unknown.
Medication-Related Errors
Even though medication errors that result in death or serious injury occur infrequently, sizable and increasing numbers of people are affected because of the extensive use of drugs in both out-of-hospital and in-hospital settings. In 1998, nearly 2.5 billion prescriptions were dispensed in U.S. pharmacies at an estimated cost of about $92 billion.52 An estimated 3.75 billion drug administrations were made to patients in hospitals.53
In a review of U.S. death certificates between 1983 and 1993, it was found that 7,391 people died in 1993 from medication errors (accidental poisoning by drugs, medicaments, and biologicals that resulted from ac- knowledged errors by patients or medical personnel), compared with 2,876 people in 1983, representing a 2.57-fold increase.54 Outpatient deaths due
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERRORS IN HEALTH CARE 33
to medication errors rose 8.48-fold during the 10-year period, compared with a 2.37-fold increase in inpatient deaths.
Medication Errors in Hospitals
Medication errors occur frequently in hospitals. Numerous studies have assessed the incidence of adverse drug events (ADEs), defined as an injury resulting from medical intervention related to a drug.55 Not all ADEs are attributable to errors. For example, a patient with no history of allergic reac- tions to drugs, who experiences an allergic reaction to an antibiotic, has suffered an ADE, but this ADE would not be attributable to error. How- ever, an error would have occurred if an antibiotic was prescribed to a pa- tient with a history of documented allergic reactions, because the medical record was unavailable or not consulted. We discuss only those studies of ADEs that identified the subset of ADEs determined to be preventable (i.e., attributable to errors).
In an analysis of 289,411 medication orders written during one year in a tertiary-care teaching hospital, the overall error rate was estimated to be 3.13 errors for each 1,000 orders written and the rate of significant errors to be 1.81 per 1,000 orders.56 In a review of 4,031 adult admissions to 11 medi- cal and surgical units at two tertiary care hospitals, Bates et al. identified 247 ADEs for an extrapolated event rate of 6.5 ADEs per 100 nonobstetrical admissions, and a mean number per hospital per year of approximately 1,900 ADEs.57 Twenty-eight percent were judged preventable.
In a study of patients admitted to coronary intensive care, medical, sur- gical, and obstetric units in an urban tertiary care hospital over a 37-day period, the rate of drug-related incidents was 73 in 2,967 patient-days: 27 incidents were judged ADEs; 34, potential ADEs; and 12, problem orders.58
Of the 27 ADEs, five were life threatening, nine were serious, and 13 were significant. Of the 27 ADEs, 15(56 percent) were judged definitely or prob- ably preventable. In a study of prescribing errors detected and averted by pharmacists in a 631-bed tertiary care teaching hospital between July 1994 and June 1995, the estimated overall rate of errors was 3.99 per 1,000 medi- cation orders.59
Children are at particular risk of medication errors, and as discussed below, this is attributable primarily to incorrect dosages.60,61 In a study of 101,022 medication orders at two children’s teaching hospitals, a total of 479 errant medication orders were identified, of which 27 represented po- tentially lethal prescribing errors.62 The frequency of errors was similar at
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
34 TO ERR IS HUMAN
the two institutions, 4.9 and 4.5 errors per 1,000 medication orders. The error rate per 100 patient-days was greater in the pediatric intensive care units (PICUs) than in the pediatric ward or neonatal intensive care units, and the authors attribute this to the greater heterogeneity of patients cared for in PICUs and the broad range of drugs and dosages used. In a four-year prospective quality assurance study, 315 medication errors resulting in in- jury were reported among the 2,147 neonatal and pediatric intensive care admissions, an error rate of one per 6.8 admissions.63 The frequency of ia- trogenic injury of any sort due to a medication error was 3.1 percent—one injury for each 33 intensive care admissions.
Not surprisingly, the potential for medication-related error increases as the average number of drugs administered increases. In a prospective cohort study of 4,031 adult admissions to 11 medical and surgical units in two ter- tiary care hospitals (including two medical and three surgical ICUs), the rate of preventable ADEs and preventable potential ADEs in ICUs was 19 events per 1,000 patient-days, nearly twice the rate of non-ICUs.64 When adjusted for the number of drugs used in the previous 24 hours or ordered since admission, there were no differences in error rates between ICUs and non- ICUs.
Current estimates of the incidence of medication errors are undoubt- edly low because many errors go undocumented and unreported.65–68 For example, in a study of patients admitted to five patient care units at a tertiary care hospital during a six month period in 1993, it was found that incident reports were filed with the hospital’s quality assurance program or called into the pharmacy hotline for only three of the 54 people experiencing an adverse drug event.69
Some errors are also difficult to detect in the absence of computerized surveillance systems. In a study of 36,653 hospitalized patients, Classen et al. identified 731 ADEs in 648 patients, but only 92 of these were reported by physicians, pharmacists, and nurses.70 The remaining 631 were detected from automated signals, the most common of which were diphenhydramine hydrochloride and naloxone hydrochloride use, high serum drug levels, leu- kopenia, and the use of phytonadione and antidiarrheals.
Medication Errors in Ambulatory Settings
There is evidence indicating that ADEs account for a sizable number of admissions to inpatient facilities, but we do not know what proportion of these ADE-related admissions are attributable to errors. One study found
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERRORS IN HEALTH CARE 35
that between three and 11 percent of hospital admissions were attributable to ADEs.71 A review of 14 Australian studies published between 1988 and 1996 reported that 2.4 to 3.6 percent of all hospital admissions were drug related, and between 32 and 69 percent were definitely or possibly prevent- able. Drug groups most commonly involved were cytotoxics, cardiovascular agents, antihypertensives, anticoagulants, and nonsteroidal anti-inflamma- tory drugs.72
ADEs also result in increased visits to physician offices and emergency departments. In an analysis of 1,000 patients drawn from a community of- fice-based medical practice who were observed for adverse drug reactions, adverse effects were recorded in 42 (4.2 percent), of which 23 were judged to be unnecessary and potentially avoidable.73 In an analysis of 62,216 visits to an emergency department by patients enrolled in a health maintenance organization (HMO), it was found that 1,074 (1.7 percent) were related to medication noncompliance or inappropriate prescribing.74
There is a sizable body of literature to document the incidence of pa- tient noncompliance with medication regimens, but less is known about the proportion of noncompliance attributable to medical error (defined as acci- dental or unintentional nonadherence to a therapeutic program) as opposed to intentional noncompliance. In a meta-analysis of seven studies, Sullivan et al. estimate that 5.5 percent of admissions can be attributed to drug therapy noncompliance, amounting to 1.94 million admissions and $8.5 billion in hospital expenditures in 1986.75 Similar results were obtained by Einarson in a meta-analysis of 37 studies published between 1966 and 1989, which found that hospital admissions caused by ADEs, resulting from noncompli- ance or unintentionally inappropriate drug use, ranged from 0.2 to 21.7 per- cent with a median of 4.9 percent and a mean of 5.5 percent.76 Patient non- compliance is clearly an important quality issue, but it should be emphasized that we do not know the extent to which noncompliance is related to errors.
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO ERRORS
Studies of Adverse Events
Patient safety problems of many kinds occur during the course of pro- viding health care. They include transfusion errors and adverse drug events; wrong-site surgery and surgical injuries; preventable suicides; restraint-re- lated injuries or death; hospital-acquired or other treatment-related infec- tions; and falls, burns, pressure ulcers, and mistaken identity. Leape et al.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
36 TO ERR IS HUMAN
BOX 2.1 Types of Errors
Diagnostic Error or delay in diagnosis Failure to employ indicated tests Use of outmoded tests or therapy Failure to act on results of monitoring or testing
Treatment Error in the performance of an operation, procedure, or test Error in administering the treatment Error in the dose or method of using a drug Avoidable delay in treatment or in responding to an abnormal test Inappropriate (not indicated) care
Preventive Failure to provide prophylactic treatment Inadequate monitoring or follow-up of treatment
Other Failure of communication Equipment failure Other system failure
SOURCE: Leape, Lucian; Lawthers, Ann G.; Brennan, Troyen A., et al. Preventing Medical Injury. Qual Rev Bull. 19(5):144–149, 1993.
have characterized the kinds of errors that resulted in medical injury in the Medical Practice Study as diagnostic, treatment, preventive, or other errors (see Box 2.1).
More than two-thirds (70 percent) of the adverse events found in this study were thought to be preventable, with the most common types of pre- ventable errors being technical errors (44 percent), diagnosis (17 percent), failure to prevent injury (12 percent) and errors in the use of a drug (10 percent). The contributions of complexity and technology to such error rates is highlighted by the higher rates of events that occur in the highly technical surgical specialties of vascular surgery, cardiac surgery, and neurosurgery. In hospitals, high error rates with serious consequences are most likely in in- tensive care units, operating rooms and emergency departments.
Thomas et al., in their study of admissions to hospitals in Colorado and Utah experiencing adverse events, found that about 30 percent were attrib- utable to negligence.77 The hospital location with the highest proportion of
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERRORS IN HEALTH CARE 37
negligent adverse events (52.6 percent) was the emergency department. The authors note the complexity inherent in emergency medical care and point to the need to improve teamwork and standardize work procedures.
Other studies have made similar attempts to classify errors. Dubois and Brook studied 49 preventable deaths from 12 hospitals, and found that for those who died of a myocardial infarction, preventable deaths reflected er- rors in management; for cerebrovascular accident, most deaths reflected er- rors in diagnosis; and for pneumonia, some deaths reflected errors in man- agement and some reflected errors in diagnosis.78 In an analysis of 203 cardiac arrests at a teaching hospital, Bedell et al. found that of the half that might have been prevented, the most common causes of potentially prevent- able arrest were medication errors and toxic effects, and suboptimal re- sponse by physicians to clinical signs and symptoms.79
Studies of Medication Errors
Ensuring appropriate medication use is a complex process involving multiple organizations and professionals from various disciplines; knowl- edge of drugs; timely access to accurate and complete patient information; and a series of interrelated decisions over a period of time. As shown in Box 2.2, errors can creep into this process at various points. Some errors are errors of commission (e.g., administration of improper drug), while others are errors of omission (e.g., failure to administer a drug that was prescribed).
Medication errors are often preventable, although reducing the error rate significantly will require multiple interventions. In the study of pre- scribing errors conducted by Lesar et al.,80 the most common factors associ- ated with errors were decline in renal or hepatic function requiring alter- ation of drug therapy (13.9 percent); patient history of allergy to the same medication class (12.1 percent); using the wrong drug name, dosage form, or abbreviation (11.4 percent for both brand name and generic name or- ders); incorrect dosage calculations (11.1 percent); and atypical or unusual and critical dosage frequency considerations (10.8 percent). The most com- mon groups of factors associated with errors were those related to knowl- edge and the application of knowledge regarding drug therapy (30 percent); knowledge and use of knowledge regarding patient factors that affect drug therapy (29.2 percent); use of calculations, decimal points, or unit and rate expression factors (17.5 percent); and nomenclature—for example incor- rect drug name, dosage form, or abbreviations (13.4 percent).
Many studies have identified inappropriate prescribing as a particu-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
38 TO ERR IS HUMAN
larly important factor in accounting for medication errors. In an analysis of 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey data, it was found that physi- cians prescribe potentially inappropriate medications for nearly a quarter of all older people living in the community.81 In a study of 366 consecutive patients admitted to a department of cardiology, “definite” or “probable” drug events (i.e., adverse drug reactions and dose-related therapeutic fail- ures) accounted for 15 admissions, of which five were judged to be due to error in prescription and another five judged to have been avoidable had appropriate measures been taken by prescribing physicians.82 In an analysis of 682 children admitted to a Congenital Heart Disease Center at a teaching hospital in the United Kingdom, 441 medication errors were reported by
BOX 2.2 Medication Use Processes
Prescribing • Assessing the need for and selecting the correct drug • Individualizing the therapeutic regimen • Designating the desired therapeutic response
Dispensing • Reviewing the order • Processing the order • Compounding and preparing the drug • Dispensing the drug in a timely manner
Administering • Administering the right medication to the right patient • Administering medication when indicated • Informing the patient about the medication • Including the patient in administration
Monitoring • Monitoring and documenting patient’s response • Identifying and reporting adverse drug events • Reevaluating drug selection, regimen, frequency and duration
Systems and Management Control • Collaborating and communicating amongst caregivers • Reviewing and managing patient’s complete therapeutic drug regimen
SOURCE: Nadzam, Deborah M., Development of medication-use indicators by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. AJHP. 48:1925– 1930, 1991.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERRORS IN HEALTH CARE 39
nurses, doctors, and pharmacists, of which prescribing errors accounted for 68 percent, followed by administration errors (25 percent) and supply errors (seven percent).83 In Burnum’s84 analysis of 1,000 patients drawn from a community office-based medical practice who experienced adverse drug re- actions, 23 patients were judged to have experienced an “unnecessary and potentially avoidable” event, 10 of which were due to physician error (i.e., six due to administration of a drug not indicated and four to improper drug administration).
Physicians do not routinely screen for potential drug interactions, even when medication history information is readily available. In an analysis of 424 randomly selected visits to a hospital emergency department, 47 percent led to added medication, and in 10 percent of the visits in which at least one medication was added, the new medication added a potential adverse inter- action.85 In all cases, a medication history was recorded on the patients and available to the physicians.
Errors can occur in the dispensing of drugs by pharmacists. In a recent investigation of pharmacists, the Massachusetts State Board of Registration in Pharmacy estimated that 2.4 million prescriptions are filled improperly each year in Massachusetts.86 Eighty-eight percent of the errors involved giving patients the wrong drug or the wrong strength.
Errors in the ordering and administration of medications are common in hospitals. Bates et al.,87 in an analysis of more than 4,000 admissions to two tertiary care hospitals, found that about 28 percent of 247 adverse drug events were preventable and most of these resulted from errors that oc- curred at the stages of ordering and administration. Davis and Cohen88 in their review of the literature and other evidence on errors report an error rate of 12 percent to be common in the preparation and administration of medications in hospitals. In a study of medication orders at two children’s teaching hospitals, Folli et al.89 found that errors occurred in almost five out of every 1,000 orders and that the most prevalent error was overdose.
Patients make errors too. With greater emphasis on community-based long-term care, increased ambulatory surgery, shorter hospital lengths of stay, and greater reliance on complex drug therapy, patients play an increas- ingly important role in the administration of drugs. Greenberg et al.90 found that 4.3 percent of the elderly enrolled in Medicare social HMOs required assistance with the administration of medications. The inability to manage complex drug therapies explains why some elderly are in institutional rather than community-based long-term-care settings.91
Automated information and decision support systems are effective in reducing many types of errors. In an analysis of admissions to 11 medical
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
40 TO ERR IS HUMAN
and surgical units at two tertiary care hospitals, Leape et al.92 identified 334 errors as the causes of 264 preventable ADEs and potential ADEs. About three out of four errors were caused by one of seven types of systems failures (drug knowledge dissemination, dose and identity checking, patient infor- mation availability, order transcription, allergy defense, medication order tracking, and interservice communication), and all could have been im- proved by better information systems that disseminate knowledge about drugs and make drug and patient information readily accessible at the time it is needed.
Computerized drug order entry systems have much potential to reduce errors. In a study of 379 consecutive admissions to three medical units at an urban tertiary care hospital, 10,070 medication orders were written and 530 medication errors were identified (5.3 errors per 100 orders). More than half of the medication errors involved at least one missing dose of a medica- tion.93 Of the 530 medication errors, five (0.9 percent) resulted in adverse drug events that were judged preventable, and another 35 represented po- tential adverse drug events (i.e., medication errors with the potential for injury but in which no injury occurred). Physician computer order entry could have prevented 84 percent missing dose medication errors, 86 percent of potential adverse drug events, and 60 percent of preventable adverse drug events. However, more sophisticated technology is not the only option; in- volving pharmacists in reviewing drug orders significantly reduced the po- tential harm resulting from errant medication orders.94,95
THE COST OF ERRORS
In addition to the unfortunate health consequences suffered by many as a result of medical error, there are direct and indirect costs borne by society as a whole as a result of medical errors. Direct costs refer to higher health care expenditures, while indirect costs include factors such as lost produc- tivity, disability costs, and personal costs of care.
Based on analysis of 459 adverse events identified by reviewing the medi- cal records of 14,732 randomly selected 1992 discharges from 28 hospitals in Colorado and Utah, Thomas et al. estimated the total costs (lost income, lost household production, disability and health care costs) to be nearly $662 million of which health care costs totaled $348 million.96 The total costs associated with the 265 of the 459 adverse events that were found to be preventable were $308 million, of which $159 million represented health care costs. Based on extrapolation to all hospital admissions in the United
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERRORS IN HEALTH CARE 41
States, the authors estimate the national costs of adverse events to be $37.6 billion and of preventable adverse events to be $17 billion. The total na- tional costs associated with adverse events was approximately 4 percent of national health expenditures in 1996. In 1992, the direct and indirect costs of adverse events were slightly higher than the direct and indirect costs of caring for people with HIV and AIDS.
It has been estimated that for every dollar spent on ambulatory medica- tions, another dollar is spent to treat new health problems caused by the medication.97 Studies of the direct costs of medication-related errors fall into three categories; (1) population-based studies of patients in a commu- nity or health plan; (2) studies of medication-related errors that occur in hospitals; and (3) studies of medication-related errors that occur in nursing homes.
One estimate places the annual national health care cost of drug-related morbidity and mortality in the ambulatory setting as high as $76.6 billion in 1994.98 Not all drug-related morbidity and mortality is preventable, but nu- merous studies document errors in prescribing,99,100 dispensing by pharma- cists,101 and unintentional nonadherence on the part of the patient.102
Medication-related errors occur frequently, most do not result in actual harm, but those that do are costly. One recent study conducted at two pres- tigious teaching hospitals found that almost two percent of admissions expe- rienced a preventable ADE, resulting in an average increased length of stay of 4.6 days and an average increased hospital cost of nearly $4,700 per ad- mission.103 This amounts to about $2.8 million annually for a 700-bed teach- ing hospital, and if these findings are generalizable, the increased hospital costs alone of preventable adverse drug events affecting inpatients are about $2 billion for the nation as a whole.
In a matched case-control study of all patients admitted to a large teach- ing hospital from January 1990 through December 1993, it was found that adverse drug events complicated 2.43 admissions per 100.104 Controls were matched to cases on primary discharge diagnosis related group (DRG), age, sex, acuity, and year of admission. The occurrence of an ADE was associated with an increased length of stay of 1.91 days and an increased cost of $2,262. The increased risk of death among patients experiencing an adverse drug event was 1.88.
Other studies corroborate the high cost of medication-related errors. One study conducted in a university-affiliated medical center hospital esti- mated that the annual costs of treating the 1,911 medication-related prob- lems identified through the hospital’s voluntary reporting system in 1994
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
42 TO ERR IS HUMAN
totaled slightly less than $1.5 million.105 Bloom has estimated that $3.9 bil- lion was spent in 1983 to manage the preventable gastrointestinal adverse effects of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs.106
Medication-related errors also occur in nursing homes. For every dollar spent on drugs in nursing facilities, $1.33 is consumed in the treatment of drug-related morbidity and mortality, amounting to $7.6 billion for the na- tion as a whole, of which $3.6 billion has been estimated to be avoidable.107
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY
Although the risk of dying as a result of a medical error far surpasses the risk of dying in an airline accident, a good deal more public attention has been focused on improving safety in the airline industry than in the health care industry. The likelihood of dying per domestic jet flight is estimated to be one in eight million.108 Statistically, an average passenger would have to fly around the clock for more than 438 years before being involved in a fatal crash. This compares very favorably with a death risk per domestic flight of one in two million during the decade 1967–1976. Some believe that public concern about airline safety, in response to the impact of news stories, has played an important role in the dramatic improvement in safety in the airline industry.
The American public is aware that health care is less safe than some other environments, but to date, it has made few demands on the health care industry to demonstrate improvement. In a public opinion poll conducted by Louis Harris & Associates for the National Patient Safety Foundation, the health care environment was perceived as “moderately safe” (rated 4.9 on a scale of one through seven where one is not safe at all and seven is very safe).109 Respondents viewed the health care environment as much safer than nuclear power or food handling, but somewhat less safe than airline travel or the work environment.
Americans have a very limited understanding of health care safety is- sues. When asked, What comes to mind when you think about patient safety issues in the health care environment? 28 percent of respondents did not mention anything, 20 percent mentioned exposure to infection, 13 percent cited the general level of care patients receive, and 11 percent cited qualifi- cations of health professionals.110 When asked about the main cause of medi- cal mistakes, respondents most frequently cited carelessness or negligence (29 percent) of health care professionals, who are overworked, worried, or stressed (27 percent).
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERRORS IN HEALTH CARE 43
Most people learn about medical mistakes through anecdotes. More than four out of five respondents have heard about a situation in which a medical mistake was made.111 When asked how they heard about the most recent medical mistake, 42 percent cited a friend or relative; 39 percent, television, newspaper, or radio; and 12 percent, personal experience.
Most people view medical mistakes as an “individual provider issue” rather than a failure in the process of delivering care in a complex delivery system. When asked about possible solutions to prevent medical mistakes, actions rated very effective by respondents were “keeping health care pro- fessionals with bad track records from providing care” (75 percent) and “better training of health care professionals” (69 percent).112
There are numerous factors that might contribute to the “disconnect” between public perceptions and actual health care error rates. The various accreditation and licensure programs for health care organizations and pro- viders have been promoted as “Good Housekeeping Seals of Approval,” yet they fail to provide adequate assurance of a safe environment. Reducing medical errors and improving patient safety are not an explicit focus of these processes. Even licensed and accredited organizations may have imple- mented only rudimentary systems and processes to ensure patient safety.
For the most part, media coverage has been limited to occasional re- porting of anecdotal cases. The impact of anecdotal information on safety may also be less effective in health care than in the nuclear waste or airline industries, where an individual event often impacts dozens or hundreds of people at a time.
Patient safety is also hindered through the liability system and the threat of malpractice, which discourages the disclosure of errors. The discoverability of data under legal proceedings encourages silence about er- rors committed or observed. Most errors and safety issues go undetected and unreported, both externally and within health care organizations.
REFERENCES
1. Brennan, Troyen A.; Leape, Lucian L.; Laird, Nan M., et al. Incidence of adverse events and negligence in hospitalized patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I. N Engl J Med. 324:370–376, 1991. See also: Leape, Lucian L.; Brennan, Troyen A.; Laird, Nan M., et al. The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II. N Engl J Med. 324(6):377–384, 1991. Thomas, Eric J.; Studdert, David M.; Burstin, Helen R., et al. Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado. Med Care forthcoming Spring 2000.
2. Thomas, Eric J.; Studdert, David M.; Newhouse, Joseph P., et al. Costs of Medi-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
44 TO ERR IS HUMAN
cal Injuries in Utah and Colorado. Inquiry. 36:255–264, 1999. See also: Leape, et al., 1991. Brennan, et al., 1991.
3. American Hospital Association. Hospital Statistics. Chicago. 1999. 4. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (National Center for Health Statis-
tics). Deaths: Final Data for 1997. National Vital Statistics Reports. 47(19):27, 1999. 5. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (National Center for Health Statis-
tics). Births and Deaths: Preliminary Data for 1998. National Vital Statistics Reports. 47(25):6, 1999.
6. Thomas, et al., 1999. 7. Thomas, et al., 1999. 8. Thomas, et al., 1999. 9. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The New OSHA: Reinventing
Worker Safety and Health [Web Page]. Dec. 16, 1998. Available at: www.osha.gov/ oshinfo/reinvent.html.
10. Bureau of Labor Statistics. National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, 1998. U.S. Department of Labor: Washington, D.C. August 1999.
11. Phillips, David P.; Christenfeld, Nicholas; Glynn, Laura M. Increase in US Medi- cation-Error Deaths between 1983 and 1993. Lancet. 351:643–644, 1998.
12. Bates, David W.; Spell, Nathan; Cullen, David J., et al. The Costs of Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients. JAMA. 277:307–311, 1997.
13. National Wholesale Druggists’ Association. Industry Profile and Healthcare Factbook. Reston, VA: 1998.
14. Hallas, Jesper; Haghfelt, Torben; Gram, Lars F., et al. Drug Related Admissions to a Cardiology Department: Frequency and Avoidability. J Intern Med. 228:379–384, 1990.
15. Willcox, Sharon M.; Himmelstein, David U.; Woolhandler, Steffie. Inappropriate Drug Prescribing for the Community Dwelling Elderly. JAMA. 272:292, 1994.
16. Knox, Richard. Prescription Errors Tied to Lack of Advice: Pharmacists Skirting Law, Massachusetts Study Finds. Boston Globe. February 10, 1999:(Metro);B1.
17. Einarson, Thomas R. Drug-Related Hospital Admissions. Ann Pharmacother. 27:832–840, 1993.
18. Reason, James T. Human Error. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press; 1990.
19. Brennan, et al., 1991. 20. Leape, et al., 1991. See also Brennan, et al., 1991. 21. Leape, et al., 1991. 22. Manasse, Henri R. Jr. Medication Use in an Imperfect World: Drug
Misadventuring as an Issue of Public Policy, part 1. Am J Hosp Pharm. 46:929–944, 1989. 23. Johnson, Jeffrey A., and Bootman, J. Lyle. Drug-Related Morbidity and Mortal-
ity: A Cost-of-Illness Model. Arch Intern Med. 155(18):1949–1956, 1995. 24. Victoroff, Michael S. The Right Intentions: Errors and Accountability. J Fam Pract.
45:38–39, 1997. 25. Andrews, Lori B.; Stocking, Carol; Krizek, Thomas, et al. An Alternative Strategy
for Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care. Lancet. 349:309–313, 1997. 26. Vincent, Charles; Taylor-Adams, Sally and Stanhope, Nicole. Framework for
Analysing Risk and Safety in Clinical Medicine. BMJ. 316(11):1154–1157, 1998. 27. Cook, Richard and Woods, David. Operating at the Sharp End: the Complexity
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERRORS IN HEALTH CARE 45
of Human Error. Bogner, Marilyn Sue, Ed. Human Errors in Medicine. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; 1994; pp. 255–310.
28. Nadzam, Deborah M. Development of Medication-Use Indicators by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations. AJHP. 48:1925–1930, 1991.
29. Brennan, et al., 1991. 30. Brennan, et al., 1991. 31. Leape, et al., 1991. 32. Brennan, et al., 1991. 33. Thomas, et al., 2000. 34. Thomas, et al., 1999. 35. Thomas, et al., 2000. 36. American Hospital Association. Hospital Statistics. Chicago. 1999. See also:
Thomas, Eric J.; Studdert, David M.; Burstin, Helen R., et al. Incidence and Types of Adverse Events and Negligent Care in Utah and Colorado. Med Care forthcoming March 2000. See also: Thomas, Eric J.; Studdert, David M.; Newhouse, Joseph P., et al. Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah and Colorado. Inquiry. 36:255–264, 1999.
37. American Hospital Association. Hospital Statistics. Chicago. 1999. See also: Brennan, Troyen A.; Leape, Lucian L.; Laird, Nan M., et al. Incidence of adverse events and negligence in hospitalized patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I. N Engl J Med. 324:370–376, 1991. See also: Leape, Lucian L.; Brennan, Troyen A.; Laird, Nan M., et al. The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II. N Engl J Med. 324(6):377–384, 1991.
38. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (National Center for Health Statis- tics). Deaths: Final Data for 1997. National Vital Statistics Reports 47(19):27, 1999. See also: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (National Center for Health Statistics). Births and Deaths: Preliminary Data for 1998. National Vital Statistics Reports. 47(25):6, 1999.
39. Andrews, et al., 1997. 40. Steel, Knight; Gertman, Paul M.; Crescenzi, Caroline, et al. Iatrogenic Illness on a
General Medical Service at a University Hospital. N Engl J Med. 304:638–642, 1981. 41. Andrews, et al., 1997. 42. Dubois, Robert W. and Brook, Robert H. Preventable Deaths: Who, How Often,
and Why? Ann Intern Med. 109:582–589, 1988. 43. Bedell, Susanne E.; Deitz, David C.; Leeman, David, et al. Incidence and Charac-
teristics of Preventable Iatrogenic Cardiac Arrests. JAMA. 265(21):2815–2820, 1995. 44. McGuire, Hunter H.; Horsley, J. Shelton; Salter, David R., et al. Measuring and
Managing Quality of Surgery: Statistical vs Incidental Approaches. Arch Surg. 127:733– 737, 1992.
45. Cooper, Jeffrey B.; Newbower, Ronald S.; Long, Charlene D., et al. Preventable Anesthesia Mishaps: A Study of Human Factors. Anesthesiology. 49:399–406, 1978.
46. Gaba, David M. Human Error in Anesthetic Mishaps. Int Anesthesiol Clin. 27(3):137–147, 1989.
47. Duncan, Peter G., and Cohen, Marsha M. Postoperative Complications: Factors of Significance to Anaesthetic Practice. Can J Anaesth. 34:2–8, 1987.
48. Cohen, Marsha M.; Duncan, Peter G.; Pope, William D. B., et al. A Survey of 112,000 Anaesthetics at One Teaching Hospital (1975–1983). Can Anaesth Soc J. 33:22– 31, 1986.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
46 TO ERR IS HUMAN
49. Sentinel Events: Approaches to Error Reduction and Prevention. Jt Comm J Qual Improv. 24(4):175–186, 1998.
50. Chassin, Mark R. Is Health Care Ready for Six Sigma Quality? Milbank Q. 764:565–591, 1998.
51. Bhasale, Alice L.; Miller, Graeme C.; Reid, Sharon E., et al. Analysing Potential Harm in Australian General Practice: an Incident-Monitoring Study. MJA. 169:73–76, 1998.
52. National Wholesale Druggists’ Association. Industry Profile and Healthcare Factbook, op cit.
53. Manasse, 1989. 54. Phillips, et al., 1998. 55. Bates, David W.; Boyle, Deborah L.; Vander Vilet, Martha, et al. Relationship
between Medication Errors and Adverse Drug Events. J Gen Intern Med. 10:199–205, 1995.
56. Lesar, Timothy S.; Briceland, Laurie, and Stein, Daniel S. Factors Related to Er- rors in Medication Prescribing. JAMA. 277(4):312–317, 1997.
57. Bates, David W.; Cullen, David J.; Laird, Nan M., et al. Incidence of Adverse Drug Events and Potential Adverse Drug Events: Implications for Prevention. JAMA. 274:29–34, 1995.
58. Bates, David W.; Leape, Lucian L., and Petrycki, Stanley. Incidence and Prevent- ability of Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Adults. J Gen Intern Med. 8:289–294, 1993.
59. Lesar, Briceland, and Stein, 1997. 60. Koren, Gideon and Haslam, Robert H. Pediatric Medication Errors: Predicting
and Preventing Tenfold Disasters. J Clin Pharmacol. 34:1043–1045, 1994. 61. Perlstein, Paul H.; Callison, Cornelia; White, Mary, et al. Errors in Drug Compu-
tations During Newborn Intensive Care. Am J Dis Child. 33:376–379, 1979. 62. Folli, Hugo L.; Poole, Robert L.; Benitz, William E., et al. Medication Error Pre-
vention by Clinical Pharmacists in Two Children’s Hospitals. Pediatrics. 79:718–722, 1987.
63. Raju, Tonse N. K.; Kecskes, Susan; Thornton, John P., et al. Medication Errors in Neonatal and Paediatric Intensive-Care Units. Lancet. 374–376, 1989.
64. Cullen, David J.; Sweitzer, Bobbie Jean; Bates, David W., et al. Preventable Ad- verse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients: A Comparative Study of Intensive Care and General Care Units. Crit Care Med. 25(8):1289–1297, 1997.
65. Manasse, 1989. 66. Davies, D.M., ed. Textbook on Adverse Drug Reactions, 3rd. ed. Oxford: Oxford
University Press; 1985. 67. Griffin, J. P., and Weber, J. C. P. Voluntary Systems of Adverse Reaction Report-
ing—Part I. Adverse Drug React Acute Poisoning Rev. 4:213–230, 1985. 68. Griffin, J. P., and Weber, J. C. P. Voluntary Systems of Adverse Reaction Report-
ing—Part II. Adverse Drug React Acute Poisoning Rev. 5:23–25, 1986. 69. Cullen, David J.; Bates, David W.; Small, Stephen D., et al. The Incident Report-
ing System Does Not Detect Adverse Drug Events. Jt Comm J Qual Improv. 21(10):541– 548, 1995.
70. Classen, David C.; Pestonik, Stanley, L.; Evans, Scott; Burke, John P., et al. Com-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERRORS IN HEALTH CARE 47
puterized Surveillance of Adverse Drug Events in Hospital Patients. JAMA. 266(20):2847–2851.
71. Beard, Keith. Adverse Reactions as a Cause of Hospital Admissions in the Aged. Drug Aging. 2:356–361, 1992.
72. Roughead, Elizabeth E.; Gilbert, Andrew L.; Primrose, J. G., et al. Drug-Related Hospital Admissions: A Review of Australian Studies Published 1998–1996. Med J. Aust. 168:405–408, 1998.
73. Burnum, John F. Preventability of Adverse Drug Reactions. Ann Intern Med. 85:80, 1976.
74. Schneitman-McIntire, Orinda.; Farnen, Tracy A.; Gordon, Nancy, et al. Medica- tion Misadventures Resulting in Emergency Department Visits at an HMO Medical Cen- ter. Am J Health Syst Pharm. 3:1416–1422, 1996.
75. Sullivan, Sean D.; Kreling, David H.; Hazlet, Thomas K., et al. Noncompliance with Medication Regimens and Subsequent Hospitalizations: A Literature Analysis and Cost of Hospitalization Estimate. J Res Pharm Econom. 2(2):19–33, 1990.
76. Einarson, 1993. 77. Thomas, et al., 2000. 78. Dubois, Robert W. and Brook, Robert H. Preventable Deaths: Who, How Often,
and Why? Ann Int Med. 109:582–589, 1988. 79. Bedell, Susanna E.; Deitz, David C.; Leeman, David; Delbanco, Thomas, L. Inci-
dence and Characteristics of Preventable Iatrogenic Cardiac Arrests. JAMA. 265:2815– 2820, 1991.
80. Lesar, Briceland, and Stein, 1997. 81. Willcox, Sharon M.; Himmelstein, David U.; Woolhandler, Steffie, et al. Inappro-
priate Drug Prescribing for the Community Dwelling Elderly, op cit. 82. Hallas, et al., 1997. 83. Wilson, Dirk G.; McArtney, R. G.; Newcombe, Robert G., et al. Medication Er-
rors in Paediatric Practice: Insights from a Continuous Quality Improvement Approach. Eur J Pediatr. 157:769–774, 1998.
84. Burnum, 1976. 85. Beers, Mark H.; Storrie, Michele; and Lee, Genell. Potential Adverse Drug Inter-
actions in the Emergency Room. Ann Intern Med. 112:61–64, 1990. 86. Knox, 1999. 87. Bates, et al., 1995. 88. Davis, Neil M. and Cohen, Michael R. Medication Errors: Causes and Preven-
tion. Philadelphia: George F. Stickley Co., 1981. 89. Folli, et al., 1987. 90. Greenberg, Jay; Leutz, Walter; Greenlick, Merwyn, et al. The Social HMO Dem-
onstration: Early Experience. Health Affairs. 7:66, 1988. 91. Strandberg, Lee R. Drugs as a Reason for Nursing Home Admissions. Am Health
Care Assoc J. 10:20–23, 1984. 92. Leape, Lucian L.; Bates, David W., and Cullen, David J. Systems Analysis of Ad-
verse Drug Events. JAMA. 274:35–43, 1995. 93. Bates, et al., 1995. 94. Folli, et al., 1987. 95. Blum, Keith V.; Abel, S.R.; Urbanski, Chris J., et al. Medication Error Prevention
by Pharmacists. Am J Hosp Pharm. 45:1902–1903, 1988
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
48 TO ERR IS HUMAN
96. Thomas, et al., 1999. 97. Alliance for Aging Research. When Medicine Hurts Instead of Helps. Washing-
ton, DC: The Alliance for Aging Research; 1998. 98. Johnson, et al., 1995. 99. Hallas, et al., 1997.
100. Willcox, et al., 1994. 101. Knox, 1999. 102. Einarson, 1993. 103. Bates, David W., et al. The Costs of Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Pa-
tients, op cit, 1995. 104. Classen, David C.; Pestotnik, Stanley L.; Evans, R. Scott, et al. Adverse Drug
Events in Hospitalized Patients: Excess Length of Stay, Extra Costs, and Attributable Mortality. JAMA. 277:301–306, 1997.
105. Schneider, Philip J.; Gift, Maja G.; Lee, Yu-Ping, et al. Cost of Medication-Re- lated Problems at a University Hospital. Am J Health Syst Pharm. 52:2415–2418, 1995.
106. Bloom, Bernard S. Cost of Treating Arthritis and NSAID-Related Gastrointesti- nal Side-Effects. Aliment Pharmacol Ther. 1(Suppl 2):131–138, 1998.
107. Bootman, J. Lyle; Harrison, LTC Donald L., and Cox, Emily. The Health Care Cost of Drug-Related Morbidity and Mortality in Nursing Facilities. Arch Intern Med. 157(18):2089–2096, 1997.
108. Federal Aviation Administration, Office of System Safety. Aviation Safety Report- ing System (ASRS) Database [Web Page]. 1999. Available at: http://nasdac.faa.gov/safety data.
109. National Patient Safety Foundation. Diverse Groups Come Together to Improve Health Care Safety Through the National Patient Safety Foundation [Web Page]. 1997 Aug 29. Available at: http://www.ama-assn.org/med-sci/npsf/pr897.htm. Note: press re- lease.
110. National Patient Safety Foundation, 1997. 111. National Patient Safety Foundation, 1997. 112. National Patient Safety Foundation, 1997.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
49
3 Why Do
Errors Happen?
The common initial reaction when an error occurs is to find and blame someone. However, even apparently single events or errors are due most often to the convergence of multiple contributing factors. Blam-
ing an individual does not change these factors and the same error is likely to recur. Preventing errors and improving safety for patients require a systems approach in order to modify the conditions that contribute to errors. People working in health care are among the most educated and dedicated workforce in any industry. The problem is not bad people; the problem is that the system needs to be made safer.
This chapter covers two key areas. First, definitions of several key terms are offered. This is important because there is no agreed-upon terminology for talking about this issue.1 Second, the emphasis in this chapter (and in this report generally) is about how to make systems safer; its primary focus is not on “getting rid of bad apples,” or individuals with patterns of poor per- formance. The underlying assumption is that lasting and broad-based safety improvements in an industry can be brought about through a systems ap- proach.
Finally, it should be noted that although the examples may draw more from inpatient or institutional settings, errors occur in all settings. The con- cepts presented in this chapter are just as applicable to ambulatory care,
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
50 TO ERR IS HUMAN
home care, community pharmacies, or any other setting in which health care is delivered.
This chapter uses a case study to illustrate a series of definitions and concepts in patient safety. After presentation of the case study, the chapter will define what comprises a system, how accidents occur, how human error contributes to accidents and how these elements fit into a broader concept of safety. The case study will be referenced to illustrate several of the con- cepts. The next section will examine whether certain types of systems are more prone to accidents than others. Finally, after a short discussion of the study of human factors, the chapter summarizes what health care can learn from other industries about safety.
An Illustrative Case in Patient Safety
Infusion devices are mechanical devices that administer intravenous solu- tions containing drugs to patients. A patient was undergoing a cardiac pro- cedure. This patient had a tendency toward being hypertensive and this was known to the staff.
As part of the routine set-up for surgery, a nurse assembled three different infusion devices. The nurse was a new member of the team in the operating room; she had just started working at the hospital a few weeks before. The other members of the team had been working together for at least six months. The nurse was being very careful when setting up the devices because one of them was a slightly different model than she had used before.
Each infusion device administered a different medication that would be used during surgery. For each medication, the infusion device had to be programmed according to how much medication would flow into the patient (calculated as “cc’s/hour”). The medications had different concentrations and each required calculation of the correct dose for that specific patient. The correct cc’s/hour were programmed into the infusion devices.
The anesthesiologist, who monitors and uses the infusion devices during surgery, usually arrived for surgery while the nurse was completing her set-up of the infusion devices and was able to check them over. This particular morn- ing, the anesthesiologist was running behind from a previous surgery. When he arrived in the operating room, the rest of the team was ready to start. The anesthesiologist quickly glanced at the set-up and accepted the report as given to him by the nurse.
One of the infusion devices was started at the beginning of surgery. About
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
WHY DO ERRORS HAPPEN? 51
halfway through the surgery, the patient’s blood pressure began to rise. The anesthesiologist tried to counteract this by starting one of the other infusion devices that had been set up earlier. He checked the drip chamber in the intravenous (IV) tubing and did not see any drips. He checked the IV tubing and found a closed clamp, which he opened. At this point, the second device signaled an occlusion, or blockage, in the tubing by sounding an alarm and flashing an error message. The anesthesiologist found a closed clamp in this tubing as well, opened it, pressed the re-start button and the device resumed pumping without further difficulty. He returned to the first device that he had started and found that there had been a free flow of fluid and medication to the patient, resulting in an overdose. The team responded appropriately and the patient recovered without further incident.
The case was reviewed two weeks later at the hospital’s “morbidity and mortality” committee meeting, where the hospital staff reviews cases that en- countered a problem to identify what happened and how to avoid a recur- rence. The IV tubing had been removed from the device and discarded. The bioengineering service had checked the pump and found it to be functioning accurately. It was not possible to determine whether the tubing had been inserted incorrectly into the device, whether the infusion rate had been set incorrectly or changed while the device was in use, or whether the device had malfunctioned unexpectedly. The anesthesiologist was convinced that the tub- ing had been inserted incorrectly, so that when the clamp was open the fluid was able to flow freely rather than being controlled by the infusion device. The nurse felt the anesthesiologist had failed to check the infusion system adequately before turning on the devices. Neither knew whether it was pos- sible for an infusion device to have a safety mechansim built into it that would prevent free flows from happening.
WHY DO ACCIDENTS HAPPEN?
Major accidents, such as Three Mile Island or the Challenger accident, grab people’s attention and make the front page of newspapers. Because they usually affect only one individual at a time, accidents in health care delivery are less visible and dramatic than those in other industries. Except for celebrated cases, such as Betsy Lehman (the Boston Globe reporter who died from an overdose during chemotherapy) or Willie King (who had the wrong leg amputated),2 they are rarely noticed. However, accidents are a form of information about a system.3 They represent places in which the system failed and the breakdown resulted in harm.
The ideas in this section rely heavily upon the work of Charles Perrow
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
52 TO ERR IS HUMAN
and James Reason, among others. Charles Perrow’s analysis of the accident at Three Mile Island identified how systems can cause or prevent accidents.4
James Reason extended the thinking by analyzing multiple accidents to ex- amine the role of systems and the human contribution to accidents.5 “A system is a set of interdependent elements interacting to achieve a common aim. The elements may be both human and non-human (equipment, technolo- gies, etc.).”
Systems can be very large and far-reaching, or they can be more local- ized. In health care, a system can be an integrated delivery system, a cen- trally owned multihospital system, or a virtual system comprised of many different partners over a wide geographic area. However, an operating room or an obstetrical unit is also a type of system. Furthermore, any element in a system probably belongs to multiple systems. For example, one operating room is part of a surgical department, which is part of a hospital, which is part of a larger health care delivery system. The variable size, scope, and membership of systems make them difficult to analyze and understand.
In the case study, one of the systems used during surgery is the automated, medication adminstration system, which includes the equipment, the people, their interactions with each other and with the equipment, the procedures in place, and the physical design of the surgical suite in which the equipment and people function.
When large systems fail, it is due to multiple faults that occur together in an unanticipated interaction,6 creating a chain of events in which the faults grow and evolve.7 Their accumulation results in an accident. “An accident is an event that involves damage to a defined system that disrupts the ongoing or future output of that system. ”8
The Challenger failed because of a combination of brittle O-ring seals, unexpected cold weather, reliance on the seals in the design of the boosters, and change in the roles of the contractor and NASA. Individually, no one factor caused the event, but when they came together, disaster struck. Perrow uses a DEPOSE (Design, Equipment Procedures, Operators, Supplies and materials, and Environment) framework to identify the potential sources of failures. In evaluating the environment, some researchers explicitly include organizational design and characteristics.9
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
WHY DO ERRORS HAPPEN? 53
In the case study, the accident was a breakdown in the delivery of IV medica- tions during surgery.
The complex coincidences that cause systems to fail could rarely have been foreseen by the people involved. As a result, they are reviewed only in hindsight; however, knowing the outcome of an event influences how we assess past events.10 Hindsight bias means that things that were not seen or understood at the time of the accident seem obvious in retrospect. Hind- sight bias also misleads a reviewer into simplifying the causes of an accident, highlighting a single element as the cause and overlooking multiple contrib- uting factors. Given that the information about an accident is spread over many participants, none of whom may have complete information,11 hind- sight bias makes it easy to arrive at a simple solution or to blame an indi- vidual, but difficult to determine what really went wrong.
Although many features of systems and accidents in other industries are also found in health care, there are important differences. In most other industries, when an accident occurs the worker and the company are di- rectly affected. There is a saying that the pilot is always the first at the scene of an airline accident. In health care, the damage happens to a third party; the patient is harmed; the health professional or the organization, only rarely. Furthermore, harm occurs to only one patient at a time; not whole groups of patients, making the accident less visible. *
In any industry, one of the greatest contributors to accidents is human error. Perrow has estimated that, on average, 60–80 percent of accidents involve human error. There is reason to believe that this is equally true in health. An analysis of anesthesia found that human error was involved in 82 percent of preventable incidents; the remainder involved mainly equipment failure.12 Even when equipment failure occurs, it can be exacerbated by human error.13 However, saying that an accident is due to human error is not the same as assigning blame. Humans commit errors for a variety of
*Public health has made an effort to eliminate the term, “accident,” replacing it with unin- tentional injuries, consistent with the nomenclature of the International Classification of Dis- eases. However, this report is not focused specifically on injury since an accident may or may not result in injury. See Institute of Medicine, Reducing the Burden of Injury, eds. Richard J. Bonnie, Carolyn Fulco and Catharyn Liverman. Washington, D.C., National Academy Press, 1999).
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
54 TO ERR IS HUMAN
expected and unexpected reasons, which are discussed in more detail in the next two sections.
Understanding Errors
The work of Reason provides a good understanding of errors. He de- fines an error as the failure of a planned sequence of mental or physical activities to achieve its intended outcome when these failures cannot be at- tributed to chance.14 It is important to note the inclusion of “intention.” According to Reason, error is not meaningful without the consideration of intention. That is, it has no meaning when applied to unintentional behav- iors because errors depend on two kinds of failure, either actions do not go as intended or the intended action is not the correct one. In the first case, the desired outcome may or may not be achieved; in the second case, the desired outcome cannot be achieved.
Reason differentiates between slips or lapses and mistakes. A slip or lapse occurs when the action conducted is not what was intended. It is an error of execution. The difference between a slip and a lapse is that a slip is observable and a lapse is not. For example, turning the wrong knob on a piece of equipment would be a slip; not being able to recall something from memory is a lapse.
In a mistake, the action proceeds as planned but fails to achieve its in- tended outcome because the planned action was wrong. The situation might have been assessed incorrectly, and/or there could have been a lack of knowl- edge of the situation. In a mistake, the original intention is inadequate; a failure of planning is involved.
In medicine, slips, lapses, and mistakes are all serious and can poten- tially harm patients. For example, in medicine, a slip might be involved if the physician chooses an appropriate medication, writes 10 mg when the inten- tion was to write 1 mg. The original intention is correct (the correct medica- tion was chosen given the patient’s condition), but the action did not pro- ceed as planned. On the other hand, a mistake in medicine might involve selecting the wrong drug because the diagnosis is wrong. In this case, the situation was misassessed and the action planned is wrong. If the terms “slip” and “mistake” are used, it is important not to equate slip with “minor.” Patients can die from slips as well as mistakes.
For this report, error is defined as the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended (e.g., error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (e.g., error of planning). From the patient’s perspective, not
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
WHY DO ERRORS HAPPEN? 55
only should a medical intervention proceed properly and safely, it should be the correct intervention for the particular condition. This report addresses primarily the first concern, errors of execution, since they have their own epidemiology, causes, and remedies that are different from errors in plan- ning. Subsequent reports from the Quality of Health Care in America project will consider the full range of quality-related issues, sometimes classified as overuse, underuse and misuse.15
Latent and Active Errors
In considering how humans contribute to error, it is important to distin- guish between active and latent errors.16 Active errors occur at the level of the frontline operator, and their effects are felt almost immediately. This is some- times called the sharp end.17 Latent errors tend to be removed from the direct control of the operator and include things such as poor design, incorrect instal- lation, faulty maintenance, bad management decisions, and poorly structured organizations. These are called the blunt end. The active error is that the pilot crashed the plane. The latent error is that a previously undiscovered design malfunction caused the plane to roll unexpectedly in a way the pilot could not control and the plane crashed.
In the case study, the active error was the free flow of the medication from the infusion device.
Latent errors pose the greatest threat to safety in a complex system be- cause they are often unrecognized and have the capacity to result in multiple types of active errors. Analysis of the Challenger accident traced contribut- ing events back nine years. In the Three Mile Island accident, latent errors were traced back two years.18 Latent errors can be difficult for the people working in the system to notice since the errors may be hidden in the design of routine processes in computer programs or in the structure or manage- ment of the organization. People also become accustomed to design defects and learn to work around them, so they are often not recognized.
In her book about the Challenger explosion, Vaughan describes the “normalization of deviance” in which small changes in behavior became the norm and expanded the boundaries so that additional deviations became acceptable.19 When deviant events become acceptable, the potential for er-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
56 TO ERR IS HUMAN
rors is created because signals are overlooked or misinterpreted and accu- mulate without being noticed.
Current responses to errors tend to focus on the active errors by punish- ing individuals (e.g., firing or suing them), retraining or other responses aimed at preventing recurrence of the active error. Although a punitive re- sponse may be appropriate in some cases (e.g., deliberate malfeasance), it is not an effective way to prevent recurrence. Because large system failures represent latent failures coming together in unexpected ways, they appear to be unique in retrospect. Since the same mix of factors is unlikely to occur again, efforts to prevent specific active errors are not likely to make the system any safer.20
In our case study, a number of latent failures were present:
• Multiple infusion devices were used in parallel during this cardiac sur- gery. Three devices were set up, each requiring many steps. each step in the assembly presents a possibility for failure that could disrupt the entire system.
• Each of the three different medications had to be programmed into the infusion device with the correct dose for that patient.
• Possible scheduling problems in the operating suites may have contrib- uted to the anesthesiologist having insufficient time to check the devices be- fore surgery.
• A new nurse on the team may have interrupted the “normal” flow between the team members, especially communication between the anesthe- siologist and the nurse setting up the devices. There was no standardized list of checks between the nurse and anesthesiologist before starting the proce- dure.
• Training of new team members may be insufficient since the nurse found herself assembling a device that was a slightly different model. As a new employee, she may have been hesitant to ask for help or may not have known who to ask.
Focusing on active errors lets the latent failures remain in the system, and their accumulation actually makes the system more prone to future fail- ure.21 Discovering and fixing latent failures, and decreasing their duration, are likely to have a greater effect on building safer systems than efforts to minimize active errors at the point at which they occur.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
WHY DO ERRORS HAPPEN? 57
In the case study, a typical response would have been to retrain the nurse on how to assemble the equipment properly. However, this would have had no effect on weaknesses in equipment design, team management and communi- cations, scheduling problems, or orienting new staff. Thus, free flow errors would likely recur.
Understanding Safety
Most of this chapter thus far has drawn on Perrow’s normal accident theory, which believes that accident are inevitable in certain systems. Al- though they may be rare, accidents are “normal” in complex, high technol- ogy industries. In contrast to studying the causes of accident and errors, other researchers have focused on the characteristics that make certain in- dustries, such as military aircraft carriers or chemical processing, highly reli- able.22 High reliability theory believes that accidents can be prevented through good organizational design and management.23 Characteristics of highly reliable industries include an organizational commitment to safety, high levels of redundancy in personnel and safety measures, and a strong organizational culture for continuous learning and willingness to change.24
Correct performance and error can be viewed as “two sides of the same coin.”25 Although accidents may occur, systems can be designed to be safer so that accidents are very rare.
The National Patient Safety Foundation has defined patient safety as the avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries stemming from the processes of health care.26 Safety does not reside in a person, device or department, but emerges from the interactions of compo- nents of a system. Others have specifically examined pharmaceutical safety and defined it to include maximizing therapeutic benefit, reducing risk, and eliminating harm.27 That is, benefit relates to risk. Other experts have also defined safety as a relative concept. Brewer and Colditz suggest that the acceptability of an adverse event depends on the seriousness of the underly- ing illness and the availability of alternative treatments.28 The committee’s focus, however, was not on the patient’s response to a treatment, but rather on the ability of a system to deliver care safely. From this perspective, the committee believes that there is a level of safety that can and should be ensured. Safety is relative only in that it continues to evolve over time and, when risks do become known, they become part of the safety requirements.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
58 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Safety is more than just the absence of errors. Safety has multiple di- mensions, including the following:
• an outlook that recognizes that health care is complex and risky and that solutions are found in the broader systems context;
• a set of processes that identify, evaluate, and minimize hazards and are continuously improving, and
• an outcome that is manifested by fewer medical errors and minimized risk or hazard.29
For this report, safety is defined as freedom from accidental injury. This simple definition recognizes that from the patient’s perspective, the primary safety goal is to prevent accidental injuries. If an environment is safe, the risk of accidents is lower. Making environments safer means looking at processes of care to reduce defects in the process or departures from the way things should have been done. Ensuring patient safety, therefore, involves the es- tablishment of operational systems and processes that increase the reliability of patient care.
ARE SOME TYPES OF SYSTEMS MORE PRONE TO ACCIDENTS?
Accidents are more likely to happen in certain types of systems. When they do occur, they represent failures in the way systems are designed. The primary objective of systems design ought to be to make it difficult for acci- dents and errors to occur and to minimize damage if they do occur.30
Perrow characterizes systems according to two important dimensions: complexity and tight or loose coupling.31 Systems that are more complex and tightly coupled are more prone to accidents and have to be made more reliable.32 In Reason’s words, complex and tightly coupled systems can “spring nasty surprises.”33
In complex systems, one component of the system can interact with multiple other components, sometimes in unexpected or invisible ways. Al- though all systems have many parts that interact, the problem arises when one part serves multiple functions because if this part fails, all of the depen- dent functions fail as well. Complex systems are characterized by specializa- tion and interdependency. Complex systems also tend to have multiple feed- back loops, and to receive information indirectly, and because of
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
WHY DO ERRORS HAPPEN? 59
specialization, there is little chance of substituting or reassigning personnel or other resources.
In contrast to complex systems, linear systems contain interactions that are expected in the usual and familiar production sequence. One compo- nent of the system interacts with the component immediately preceding it in the production process and the component following it. Linear systems tend to have segregated subsystems, few feedback loops, and easy substitutions (less specialization).
An example of complexity is the concern with year 2000 (Y2K) com- puter problems. A failure in one part of the system can unexpectedly inter- rupt other parts, and all of the interrelated processes that can be affected are not yet visible. Complexity is also the reason that changes in long-standing production processes must be made cautiously.34 When tasks are distrib- uted across a team, for example, many interactions that are critical to the process may not be noticed until they are changed or removed.
Coupling is a mechanical term meaning that there is no slack or buffer between two items. Large systems that are tightly coupled have more time- dependent processes and sequences that are more fixed (e.g., y depends on x having been done). There is often only one way to reach a goal. Compared to tightly coupled systems, loosely coupled systems can tolerate processing delays, can reorder the sequence of production, and can employ alternative methods or resources.
All systems have linear interactions; however, some systems additionally experience greater complexity. Complex interactions contribute to accidents because they can confuse operators. Tight coupling contributes to accidents because things unravel too quickly and prevent errors from being intercepted or prevent speedy recovery from an event.35 Because of complexity and cou- pling, small failures can grow into large accidents.
In the case study, the medication adminstration system was both complex and tightly coupled. The complexity arises from three devices functioning simulta- neously, in close proximity, and two having problems at the same time. The tight coupling arises from the steps involved in making the system work prop- erly, from the steps required to assemble three devices, to the calculation of correct medication dosage levels, to the operation of multiple devices during surgery, to the responses when alarms start going off.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
60 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Although there are not firm assignments, Perrow considered nuclear power plants, nuclear weapons handling, and aircraft to be complex, tightly coupled systems.36 Multiple processes are happening simultaneously, and failure in one area can interrupt another. Dams and rail transportation are considered tightly coupled because the steps in production are closely linked, but linear because there are few unexpected interactions. Universi- ties are considered complex, but loosely coupled, since the impact of a deci- sion in one area can likely be limited to that area.
Perrow did not classify health care as a system, but others have sug- gested that health care is complex and tightly coupled.37 The activities in the typical emergency room, surgical suite, or intensive care unit exemplify complex and tightly coupled systems. Therefore, the delivery of health care services may be classified as an industry prone to accidents.38
Complex, tightly coupled systems have to be made more reliable.39 One of the advantages of having systems is that it is possible to build in more defenses against failure. Systems that are more complex, tightly coupled, and are more prone to accidents can reduce the likelihood of accidents by simplifying and standardizing processes, building in redundancy, develop- ing backup systems, and so forth.
Another aspect of making systems more reliable has to do with organi- zational design and team performance. Since these are part of activities within organizations, they are discussed in Chapter 8.
Conditions That Create Errors
Factors can intervene between the design of a system and the produc- tion process that creates conditions in which errors are more likely to hap- pen. James Reason refers to these factors as psychological precursors or pre- conditions.40 Although good managerial decisions are required for safe and efficient production, they are not sufficient. There is also a need to have the right equipment, well-maintained and reliable; a skilled and knowledgeable workforce; reasonable work schedules, well-designed jobs; clear guidance on desired and undesired performance, et cetera. Factors such as these are the precursors or preconditions for safe production processes.
Any given precondition can contribute to a large number of unsafe acts. For example, training deficiencies can show up as high workload, undue time pressure, inappropriate perception of hazards, or motivational difficul- ties.41 Preconditions are latent failures embedded in the system. Designing
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
WHY DO ERRORS HAPPEN? 61
safe systems means taking into account people’s psychological limits and either seeking ways to eliminate the preconditions or intervening to mini- mize their consequences. Job design, equipment selection and use, opera- tional procedures, work schedules, and so forth, are all factors in the pro- duction process that can be designed for safety.
One specific type of precondition that receives a lot of attention is tech- nology. The occurrence of human error creates the perception that humans are unreliable and inefficient. One response to this has been to find the unreliable person who committed the error and focus on preventing him or her from doing it again. Another response has been to increase the use of technology to automate processes so as to remove opportunities for humans to make errors. The growth of technology over the past several decades has contributed to system complexity so this particular issue is highlighted here.
Technology changes the tasks that people do by shifting the workload and eliminating human decision making.42 Where a worker previously may have overseen an entire production process, he or she may intervene now only in the last few steps if the previous steps are automated. For example, flying an aircraft has become more automated, which has helped reduce workload during nonpeak periods. During peak times, such as take-off and landing, there may be more processes to monitor and information to interpret.
Furthermore, the operator must still do things that cannot be automated. This usually involves having to monitor automated systems for rare, abnor- mal events43 because machines cannot deal with infrequent events in a con- stantly changing environment.44 Fortunately, automated systems rarely fail. Unfortunately, this means that operators do not practice basic skills, so work- ers lose skills in exactly the activities they need in order to take over when something goes wrong.
Automation makes systems more “opaque” to people who manage, maintain, and operate them.45 Processes that are automated are less visible because machines intervene between the person and the task. For example, automation means that people have less hands-on contact with processes and are elevated to more supervisory and planning tasks. Direct information is filtered through a machine (e.g., a computer), and operators run the risk of having too much information to interpret or of not getting the right information.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
62 TO ERR IS HUMAN
In the case study, the infusion device administered the medication and the professional monitored the process, intervening when problems arose. The medication administration process was “opaque” in that the device provided no feedback to the user when the medication flowed freely and minimal feed- back when the medication flow was blocked.
One of the advantages of technology is that it can enhance human per- formance to the extent that the human plus technology is more powerful than either is alone.46 Good machines can question the actions of operators, offer advice, and examine a range of alternative possibilities that humans cannot possibly remember. In medicine, automated order entry systems or decision support systems have this aim. However, technology can also create new demands on operators. For example, a new piece of equipment may provide more precise measurements, but also demand better precision from the operator for the equipment to work properly.47 Devices that have not been standardized, or that work and look differently, increase the likelihood of operator errors. Equipment may not be designed using human factors principles to account for the human–machine interface.48
In the case study, safer systems could have been designed by taking into consideration characteristics of how people use machines and interact with each other in teams. For example:
• Redesign the devices to default to a safe mode • Reduce the difficulties of using multiple devices simultaneously • Minimize the variety of equipment models purchased • Implement clear procedures for checking equipment, supplies, etc.,
prior to begixnning surgery • Orient and train new staff with the team(s) with which they will work • Provide a supportive environment for identifying and communicating
about errors for organizational learning and change to prevent errors.
Technology also has to be recognized as a “member” of the work team. When technology shifts workloads, it also shifts the interactions between team members. Where processes may have been monitored by several people, technology can permit the task to be accomplished by fewer people. This affects the distributed nature of the job in which tasks are shared among
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
WHY DO ERRORS HAPPEN? 63
several people and may influence the ability to discover and recover from errors.49
In this context, technology does not involve just computers and infor- mation technology. It includes “techniques, drugs, equipment and proce- dures used by health care professionals in delivering medical care to indi- viduals and the systems within which such care is delivered.”50 Additionally, the use of the term technology is not restricted to the technology employed by health care professionals. It can also include people at home of different ages, visual abilities, languages, and so forth, who must use different kinds of medical equipment and devices. As more care shifts to ambulatory and home settings, the use of medical technology by non-health professionals can be expected to take on increasing importance.
RESEARCH ON HUMAN FACTORS
Research in the area of human factors is just beginning to be applied to health care. It borrows from the disciplines of industrial engineering and psychology. Human factors is defined as the study of the interrelationships between humans, the tools they use, and the environment in which they live and work.51
In the context of this report, a human factors approach is used to under- stand where and why systems or processes break down. This approach ex- amines the process of error, looking at the causes, circumstances, condi- tions, associated procedures and devices and other factors connected with the event. Studying human performance can result in the creation of safer systems and the reduction of conditions that lead to errors. However, not all errors are related to human factors. Although equipment and materials should take into account the design of the way people use them, human factors may not resolve instances of equipment breakdown or material failure.
Much of the work in human factors is on improving the human–system interface by designing better systems and processes.52 This might include, for example, simplifying and standardizing procedures, building in redun- dancy to provide backup and opportunities for recovery, improving com- munications and coordination within teams, or redesigning equipment to improve the human–machine interface.
Two approaches have typically been used in human factors analysis. The first is critical incident analysis. Critical incident analysis examines a signifi- cant or pivotal occurrence to understand where the system broke down,
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
64 TO ERR IS HUMAN
why the incident occurred, and the circumstances surrounding the inci- dent.53 Analyzing critical incidents, whether or not the event actually leads to a bad outcome, provides an understanding of the conditions that pro- duced an actual error or the risk of error and contributing factors.
In the case study, researchers with expertise in human factors could have helped the team investigate the problem. They could examine how the device performed under different circumstances (e.g., what the alarms and displays did when the medication flow changed), varying the setup and operation of the infusion device to observe how it performed under normal and abnormal conditions. They could observe how the staff used the particular infusion de- vice during surgery and how they interacted with the use of multiple infusion devices.
A critical incident analysis in anesthesia found that human error was involved in 82 percent of preventable incidents. The study identified the most frequent categories of error and the riskiest steps in the process of administering anesthesia. Recommended corrective actions included such things as labeling and packaging strategies to highlight differences among anesthesiologists in the way they prepared their workspace, training issues for residents, work–rest cycles, how relief and replacement processes could be improved, and equipment improvements (e.g., standardizing equipment in terms of the shape of knobs and the direction in which they turn).
Another analytic approach is referred to as “naturalistic decision mak- ing.”54 This approach examines the way people make decisions in their natu- ral work settings. It considers all of the factors that are typically controlled for in a laboratory-type evaluation, such as time pressure, noise and other distractions, insufficient information, and competing goals. In this method, the researcher goes out with workers in various fields, such as firefighters or nurses, observes them in practice, and then walks them through to recon- struct various incidents. The analysis uncovers the factors weighed and the processes used in making decisions when faced with ambiguous information under time pressure.
In terms of applying human factors research, David Woods of Ohio State University describes a process of reporting, investigation, innovation, and dissemination (David Woods, personal communication, December 17, 1998). Reporting or other means of identifying errors tells people where
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
WHY DO ERRORS HAPPEN? 65
errors are occurring and where improvements can be made. The investiga- tion stage uses human factors and other analyses to determine the contribut- ing factors and circumstances that created the conditions in which errors could occur. The design of safer systems provides opportunities for innova- tion and working with early adopters to test out new approaches. Finally, dissemination of innovation throughout the industry shifts the baseline for performance. The experience of the early adopters redefines what is pos- sible and provides models for implementation.
Aviation has long analyzed the role of human factors in performance. The Ames Research Center (part of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration) has examined areas related to information technology, au- tomation, and the use of simulators for training in basic and crisis skills, for example. Other recent projects include detecting and correcting errors in flight; interruptions, distractions and lapses of attention in the cockpit; and designing information displays to assist pilots in maintaining awareness of their situation during flight.55
SUMMARY
The following key points can be summarized from this chapter.
1. Some systems are more prone to accidents than others because of the way the components are tied together. Health care services is a complex and technological industry prone to accidents.
2. Much can be done to make systems more reliable and safe. When large systems fail, it is due to multiple faults that occur together.
3. One of the greatest contributors to accidents in any industry includ- ing health care, is human error. However, saying that an accident is due to human error is not the same as assigning blame because most human errors are induced by system failures. Humans commit errors for a variety of known and complicated reasons.
4. Latent errors or system failures pose the greatest threat to safety in a complex system because they lead to operator errors. They are failures built into the system and present long before the active error. Latent errors are difficult for the people working in the system to see since they may be hid- den in computers or layers of management and people become accustomed to working around the problem.
5. Current responses to errors tend to focus on the active errors. Al- though this may sometimes be appropriate, in many cases it is not an effec-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
66 TO ERR IS HUMAN
tive way to make systems safer. If latent failures remain unaddressed, their accumulation actually makes the system more prone to future failure. Dis- covering and fixing latent failures and decreasing their duration are likely to have a greater effect on building safer systems than efforts to minimize ac- tive errors at the point at which they occur.
6. The application of human factors in other industries has successfully reduced errors. Health care has to look at medical error not as a special case of medicine, but as a special case of error, and to apply the theory and approaches already used in other fields to reduce errors and improve reliability.56
REFERENCES
1. Senders, John, “Medical Devices, Medical Errors and Medical Accidents,” in Hu- man Error in Medicine, ed., Marilyn Sue Bogner, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Asso- ciates, 1994.
2. Cook, Richard; Woods, David; Miller, Charlotte, A Tale of Two Stories: Contrast- ing Views of Patient Safety, Chicago: National Patient Safety Foundation, 1998.
3. Cook, Richard and Woods, David, “Operating at the Sharp End: The Complexity of Human Error,” in Human Error in Medicine, ed., Marilyn Sue Bogner, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994.
4. Perrow, Charles, Normal Accidents, New York: Basic Books, 1984. 5. Reason, James, Human Error, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 6. Perrow, 1984; Cook and Woods, 1994. 7. Gaba, David M.; Maxwell, Margaret; DeAnda, Abe, Jr.. Anesthetic Mishaps:
Breaking the Chain of Accident Evolution. Anesthesiology. 66(5):670–676, 1987. 8. Perrow, 1984. 9. Van Cott, Harold, “Human Errors: Their Causes and Reductions,” in Human
Error in Medicine, ed., Marilyn Sue Bogner, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994. Also, Roberts, Karlene, “Organizational Change and A Culture of Safety,” in Pro- ceedings of Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing Errors in Health Care, Chicago: Na- tional Patient Safety Foundation at the AMA, 1999.
10. Reason, 1990. See also Cook, Woods and Miller, 1998. 11. Norman, Donald, Things That Make Us Smart, Defending Human Attributes in
the Age of Machines, Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1993. 12. Cooper, Jeffrey B.; Newbower, Ronald; Long, Charlene, et al. Preventable Anes-
thesia Mishaps: A Study of Human Factors. Anesthesiology. 49(6):399–406, 1978. 13. Cooper, Jeffrey B. and Gaba, David M. A Strategy for Preventing Anesthesia
Accidents. International Anesthesia Clinics. 27(3):148–152, 1989 14. Reason, 1990. 15. Chassin, Mark R.; Galvin, Robert W., and the National Roundtable on Health
Care Quality. The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality, JAMA. 280(11):1000– 1005, 1998.
16. Reason, 1990.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
WHY DO ERRORS HAPPEN? 67
17. Cook, Woods and Miller, 1998. 18. Reason, 1990. 19. Vaughan, Diane, The Challenger Launch Decision, Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1996. 20. Reason, 1990. 21. Reason, 1990. 22. Roberts, Karlene, 1999. See also: Gaba, David, “Risk, Regulation, Litigation and
Organizational Issues in Safety in High-Hazard Industries,” position paper for Work- shop on Organizational Analysis in High Hazard Production Systems: An Academy/ Industry Dialogue,” MIT Endicott House, April 15–18, 1997, NSF Grant No. 9510883- SBR.
23. Sagan, Scott D., The Limits of Safety, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.
24. Sagan, Scott D., 1993 and Robert, Karlene, 1999. 25. Reason, James, “Forward,” in Human Error in Medicine, ed., Marilyn Sue Bogner,
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994. 26. “Agenda for Research and Development in Patient Safety,” National Patient
Safety Foundation at the AMA, http://www.ama-assn.org/med-sci/npsf/research/ research.htm. May 24, 1999.
27. Dye, Kevin M.C.; Post, Diana; Vogt, Eleanor, “Developing a Consensus on the Accountability and Responsibility for the Safe Use of Pharmaceuticals,” Preliminary White Paper prepared for the National Patient Safety Foundation, June 1, 1999.
28. Brewer, Timothy; Colditz, Graham A. Postmarketing Surveillance and Adverse Drug Reactions, Current Perspectives and Future Needs. JAMA. 281(9):824–829, 1999.
29. VHA’s Patient Safety Improvement Initiative, presentation to the National Health Policy Forum by Kenneth W. Kizer, Under Secretary for Health, Department of Veterans Affairs, May 14, 1999, Washington, D.C.
30. Leape, Lucian L. Error in Medicine. JAMA. 272(23):1851–1857, 1994. 31. Perrow, 1984. 32. Cook and Woods, 1994. 33. Reason. 1990. 34. Norman, 1993. 35. Perrow, 1984. 36. Perrow, 1984. 37. Cook, Woods and Miller, 1998. 38. On the other hand, in some places, the health system may be complex, but loosely
coupled. For example, during an emergency, a patient may receive services from a loosely networked set of subsystems—from the ambulance to the emergency room to the outpa- tient clinic to home care. See Van Cott in Bogner, 1994.
39. Cook and Woods, 1994. 40. Reason, 1990. 41. Reason, 1990. 42. Cook and Woods, 1994. 43. Reason, 1990. 44. Van Cott, 1994. 45. Reason, 1990. 46. Norman, 1993.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
68 TO ERR IS HUMAN
47. Cook and Woods, 1994. 48. Van Cott, 1994. 49. Norman, 1993. 50. Institute of Medicine, Assessing Medical Technologies, Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 1985. 51. Weinger, Matthew B; Pantiskas, Carl; Wiklund, Michael; Carstensen, Peter. In-
corporating Human Factors Into the Design of Medical Devices. JAMA. 280(17):1484, 1998.
52. Reason, 1990. Leape, 1994. 53. Cooper, Newbower, Long, et al., 1978. 54. Klein, Gary, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, 1998. 55. “Current Projects,” Human Factors Research and Technology Division, Ames
Research Center, NASA, http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/frameset.html 56. Senders, 1994.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
69
E rrors in the health care industry are at an unacceptably high level. A national commitment to achieve a threshold improvement in patient safety is needed. This will require strong leadership, specification of
goals and mechanisms for tracking progress, and an adequate knowledge base. This chapter proposes the development of the Center for Patient Safety within the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) to serve as a focal point for these activities. Experience from other industries suggests that unless a Center is created or designated to keep attention focused on patient safety and enhance the base of knowledge and tools, meaningful progress is not likely. Although existing efforts to improve patient safety are valuable, they are inadequate. There is no way of knowing if these efforts are attending to the most critical issues or if they are actually reducing errors. There must be greater attention placed on evaluating current approaches for reducing errors and building new systems to improve patient safety.
RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATION 4.1 Congress should create a Center for Patient Safety with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. This Center should
4 Building Leadership
and Knowledge for Patient Safety
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
70 TO ERR IS HUMAN
• set the national goals for patient safety, track progress in meet- ing these goals, and issue an annual report to the President and Con- gress on patient safety; and
• develop knowledge and understanding of errors in health care by developing a research agenda, funding Centers of Excellence, evalu- ating methods for identifying and preventing errors and funding dis- semination and communication activities to improve patient safety.
National goals for safety should be established through a process in- volving consumers, providers, health care organizations, purchasers, re- searchers, and others. The goals should also reflect areas that represent opportunities for significant improvement. In carrying out its activities in the areas of research and dissemination, the Center for Patient Safety should collaborate with universities, research centers, and various groups involved in education and dissemination, such as the National Patient Safety Foundation.
The committee believes that initial annual funding of $30 to 35 million for a Center for Patient Safety would be appropriate. This initial funding would permit a center to conduct activities in goal setting, tracking, research and dissemination. Funding should grow over time to at least $100 million, or approximately 1% of the $8.8 billion in health care costs attributable to preventable adverse events (see Chapter 2). This level is modest compared to the resources devoted to other major health issues. The committee be- lieves a 50% reduction in errors over five years is imperative.
WHY A CENTER FOR PATIENT SAFETY IS NEEDED
As discussed in Chapter 2, errors in health care are a leading cause of death and injury. Yet, the American public is seemingly unaware of the prob- lem, and the issue is not getting the attention it should from leaders in the health care industry and the professions. Additionally, the knowledge that has been used in other industries to improve safety is rarely applied in health care. Although more needs to be learned, there are actions that can be taken today to improve safety in health care. Medical products can be designed to be safer in use, jobs can be designed to minimize the likelihood of errors, and much can be done to reduce the complexity of care processes.
Although multiple agencies are concerned with selected issues that in- fluence patient safety, there is no focal point for patient safety in health care today. Public- and private-sector oversight organizations, such as state licen-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING LEADERSHIP AND KNOWLEDGE FOR PATIENT SAFETY 71
sure units, accrediting bodies, and federal certification programs devote some attention to patient safety, but patient safety is not their sole focus. The National Patient Safety Foundation conducts educational programs, work- shops, and various convening activities but its programs and resources are limited. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) focuses only on drugs and devices through the regulation of manufacturers. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations’ (JCAHO) mission is to im- prove quality of care through accreditation. This may include issues relevant to patient safety, but patient safety is not its sole focus. Many states operate reporting programs or other oversight programs for patient safety but they take a variety of approaches and focus.
Although anesthesiology applied some of the techniques of system analy- sis and human factors during the 1980s, the concepts are just beginning to diffuse through the health care industry. The advantage of this lag is that we can learn about building safe systems from the experiences of others. The problem is that there has to be a substantially greater commitment to getting more and better information to advance the science and apply the tech- niques to health care.
The next section describes how attention to safety issues has been ap- plied in two areas: aviation and occupational health. Both of these examples illustrate how broad-based safety improvements can be accomplished.
HOW OTHER INDUSTRIES HAVE BECOME SAFER
The risk of dying in a domestic jet flight between 1967 and 1976 was 1 in 2 million. By the 1990s, the risk had declined to 1 in 8 million.1 Between 1970 (when the Occupational Health and Safety Administration was cre- ated) and 1996, the workplace death rate was cut in half.2 Health care has much to learn from other industries about improving safety.
Aviation
Health care is decades behind other industries in terms of creating safer systems. Much of modern safety thinking grew out of military aviation.3
Until World War II, accidents were viewed primarily as individually caused and safety meant motivating people to “be safe.” During the war, generals lost aircraft and pilots in stateside operations and came to realize that plan- ning for safety was as important to the success of a mission as combat plan- ning. System safety continued after the war when several military aviation
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
72 TO ERR IS HUMAN
safety centers were formed in the early 1950s. Human factors started to enter the picture at around the same time. In 1954, the Flight Safety Foun- dation was formed to design aircraft cockpits using better human engineer- ing. In the mid-1960s, the University of Southern California began its first advanced safety management programs and included a heavy emphasis on human factors. By the 1970s, principles of system safety began to spread to other industries, including rapid rail and the oil industry.
Building on the successful experience and knowledge of military avia- tion, civilian aviation takes a comprehensive approach to safety, with pro- grams aimed at setting and enforcing standards, accident investigation, inci- dent reporting, and research for continuous improvement.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), housed in the Department of Transportation, has regulatory oversight of the industry and an explicit charge for ensuring safety. Accident investigations are conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), an independent federal agency, which has no regulatory or enforcement power but can issue recom- mendations to the FAA for regulatory action. Confidential incident report- ing (defined as an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of operations) is conducted through the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), which is discussed in Chapter 5.
Research into safety is an integral component of the aviation industry strategy. The national research agenda is set through several mechanisms. First, a formal process determined how to allocate approximately $60 mil- lion committed to the Aviation Safety Program for FY 2000 (Cynthia Null, Ames Research Center, personal communication, May 24, 1999). Workshops and meetings were held with multiple agencies and organizations to define the work in the specific program area; participants included NASA, FAA, Department of Defense, all levels of airline employees (pilots, maintenance workers, flight attendants, air traffic controllers), airlines, manufacturers, and others. Existing resources are being redirected consistent with the pri- orities. Other research that supports safety is funded through “base re- search” in which in-house researchers propose and carry out research projects for development. Research into human factors is part of the base research program.
The Aviation Safety Reporting System may also conduct “topical re- search,” which could include structured callback studies on a certain topic or basic research. This area of work is funded within ASRS’s main program, but funding is not often available (Linda Connell, Director of ASRS,
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING LEADERSHIP AND KNOWLEDGE FOR PATIENT SAFETY 73
personal communication, May 20, 1999). Human factors researchers at Ames may also tap into the ASRS database to generate hypotheses which can then be tested through other research.
Finally, the FAA itself maintains several databases that aggregate a vari- ety of statistics (e.g., airline operations such as departures, hours and miles flown, history of safety recommendations to different parts of the industry and responses to them). FAA and NASA coordinate their research efforts to minimize duplication. For example, both agencies may jointly contribute to a single effort, or they may fund different, but complementary, aspects of an issue.
Charles Billings, M.D., designer and founder of the Aviation Safety Re- porting System, has stated his belief that aviation would not be as safe as it is today without the FAA.4 By setting standards, maintaining multiple data- bases to monitor trends, and supporting research to constantly improve sys- tems, the FAA (in collaboration with other agencies such as NASA and NTSB) has made flying safer.
Occupational Health
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 created both the Oc- cupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), housed in the De- partment of Labor, and its research arm, the National Institute for Occupa- tional Safety and Health (NIOSH), housed in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the Department of Health and Human Services. OSHA’s purpose is to encourage employers and employees to re- duce workplace hazards and to implement new, or improve existing, safety and health programs. It provides for research in occupational health and safety, maintains reporting and record-keeping systems, establishes training programs, and develops and enforces mandatory standards for job safety and health.5 OSHA is administered through a combined federal–state ap- proach. States that develop their own programs and have an approved plan receive up to 50 percent of the plan’s approved operating costs.
OSHA requires employers with 11 or more employees to routinely main- tain records of occupational injury and illness as they occur. These records are not submitted to OSHA, but must be made available during inspection and shared with OSHA if the company is selected for an annual tracking survey. OSHA and the Bureau of Labor and Statistics both conduct sample surveys to collect the routine data maintained by companies. These surveys
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
74 TO ERR IS HUMAN
are used to construct population rates or to examine particular issues of concern.
A related incentive for employers to create a safe environment is the worker’s compensation program. Under state law, employers must pay the premium for insuring workers against the medical costs of injuries sustained while on the job. Responsibility for the costs associated with workers com- pensation further encourages employers to improve the safety systems in their companies.
Responsibility for research and for identifying new safety improvements is housed in a separate agency. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has the responsibility for conducting research and making recommendations for the prevention of work-related illnesses and injuries.6 It conducts and funds research on safety and health problems, provides technical assistance to OSHA, and recommends standards for OSHA adoption. Although OSHA provides input into the NIOSH research agenda, it is set mainly through input from other stakeholders, including company requests. Information gathered by NIOSH from these companies for research purposes is not shared with OSHA for regulatory purposes.
A major agenda for research was established in 1996 through the Na- tional Occupational Research Agenda (NORA). Input was obtained from 500 public and private organizations to provide a framework for safety re- search during the next decade and to guide intramural and extramural fund- ing decisions. Twenty-one research priorities were selected and are now be- ing implemented, mostly by shifting existing resources so that over time, more monies are directed to the priority areas. For example, in 1998, NIOSH and three institutes at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) committed $24 million over three years to certain priority areas.7 For 1999, NIOSH’s operating budget is $200 million, of which $156 million is for intramural and extramural research projects (Janice Klink, Associate Director for Policy, Planning, and Legislation, NIOSH, personal communication, May 19, 1999).
Lessons Learned
There are several key points to be taken from the experiences in aviation and occupational health. In each of these areas, there was a growing aware- ness of safety concerns and the need to improve performance. This led to comprehensive strategies, which included the creation of a national focal point for leadership, development of a knowledge base, and dissemination of information throughout the industry.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING LEADERSHIP AND KNOWLEDGE FOR PATIENT SAFETY 75
In both areas, there is a designated government agency with regulatory responsibility for safety, which is separate from the agency responsible for research. Although the entity responsible for research may generate reports that are useful to the regulatory authority in setting standards, data and in- formation collected from organizations are not available for use in enforcing standards on a particular organization.
Both areas recognized the need to rapidly expand the knowledge base on safety and to establish ongoing processes for the diffusion of this knowl- edge. The creation of a carefully constructed research agenda was devel- oped with broad-based input from the industry and is implemented through both public- and private-sector programs to draw upon the best expertise in the academic and scientific communities.
Finally, substantial resources were devoted to these initiatives. Achiev- ing steady improvement requires that adequate resources be sustained over a sufficient period of time. The safety improvements did not occur because of a one-time effort. The results were achieved through an ongoing commit- ment of resources and leadership.
Although some of these components can be found in health care to- day—regulatory oversight, research and dissemination—there is no cohe- sive effort to improve safety in health care, and the resources devoted to enhancing and disseminating the knowledge base are wholly inadequate. Given the experience of other industries, health care is not likely to make significant safety improvements without a more comprehensive, coordinated approach.
OPTIONS FOR ESTABLISHING A CENTER FOR PATIENT SAFETY
Objectives
The objectives of a Center for Patient Safety are to provide leadership for safety improvements throughout the industry, to establish goals and track progress in achieving results, and to expand the knowledge base for improv- ing safety in health care.
A central objective of the Center for Patient Safety is to provide visibil- ity to safety concerns. The leadership of the Center must possess the requi- site expertise and stature to communicate with a broad audience to raise awareness of safety concerns and convene stakeholders to identify strategies for improving safety.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
76 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Expanding the knowledge base requires the formulation and implemen- tation of a research agenda. Such an agenda should include short-term, fo- cused studies as well as long-term, population studies. Expanding the knowl- edge base also requires effective methods for diffusing the new knowledge to a variety of audiences, including those in the industry and the general public.
The Center should develop a limited number of high-priority goals based on careful analysis of areas in which improvements will result in the greatest gains in terms of reduced morbidity and mortality and reduced costs. Specific goals identify priority areas for the industry so the industry can respond supportively. Specific goals also provide a basis for tracking change. Safety efforts must be evaluated to determine whether actual improvements are being achieved and to ensure that resources are allocated to high-prior- ity areas that will have the most impact on patients.
Implementation Options
The committee believes that an organization designated as the focal point for patient safety should have the following characteristics. First, it should be involved in a broader agenda for improving quality. Patient safety is part of general quality improvement, even if certain safety problems may utilize distinct knowledge and expertise. It would not be desirable to have one agency focused on quality issues and a separate agency focused on pa- tient safety.
Second, the agency should possess the core competencies required to undertake the broad array of tasks identified. Although some may be carried out through partnership arrangements, the agency should have adequate expertise and funding to engage in strategic planning, convening, tracking, research and evaluation, and information dissemination activities.
Finally, the designated agency should be able to work collaboratively with other health- and non-health-related safety agencies. For example, it should consult with NTSB and ASRS to understand how an entire industry sets safety as a priority and becomes safer over time. Experts from OSHA may also offer guidance on their experience in encouraging companies to build safety systems within their own organizations. Collaboration with the National Patient Safety Foundation might be desirable in carrying out vari- ous agenda-setting and education activities.
The committee discussed three alternative organizational arrangements for a Center for Patient Safety. One option considered was the creation of a
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING LEADERSHIP AND KNOWLEDGE FOR PATIENT SAFETY 77
new, free-standing agency whose sole purpose is to focus on patient safety issues. A second alternative was to place such a center within NIH, as a defined division or institute. A third option was to place the proposed Cen- ter for Patient Safety within the AHRQ.
The committee decided that placing the Center within AHRQ was the best option for several reasons. Although a dedicated agency might be most able to maintain a focus on patient safety, this option should be pursued as a last resort, given the resources and time required to establish a new agency. NIH has the expertise and industry respect to drive a basic research agenda and has built partnerships with other agencies, but its agenda is already very broad and does not routinely involve analyses of systems of care or quality measurement or improvement.
AHRQ is already involved with a broad range of quality-of-care issues, including quality measurement, quality improvement, and identification of best practices. The Consumer Assessment of Health Plans (CAHPS) is a standardized measurement and reporting tool in which consumers report their experience with specific aspects of their health plans to assess the fea- tures that form the basis of overall satisfaction. The goal is to provide con- sumers and purchasers with objective information for choosing among health plans. Another initiative is the support of evidence-based practice centers. These are five-year contracts awarded to 12 institutions to review scientific literature on assigned clinical care topics and to produce evidence reports and technology assessments, conduct research on methodologies and the effectiveness of their implementation, and participate in technical assistance activities.
AHRQ also is engaged in activities specifically related to patient safety, and these activities constitute a good base of experience upon which to ex- pand. AHRQ has sponsored research in the area of patient safety, specifi- cally in the areas of medication errors, diagnostic inaccuracies, inaccurate information recall by patients, and system failures in adverse drug events.8
A recent Memorandum of Understanding was executed with the National Institutes on Aging to cofund a grant to examine adverse drug events among a geriatric population in an ambulatory setting. Technologies tested in AHRQ-sponsored research that would improve patient safety include com- puterized monitoring of adverse drug events, computer-generated remind- ers for follow-up testing, standardized protocols, and computer-assisted de- cision making.
A new AHRQ endeavor initiated in 1998 is the establishment of Centers for Education and Research in Therapeutics (CERTs). CERTs will conduct
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
78 TO ERR IS HUMAN
research to increase understanding of ways to improve the appropriate and effective use of pharmaceuticals and other interventions to avoid adverse drug events. CERTs will also increase knowledge of the possible risks of new drugs and combinations of drugs, as they are prescribed in everyday prac- tice. CERTs are being implemented in collaboration with FDA.9
AHRQ also has experience in collaborating with other relevant organi- zations. It has provided support for meetings on patient safety and is a mem- ber of the National Patient Safety Partnership, a public–private group dedi- cated to reducing preventable adverse medical events. AHRQ participates in the Quality Interagency Coordinating Committee (QuIC), which is devel- oping an initiative on reducing medical errors. AHRQ also sponsors the User Liaison Program (ULP) as a vehicle to link states, local health policy makers and researchers to disseminate research to states, conduct work- shops, and provide technical assistance.10
Finally, the agency’s reauthorization legislation for FY 2000 is expected to include explicit language defining a focus on reducing medical errors and improving patient safety.
FUNCTIONS OF THE CENTER FOR PATIENT SAFETY
Creating an information infrastructure and building a better evidence base for patient safety are critical to taking a more strategic approach to reducing medical errors and improving patient safety. The goal is to improve decision making by policy makers, regulators, health care organizations, and others, so that decisions are based on evidence rather than anecdote. Good information can and should be used to guide the development and continu- ous improvement of standards and to support communication and outreach efforts.
The Center for Patient Safety should build an information infrastruc- ture and resource for patient safety. It should have a broad agenda com- prised of multiple programs. In its first five full years of existence, it should deliver the following products:
1. Establish a limited set of high-priority goals for improving patient safety based on expert opinion and review of the evidence on errors.
2. Assess progress toward national goals by compiling aggregate infor- mation from state adverse event reporting systems, voluntary reporting sys- tems, health care organizations, and other sources; and periodically con- ducting a representative survey of health care organizations.
3. Develop a research agenda, conduct and fund intramural and extra-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING LEADERSHIP AND KNOWLEDGE FOR PATIENT SAFETY 79
mural research to assess the magnitude of errors, and the role of human factors, and test and evaluate approaches for preventing errors.
4. Define feasible prototype systems (best practices) and tools for safety in key processes, including both clinical and managerial support systems for:
• medication systems (from prescribing to administering), • operating rooms and surgery processes, • emergency departments, • management of diagnostic tests, screening, and information, • intensive care units, • neonatal intensive care units, • care of frail elderly (e.g., falls, decubitus, etc.), • the use of simulation and simulators in health care, and • team training and crew resource management applications in
health care.
5. Develop instructional methods, demonstration projects, and techni- cal support to ensure widespread implementation of the prototype systems and tools identified above.
6. Conduct periodic evaluations of error reporting systems for two pur- poses: assessing the impact of mandatory reporting systems in various states and identifying best practices in program design and implementation; and assessing the usefulness of voluntary reporting systems in identifying impor- tant safety improvements and determining whether current levels of partici- pation by health care organizations are adequate or additional incentives are needed.
7. Provide support to health care organizations for internal quality im- provement demonstration projects to prevent and reduce errors.
8. Develop tools and methods for educating consumers about patient safety.
9. Issue an annual report on progress made to improve patient safety, and recommend changes for continuously improving patient safety to ap- propriate parties, such as FDA, states, accrediting agencies, professional as- sociations, group purchasers, and health care organizations.
In setting the research agenda, the Center for Patient Safety should establish a formal process to gather input on priorities, methodologies and approaches for research. Advice should be obtained from a wide range of people and organizations who will use and can benefit from the availability of information. It should look at the experiences of other industries and the
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
80 TO ERR IS HUMAN
processes they employed, such as aviation and occupational health, as al- ready described. Initial areas for attention might include the following:
• enhance understanding of the impact of various management prac- tices (e.g., maximum work hours and overtime) on the likelihood of errors;
• apply safety methods and technologies from other industries to health care, especially human factors and engineering principles;
• increase understanding of errors in different settings (e.g., ambula- tory or home care) and for vulnerable populations (e.g., children, elderly);
• establish baseline rates of specific types of errors and monitor trends; • monitor error rates that accompany the introduction of new tech-
nologies; and • increase understanding of the use of information technology to im-
prove patient safety (e.g., automated drug order or entry systems, reminder systems).
In conducting research and developing prototype systems, the Center should consider providing support for the establishment of several Centers of Excellence in academic or applied research settings and which can gather expertise from diverse settings as needed. Centers of Excellence might focus on particular types of errors (e.g., medication-related errors), errors in par- ticular settings or clinical specialties (e.g., intensive care), or types of inter- ventions or strategies that might be applied across many areas and settings (e.g., interdisciplinary teams).
In establishing Centers of Excellence, the Center for Patient Safety will want to learn from and coordinate with the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), which has pursued a similar strategy on a much smaller scale. As part of its comprehensive program in improving patient safety throughout their delivery system, the Veterans Health Administration has committed $6 million to establish four Patient Safety Centers of Inquiry, focused on re- searching new knowledge in patient safety, with special emphasis on trans- ferring safety technologies from other high-risk industries to health care, and on disseminating existing knowledge.11
It is also imperative that the Center for Patient Safety focus adequate attention on the communication of information on and knowledge of pa- tient safety. The support and production of more and better information on medical errors and patient safety will be of little use without explicit mecha- nisms identified for dissemination of the information and recommended ac- tions. Although dissemination of information is sometimes an afterthought, there are attributes that can improve outreach. Important factors that have
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING LEADERSHIP AND KNOWLEDGE FOR PATIENT SAFETY 81
been identified are translating raw data into summary measures and infor- mation that can be used; presenting information in formats that are tailored to different audiences; and providing multiple ways to access the informa- tion, such as print, television, radio, videotaped presentations, online ser- vices, and face-to-face presentations. The information also needs to be timely and to come from a credible source.12
At the present time, there are few objective sources for the latest infor- mation on patient safety. Improvements may be made in practice within health care organizations, but there is no way to disseminate such informa- tion to a broader audience. An important responsibility of the Center for Patient Safety should be to work to increase the frequency of communica- tion about patient safety to multiple audiences. In carrying out its responsi- bilities to communicate information and knowledge on safety, the Center should work closely with existing organizations that have related objectives, including public and private organizations; policy, educational and accredit- ing entities; and quality oversight organizations.
The National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF) is an existing organiza- tion that may be able to serve this resource and dissemination role. The National Patient Safety Foundation was formed by the American Medical Association in 1997 as an independent, nonprofit research and education organization, whose mission is to improve patient safety in the delivery of care. The AMA’s goal was to establish linkages with other health care organi- zations dedicated to improving patient safety.
NPSF is well positioned to “translate” concerns and findings about pa- tient safety between many different parties because of the broad base of representation on its board that can communicate with various constituen- cies and its proven ability to convene a mix of stakeholders. NPSF’s core strategies include activities to raise awareness and foster communication and dialogue to enhance patient safety and to develop information, collaborative relationships, and educational approaches that advance patient safety.13 It supports an annual grant program for innovative research to prevent patient injuries; has conducted a benchmark survey to capture consumer attitudes, experience and expectations about health care safety; conducts regional fo- rums to bring together community and health leaders in local communities and convenes national conferences that brings together leaders in patient safety from around the world.14 NPSF has also begun developing a clearing- house function to collect patient safety information that can be accessed by both health professionals and consumers.
The National Patient Safety Partnership is a voluntary public–private partnership, comprised of the American Hospital Association, American
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
82 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Medical Association (AMA), American Nurses Association, Association of American Medical Colleges, JCAHO, National Patient Safety Foundation of the AMA, and Department of Veterans Affairs as charter members. Addi- tional members include AHRQ, FDA, HCFA, NIOSH, and the Depart- ment of Defense, Health Affairs. Its primary concerns have focused on year 2000 (Y2K) issues and adverse drug events.15
The deliverables previously identified for the Center for Patient Safety include the development of tools and methods for educating consumers about patient safety. Although consumers are an important audience, there are many other constituencies that must be reached, including health pro- fessionals and managers, health care organizations, state and national policy makers, regulators, pharmaceutical companies and medical device manufac- turers, professional groups and associations, medical and health care train- ing centers, and various forms of media. Although AHRQ and the Center for Patient Safety will disseminate their work on patient safety through cur- rent mechanisms (e.g., reports, newsletters, Internet), the NPSF and the National Patient Safety Partnership are existing organizations that can sup- port a broad approach for dissemination activities.
RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR A CENTER FOR PATIENT SAFETY
In determining what would be an adequate level of funding for a Center for Patient Safety, the committee considered three things: (1) research in- vestments made to address health care issues of a similar magnitude; (2) investments in safety research in other industries; and (3) operating budgets for research initiatives with similar programs.
The United States invests significant resources in research to reduce the morbidity and mortality associated with various diseases and health con- cerns. As noted in Chapter 2, medical errors among hospitalized patients ranks as a leading cause of death, exceeding the number of deaths in 1997 due to motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, or AIDS. NIH funding in 1998 for AIDS was estimated at $1.6 billion and for breast cancer, $433 million.16 Another funding comparison in health care is to examine research centers that have a more focused agenda. The National Institute for Deaf- ness and Other Communication Disorders has funding of approximately $230 million in FY99.17 The National Institute of Nursing Research received funding of approximately $63 million in FY99.18 These are examples of “smaller” institutes at NIH.
The success of other industries in improving safety is undoubtedly at-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING LEADERSHIP AND KNOWLEDGE FOR PATIENT SAFETY 83
tributable in part to the commitment made to enhancing the knowledge base. As noted previously, the NIOSH operating budget for 1999 is $200 million, of which $156 million is for intramural and extramural research projects. The Aviation Safety Program at NASA Ames Research Center allo- cated approximately $60 million for FY 2000.
Another funding comparison is the resources devoted by AHRQ to dif- ferent programs. In FY 1999, $2 million was appropriated for the CERTs, newly established research centers; twice that amount is expected for FY 2000 to continue funding.19 The Evidence-Based Practice Centers at AHRQ are funded at more than $3 million per year (Nancy Foster, AHRQ, personal communication, July 22, 1999). AHRQ also conducts a Medical Expendi- ture Panel Survey for which almost $35 million was appropriated in FY 1999.20
Finally, the Veterans Health Administration created several centers within its own system devoted to research and improved understanding about medical errors. It committed $6 million over 4 years.
Initial annual funding of $30 to 35 million for the Center for Patient Safety would be reasonable. This estimate is based on the functions that the center is to perform. Goal setting would involve convening a broad set of audiences for input into goals and a research agenda. Regional meetings and other mechanisms may be employed to gather input. It is estimated that approximately $2 million would be needed for goal setting activities. Track- ing progress on meeting goals would require periodic data collection from health care organizations. The Harvard Medical Practice Study reviewed over 31,000 hospital records and cost approximately $3 million. The devel- opment and implementation of a national survey is estimated at $5 million. To implement a research agenda, it is estimated that five Centers of Excel- lence would be formed, each with a specific focus of attention. Each Center of Excellence should be initially funded at $5 million, growing over time to $15 million each. Dissemination of information to the industry, general pub- lic, policy makers and others is estimated initially at $5 million. The estimate of initial funding seems modest in light of the investments made to address health concerns of similar magnitude.
The committee believes that the growth in the funding level is necessary to communicate to researchers, states, professional groups and health care organizations that this will be a sustained effort. In the absence of a signifi- cant long term commitment to funding, researchers are unlikely to re-orient their focus to patient safety. The patient safety initiatives of other groups, such as states, professional associations and health care organizations are likely to be far more successful if accompanied by a steady flow of new
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
84 TO ERR IS HUMAN
knowledge, tools, and prototype systems. It can take several years to create awareness about safety and build interest. The growth in funding recognizes that initial funding should be at a lower, but sufficient, level to begin work in the area, but should grow over time as the efforts evolve and expand.
REFERENCES
1. “The Aviation Safety System,” Aviation Safety Information From The Federal Aviation Administration, http:www.faa.gov/publicinfo.htm
2. “Common Sense at Work,” OSHA Vital Facts 1997, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor, http://www.osha-slc.gov/OshDoc/ OSHFacts/OSHAFacts.html, last modified May 4, 1999.
3. Miller, C.O., “System Safety,” in Human Factors in Aviation, eds., Earl L. Wiener, David C. Nagel, San Diego, CA: Academic Press, Inc., 1988.
4. Comments to Subcommittee on Creating an External Environment for Quality, IOM Quality of Health Care in America project, January 28, 1999.
5. “All About OSHA,” OSHA 2056, 1995 (Revised), http://www.osha.gov 6. “About NIOSH,” National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Cen-
ters for Disease Control, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/about.html 7. “NIOSH/NORA Fact Sheet, July 1999,” www.cdc.gov/niosh/99-130.html, July
29, 1999. 8. Reducing Errors in Health Care. Research in Action, September, 1998. Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. http://www.AHRQ.gov/research/ errors.htm.
9. Therapeutics Research Centers to be Established Through Federal Cooperative Agreement Funding: Applications Sought. Press Release. February 1, 1999. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. http://www.AHRQ.gov/news/press/ pre1999/certspr.htm.
10. “Research Findings, User Liaison Program,” http://www.AHRQ.gov/research. 11. NPSF News Brief, No. 6, March 22, 1999, The National Patient Safety Founda-
tion at the AMA. http://www.ama-assn.org/med-sci/npsf/news/03_22_99.htm. 12. Quality First: Better Health Care for All Americans, The President’s Advisory Com-
mission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry. Final Report, Washington, D.C., March 1998.
13. Request for Proposals for Research in Patient Safety, The National Patient Safety Foundation at the AMA. http://www.ama-assn.org/med-sci/npsf/focus.htm, January 1999.
14. “Leading the Way,” National Patient Safety Foundation at the AMA, http:// www.ama-assn.org/med-sci/npsf/broc.htm.
15. Kenneth W. Kizer, presentation at National Health Policy Forum, May 14, 1999, Washington, D.C.
16. Institute of Medicine, Scientific Opportunities and Public Needs. Improving Pri- ority Setting and Public Input at the National Institutes of Health. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1998.
17. “Fiscal Year 2000 President’s Budget request for the National Institute on Deaf-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
BUILDING LEADERSHIP AND KNOWLEDGE FOR PATIENT SAFETY 85
ness and Other Communication Disorders,” Statement by Dr. James F. Battey, Jr., Direc- tor, National Institute of Deafness and Other Communication Disorders, www.nih.nidcd/ about/director/openstate00.htm
18. Fiscal Year 2000 President’s Budget request for the National Institute of Nursing Research,” Statement by Dr. Patricia A. Grady, Director, National Institute on Nursing Research, www.nih.gov/ninr/openingstatement99.htm.
19. Margaret Keyes, AHRQ Center for Quality Measurement and Improvement, pre- sentation to Subcommittee on Creating an External Environment for Quality of the IOM Quality of Care in America Study, June 15, 1999.
20. Justification for Budget Estimates for Appropriations Committees, Fiscal Year 2000. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. http://www.AHRQ.gov/ news/cj2000/cjweb00.htm.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
86
5 Error
Reporting Systems
A lthough the previous chapter talked about creating and dissemi- nating new knowledge to prevent errors from ever happening, this chapter looks at what happens after an error occurs and how to
learn from errors and prevent their recurrence. One way to learn from er- rors is to establish a reporting system. Reporting systems have the potential to serve two important functions. They can hold providers accountable for performance or, alternatively, they can provide information that leads to im- proved safety. Conceptually, these purposes are not incompatible, but in reality, they can prove difficult to satisfy simultaneously.
Reporting systems whose primary purpose is to hold providers account- able are “mandatory reporting systems.” Reporting focuses on errors associ- ated with serious injuries or death. Most mandatory reporting systems are operated by state regulatory programs that have the authority to investigate specific cases and issue penalties or fines for wrong-doing. These systems serve three purposes. First, they provide the public with a minimum level of protection by assuring that the most serious errors are reported and investi- gated and appropriate follow-up action is taken. Second, they provide an incentive to health care organizations to improve patient safety in order to avoid the potential penalties and public exposure. Third, they require all health care organizations to make some level of investment in patient safety, thus creating a more level playing field. While safety experts recognize that
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS 87
errors resulting in serious harm are the “tip of the iceberg,” they represent the small subset of errors that signal major system breakdowns with grave consequences for patients.
Reporting systems that focus on safety improvement are “voluntary re- porting systems.” The focus of voluntary systems is usually on errors that resulted in no harm (sometimes referred to as “near misses”) or very mini- mal patient harm. Reports are usually submitted in confidence outside of the public arena and no penalties or fines are issued around a specific case. When voluntary systems focus on the analysis of “near misses,” their aim is to identify and remedy vulnerabilities in systems before the occurrence of harm. Voluntary reporting systems are particularly useful for identifying types of errors that occur too infrequently for an individual health care orga- nization to readily detect based on their own data, and patterns of errors that point to systemic issues affecting all health care organizations.
The committee believes that there is a need for both mandatory and voluntary reporting systems and that they should be operated separately. Mandatory reporting systems should focus on detection of errors that result in serious patient harm or death (i.e., preventable adverse events). Adequate attention and resources must be devoted to analyzing reports and taking appropriate follow-up action to hold health care organizations accountable. The results of analyses of individual reports should be made available to the public.
The continued development of voluntary reporting efforts should also be encouraged. As discussed in Chapter 6, reports submitted to voluntary reporting systems should be afforded legal protections from data discoverability. Health care organizations should be encouraged to partici- pate in voluntary reporting systems as an important component of their pa- tient safety programs.
For either type of reporting program, implementation without adequate resources for analysis and follow-up will not be useful. Receiving reports is only the first step in the process of reducing errors. Sufficient attention must be devoted to analyzing and understanding the causes of errors in order to make improvements.
RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATION 5.1 A nationwide mandatory reporting sys- tem should be established that provides for the collection of standard- ized information by state governments about adverse events that re- sult in death or serious harm. Reporting should initially be required
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
88 TO ERR IS HUMAN
of hospitals and eventually be required of other institutional and am- bulatory care delivery settings. Congress should
• designate the National Forum for Health Care Quality Mea- surement and Reporting as the entity responsible for promulgating and maintaining a core set of reporting standards to be used by states, including a nomenclature and taxonomy for reporting;
• require all health care organizations to report standardized in- formation on a defined list of adverse events;
• provide funds and technical expertise for state governments to establish or adapt their current error reporting systems to collect the standardized information, analyze it and conduct follow-up action as needed with health care organizations. Should a state choose not to implement the mandatory reporting system, the Department of Health and Human Services should be designated as the responsible entity; and designate the Center for Patient Safety to:
(1) convene states to share information and expertise, and to evaluate alternative approaches taken for implementing reporting programs, identify best practices for implementation, and assess the impact of state programs; and (2) receive and analyze aggregate reports from states to identify persistent safety issues that require more intensive analysis and/or a broader-based response (e.g., designing prototype systems or requesting a response by agencies, manufacturers or others).
Mandatory reporting systems should focus on the identification of seri- ous adverse events attributable to error. Adverse events are deaths or serious injuries resulting from a medical intervention.1 Not all, but many, adverse events result from errors. Mandatory reporting systems generally require health care organizations to submit reports on all serious adverse events for two reasons: they are easy to identify and hard to conceal. But it is only after careful analysis that the subset of reports of particular interest, namely those attributable to error, are identified and follow-up action can be taken.
The committee also believes that the focus of mandatory reporting sys- tem should be narrowly defined. There are significant costs associated with reporting systems, both costs to health care organizations and the cost of operating the oversight program. Furthermore, reporting is useful only if it includes analysis and follow-up of reported events. A more narrowly de- fined program has a better chance of being successful.
A standardized reporting format is needed to define what ought to be
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS 89
reported and how it should be reported. There are three purposes to having a standardized format. First, a standardized format permits data to be com- bined and tracked over time. Unless there are consistent definitions and methods for data collection across organizations, the data cannot be aggre- gated. Second, a standardized format lessens the burden on health care or- ganizations that operate in multiple states or are subject to reporting re- quirements of multiple agencies and/or private oversight processes and group purchasers. Third, a standardized format facilitates communication with consumers and purchasers about patient safety.
The recently established National Forum for Health Care Quality Mea- surement and Reporting is well positioned to play a lead role in promulgat- ing standardized reporting formats, including a nomenclature and taxonomy for reporting. The Forum is a public/private partnership charged with de- veloping a comprehensive quality measurement and public reporting strat- egy. The existing reporting systems (i.e., national and state programs, public and private sector programs) also represent a growing body of expertise on how to collect and analyze information about errors, and should be con- sulted during this process.2
RECOMMENDATION 5.2 The development of voluntary report- ing efforts should be encouraged. The Center for Patient Safety should
• describe and disseminate information on existing voluntary re- porting programs to encourage greater participation in them and track the development of new reporting systems as they form;
• convene sponsors and users of external reporting systems to evaluate what works and what does not work well in the programs, and ways to make them more effective;
• periodically assess whether additional efforts are needed to ad- dress gaps in information to improve patient safety and to encourage health care organizations to participate in voluntary reporting pro- grams; and
• fund and evaluate pilot projects for reporting systems, both within individual health care organizations and collaborative efforts among health care organizations.
Voluntary reporting systems are an important part of an overall pro- gram for improving patient safety and should be encouraged. Accrediting bodies and group purchasers should recognize and reward health care orga- nizations that participate in voluntary reporting systems.
The existing voluntary systems vary in scope, type of information col-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
90 TO ERR IS HUMAN
lected, confidentiality provisions, how feedback to reporters is fashioned, and what is done with the information received in the reports. Although one of the voluntary medication error reporting systems has been in operation for 25 years, others have evolved in just the past six years. A concerted analy- sis should assess which features make the reporting system most useful, and how the systems can be made more effective and complementary.
The remainder of this chapter contains a discussion of existing error reporting systems, both within health care and other industries, and a dis- cussion of the committee’s recommendations.
REVIEW OF EXISTING REPORTING SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE
There are a number of reporting systems in health care and other indus- tries. The existing programs vary according to a number of design features. Some programs mandate reporting, whereas others are voluntary. Some pro- grams receive reports from individuals, while others receive reports from organizations. The advantage of receiving reports from organizations is that it signifies that the institution has some commitment to making corrective system changes. The advantage of receiving reports from individuals is the opportunity for input from frontline practitioners. Reporting systems can also vary in their scope. Those that currently exist in health care tend to be more narrow in focus (e.g., medication-related error), but there are examples outside health care of very comprehensive systems.
There appear to be three general approaches taken in the existing re- porting systems. One approach involves mandatory reporting to an external entity. This approach is typically employed by states that require reporting by health care organizations for purposes of accountability. A second ap- proach is voluntary, confidential reporting to an external group for purposes of quality improvement (the first model may also use the information for quality improvement, but that is not its main purpose). There are medica- tion reporting programs that fall into this category. Voluntary reporting sys- tems are also used extensively in other industries such as aviation. The third approach is mandatory internal reporting with audit. For example, the Oc- cupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requires organiza- tions to keep data internally according to a standardized format and to make the data available during on-site inspections. The data maintained internally are not routinely submitted, but may be submitted if the organization is selected in the sample of an annual survey.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS 91
The following sections provide an overview of existing health care re- porting systems in these categories. They also include two examples from areas outside health care. The Aviation Safety Reporting System is discussed because it represents the most sophisticated and long-standing voluntary external reporting system. It differs from the voluntary external reporting systems in health care because of its comprehensive scope. Since there are currently no examples of mandatory internal reporting with audit, the char- acteristics of the OSHA approach are described.
Mandatory External Reporting
State Adverse Event Tracking
In a recent survey of states conducted by the Joint Commission on Ac- creditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), it was found that at least one-third of states have some form of adverse event reporting system.3 It is likely that the actual percentage is higher because not all states responded to the survey and some of the nonrespondents may have reporting require- ments. During the development of this report, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) interviewed 13 states with reporting systems to learn more about the scope and operation of their programs. The remainder of this section relates to information provided to the IOM. Appendix D summarizes selected char- acteristics of the reporting systems in these states, and includes information on what is reported to the state, who is required to submit reports, the num- ber of reports received in the most recent year available, when the program began, who has access to the information collected and how the state uses the information that is obtained. This is not intended as a comprehensive review, but rather, as an overview of how some state reporting systems are designed.
States have generally focused their reporting systems on patient injuries or facility issues (e.g., fire, structural issues). Reports are submitted by health care organizations, mostly hospitals and/or nursing homes, although some states also include ambulatory care centers and other licensed facilities. Al- though the programs may require reporting from a variety of licensed facili- ties, nursing homes often consume a great deal of state regulatory attention. In Connecticut, 14,000 of almost 15,000 reports received in 1996 were from nursing homes.
Several of the programs have been in place for ten years or longer, al- though they have undergone revisions since their inception. For example,
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
92 TO ERR IS HUMAN
New York State’s program has been in place since 1985, but it has been reworked three times, the most recent version having been implemented in 1998 after a three-year pilot test.
Underreporting is believed to plague all programs, especially in their early years of operation. Colorado’s program received 17 reports in its first two years of operation,4 but ten years later, received more than 1000 re- ports. On the other hand, New York’s program receives approximately 20,000 reports annually.
The state programs reported that they protected the confidentiality of certain data, but policies varied. Patient identifiers were never released; practitioner’s identity was rarely available. States varied in whether or not the hospital’s name was released. For example, Florida is barred from releas- ing any information with hospital or patient identification; it releases only a statewide summary.
The submission of a report itself did not trigger any public release of information. Some states posted information on the Internet, but only after the health department took official action against the facility. New York has plans to release hospital-specific aggregate information (e.g., how many re- ports were submitted), but no information on any specific report.
Few states aggregate the data or analyze them to identify general trends. For the most part, analysis and follow-up occurs on a case-by-case basis. For example, in some states, the report alerted the health department to a prob- lem; the department would assess whether or not to conduct a follow-up inspection of the facility. If an inspection was conducted, the department might require corrective action and/or issue a deficiency notice for review during application for relicensure.
Two major impediments to making greater use of the reported data were identified: lack of resources and limitations in data. Many states cited a lack of resources as a reason for conducting only limited analysis of data. Several states had, or were planning to construct a database so that information could be tracked over time but had difficulty getting the resources or exper- tise to do so. Additionally, several states indicated that the information they received in reports from health care organizations was inadequate and vari- able. The need for more standardized reporting formats was noted.
A focus group was convened with representatives from approximately 20 states at the 12th Annual conference of the National Academy of State Health Policy (August 2, 1999). This discussion reinforced the concerns heard in IOM’s telephone interviews. Resource constraints were identified, as well as the need for tools, methods, and protocols to constructively ad- dress the issue. The group also identified the need for mechanisms to im-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS 93
prove the flow of information between the state, consumers, and providers to encourage safety and quality improvements. The need for collaboration across states to identify and promote best practices was also highlighted. Finally, the group emphasized the need to create greater awareness of the problem of patient safety and errors in health care among the general public and among health care professionals as well.
In summary, the state programs appear to provide a public response for investigation of specific events,5 but are less successful in synthesizing infor- mation to analyze where broad system improvements might take place or in communicating alerts and concerns to other institutions. Resource con- straints and, in some cases, poorly specified reporting requirements contrib- ute to the inability to have as great an impact as desired.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Reports submitted to FDA are one part of the surveillance system for monitoring adverse events associated with medical products after their ap- proval (referred to as postmarketing surveillance).6 Reports may be submit- ted directly to FDA or through MedWatch, FDA’s reporting program. For medical devices, manufacturers are required to report deaths, serious inju- ries, and malfunctions to FDA. User facilities (hospitals, nursing homes) are required to report deaths to the manufacturer and FDA and to report seri- ous injuries to the manufacturer. For suspected adverse events associated with drugs, reporting is mandatory for manufacturers and voluntary for phy- sicians, consumers, and others. FDA activities are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
Voluntary External Reporting
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
JCAHO initiated a sentinel event reporting system for hospitals in 1996 (see Chapter 7 for a discussion on JCAHO activities related to accredita- tion). For its program, a sentinel event is defined as an “unexpected occur- rence or variation involving death or serious physical or psychological injury or the risk thereof.” Sentinel events subject to reporting are those that have resulted in an unanticipated death or major permanent loss of function not related to the natural course of the patient’s illness or underlying condition, or an event that meets one of the following criteria (even if the outcome was
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
94 TO ERR IS HUMAN
not death or major permanent loss of function): suicide of a patient in a setting where the patient receives around-the-clock care; infant abduction or discharge to the wrong facility; rape; hemolytic transfusion reaction in- volving administration of blood or blood products having major blood group incompatibilities; or surgery on the wrong patient or wrong body part.7
The Joint Commission requires that an organization experiencing a sen- tinel event conduct a root cause analysis, a process for identifying the basic or causal factors of the event. A hospital may voluntarily report an incident to JCAHO and submit their root cause analysis (including actions for im- provement). If an organization experiences a sentinel event but does not voluntarily report it and JCAHO discovers the event (e.g., from the media, patient report, employee report), the organization is still required to prepare an acceptable root cause analysis and action plan. If the root cause analysis and action plan are not acceptable, the organization may be placed on ac- creditation watch until an acceptable plan is prepared. Root cause analyses and action plans are confidential; they are destroyed after required data ele- ments have been entered into a JCAHO database to be used for tracking and sharing risk reduction strategies.
JCAHO encountered some resistance from hospitals when it introduced the sentinel event reporting program and is still working through the issues today. Since the initiation of the program in 1996, JCAHO has changed the definition of a sentinel event to add more detail, instituted procedural revi- sions on reporting, authorized on-site review of root cause analyses to mini- mize risk of additional liability exposure, and altered the procedures for affecting a facility’s accreditation status (and disclosing this change to the public) while an event is being investigated.8 However, concerns remain regarding the confidentiality of data reported to JCAHO and the extent to which the information on a sentinel event is no longer protected under peer review if it is shared with JCAHO (these issues are discussed in Chapter 6).
There is the potential for cooperation between the JCAHO sentinel event program and state adverse event tracking programs. For example, JCAHO is currently working with New York State so that hospitals that report to the state’s program are considered to be in compliance with JCAHO’s sentinel events program.9 This will reduce the need for hospitals to report to multiple groups with different requirements for each. The state and JCAHO are also seeking to improve communications between the two organizations before and after hospitals are surveyed for accreditation.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS 95
Medication Errors Reporting (MER) Program
The MER program is a voluntary medication error reporting system originated by the Institute for Safe Medication Practice (ISMP) in 1975 and administered today by U.S. Pharmacopeia (USP). The MER program re- ceives reports from frontline practitioners via mail, telephone, or the Internet. Information is also shared with the FDA and the pharmaceutical companies mentioned in the reports. ISMP also publishes error reports re- ceived from USP in 16 publications every month and produces a biweekly publication and periodic special alerts that go to all hospitals in the United States. The MER program has received approximately 3,000 reports since 1993, primarily identifying new and emerging problems based on reports from people on the frontline.
MedMARx from the U.S. Pharmacopoeia
In August 1998, U.S. Pharmacopeia initiated the MedMARx program, an Internet-based, anonymous, voluntary system for hospitals to report medication errors. Hospitals subscribe to the program. Hospital employees may then report a medication error anonymously to MedMARx by complet- ing a standardized report. Hospital management is then able to retrieve com- piled data on its own facility and also obtain nonidentified comparative in- formation on other participating hospitals. All information reported to MedMARx remains anonymous. All data and correspondence are tied to a confidential facility identification number. Information is not shared with FDA at this time. The JCAHO framework for conducting a root cause analy- sis is on the system for the convenience of reporters to download the forms, but the programs are not integrated.
Aviation Safety Reporting System at NASA
The three voluntary reporting systems described above represent fo- cused initiatives that apply to a particular type of organization (e.g., hospi- tal) or particular type of error (e.g., medication error). The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a voluntary, confidential incident reporting sys- tem used to identify hazards and latent system deficiencies in order to elimi- nate or mitigate them.10 ASRS is described as an example of a comprehen- sive voluntary reporting system.
ASRS receives “incident” reports, defined as an occurrence associated
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
96 TO ERR IS HUMAN
with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of operations. Reports into ASRS are submitted by individuals confidentially. After any additional information is obtained through follow-up with report- ers, the information is maintained anonymously in a database (reports sub- mitted anonymously are not accepted). ASRS is designed to capture near misses, which are seen as fruitful areas for designing solutions to prevent future accidents.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigates aviation accidents. An “accident” is defined as an occurrence that results in death or serious injury or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. NTSB was formed in 1967 and ASRS in 1976. The investigation of accidents thus preceded attention to near misses.
ASRS operates independently from the Federal Aviation Administra- tion (FAA). It was originally formed under FAA, but operations were shifted to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) because of the reluctance of pilots to report incidents (as differentiated from accidents) to a regulatory authority. FAA funds the ASRS, but NASA administers and manages the program independently. ASRS has no regulatory or enforce- ment powers over civil aviation.
ASRS issues alerts to the industry on hazards it identifies as needed (e.g., ASRS does not go through a regulatory agency to issue an alert or other communication; Linda Connell, Director of ASRS, personal commu- nication, May 20, 1999). If a situation is very serious, it may issue an alert after only one incident. Often, ASRS has received multiple reports and noted a pattern. The purpose of ASRS alerts and other communications is to notify others of problems. Alerts may be disseminated throughout the industry and may also be communicated to the FAA to notify them about areas that may require action. ASRS does not propose or advocate specific solutions because it believes this would interfere with its role as an “honest broker” for reporters. As a result, although some reported problems may be acted upon, others are not. For example, ASRS has been notifying FAA and the industry about problems that have persisted throughout its 23-year history, such as problems with call signs. To date, no agency has been able to a find permanent solution. However, ASRS continues to issue alerts about the problem to remind people that the problem has not been solved.
ASRS maintains a database on reported incidents, identifies hazards and patterns in the data, conducts analyses on types of incidents, and interviews reporters when indicated. It sends out alert messages, publishes a monthly safety bulletin that is distributed to 85,000 readers and produces a semi-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS 97
annual safety topics publication targeted to the operators and flight crews of complex aircraft. Quick-response studies may be conducted for NTSB and FAA as needed (e.g., if an accident occurred, they may look for similar inci- dents). ASRS receives over 30,000 reports annually and has an operating budget of approximately $2 million.11
A more recent program is the Aviation Safety Action Programs. The de- identification of reports submitted to ASRS means that organizations do not have access to reports that identify problems in their own operations. In 1997, FAA established a demonstration program for the creation of Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP).12 Under ASAP, an employee may submit a report on a serious incident that does not meet the threshold of an accident to the airline and the FAA with pilot and flight identification. Reports are reviewed at a regular meeting of an event review committee that includes representatives from the employee group, FAA and the airline. Corrective actions are identified as needed.
Mandatory Internal Reporting with Audit
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OSHA uses a different approach for reporting than the systems already described. It requires companies to keep internal records of injury and ill- ness, but does not require that the data be routinely submitted. The records must be made available during on-site inspections and may be required if the company is included in an annual survey of a sample of companies.13
OSHA and the Bureau of Labor Statistics both conduct sample surveys and collect the routine data maintained by the companies. These agencies con- duct surveys to construct incidence rates on worksite illness and injury that are tracked over time or to examine particular issues of concern, such as a certain activity.
Employers with 11 or more employees must routinely maintain records of occupational injury and illness as they occur. Employees have access to a summary log of the injury and illness reports, and to copies of any citations issued by OSHA. Citations must be posted for three days or until the prob- lem is corrected, whichever is longer. Companies with ten or fewer employ- ers are exempt from keeping such records unless they are selected for an annual survey and are required to report for that period. Some industries, although required to comply with OSHA rules, are not subject to record- keeping requirements (including some retail, trade, insurance, real estate,
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
98 TO ERR IS HUMAN
and services). However, they must still report the most serious accidents (defined as an accident that results in at least one death or five or more hospitalizations).
Key Points from Existing Reporting Systems
There are a number of ways that reporting systems can contribute to improving patient safety. Good reporting systems are a tool for gathering sufficient information about errors from multiple reporters to try to under- stand the factors that contribute to them and subsequently prevent their recurrence throughout the health care system. Feedback and dissemination of information can create an awareness of problems that have been encoun- tered elsewhere and an expectation that errors should be fixed and safety is important. Finally, a larger-scale effort may improve analytic power by in- creasing the number of “rare” events reported. A serious error may not oc- cur frequently enough in a single entity to be detected as a systematic prob- lem; it is perceived as a random occurrence. On a larger scale, a trend may be easier to detect.
Reporting systems are particularly useful in their ability to detect un- usual events or emerging problems.14 Unusual events are easier to detect and report because they are rare, whereas common events are viewed as part of the “normal” course. For example, a poorly designed medical device that malfunctions routinely becomes viewed as a normal risk and one that practi- tioners typically find ways to work around. Some common errors may be recognized and reported, but many are not. Reporting systems also poten- tially allow for a fast response to a problem since reports come in spontane- ously as an event occurs and can be reacted to quickly.
Two challenges that confront reporting systems are getting sufficient participation in the programs and building an adequate response system. All reporting programs, whether mandatory or voluntary, are perceived to suffer from underreporting. Indeed, some experts assert that all reporting is fundamentally voluntary since even mandated reporting can be avoided.15
However, some mandatory programs receive many reports and some volun- tary programs receive fewer reports. New York’s mandatory program re- ceives an average of 20,000 reports annually, while a leading voluntary pro- gram, the MER Program, has received approximately 3,000 reports since 1993. Reporting adverse reactions to medications to FDA is voluntary for practitioners, and they are not subject to FDA regulation (so the report is not going to an authority that can take action against them). Yet, under- reporting is still perceived.16 Of the approximately 235,000 reports received
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS 99
annually at FDA, 90 percent come from manufacturers (although practitio- ners may report to the manufacturers who report to FDA). Only about 10 percent are reported directly through MedWatch, mainly from practitioners.
The volume of reporting is influenced by more factors than simply whether reporting is mandatory or voluntary. Several reasons have been sug- gested for underreporting. One factor is related to confidentiality. As al- ready described, many of the states contacted faced concerns about confi- dentiality, and what information should be released and when. Although patients were never identified, states varied on whether to release the iden- tity of organizations. They were faced with having to balance the concerns of health care organizations to encourage participation in the program and the importance of making information available to protect and inform consum- ers. Voluntary programs often set up special procedures to protect the confi- dentiality of the information they receive. The issue of data protection and discoverability is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
Another set of factors that affects the volume of reports relates to re- porter perceptions and abilities. Feedback to reporters is believed to influ- ence participation levels.17 Belief by reporters that the information is actu- ally used assures them that the time taken to file a report is worthwhile. Reporters need to perceive a benefit for reporting. This is true for all report- ing systems, whether mandatory or voluntary. Health care organizations that are trained and educated in event recognition are also more likely to report events.18 Clear standards, definitions, and tools are also believed to influ- ence reporting levels. Clarity and ease helps reporters know what is expected to be reported and when. One experiment tried paying for reporting. This increased reporting while payments were provided, but the volume was not sustained after payments stopped.19
Although some reporting systems that focus on adverse events, such as hospital patients experiencing nosocomial infections, are used to develop incidence rates and track changes in these rates over time, caution must be exercised when calculating rates from adverse event reporting systems for several reasons. Many reporting systems are considered to be “passive” in that they rely on a report being submitted by someone who has observed the event.20 “Active” systems work with participating health care organizations to collect complete data on an issue being tracked to determine rates of an adverse event21 (e.g., the CDC conducted an active surveillance study of vaccine events with four HMOs linking vaccination records with hospital admission records22 ).
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
100 TO ERR IS HUMAN
The low occurrence of serious errors can also produce wide variations in frequency from year to year. Some organizations and individuals may rou- tinely report more than others, either because they are more safety con- scious or because they have better internal systems.23 Certain characteristics of medical processes may make it difficult to identify an adverse event, which can also lead to variation in reporting. For example, adverse drug events are difficult to detect when they are widely separated in time from the original use of the drug or when the reaction occurs commonly in an unexposed population.24 These reasons make it difficult to develop reliable rates from reporting systems, although it may be possible to do so in selected cases. However, even without a rate, repetitive reports flag areas of concern that require attention.
It is important to note, however, that the goal of reporting programs is not to count the number of reports. The volume of reports by itself does not indicate the success of a program. Analyzing and using the information they provide and attaching the right tools, expertise and resources to the infor- mation contained in the reports helps to correct errors. Medication errors are heavily monitored, by several public and private reporting systems, some of which afford anonymous reporting. It is possible for a practitioner to voluntarily and confidentially report a medication error to the FDA or to private systems (e.g., MER program, MedMARx). Some states with manda- tory reporting may also receive reports of medication-related adverse events. Yet, some medication problems continue to occur, such as unexpected deaths from the availability of concentrated potassium chloride on patient care units.25
Reporting systems without adequate resources for analysis and follow- up action are not useful. Reporting without analysis or follow-up may even be counterproductive in that it weakens support for constructive responses and is viewed as a waste of resources. Although exact figures are not avail- able, it is generally believed that the analysis of reports is harder to do, takes longer and costs more than data collection. Being able to conduct good analyses also requires that the information received through reporting sys- tems is adequate. People involved in the operation of reporting systems be- lieve it is better to have good information on fewer cases than poor informa- tion on many cases. The perceived value of reports (in any type of reporting system) lies in the narrative that describes the event and the circumstances under which it occurred. Inadequate information provides no benefit to the reporter or the health system.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS 101
DISCUSSION OF COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
Reporting systems may have a primary focus on accountability or on safety improvement. Design features vary depending on the primary pur- pose. Accountability systems are mandatory and usually receive reports on errors that resulted in serious harm or death; safety improvement systems are generally voluntary and often receive reports on events resulting in less serious harm or no harm at all. Accountability systems tend to receive re- ports from organizations; safety improvement systems may receive reports from organizations or frontline practitioners. Accountability systems may release information to the public; safety improvement systems are more likely to be confidential.
Figure 5.1 presents a proposed hierarchy of reporting, sorting potential errors into two categories: (1) errors that result in serious injury or death (i.e., serious preventable adverse events), and (2) lesser injuries or noninjurious events (near-misses).26 Few errors cause serious harm or death; that is the tip of the triangle. Most errors result in less or no harm, but may represent early warning signs of a system failure with the potential to cause serious harm or death.
The committee believes that the focus of mandatory reporting systems should be on the top tier of the triangle in Figure 5.1. Errors in the lower tier are issues that might be the focus of voluntary external reporting systems, as well as research projects supported by the Center for Patient Safety and internal patient safety programs of health care organizations. The core re- porting formats and measures promulgated by the National Forum for Health Care Quality Measurement and Reporting should focus first on the top tier. Additional standardized formats and measures pertaining to other
FIGURE 5-1 Hierarchy of reporting.
Voluntary reporting Confidentiality protected
Serious preventable adverse events
Near misses or lesser injuries
Mandatory reporting Public disclosure
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
102 TO ERR IS HUMAN
types of errors might be promulgated in the future to serve as tools to be made available to voluntary reporting systems or health care organizations for quality improvement purposes.
The committee believes there is an important role for both mandatory and voluntary reporting systems. Mandatory reporting of serious adverse events is essential for public accountability and the current practices are too lax, both in enforcement of the requirements for reporting and in the regula- tory responses to these reports. The public has the right to expect health care organizations to respond to evidence of safety hazards by taking what- ever steps are necessary to make it difficult or impossible for a similar event to occur in the future. The public also has the right to be informed about unsafe conditions. Requests by providers for confidentiality and protection from liability seem inappropriate in this context. At the same time, the com- mittee recognizes that appropriately designed voluntary reporting systems have the potential to yield information that will impact significantly on pa- tient safety and can be widely disseminated. The reports and analyses in these reporting systems should be protected from disclosure for legal liabil- ity purposes.
Mandatory Reporting of Serious Adverse Events
The committee believes there should be a mandatory reporting pro- gram for serious adverse events, implemented nationwide, linked to systems of accountability, and made available to the public. Comparable to aviation “accidents” that are investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board, health care organizations should be required to submit reports on the most serious adverse events using a standard format. The types of ad- verse events to be reported may include, for example, maternal deaths; deaths or serious injuries associated with the use of a new device, operation or medication; deaths following elective surgery or anesthetic deaths in Class I patients. In light of the sizable number of states that have already estab- lished mandatory reporting systems, the committee thinks it would be wise to build on this experience in creating a standardized reporting system that is implemented nationwide.
Within these objectives, however, there should be flexibility in imple- mentation. Flexibility and innovation are important in this stage of develop- ment because the existing state programs have used different approaches to implement their programs and a “best practice” or preferred approach is not yet known. The Center for Patient Safety can support states in identify-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS 103
ing and communicating best practices. States could choose to collect and analyze such data themselves. Alternatively, they could rely on an accredit- ing body, such as Joint Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organi- zations or the National Committee for Quality Assurance, to perform the function for them as many states do now for licensing surveys. States could also contract with peer review organizations (PROs) to perform the func- tion. As noted in Chapter 4, the Center for Patient Safety should evaluate the approaches taken by states in implementing reporting programs. States have employed a variety of strategies in their programs, yet few (if any) have been subject to rigorous evaluation. Program features that might be evalu- ated include: factors that encourage or inhibit reporting, methods of analyz- ing reports, roles and responsibilities of health care organizations and the state in investigating adverse events, follow-up actions taken by states, infor- mation disclosed to the public, and uses of the information by consumers and purchasers.
Although states should have flexibility in how they choose to implement the reporting program, all state programs should require reporting for a standardized core set of adverse events that result in death or serious injury, and the information reported should also be standardized.
The committee believes that these standardized reporting formats should be developed by an organization with the following characteristics. First, it should be a public–private partnership, to reflect the need for in- volvement by both sectors and the potential use of the reporting format by both the public and the private sectors. Second, it should be broadly repre- sentative, to reflect the input from many different stakeholders that have an interest in patient safety. Third, it should be able to gather the expertise needed for the task. This requires adequate financial resources, as well as sufficient standing to involve the leading experts. Enabling legislation can support all three objectives.
The National Forum for Health Care Quality Measurement and Re- porting meets these criteria. The purpose of this public-private partnership (formed in May 1999) is to develop a comprehensive quality measurement and public reporting strategy that addresses priorities for quality measure- ment for all stakeholders consistent with national aims for quality improve- ment in health care. It is to develop a plan for implementing quality mea- surement, data collection and reporting standards; identify core sets of measures; and promote standardized measurement specifications. One of its specific tasks should relate to patient safety.
The advantage of using the Forum is that its goal already is to develop a
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
104 TO ERR IS HUMAN
measurement framework for quality generally. A focus on safety would en- sure that safety gets built into a broader quality agenda. A public–private partnership would also be able to convene the mix of stakeholders who, it is hoped, would subsequently adopt the standards and standardized reporting recommendations of the Forum. However, the Forum is a new organization that is just starting to come together; undoubtedly some time will be re- quired to build the organization and set its agenda.
Federal enabling legislation and support will be required to direct the National Forum for Health Care Quality Measurement and Reporting to promulgate standardized reporting requirements for serious adverse events and encourage all states to implement the minimum reporting requirements. Such federal legislation pertaining to state roles may be modeled after the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). HIPAA provides three options for implementing a program: (1) states may pass laws congruent with or stronger than the federal floor and enforce them using state agencies; (2) they may create an acceptable alternative mecha- nism and enforce it with state agencies; or finally, (3) they may decline to pass new laws or modify existing ones and leave enforcement of HIPAA to the federal government.27 OSHA is similarly designed in that states may develop their own OSHA program with matching funds from the federal government; the federal OSHA program is employed in states that have not formed a state-level program.
Voluntary Reporting Systems
The committee believes that voluntary reporting systems play a valuable role in encouraging improvements in patient safety and are a complement to mandatory reporting systems. The committee considered whether a national voluntary reporting system should be established similar to the Aviation Safety Reporting System. Compared to mandatory reporting, voluntary re- porting systems usually receive reports from frontline practitioners who can report hazardous conditions that may or may not have resulted in patient harm. The aim is to learn about these potential precursors to errors and try to prevent a tragedy from occurring.
The committee does not propose a national voluntary reporting system for several reasons. First, there are already a number of good efforts, par- ticularly in the area of medications. Three complementary national report- ing systems are focused on medication errors: FDA, the Institute for Safe Medication Practice, and U.S. Pharmacopeia. The JCAHO sentinel events
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS 105
program is another existing national reporting program for hospitals that will also receive reports on medication and other errors. These reporting systems should be encouraged and promoted within health care organiza- tions, and better use should be made of available information being reported to them.
Second, there are several options available about how to design such a voluntary reporting system. Better information is needed on what would be the best approach. At least three different approaches were identified. One is a universal, voluntary reporting system, modeled after ASRS. The concern with this approach is the potential volume of reports that might come for- ward when such a system is applied to health care. Another concern is that any single group is unlikely to have the expertise needed to analyze and interpret the diverse set of issues raised in health care. The experience of ASRS has shown that the analysts reviewing incoming reports must be con- tent experts who can understand and interpret these reports.28 In health care, different expertise is likely needed to analyze, for example, medication errors, equipment problems, problems in the intensive care unit (ICU), pe- diatric problems, and home care problems.
Another approach is to develop focused “mini-systems” that are tar- geted toward selected areas (e.g., those that exist for medications) rather than a single voluntary program. This approach would manage the potential volume of reports and match the expertise to the problems. It is possible that there should be different mini-systems for different issues such as medi- cations, surgery, pediatrics, and so forth. If such mini-systems are formed, there should be a mechanism for sharing information across them since a report to one system may have relevance for another (e.g., surgical events that also involve medications).
A third possibility is to use a sampling approach. For example, in its postmarketing surveillance of medical devices, FDA is moving away from a universal reporting system for hospitals and nursing homes to one in which a representative sample of hospitals and nursing homes keeps complete data. Its pilot test found that both the quantity and the quality of reports im- proved when FDA worked with a sample of hospitals who were trained in error identification and reporting and could receive feedback quickly. By periodically renewing the sample, the burden on any organization is limited (although participation in the sample may have the side benefit of helping interested organizations build their internal systems and train practitioners in error detection).
Lastly, establishing a comprehensive voluntary reporting system mod-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
106 TO ERR IS HUMAN
eled after ASRS would require an enormous investment of time and re- sources. The committee believes that recommending such an investment would be premature in light of the many questions still surrounding this issue.
The committee does believe that voluntary reporting systems have a very important role to play in enhancing understanding of the factors that con- tribute to errors. When properly structured, voluntary systems can help to keep participating health care organizations focused on patient safety issues through frequent communication about emerging concerns and potential safety improvement strategies. Voluntary systems can provide much-needed expertise and information to health care organizations and providers.
The continued development of voluntary reporting efforts should be encouraged. Through its various outreach activities, the Center for Patient Safety should describe and disseminate information on voluntary reporting programs throughout the health care industry and should periodically con- vene sponsors and users of voluntary reporting systems to discuss ways in which these systems can be made more effective. As a part of developing the national research agenda for safety, the Center for Patient Safety should con- sider projects that might lead to the development of knowledge and tools that would enhance the effectiveness of voluntary reporting programs. The Center should also periodically assess whether there are gaps in the current complement of voluntary reporting programs and should consider funding pilot projects.
In summary, this chapter and the previous chapter outlining the pro- posed Center for Patient Safety together describe a comprehensive approach for improving the availability of information about medical errors and using the information to design systems that are safer for patients. Although this chapter focuses on using reporting systems to learn about and learn from errors that have already occurred, Chapter 4 focused on how to create and disseminate new knowledge for building safer delivery systems. Both of these strategies should work together to make health care safer for patients.
REFERENCES
1. Bates, David, W.; Spell, Nathan; Cullen, David J., et al. The Costs of Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients. JAMA. 277(4):307–311, 1997.
2. For example, there are several efforts relative to the reporting of medication er- rors specifically, such as the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) and U.S. Pharmacopeia. The FDA sponsors its MedWatch medication and device reporting pro- gram. The National Coordinating Council of the Medical Errors Program (NCC-MERP)
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
ERROR REPORTING SYSTEMS 107
has developed a taxonomy for medication errors for the recording and tracking of errors. General reporting programs (not specific to medications) include JCAHO’s sentinel events reporting program and some state programs.
3. “State Agency Experiences Regarding Mandatory Reporting of Sentinel Events,” JCAHO draft survey results, April 1999.
4. Billings, Charles, “Incident Reporting Systems in Medicine and Experience With the Aviation Safety Reporting System,” in Cook, Richard; Woods, David; and Miller, Charlotte, A Tale of Two Stories: Contrasting Views of Patient Safety, Chicago: National Patient Safety Foundation of the AMA, 1998.
5. Office of the Inspector General, “The External Review of Hospital Quality: A Call for Greater Accountability,” http://www.dhhs.gov/progorg/oei/reports/oei-01-97- 00050.htm.
6. Additional strategies include field investigations, epidemiological studies and other focused studies.
7. “Sentinel Event Policy and Procedure,” Revised: July 18, 1998. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois.
8. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Sentinel Event Alert, Number Three, May 1, 1998.
9. Heigel, Fred, presentation at 12th Annual State Health Policy Conference, Na- tional Academy for State Health Policy, Cincinnati, Ohio, August 2, 1999.
10. “Federal Aviation Administration, Office of System Safety, Safety Data,” http:// nasdac.faa.gov/safety_data.
11. Billings, Charles, “Incident Reporting Systems in Medicine and Experience With the Aviation Safety Reporting System,” Appendix B in A Tale of Two Stories, Richard Cook, David Woods and Charlotte Miller, Chicago: National Health Care Safety Council of the National Patient Safety Foundation at the AMA, 1998.
12. Federal Aviation Administration, “Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP),” Ad- visory Circular No. 120-66, 1/8/97.
13. “All About OSHA,” U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA 2056, 1995 (Revised).
14. Brewer, Timothy and Colditz, Graham A. Postmarketing Surveillance and Ad- verse Drug Reactions, Current Perspectives and Future Needs. JAMA. 281(9):824-829, 1999. See also: FDA, “Managing the Risks from Medical Product Use, Creating a Risk Management Framework,” Report to the FDA Commissioner from the Task Force on Risk Management, USDHHS, May, 1999.
15. Billings, Charles, presentation to Subcommittee on Creating an External Envi- ronment for Quality Health Care, January 29, 1999.
16. Brewer and Colditz, 1999. See also: FDA, “Managing the Risks from Medical Product Use,” May 1999.
17. FDA, “Managing the Risks from Medical Product Use,” May 1999. 18. As part of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, the FDA is mandated to shift
from a universal mandatory reporting system for users (hospitals and nursing homes) of medical devices to one where only a subset of facilities report. In their pilot test, they believed that faster and better feedback to reporters contributed to improved reporting. FDA, May 1999. See also: Susan Gardner, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, personal communication, November 24, 1998.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
108 TO ERR IS HUMAN
19. Feely, John; Moriarty, Siobhan; O’Connor, Patricia. Stimulating Reporting of Ad- verse Drug Reactions by Using a Fee. BMJ. 300:22–23, 1990.
20. FDA, “Managing the Risks from Medical Product Use,” 1999. 21. Brewer and Colditz, 1999. 22. Farrington, Paddy; Pugh, Simon; Colville, Alaric, et al. A New Method for Active
Surveillance of Adverse Events from Diphtheria/Tetanus/Pertussis and Measles/Mumps/ Rubella Vaccines. Lancet. 345(8949):567–569, 1995.
23. Nagel, David C., “Human Error In Aviation Operations,” in D.C. Nagel and E.L. Wiener (eds.), Human Factors in Aviation, eds., Orlando, FL: Academic Press, Inc., 1988.
24. Brewer and Colditz, 1999. 25. Medication Error Prevention—Potassium Chloride. JCAHO Sentinel Event Alert,
Issue One, Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois: 1998. 26. Adapted from work by JCAHO based on presentation by Margaret VanAmringe
to the Subcommittee on Creating an External Environment for Quality in Health Care, June 15, 1999, Washington, D.C.
27. Nichols, Len M. and Blumberg, Linda J. A Different Kind of “New Federalism”? The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. Health Affairs. 17(3):25–42, 1998.
28. Billings, Charles, presentation to Subcommittee on Creating an External Envi- ronment for Quality, January 29, 1999.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
109
A lthough all industries face concerns about liability, the organiza- tion of health care creates a different set of circumstances com- pared to other industries. In health care, physicians primarily de-
termine the amount and content of care rendered. A hospital or clinic often produces the care directed by the physician. The consumer, purchaser, and health plan share in decisions to determine whether and how treatment de- cisions directed by the physician are paid, which influences access to care. Although some of these decisions could be under one umbrella, they are often dispersed across different and unrelated entities. Compared to other industries, there is no single responsible entity in health care that is held accountable for an episode of care. The physician, in particular, has a signifi- cant responsibility for the well-being of his or her patients and the decisions made concerning their care. This distinctive arrangement in organization and decision making in health care creates a unique set of liability issues and challenges in creating an environment conducive to recognizing and learn- ing from errors.
The potential for litigation may sometimes significantly influence the behavior of physicians and other health care providers. Often the interests of the various participants in furnishing an episode of care are not aligned and may be antagonistic to each other. In this environment, physicians and other providers can be cautious about providing information that may be
6 Protecting Voluntary
Reporting Systems from Legal Discovery
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
110 TO ERR IS HUMAN
subsequently used against them. Thus, the prominence of litigation can be a substantial deterrent to the development and maintenance of the reporting systems discussed in this report.
Chapter 5 lays out a strategy to encourage greater recognition and analy- sis of errors and improvements in patient safety through a mandatory re- porting system for errors that result in serious harm, and voluntary partici- pation in error reporting systems that focus on “near misses” or errors resulting in lesser harm. The issue of whether data submitted to reporting systems should be protected from disclosure, particularly in litigation, arose early in the committee discussions. Members of the committee had different views. Some believed all information should be protected because access to the information by outsiders created concerns with potential litigation and interfered with disclosure of errors and taking actions to improve safety. Others believed that information should be disclosed because the public has a right to know. Liability is part of the system of accountability and serves a legitimate role in holding people responsible for their actions.
The recommendations contained in Chapter 5 and in this chapter re- flect the committee’s recognition of the legitimacy of the alternative views. The committee believes that errors that are identified through a mandatory reporting system and are part of a public system of accountability should not be protected from discovery. Other events that are reported inside health care organizations or to voluntary systems should be protected because they often focus on lesser injuries or non-injurious events that have the potential to cause serious harm to patients, but have not produced a serious adverse event that requires reporting to the mandatory system. Protecting such in- formation encourages disclosure of problems and a proactive approach to correcting problems before serious harm occurs.
Although information about serious injuries and deaths due to errors should not be protected from discovery, it is important that information released to the public is accurate. As described in Chapter 5, mandatory reporting systems receive reports on adverse events, which are then investi- gated to determine whether an error occurred. The mere filing of a report should not, by itself, trigger release of information. Rather, information should be released after an investigation has been completed so the informa- tion that is released is accurate. This chapter focuses primarily on protecting information reported to voluntary systems, although aspects may also apply to protecting data submitted to mandatory systems until the information is ready for public release.
The committee believes that a different approach to promoting the col-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PROTECTING VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS 111
lection, sharing, and analysis of such data (not considered in this chapter) would be to change the legal environment in which health care organiza- tions and providers operate. Exclusive enterprise liability, shifting liability for medical injuries from individual practitioners to responsible organiza- tions, has been suggested to possess several advantages over the current li- ability system.1–3 One of these is to remove the fear of personal liability from individual health care workers, eliminating this incentive to hide errors. An- other proposed reform, no-fault compensation for medical injuries, might promote reporting by eliminating the adversarial inquiry into fault and blame that characterizes the current liability system.4 Workplace injuries to em- ployees are handled within an example of such a no-fault, enterprise-liability system.5
Together, enterprise liability and no-fault compensation might produce a legal environment more conducive to reporting and analysis, without the elaborate legal and practical strategies needed to protect data under the cur- rent liability system. An analysis of enterprise liability and no-fault compen- sation systems is beyond the scope of the Quality of Health Care in America project, but the committee believes that the issue merits further analysis.
This chapter examines legal precedents and practical experiences bear- ing on how and to what extent information can be protected in error report- ing systems when it leaves the health care organization that generated it. Legal protections like state peer review shields and laws created to protect a specific reporting system have much promise. Many current state peer re- view statutes, however, may not protect data about errors shared in collabo- rative networks, especially across state lines, or reported to voluntary report- ing systems (e.g., independent data banks). A combination of practical and legal safeguards may be the best approach to protect the data in voluntary reporting systems from discoverability. The practical safeguards of anony- mous reporting and de-identification (removal of identifying information after receipt of the report) can confer some, but not complete, protection. Statutory protection could add three benefits to some level of de-identifica- tion: (1) it could provide an added measure of security for the data; (2) it could protect from subpoena identifiable reporters and recipients of the reports; and (3) it could permit the reporting system to obtain and retain information that might identify the reports and reporters.
RECOMMENDATION
RECOMMENDATION 6.1 Congress should pass legislation to ex- tend peer review protections to data related to patient safety and
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
112 TO ERR IS HUMAN
quality improvement that are collected and analyzed by health care organizations for internal use or shared with others solely for pur- poses of improving safety and quality.
Existing law often shields data about errors within an institution, but this protection may be lost when the data are transmitted elsewhere, for example, to other institutions collaborating in an error reduction initiative or to a voluntary reporting system. Unless such data are assured protection, people will be reluctant to discuss them and opportunities to improve will be lost. A more conducive legal environment is needed to encourage health care professionals and organizations to identify, analyze, and prevent errors without increasing the threat of litigation and without compromising pa- tients’ legal rights. Information about errors which have resulted in serious harm or death to patients and which are subject to mandatory reporting should not be protected.
INTRODUCTION
The systematic reporting and tracking of safety problems is an impor- tant approach to quality improvement. There are many ways to gather, main- tain, and use safety-related data. Systems can vary considerably according to their key characteristics (e.g., type of events reported, who reports, volun- tary or mandatory submission, location and maintenance of a data bank), which also affect the likelihood of vulnerability to discovery in legal process.
All such systems face two bedrock issues: (1) how to motivate health care practitioners and others to submit information, and (2) how to main- tain reported data in a systematic way that is useful to practitioners. A cen- tral concern for both is the extent to which confidentiality of information should be maintained given a litigious society. Access to detailed informa- tion compiled by peer reviewers, risk managers, or others could greatly help a plaintiff’s lawyer to build and prove a case. This in turn creates a strong disincentive to collect and report such information.
Plaintiffs’ interest in and uses of information on errors depend on the level of identification of the data. A fully identified report will always be of interest to the plaintiff involved in the case reported. But even if the data are identified or aggregated by institution or physician, but not by patient, they may still be useful in claims against the institution for negligent supervision or credentialing—causes of action that are well known to the plaintiff’s bar. Data from which all personal and organizational identifiers have been re- moved could still be used to prove some elements of certain types of cases,
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PROTECTING VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS 113
such as causation (e.g., injuries similar to the plaintiff’s were caused by the same mechanism or problem; there was reason for the defendant to know of problems with a certain process or device). The latter use is probably not common today, possibly in part because of the scarcity of such data. The more that liability moves from individual focus to a focus on organizations, the more useful general information may become.
Plaintiffs can seek information from three components of a reporting system: (1) the original reporter; (2) the personnel who receive, investigate, or analyze the reports; and (3) the data per se as they reside in the data bank. The way in which plaintiffs can gain access to these targets is described in the next section. Two avenues are available to protect each of these targets: laws that prevent discovery and practical methods that render the reporter unfindable or the data unuseful to the plaintiff. These protections may apply differently to the three possible targets of discovery. They are described in more detail, along with the experience that reporting systems have had with them. The purpose of the analysis is to illuminate the legal policy and design choices facing those who want to protect data collection, sharing, and analy- sis of information on adverse events and errors.
The committee notes that protecting data in a reporting system as rec- ommended in this chapter does not mean that the plaintiff in a lawsuit could not try to obtain such information through other avenues if it is important in securing redress for harm; it just means that the plaintiff would not be as- sisted by the presence of a reporting system designed specifically for other purposes beneficial to society.
THE BASIC LAW OF EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERABILITY OF ERROR-RELATED INFORMATION
Demands for information on errors can come from any of the plaintiffs in medical malpractice lawsuits, which are almost always based on state law.* Whether and when plaintiffs can obtain access to such data or have such information admitted as evidence at trial depend on the general rules of evidence and civil procedure, as applied by a state judge under particular
*Error data may be sought in other types of cases as well, such as antitrust or libel claims by physicians against medical organizations. Further, regulators may seek data on injuries, either under their general authority (notably, state licensing boards that can discipline practitioners) or under specific statutory schemes of regulation that mandate reporting and investigation of consequential errors (discussed below).
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
114 TO ERR IS HUMAN
circumstances. Rules vary by state, but most are similar to the federal rules described below. State differences are mentioned when relevant.
Trial Admissibility and the Rule of Relevance
The basic legal principle governing whether information can be used by a plaintiff in a civil trial is the rule of relevance. The formal threshold of relevance is quite low: whether the evidence would have “any tendency” to make any element of the cause of action (mainly, existence of negligence, causation of harm, presence of damages) more or less likely.6 Moreover, trial judges are accorded broad discretion in judging whether an item of evidence is relevant,7 and they make such determinations on a case-by-case basis.8 In practice, then, a piece of evidence is relevant to a particular case if the judge says it is, unless there is no arguable basis for its relevance.
All relevant evidence is admissible at trial unless there is a specific ex- ception or reason for it to be inadmissible,9 such as the evidentiary privi- leges discussed below. The attorney–client privilege, for example, can pre- vent certain clearly relevant statements by the client from being introduced at trial.
Information on errors could be relevant to a malpractice lawsuit in three ways. First, if the data are reported about the particular case in dispute, so that the report and the litigation are about the identical circumstances, every piece of information would undoubtedly be relevant. This use of data would apply only to databases with identified data about errors that produce in- jury; the specific identification is what makes the information relevant, and the data would help establish liability in the lawsuit. The information could show negligence, causation (i.e., relation of the injury to the medical care that prompted the report), and possible damages.
Second, information about similar occurrences to the case in dispute is relevant to lawsuits that allege not merely one negligent occurrence, but negligence in a practitioners’ engaging in a certain activity at all. It may be argued that an individual doctor’s record makes it negligent to fail to refer a patient to a better-qualified practitioner. Similarly, a suit may allege negli- gent oversight in credentialing or supervision by the institution, medical group or health plan within which the doctor practices. In such a lawsuit, the plaintiff would argue that the occurrence of similar problems before the case in dispute should have or did put the defendant on notice of a pattern of problems that should have been corrected before the plaintiff’s injury occurred. The previous occurrences would have to be similar in salient as-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PROTECTING VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS 115
pects to the data sought from the bank, for example, a particular sort of complex surgery. This use of prior similar-occurrence data would require data identified at least by institution, because the notice has to be shown with respect to a particular defendant. In one case, for example, a plaintiff who was injured by implantation of a pacemaker was allowed access to records of other instances of pacemaker implantation to help make a case for negligent supervision of the physicians by the hospital.10
Third, data on similar occurrences might also be relevant in more limited ways—to help some lawsuits prove certain aspects of their cases. If, for ex- ample, there is a dispute about whether a particular instrumentality could have caused the injury (“causation”), evidence that it caused similar injuries in other instances could be relevant. Other points that could be proven with similar-occurrence data include the defendant’s ability to correct a known defect (e.g., a systems weakness or device problem), the lack of safety for intended uses, and the standard of care. Using similar occurrences in this manner would not require identified data, and the similar instances could have come before or after the event that is the subject of the lawsuit.
A recent Florida case combined the notice and causation purposes of similar-occurrence evidence. An obese patient alleged that the defendant obstetrician injured her child by delivering her on a standard bed, rather than a drop-down bed. The court held that the records of other obese pa- tients the doctor had delivered were relevant and discoverable. If other in- fants suffered similar injuries when a standard bed was used, this should have afforded the obstetrician notice that this method was deficient. Con- versely, if no such injuries occurred when drop-down beds were used, this might be relevant for causation. In this instance, the other patients’ names were removed from the records.11 A similar rationale could easily apply to a collection of data on errors.
Pretrial Discoverability
The potential for discovery is even greater than indicated by the preced- ing section on trial admissibility. The requirement of relevance applies to whether a piece of evidence can be admitted into the record at trial. A pre- trial process called “discovery” can extend a plaintiff’s reach even further by allowing the plaintiff access to information that would not be admissible at the trial, but could lead to admissible evidence at the subsequent trial. Dis- covery is the process by which each party can obtain evidence in the posses- sion of the other party and nonparties. It typically consists of requests for
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
116 TO ERR IS HUMAN
copies of documents and questions asked under oath of the other party (called interrogatories if written and depositions if oral). It may also extend to the production of physical objects or even the plaintiff’s person for a medical examination. Persons or organizations that are not parties in a law- suit can also be compelled to provide verbal, documentary, or physical evi- dence.
Relevance for discovery purposes is broadly and liberally construed. If there is a doubt about relevance, judges will generally permit discovery.12
The information asked for need not be admissible at trial, as long as it rea- sonably might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.13 Therefore, a report of a medical error need not itself be admissible to be discoverable. The report could point the plaintiff toward relevant facts needed to prove the case. The report could inform the plaintiff, for example, of theories or conclusions about what contributed to the occurrence of the error. This knowledge could help direct the plaintiff’s search for admissible evidence, for example, by suggesting the existence or importance of pertinent docu- ments, witnesses, and questions that the plaintiff would not have otherwise considered.
Nonparties
Discovery can be obtained from nonparties as well as parties to the ac- tion. Nonparties include any person or organization that is not named in the lawsuit as being allegedly liable for the injury. They could include external data banks, quality consultants, accrediting bodies such as JCAHO, and other persons or organizations that have information on errors. Subject to the judge’s approval, the party seeking discovery simply issues a subpoena to the nonparty for the information.14 The same methods of discovery gener- ally apply to nonparties as to parties, except that interrogatories (a set of written questions) normally cannot be used with nonparties. With regard to the scope of discovery, the major difference for nonparties is that, if compli- ance with the subpoena would impose a burden on the nonparty, the court may impose a higher standard of relevance on the request for discovery. Judges may also be more apt to limit the scope or duration of a party’s prob- ing of a nonparty’s information.
Judges are given substantial discretion over discovery from nonparties as well as discovery from parties to the lawsuit. Thus, the person or entity that reported or shared the error information, independent investigators, organizations that maintain information on errors, and those who work for
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PROTECTING VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS 117
such organizations could be subject to subpoenas, as long as compliance with the subpoena would not impose an undue burden. Even a data bank that maintains information with no personal or organizational identifiers would not protect a reporter to the data bank from being compelled to testify under oath about his or her recollections of the case, if the reporter could be identified by the plaintiff. The ease of identifying the reporter in practice is variable. It could be straightforward, for example, if a single phy- sician was responsible for all quality assurance reviews in a medical group. Similarly, those who receive, de-identify, investigate, and analyze reports could be compelled to testify if they could be identified with sufficient par- ticularity to be served with a subpoena.
LEGAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST DISCOVERY OF INFORMATION ABOUT ERRORS
Three main types of legal protections can block the discovery of data on errors. These include (1) general rules of evidence (not restricted to the medi- cal context), (2) the medical peer review privilege, and (3) special statutory privileges enacted for particular reporting systems. This section discusses each of the protections in turn, along with their limitations.
General Rules of Evidence
Three general rules of evidence could potentially protect error informa- tion from disclosure—the remedial action privilege, the attorney–client privi- lege, and the work product doctrine. Each has some applicability to report- ing systems, but each also has significant limits.
Remedial Action
By a long-standing rule of evidence, a showing that remedial action has been taken after an injury cannot be admitted as proof that the injury re- sulted from negligence or a defective product. One rationale for this rule is to encourage defendants and potential defendants to improve safety, with- out having to worry that doing so might be taken as an admission of prior substandard practice. The other rationale for the rule is that remedial mea- sures are not necessarily relevant to negligence: that is, one can seek to pre- vent nonnegligent as well as negligent injuries. All states but one have adopted this rule.15
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
118 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Some states have extended this rule to include self-evaluative reports or other postinjury analyses and reports. This might include evaluative reports on health care errors. The policy rationale for the rule would argue for this extension; without it, defendants might be unwilling to undertake the analy- ses needed to devise remedial measures. A California court, for example, recently held that the rule protected the records of peer review committees from discovery, independently from California’s peer review statute, which also applied.16
However, other states have ruled the opposite way or have not yet reached the question of whether evaluative reports are protected.17 Even in states that have extended the remedial measures rule to evaluative reports, protecting the reports outside of the institution involved in the lawsuit would require yet another extension of the rule. Another problem is that even if the reports are protected from being used by a plaintiff to prove the main ele- ments of the cause of action (such as negligence), they could still be admis- sible for other purposes. A plaintiff could use them, for example, to impeach a witness (i.e., contradict a witness’ testimony), prove causation, or prove the feasibility of taking preventive measures.18
Furthermore, the discovery privilege applies to critical evaluation (analy- sis, opinions, and conclusions) but not to facts of the event, so plaintiffs can still obtain factual information contained in the reports to support their case (e.g., what happened, who was there, what was said, whether the equipment was functioning normally).19
Attorney–Client Privilege
Communications with one’s attorney are privileged from discovery. The purpose of the privilege is to encourage free communication between clients and lawyers so that clients may have the full benefit of legal advice. The privilege is nearly absolute, in that an opposing party can almost never argue that it should not be applied in particular circumstances.* It can be waived, however, by the client to whom it belongs; the attorney has a perma- nent obligation to the client and can never waive the privilege.
Attorney–client privilege will rarely if ever be useful in protecting re- ports sent to an external entity. Typically, the client is the medical institution,
*There are limited exceptions not relevant here, such as the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court to report a client’s plans to engage in future criminal activity.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PROTECTING VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS 119
which generally includes only senior management for purposes of this privi- lege. A report from a floor or charge nurse, for example, may not qualify. The most important problem, however, is that even if a document is origi- nally covered by the attorney–client privilege, once it is sent to any nonparty, including external data banks or independent collaborating institutions, it loses the protection of the privilege. In other words, sending a report to one’s attorney does not immunize it from discovery if it is also used for other purposes.
Attorney Work Product Doctrine
This rule protects materials that are created by or on behalf of a lawyer in preparation for litigation. The purpose is to protect the thoughts and plans of the lawyer, and the privilege can be waived only by the lawyer. Some states do not apply this doctrine to protect reports on errors, not even those kept internal to an organization, such as incident reports.20 These states view the reports as being generated in the ordinary course of business. In addition, the protection afforded by the work product doctrine is not abso- lute; it can be overcome if the other party has need of the materials and would be unable without hardship to obtain the equivalent information.21
In this situation, the facts of the event can be discovered, but the thoughts, opinions, and plans of the lawyer remain protected (i.e., may be removed before the materials are produced in discovery).
Peer Review Privilege
The peer review privilege is the most promising existing source of legal protection for data on errors. This privilege is statutory and is specific to medical peer review within specified settings and meeting specified stan- dards. Every state, except one, statutorily protect from discovery various records and deliberations of peer review committees.* 22,23 The quality im- provement purpose of peer review is consistent with the purpose of report- ing systems; the statutes’ value in protecting reporting, however, depends on fitting the reporting system to the specifics of each protective statute.
*New Jersey is the exception, according to a 50-state survey of peer review statutes that was undertaken in part to understand how JCAHO’s proposed “sentinel event” reporting would fare under the statutes.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
120 TO ERR IS HUMAN
These statutes vary considerably in their reach and strength. Overall, this makes them a problematic source of legal protection for data on errors. Some protect only documents generated by the peer review committee, whereas others protect information provided to them. In addition, the treat- ment of incident reports within an institution, such as a hospital, varies by state. Some statutes have specific requirements for the composition of quali- fying peer review committees (e.g., that physicians constitute a majority of the members). In some states, a hospital committee must be under the aegis of the medical staff, not the administrative staff.24
Some states restrict the privilege to in-hospital committees or commit- tees of professional societies. Many statutes may not cover collaborations among institutions, even if all are within an integrated delivery system. The California statute is one of the broadest and might apply to collaborative reporting systems and external data banks. California defines a peer review body as including “a medical or professional staff of any licensed health care facility, a nonprofit medical professional society, or a committee whose func- tion is to review the quality of professional care provided by the members or employees of the entity to which the committee belongs.”25 No statute ex- pressly covers systems or collaborations that cross state lines.
States can develop statutes to accommodate reporting systems, such as in Oklahoma. In that state the law protects any information, including inter- views, reports, statements, memoranda, or other data, that is provided “for use in the course of studies for the purpose of reducing morbidity or mortal- ity.” The recipients may use such information “only for the purpose of ad- vancing medical research or medical education in the interest of reducing morbidity or mortality.” The findings and conclusions resulting from these studies are also protected. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has upheld the protection under this statute for records generated by a hospital infectious disease committee that reviewed every case involving infection in order to improve infection control.26 It would appear possible to devise reporting systems that would meet the requirements of this statute.
Even when peer review information qualifies for the privilege, it may nonetheless be discoverable under some circumstances. The information may not be protected in allegations of negligent supervision or credentialing by an institution, because the performance of the peer review process is what is at issue in such claims. Some state medical licensing boards have gained access to peer review information for disciplinary purposes.27 Some state courts employ a balancing test to determine whether a plaintiff should have access to facts contained in peer review documents (though not opin-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PROTECTING VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS 121
ions or conclusions), balancing how crucial this is to the plaintiff (e.g., not available in any other way) against how much trouble and expense it im- poses on the defendant.* Moreover, state or federal law enforcement au- thorities may be able to discover the information for use in criminal pro- ceedings, although instances of criminal prosecution for medical errors are exceptionally rare. Many states’ statutes prevent a plaintiff from compelling a member of the peer review committee to testify, but one might testify vol- untarily.28 To close this loophole, hospitals can adopt bylaws prohibiting staff members from disclosing any information obtained through the peer review committee.
There is federal protection for the practice of peer review under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. §§11101 et seq.). This statute establishes peer review immunity from damage suits when the participants act in good faith in any peer review process that meets the act’s standards for structure and fair process. Peer review is defined quite broadly, and protected participants include everyone involved in the process, from investigators to witnesses to medical peers.
STATUTORY PROTECTIONS SPECIFIC TO PARTICULAR REPORTING SYSTEMS
Some statutes have been crafted to protect specific reporting systems. Examples of these follow, along with some indications of their success in practice. All provide limited precedent for protecting data.
National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB)
The federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. §§11101 et seq.) requires all malpractice insurers and self-insurers to report claims paid on behalf of named practitioners to the NPDB maintained by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). Decisions af- fecting clinical privileges of physicians and dentists must be reported by hospitals, state boards or professional associations; hospitals and other enti- ties may voluntarily submit reports on other practitioners. Practitioners are also allowed limited space in the data bank to comment on the information reported (often asserting that the payment was made solely for tactical legal
*An unknown but key issue is the extent to which general harm to incentives to generate data would enter into a court’s balancing.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
122 TO ERR IS HUMAN
reasons, not in recognition of medical failures). The reporting obligation is limited to specified formal determinations about consequential errors in medicine (claims settled, discipline meted out) and does not extend to simple observation of medical errors “in the field.”
With regard to confidentiality, the act allows only designated authorized users to obtain information from the data bank, mainly hospitals and other health care organizations that credential practitioners. Regulations call for authorized users to use data only for credentialing or peer review and to keep data only within departments doing such authorized activities. The NPDB may not give information on any practitioner to any malpractice in- surer, defense attorney, or member of the general public, although plaintiffs’ attorneys may query the bank under very limited circumstances. Strong mon- etary penalties exist for unauthorized disclosures from the NPDB. Bills have often been filed in the Congress to “open up” the bank for public access, but these have always been opposed by federal authorities and have never been close to enactment. There is nonetheless substantial concern among practitioners that legislative change will eventually succeed.
Completeness of reporting is difficult to assess. Some physicians are said to avoid being reported to the data bank by settling lawsuits in the name of a corporate defendant and being dropped individually from the lawsuit. In- surers and corporate defendants, in turn, are said to report increased diffi- culty in settling claims because of the resistance of practitioners to being reported. HRSA sources interviewed said that they believe reporting is good, and said that occasional complaints referred to them almost always turn out to have been reported. HRSA interviewees said that there have been no known leaks from HRSA or from any contractor that has maintained the database. Complaints about leaks have been too general and non-specific to investigate.
The claims data in the data bank are effectively “protected” from dis- covery in a lawsuit involving the injury-producing error that was reported because the applicable lawsuit must already be over. Claim closure is what generates the duty to report, including information from the settlement. Plaintiffs might be interested in the data as similar-occurrence information, but no civil lawsuit subpoenas have been issued to the data bank; the pro- tecting federal law preempts any attempts to obtain data for a state lawsuit. The NPDB does not face the problem of having to protect any investigators of reports, because it conducts no independent investigation, being prohib- ited by law from modifying information submitted in reports. Those who generate reports do face inquiries, however; when a physician is under re-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PROTECTING VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS 123
view for privileges at a hospital, for example, the institution will routinely ask liability insurers and doctors about their reported history of malpractice and discipline, and no confidentiality applies.
Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs)
Also known as peer review organizations (PROs), these entities monitor the utilization and quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries, including qual- ity improvement projects, mandatory case review and oversight of program integrity (see Chapter 7). One responsibility involves the investigation and evaluation of instances of possibly substandard care provided to fee-for-ser- vice Medicare beneficiaries. Case review information with patient identifiers is not subject to subpoena in a civil action (42 CFR Section 476.140).
Veterans Health Administration System
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is planning to implement a voluntary, non-punitive reporting system on a pilot basis. This system is be- ing designed after the aviation model (see Chapter 5) for eventual use throughout the VHA delivery system. A specific federal statute confers con- fidentiality for quality assurance within the VHA. The VHA’s general coun- sel has not formally issued an opinion on whether the new reporting system will be protected by this statute, but VHA officials believe it will be. Because the system is not yet operational, there has been no opportunity for the statute’s application to the reporting system to be challenged (the federal Tort Claims Act waives governmental immunity for the VHA, so it generally can be sued for medical malpractice).
Food and Drug Administration
Via its MedWatch system, the FDA receives reports from practitioners and manufacturers of serious adverse events and product problems related to medications and devices within its regulatory authority. Strict confidenti- ality rules apply to the identities of both reporters and patients; governing laws include the federal Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act. Agency regulations since 1995 have protected against disclosure of volun- tary reports held by pharmaceutical, biological, and medical device manu- facturers, by preempting state discovery laws.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
124 TO ERR IS HUMAN
New York Patient Occurrence Reporting and Tracking System
New York operates a leading example of a type of state regulatory sys- tem that collects reports of various types of adverse events. Access to indi- vidual reports is protected by statute. This statutory shield was challenged and was upheld by the courts, according to interviewees. Reports from hos- pitals are also protected by the statute protecting internal investigative re- ports and incident reports. If the department conducts an investigation of a specific event (prompted by a report or by a patient’s complaint) official action is taken by the state (e.g., a statement of deficiencies), and the public and the patient have access to these findings. Accordingly, reporters can expect information reported to become public.
PRACTICAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST THE DISCOVERY OF DATA ON ERRORS
Two practical methods have been used to try to assure those who report errors that their reports will not be used in civil lawsuits against them or their colleagues. The first is simply to promise confidentiality by operational practice, but without full legal support in case of subpoena. Some organiza- tions have tried to abide by a promise not to disclose the reporter’s identity, and so far, have apparently been successful. However they appear to be vulnerable to subpoena.
The second practical protection is to obtain and maintain the data in a manner that prevents identification of the reporter or the specific event, even if a plaintiff obtains access to the report. This can be done with anony- mous reporting (in which case the data recipient never receives any identi- fied information to begin with) and by de-identification of reported data (in which case the identity of the reporter is removed after receipt of the re- port, often after a short lag to permit clarification or additional information to be obtained from the reporter). This section relates experience with these methods.
Confidentiality by Promise and Practice
A promise of confidentiality is sometimes the only option available to private organizations today. Two organizational examples are described be- low. Operational practice to maintain confidentiality can also be important within organizations that have dual roles—quality improvement and enforce-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PROTECTING VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS 125
ment—so that the information on errors is sequestered behind an internal curtain of confidentiality and made available only to those who need access to it for purposes of analysis and prevention. Even such a “firewall” may not have credibility for reporters. The Aviation Safety Reporting System, for ex- ample, was not fully trusted by reporters until it was moved from within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to a separate agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
JCAHO’s sentinel event system is a notable example of confidentiality based on promise and practice. When first proposed in 1996, the policy caused controversy among hospitals fearful of disclosure to JCAHO. JCAHO has since changed its policy to permit hospitals to disclose details through on-site inspection by JCAHO investigators so that information stayed inside the institution and was not reported externally to JCAHO. One legal fear is that disclosure of internal quality data to outside reviewers not under a peer review statute will lead to discovery from JCAHO in law- suits; indeed, many fear that disclosure to JCAHO would invalidate even the nondiscoverability protections each hospital enjoys for its own data un- der its state peer review statute.* A practical fear is that involving numerous outsiders will increase the potential for security breaches. JCAHO is seeking federal statutory protection as a definitive solution to the problem.
The Medical Error Reporting (MER) System also relies on a promise of confidentiality. It receives identified reports of medication errors, almost exclusively from practitioners. The reporter is given the option of not being identified to the sponsoring organizations (see Chapter 5), FDA, and the relevant pharmaceutical company, but the reporter’s identity is maintained within the MER data system. Sometimes, anonymous reports are received. Lawyers have requested and been given copies of general reports on a par- ticular problem, but not specific case reports. The data bank has never been subpoenaed, but the director considers this to be a significant risk that likely contributes to substantial under reporting.
Anonymous Reporting
The intent of anonymous reporting is to ensure that the reporter cannot be identified from the report. The information, therefore, can be used pri- marily as unidentified similar-occurrence data to prove particular aspects of
*The 50-state survey on peer review noted above was undertaken as part of the reaction against the initial JCAHO proposal for mandatory reporting of identified information.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
126 TO ERR IS HUMAN
a case, such as causation. The potential for this kind of generalized legal risk may not significantly deter reporting.
The use of anonymous reporting can reduce the effectiveness of the reporting system. On a practical level, a loss of information can occur be- cause the data system is restricted to receive only the information transmit- ted initially by the reporter. The recipient cannot go back to the reporter to get clarification and additional information.
At a more fundamental level, some detailed information can be lost to the system because it might tend to identify the specific event or the re- porter. This is especially true for injury-producing errors, because of the greater knowledge of the error possessed by a plaintiff compared with per- sons not involved in the event being reported. Plaintiffs know detailed infor- mation about their own cases that could enable each to identify with some certainty even an anonymous report or reporter about the specific injury being litigated. This information could include the dates of the event and the injury, nature and severity of the injury, type of facility, types of practitio- ners, and type and location of error. The names and types of specific equip- ment and drugs involved in the error, if any, also could help make the report identifiable to a plaintiff. As a result, information that is important to meet the needs of the reporting and analysis system might have to be omitted because it would serve to make the report identifiable to a plaintiff.
One example of an anonymous reporting system, is MedMARx. Hospi- tals submit reports on medication errors to MedMARx over the Internet, identified by a random number known only to the submitting hospital. This preserves anonymity, but allows the hospital to compare its experience to similar institutions. Because information is collected in a standardized for- mat, the need to go back to the reporter for additional information is mini- mized. The usefulness of data for comparisons is enhanced by including “demographic” information on reporting hospitals (e.g., size, teaching sta- tus, location of error within hospital), but within categories sufficiently large to frustrate any attempt to identify reporters.
De-Identification
Two programs de-identify data as a practical protection against dis- covery. The Medical Event Reporting System for Transfusion Medicine (MERS-TM) is a private collaboration between blood centers and hospital transfusion services in Texas. Reports are generated within the protected quality assurance structures at each institution, but the Texas peer review
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PROTECTING VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS 127
statute may not apply to the data bank itself. Only near-miss data have been included to date, but the operators of the data bank are nonetheless ex- tremely concerned about the possibility of receiving a subpoena. De-identi- fication is the primary protection, but it causes them to lose information they would like to have about the reporting institution, such as the type of center, size, and location.
In the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), the reporter’s name and contact information are retained temporarily in case additional informa- tion is needed. De-identification usually occurs within 72 hours of the initial receipt of the report. There has been no breach of identity of the reporter in more than 20 years of operation.
SUMMARY
Litigators have strong incentives and powerful legal tools to obtain in- formation about errors to assist them in lawsuits for medical injuries. Many reporting systems contain information that would be useful to plaintiffs. The more that the content of a particular reporting system resembles the claims files of a medical liability insurer, the more attractive a target report- ing system is for the plaintiffs. For example, a reporting system that focuses only on identified injury-causing errors from a small number of institutions is more attractive to plaintiffs than one that collects large numbers of nonidentified near misses from many different types of reporters in different states.
Fear of legal discoverability or involvement in the legal process is be- lieved to contribute to underreporting of errors. Collaborative quality im- provement efforts may be inhibited by the loss of statutory peer review pro- tection that may occur when data are shared across institutions. Some form of protection appears necessary for each of the three components of an error reporting system: (1) the original reporters; (2) the various recipients of the information (including processors, investigators, de-identifiers, and analyz- ers); and (3) the reported information itself. Information voluntarily shared should be done with appropriate safeguards for patient confidentiality.
Legal protections are the only possible way to protect identified report- ers, report recipients, and reports from discovery but legal protections are not without problems. Specific statutory protection for a particular report- ing system may be the most desirable form of protection, but this may not be a realistic option for many systems. Some states’ peer review statutes could be used by some types of reporting systems—for example in California and
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
128 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Oklahoma—but the assurance of protection is not ironclad. Other states’ statutes would need revision to accommodate external data banks and col- laborative efforts. This would require careful drafting that could survive state-by-state political processes, with careful attention to the scope of the protection, definitions of authorized users and uses, potential loopholes, and the like.
A more promising alternative, proposed recently by the Medicare Pay- ment Advisory Commission (1999), is for Congress to enact protective fed- eral legislation.29 Such legislation could be enacted immediately and would not rely on actions to be taken by 50 different states.
Practical methods can be very useful in protecting nonidentified report- ers, recipients, and reported data, but they also have some weaknesses, so reporters may not fully trust them. The level of protection of practical meth- ods differs somewhat for the three components of reporting systems. Re- porters could be protected from subpoena if all potentially identifying infor- mation is absent from the report, but anonymous reporting and de-identification may not be effective if the likely reporter can be identified readily by the plaintiff independent of the reports. This may occur, for ex- ample, when only one person is the logical or mandated reporter for an organization or department within the organization.
Similarly, recipients of reports (processors, investigators, etc.) might be- come identifiable to a plaintiff. A recipient who handles large numbers of reports may not remember details about any specific report. However, if an investigator spent some time on-site looking into a particular event, as might a JCAHO investigator examining a hospital’s root cause analysis of a par- ticular sentinel event, practical methods of protection would likely fail.
Any reported data of an injury-causing error can be protected from use in a lawsuit involving that specific reported injury by practical methods (anonymous reporting or de-identification). In nonidentified form, the re- port might still be useful to plaintiffs in other cases as a similar occurrence, but whether this type of use would deter reporting is an empirical question that might vary with the reporting system and might change over time. In addition, anonymous reporting and de-identified reporting both cause re- ports to lose some information. The information loss would likely be great- est for reports of injury-producing errors, which an informed plaintiff might seek.
Legal protections may help patch up the weaknesses of practical meth- ods of protection. Depending on the nature of the reporting system (geo- graphic catchment, type of reporters, number and type of events reported),
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PROTECTING VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS 129
legal protection may be a necessary supplement to practical protections for possibly identifiable reporters, recipients, and reports. Supplementary legal protection also could ameliorate the loss of data that might otherwise occur to preserve nonidentifiability. If legal use of similar-occurrence data does in fact deter reporting, then legal protection may be desirable to prevent even this type of use. The strongest legal protections would cover the entire chain of custody of the information, from its initial generation to its ultimate use. This strong form of protection is used, for example, in the Health Care Quality Improvement Act’s protection for the peer review process.
The committee concludes that some combination of legal and practical protections would be best. Each alone is imperfect, but they are mutually reinforcing and together can provide the strongest assurance of confidenti- ality.
REFERENCES
1. Steves, Myron F. A Proposal to Improve the Cost to Benefit Relationships in the Medical Professional Liability Insurance System. Duke Law Journal. 16:1305–1333, 1975.
2. Abraham, Kenneth S. and Weiler, Paul C. Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System. Harv L Rev. 108:381, 1994.
3. Sage, William M.; Hastings, K. E.; Berenson, Robert A. Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health Care Quality Improvement. Am J Law Med. 20:1–28, 1994.
4. Bovbjerg, Randall R. and Sloan, Frank A. A No Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence. University of Cincinnati Law Review. 67:53–123, 1998.
5. Many lessons from Workers’ Compensation and one limited medical no-fault ap- proach are set out in Bovbjerg and Sloan, 1998.
6. Federal Rule of Evidence 401: “Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
7. Weinstein’s Federal Evidence 2nd ed., 1998, Vol. 2, Section 401.03. 8. Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, 2nd ed., 1998, Vol. 2, Section 401.07. 9. Federal Rule of Evidence 402.
10. Ziegler v. Superior Court of County of Pima (1982, app) 134 Ariz. 390, 656 P2d 1251. In this case, the names of the patients were removed to protect their privacy.
11. Amente v. Newman 653 So 2d 1030, 20 FLW S172 (1995, Fla). 12. Moore, James W.; Vestal, Allan D.; and Kurland, Phillip B. Moore’s Manual: Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure. 2(15):03[2][a], 1998. 13. “The information sought need not be admissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b).
14. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45. 15. Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 407. 16. Fox v. Kramer (Calif. 6th App. Dist. 1999) 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1772.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
130 TO ERR IS HUMAN
17. Leonard, David R., New Wigmore’s Treatise on Evidence: Selected Rules of Lim- ited Admissibility, Ch. 2, 1999 Suppl., Section 2:46–1.
18. Federal Rule of Evidence 407. 19. Leonard, David R., New Wigmore’s Treatise on Evidence: Selected Rules of Lim-
ited Admissibility, Ch. 2, Supp., Section 2:46–51, 1999. 20. State ex rel. United Hospital Center, Inc. v. Bedell (W. Va. 1997) 484 SE2d 199;
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation v. Eighth Judicial District Court, (Nev. 1997) 936 P2d 844.
21. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation v. Eighth Judicial District Court, (Nev. 1997) 936 P2d 844.
22. Brennan, Elise D. Peer Review Confidentiality. American Health Lawyers Asso- ciation Annual Meeting, 1998.
23. Mills, D. H. Medical Peer Review: The Need to Organize a Protective Approach. Health Matrix. 1(1):67–76, 1991.
24. Mills, 1991. 25. California Business and Professions Code Section 805. 26. City of Edmond v. Parr, 1978 OK 70, 578 P.2d 56 (Okla. 1978). 27. Arnett v. Dal Cielo, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 712 (1995); Arizona Occupations Code Sec-
tion 32-1451.01(E). 28. West Covina Hospital v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 3d 846, 718 P. 2d. 119 (1986). 29. See Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (1999), recommendation 3C,
at p. 36.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ASRS (Aviation Safety Reporting System). 1999. Program Overview. http:// olias.arc.nasa.gov/asrs/Overview.html accessed 28 July 1999.
Berwick, Donald. M. Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Health Care. N Engl J Med. 320:53–56, 1989.
Bodenheimer, Thomas. The American Health Care System—The Movement for Improved Quality in Health Care. N Engl J Med. 340(6):488–492, 1999.
Brown, Lowell C. and Meinhardt, Robyn. Peer Review Confidentiality: Those Old Protections Just Ain’t What They Used to Be. Whittier Law Review. 18:99–104, 1996.
Bovbjerg, Randall R. and Sloan, Frank A. No Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence. University of Cincinnati Law Review. 67:53–123, 1998.
Friend, Gail N., et al. The New Rules of Show and Tell: Identifying and Protecting the Peer Review and Medical Committee Privileges. Baylor Law Review. 49:607–656, 1997.
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. Sentinel Event Policy and Procedures, 1998. http://wwwa.jcaho.org/ns-search/sentinel/ se_poly.htm?NS-search-set=/36c06/aaaa17864c065ea&NS-doc-offset=0& accessed February 9, 1999.
Kutrow, Bradley. Accident Reports Take on New Status with North Carolina Court Ruling. The Business Journal of Charlotte, June 1, 1998. http://www.amcity.com/ charlotte/stories/060198/smallb4.html accessed January 19, 1999.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
PROTECTING VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS 131
Leape, Lucian. Error in Medicine. JAMA. 272:1851–1857, 1994. Leape, Lucian L.; Woods, David D.; Hatlie, Martin J., et al. Promoting patient safety by
preventing medical error. JAMA. 280:1444–1447, 1998. Liang, Bryan A. Error in Medicine: Legal Impediments to U.S. Reform. J Health Polit
Policy Law. 24:27–58, 1999. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. Report to the Congress: Selected Medicare
Issues. Washington, DC: MedPAC, June, 1999. National Patient Safety Foundation. Diverse Groups Come Together to Improve Health
care Safety Through the National Patient Safety Foundation. Press Release August 29, 1997 <http://www.ama-assn.org/med-sci/npsf/pr897.htm>.
Pape, Julie Barker. Physician Data Banks: The Public’s Right to Know Versus the Physician’s Right to Privacy. Fordham Law Review. 66:975–1028, 1997.
Smarr, Lawrence E. A Comparative Assessment of the PIAA Data Sharing Project and the National Practitioner Data Bank: Policy, Purpose, and Application. Law and Cont Prob. 60(1):59–79, 1997.
Weiler, Paul C.; Newhouse, Joseph P.; and Hiatt, Howard H. Proposal for Medical Liability Reform. JAMA. 267:2355–2358, 1992.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
132
The development and availability of standards for patient safety can serve several purposes. They can either establish minimum levels of performance or can establish consistency or uniformity across mul-
tiple individuals and organizations. Another purpose for standards is that they set expectations. The process of developing standards can set expecta- tions for the organizations and health professionals affected by the stan- dards. The publication and dissemination of standards additionally helps to set expectations for consumers and purchasers.
Standards can be developed and used in public regulatory processes, such as licensure for health professionals and licensure for health care orga- nizations, such as hospitals or health plans. Standards can also be developed through private voluntary processes, such as professional certification or organizational accreditation.
Although there are many kinds of standards in health care, especially those promulgated by licensing agencies and accrediting organizations, few standards focus explicitly on issues of patient safety. Furthermore, the cur- rent lack of safety standards does not allow consumers and purchasers to reinforce the need for safe systems from the providers and organizations with whom they have contact. All existing regulatory and voluntary stan- dard-setting organizations can increase their attention to patient safety and should consistently reinforce its importance.
7 Setting Performance
Standards and Expectations for
Patient Safety
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS 133
Expectations for the performance of health professionals and organiza- tions are also shaped by professional groups, purchasers and consumers, and society in general. Professional groups and leaders play a particularly important role in establishing norms and facilitating improvements in per- formance through educational, convening and advocacy activities. Large public and private group purchasers and purchasing coalitions also have the opportunity to shape expectations through marketplace decisions.
This chapter describes how performance standards and expectations can foster improvements in patient safety. Although this report has described the importance of a systems approach for reducing errors in health care, licensing and accreditation of individual practitioners and organizations can also play a role in reinforcing the importance of patient safety. The primary focus is on how existing models of oversight can be strengthened to include a focus on patient safety. In this report, the committee did not undertake an evaluation of the effectiveness of public and private oversight systems to affect quality of care. The committee recognizes, however, that as the orga- nizational arrangements through which health care is delivered change, an evaluation may be appropriate since the existing models of oversight may no longer be adequate.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In the health care industry, standards and expectations about perfor- mance are applicable to health care organizations, health professionals, and drugs and devices. The committee believes there are numerous opportuni- ties to strengthen the focus of the existing processes on patient safety issues.
RECOMMENDATION 7.1 Performance standards and expecta- tions for heath care organizations should focus greater attention on patient safety.
• Regulators and accreditors should require health care organiza- tions to implement meaningful patient safety programs with defined executive responsibility.
• Public and private purchasers should provide incentives to health care organizations to demonstrate continuous improvement in patient safety.
Changes within health care organizations will have the most direct impact on making care delivery processes safer for patients. Regulators and
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
134 TO ERR IS HUMAN
accreditors have a role in encouraging and supporting actions within health care organizations by holding them accountable for ensuring a safe environ- ment for patients.
Health care organizations ought to be developing patient safety pro- grams within their own organizations (see Chapter 8). After a reasonable period of time for health care organizations to set up such programs, regula- tors and accreditors should require patient safety programs as a minimum standard. The marketplace, through purchaser and consumer demands, also exerts influence on health care organizations. Public and private purchasers have three tools that can be employed today to demand better attention to safety by health care organizations. First, purchasers can consider safety is- sues in their contracting decisions. Second, purchasers can reinforce the importance of patient safety by providing relevant information to their em- ployees or beneficiaries. There is increasing attention in providing informa- tion to aid in the selection of health coverage. Information about safety can be part of that process. Finally, purchasers can communicate concerns about patient safety to accrediting bodies to support stronger oversight for patient safety.
RECOMMENDATION 7.2 Performance standards and expecta- tions for health professionals should focus greater attention on pa- tient safety.
• Health professional licensing bodies should
(1) implement periodic reexaminations and relicensing of doc- tors, nurses, and other key providers, based on both competence and knowledge of safety practices; and (2) work with certifying and credentialing organizations to de- velop more effective methods to identify unsafe providers and take action.
• Professional societies should make a visible commitment to patient safety by establishing a permanent committee dedicated to safety improvement. This committee should
(1) develop a curriculum on patient safety and encourage its adoption into training and certification requirements; (2) disseminate information on patient safety to members at spe- cial sessions at annual conferences, journal articles and editorials, newsletters, publications and websites on a regular basis;
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS 135
(3) recognize patient safety considerations in practice guidelines and in standards related to the introduction and diffusion of new technologies, therapies, and drugs; (4) work with the Center for Patient Safety to develop commu- nity-based, collaborative initiatives for error reporting and analysis and implementation of patient safety improvements; and (5) collaborate with other professional societies and disciplines in a national summit on the professional’s role in patient safety.
For most health professionals, current methods of licensing and credentialing assess knowledge, but do not assess performance skills after initial licensure. Although the state grants initial licensure, responsibility for documenting continued competence is dispersed. Competence may be con- sidered when a licensing board reacts to a complaint. It may be evaluated when an individual applies to a health care organization for privileges or network contracting or employment. Professional certification is the current process for evaluating clinical knowledge after licensure and some programs are now starting to consider assessment of clinical skills in addition to clini- cal knowledge. Given the rapid pace of change in health care and the con- stant development of new technologies and information, existing licensing and accreditation processes should be strengthened to ensure that all health care professionals are assessed periodically on both skills and knowledge for practice.
More effective methods for identifying unsafe providers and better co- ordination between the organizations involved are also needed. The time between discovery of a problem, investigation, and action can currently last several years, depending on the issue and procedures for appeal or other processes. Efforts should be made to make this time as short as possible, while ensuring that practitioners have available the due process procedures to which they are entitled. States should also be more active in notifying other states when a practitioner’s license is rescinded. Although unsafe prac- titioners are believed to be few in number and efforts to identify such indi- viduals are not likely to improve overall quality or safety problems through- out the industry, such efforts are important to a comprehensive safety program.
Finally, professional societies and groups should become active leaders in encouraging and demanding improvements in patient safety. Setting stan- dards, convening and communicating with members about safety, incorpo- rating attention to patient safety into training programs, and collaborating across disciplines are all mechanisms that will contribute to creating a cul-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
136 TO ERR IS HUMAN
ture of safety. As patient advocates, health care professionals owe their pa- tients nothing less.
RECOMMENDATION 7.3 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) should increase attention to the safe use of drugs in both pre- and postmarketing processes through the following actions:
• develop and enforce standards for the design of drug packaging and labeling that will maximize safety in use;
• require pharmaceutical companies to test (using FDA-approved methods) proposed drug names to identify and remedy potential sound-alike and look-alike confusion with existing drug names; and
• work with physicians, pharmacists, consumers and others to establish appropriate responses to problems identified through post- marketing surveillance, especially for concerns that are perceived to require immediate response to protect the safety of patients.
FDA’s role is to regulate manufacturers for the safety of their drugs and devices; however, even approved drugs can present safety problems when used in practice. Drugs may be prone to error in use due to sound- alike or look-alike names, unclear labeling, or poorly designed packaging. FDA standards for packaging and labeling of drugs should consider the safety of the products in actual use. Manufacturers should also be required to use proven methods for detecting drug names that sound or look similar. If necessary, Congress should take appropriate action to provide additional enabling authority or clarification of existing authority for FDA to imple- ment this action. Since not all safety problems can be predicted or avoided before a drug is marketed, FDA should also conduct intensive and extensive monitoring to identify problems early and respond quickly when serious threats are discovered in the actual use of approved drugs.
CURRENT APPROACHES FOR SETTING STANDARDS IN HEALTH CARE
Generically, standards can be used to define a process or outcome of care. The Institute of Medicine defines a quality standard as a minimum level of acceptable performance or results or excellent levels of performance or results or the range of acceptable performance or results.1 Other defini- tions for standards have been enacted through legislation, such as the Occu- pational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which defines a safety and health standard as one that requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS 137
more practices, means, methods, operations or processes, reasonably neces- sary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.2 A variety of standards have also been defined through private organizations, such as the American Society for Testing and Materials (see Appendix B). The committee does not recommend one definition or type of standard over another, but recognizes that standards can be quite varied and that as standards specific to safety are developed, they could take multiple forms and focus.
In health care, standards are set through both public, regulatory initia- tives and private, voluntary initiatives. Standards can apply to health care organizations, health professionals, and drugs and medical devices. For health care organizations (e.g., health plans, hospitals, ambulatory care fa- cilities), standards are set through licensure and accreditation and, to some extent, requirements imposed by large purchasers, such as Medicare and Fortune 500 companies. For health care professionals, standards are set through state licensure, board certification, and accrediting and credentialing programs. For drugs and devices, the FDA plays a critical role in standard setting.
In general, current standards in health care do not provide adequate focus on patient safety. Organizational licensure and accreditation focus on the review of core processes such as credentialing, quality improvement, and risk management, but lack a specific focus on patient safety issues. Pro- fessional licensure concentrates on qualifications at initial licensure, with no requirements to demonstrate safe and competent clinical skills during one’s career. Standards for drugs and medical devices concentrate on safe design and production, with less attention to their safe use. Current standards in health care leave serious gaps in ensuring patient safety.
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS
Standards and expectations for health care organizations may be estab- lished through oversight processes, primarily licensing and accreditation re- quirements. Additionally, large public and private purchasers may also im- pose demands on health care organizations. Each is discussed in this section.
Licensing and Accreditation
There is a great deal of variation in state licensure requirements for health care organizations. Responsibility for licensure rests at the state level,
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
138 TO ERR IS HUMAN
with each state setting its own standards, measurement, and enforcement. Although standards and measurement can be made more similar, enforce- ment is always likely to vary to some extent depending on the level of re- sources devoted by a state to this activity.
In many states, licensure and accreditation are intertwined. For hospital licensure, 44 states accept the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization’s evaluation, in whole or in part, as a condition for licensure (Margaret VanAmringe, JCAHO, personal communication, Feb- ruary 23, 1999). Some states may additionally require compliance with other standards related to building safety or medical care issues that are tracked in that particular state. The remaining states do not link hospital licensure and accreditation. Although the overwhelming tendency to use JCAHO increases the consistency of standards nationally, differences in application also con- tribute to the variation in ensuring patient safety. For licensure of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), some states rely on private accrediting bodies, primarily the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), to conduct reviews of health plans. It should also be noted that other health facilities, such as some ambulatory care centers or physicians’ offices, may not be licensed at all and are generally not subject to traditional methods of oversight. One of the few mechanisms in place today that more broadly examines care in the ambulatory setting is managed care organizations.
Three private-sector agencies play a role in organizational accreditation: JCAHO, NCQA, and the American Accreditation Healthcare Commission/ URAC. Each effort, to some degree, encompasses aspects of standard set- ting and performance measurement.
JCAHO accredits more than 18,000 health care organizations, includ- ing hospitals, health plans, home care agencies, and others.3 Its longest- standing accreditation program applies to hospitals. JCAHO accredits hos- pitals for three-year periods based on compliance with its standards in the areas of patient rights and patient care: organizational performance; leader- ship; information management; and nursing and medical staff structures. Approximately 85 percent of hospitals are accredited by JCAHO. Both Joint Commission-accredited hospitals and those accredited by the American Os- teopathic Association are deemed to meet Medicare conditions of participa- tion. JCAHO is incorporating performance information into the accredita- tion process through its Oryx system, in which hospitals will collect clinical data on six measures and submit performance data on these measures. This
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS 139
system was introduced in 1997 and is required by the Joint Commission for a hospital to be accredited. Eventually hospitals will have to demonstrate specific Oryx performance to maintain their accreditation status.
NCQA accredits health plans for periods of one, two, or three years. The accreditation process covers areas related to quality improvement, credentialing, members’ rights and responsibilities, preventive health ser- vices, utilization management, and medical records. Approximately 14 states incorporate accreditation into their licensure requirement for health plans; another six states require that health plans have external reviews, most of which are done by NCQA (Steve Lamb, NCQA, personal communication, March 2, 1999). A number of states also require that health plans serving public employees and/or Medicaid enrollees be accredited. NCQA’s perfor- mance dataset, the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), looks at indicators of effectiveness of care, access or availability, satisfaction, health plan stability, use of services, and costs. Beginning in July 1999, accreditation criteria began to incorporate HEDIS measures, initially being used only if they increase a health plan’s overall score.4 Accreditation status will also change with the top 20 percent of health plans earning the status of “excellent.”
URAC was established in 1990 and offers nine different accreditation programs for managed care organizations, such as health plan accreditation, health network accreditation, health utilization management accreditation, and network practitioner credentialing.5 Individual managed care organiza- tions can seek accreditation under different sets of programs depending on the range of services they offer. URAC accreditation focuses on preferred provider organization (PPO) and point-of-service (POS) plans. Approxi- mately 22 states have incorporated Commission/URAC accreditation into their regulatory structures.
Purchaser Requirements and Demands
Both private and public purchasers have the ability to encourage health care organizations and providers to pursue continuous improvements in patient safety. Large group purchasers, such as Fortune 500 companies or the Health Care Financing Administration, and purchasing coalitions that provide insurance to large numbers of people are well positioned to exert considerable leverage in the marketplace.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
140 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Private Group Purchasers
There are numerous examples of large private employers that incor- porate quality issues into their decision-making process when selecting health plans and providers to offer to employees.6 Xerox Corporation ranks health plans according to various quality indicators, including accreditation status, satisfaction ratings, and quality indicators. ARCO evaluates health plans based on 50 different quality and access criteria, and ties the employer contribution to the premium level of the highest-ranking plan. In a survey of 33 large purchasers in four states, 45 percent reported using HEDIS data (i.e., NCQA’s Healthplan Employer Data and Information Set quality indi- cators), 55 percent reported using accreditation data, and 53 percent re- ported using consumer satisfaction survey data to choose a health plan.7
Although some large employers have incorporated quality consider- ations into their purchasing decisions, this is not the norm. A 1997 survey of 325 U.S. companies found that most employers consider provider network characteristics, but only a fraction consider quantifiable measures of access, quality or outcomes.8 Another survey found that nearly two-thirds of mid- size and large employers are unfamiliar with NCQA accreditation, the most widely used accreditation program for health plans.9
Clearly, there is much opportunity for large employers to place greater emphasis on quality, and specifically patient safety, issues when making deci- sions to contract with a specific health plan and in the design of payment and financial incentive systems to reward demonstrated quality and safety improvements.
Health Care Financing Administration
As a major national purchaser of health care services, HCFA sets stan- dards through payment policies and conditions of participation for the orga- nizations with which it contracts. HCFA provides health insurance for 74 million people through Medicare, and in partnership with the states, Medic- aid, and Child Health Insurance programs.10 It also performs a number of quality-focused activities, including regulation of laboratory testing, surveys and certification, development of coverage policies, and quality improve- ment initiatives.
The peer review organizations (PROs) monitor the utilization and qual- ity of care of Medicare beneficiaries through a state-based network.11 They have three functions. First, they conduct cooperative quality improvement projects in partnership with other quality-focused organizations. Among the
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS 141
current projects are programs on diabetes, end-stage renal disease, influenza campaign, and quality improvement systems for managed care. Second, PROs conduct mandatory case review in response to beneficiary complaints, as well as educational and outreach activities. Third, they oversee program integrity by ensuring that Medicare pays only for medically necessary ser- vices. Patient safety has not been identified as a priority to date, however, HCFA is giving serious consideration to making patient safety a higher pri- ority.12
Medicare and Medicaid survey and certification activities are aimed at ensuring that providers and suppliers for these programs meet health, safety, and program standards.13 They deal with issues related to the effective and efficient delivery of care to beneficiaries, ensuring their safety while in health care facilities and improving their quality of care. HCFA relies on state health agencies as the principal agents to perform certification activities through their licensure activities. As already noted, state health departments, in turn, often rely on JCAHO as part of licensing a hospital.
STANDARDS FOR HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
Performance standards and expectations for health professionals may be defined through regulatory and other oversight processes, such as licens- ing, accreditation, and certification. Standards and expectations may also be shaped by professional societies and other groups that voluntarily pro- mulgate guidelines or protocols and sponsor educational and convening activities.
Licensing, Certification, and Accreditation
Compared to facility licensure (as discussed in the previous section) there is even greater variation found in professional licensure. There are several reasons for this. First, professional licensure is structured through individual licensing boards for each regulated profession in the state.14 The result is variation both within states and across states. Within states, there is little coordination of management or dissemination of information among different boards.15 Across states, there is variation in what is considered a complaint and in the rate at which disciplinary action is taken. Variation in what is considered a “complaint” influences what is investigated and what can be shared and when. A call to the licensing board may be considered a complaint, or a complaint may be recognized only when there is a formal
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
142 TO ERR IS HUMAN
charge. It is not clear, therefore, when information can be shared: when something is filed (which may or may not lead to a charge), while it is being investigated, after there is a charge, or only if disciplinary action is taken. Inconsistencies permit unsafe practitioners to move to different jurisdictions before a complaint can be investigated and handled.16
Although not a comprehensive measure of effectiveness, there is wide variation in the rate at which state licensing boards take serious disciplinary actions against physicians, ranging from 0.85 per 1,000 physicians in Louisi- ana to 15.40 per 1,000 physicians in Alaska, based on data from the Federa- tion of State Medical Boards.17 Across the country, the rate was 3.76 actions per 1,000 physicians in 1998. States that appeared to be doing a better job (more disciplinary actions) tended to have better funding, and more staff, conducted proactive investigations (as opposed to waiting for complaints), used other available data (e.g., Medicare or Medicaid data), had good lead- ership, were independent from state medical societies and other parts of state government, and had a reasonable statutory framework for conducting their work. Board action can also be quite slow. For example, the Virginia Board of Medicine takes an average of more than two and a half years to resolve a case.18
The National Council of State Boards of Nursing has endorsed a mutual recognition model for interstate nursing practice to encourage reciprocal arrangements between states for licensing and disciplinary action (Carolyn Hutcherson, National Council of State Boards of Nursing, personal com- munication, June 1, 1999).19 The goal would be to make licensure more like the rules used for a driver’s license. That is, licensure is recognized across state lines, but the nurse would still be subject to the rules of a state while in that state (e.g., even if a driver’s residence is in Maryland, the driver can still get a speeding ticket in Texas).
Another issue related to professional licensure is that there is no con- tinuing assessment or required demonstration of performance after initial licensure is granted, except for physician assistants and emergency medical technicians.20 In general, the state is involved in initial licensure or follow- up of complaints; processes for documenting continued competence are vol- untary.
For example, physicians may voluntarily seek board certification through one of 24 specialty medical boards that have been approved by the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS).21 The specialty boards set professional and educational standards for the evaluation and certification of physician specialists. Initial certification is granted by passing written and
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS 143
oral examinations. Recertification occurs at seven- to ten-year intervals, al- though not all boards require recertification. Recertification is granted based on self-assessment, examinations, and credentialing (e.g., unrestricted li- cense, good standing in practice, hospital privileges (Linda Blank, American Board of Internal Medicine, personal communication, May 18, 1999). A minimum number of continuing education credits may also be required. At the present time, there is no assessment of practice skills, although some specialty boards have committed a broader and more timely assessment of competence.22
Another voluntary approach is the American Medical Accreditation Pro- gram (AMAP), which is being developed by the American Medical Associa- tion. AMAP is a voluntary process, begun in 1998, for the accreditation of individual physicians that is designed to measure and evaluate individual physicians against national standards and peer performance.23 The program will evaluate physicians in five areas: (1) credentials; (2) personal qualifica- tions (including ethical behavior and participation in continuing medical education, peer reviews, and self-assessment of performance); (3) environ- ment of care (including a site review of office operations and medical records); (4) clinical processes (including standardized measures of key pa- tient care processes and comparative feedback to the physician); and (5) patient outcomes (including standardized measures of patient outcomes, perceptions of care, and health status). Although this is a national program, it is being implemented on a state-by-state basis.
A comparable process is found in nursing, which recognizes specialty practice through board certification. One such specialty certifying body is the American Nurses Credentialing Center (ANCC), a subsidiary of the American Nurses Association. Specialty certifying boards set professional and educational standards for the defined specialty and determine a mecha- nism for establishing continued competency through the recertification pro- cess, which occurs every three to five years, depending on the specialty. Al- though safety is not an explicit focus of certification exams, areas covered may relate to safety, for example, medication errors. Nurses may pursue cer- tification voluntarily, although some states require it for licensure at ad- vanced levels such as nurse practitioner (Ann Carey, R.N., American Nurses Credentialing Center, personal communication, July 20, 1999). Certifying organizations are exploring alternative ways to validate continued compe- tency in addition to continuing education.
Health care organizations are also involved in assessing the continued performance of professionals when hiring nurses or credentialing physicians
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
144 TO ERR IS HUMAN
for hospital privileges, network membership, or employment. Again, there is little consistency in the standards used and little opportunity for commu- nication across organizations. For example, an unsafe provider may be dis- missed from one hospital, with no notification to the licensing board and limited ability for the next hospital to find out the reasons for the dismissal.
The Pew Health Professions Commission conducted an extensive inves- tigation of licensure and continued competency issues. Its report identifies four places in which assessment of competency can occur: upon entry into practice, for continuing authorization to practice, reentry to practice, and after disciplinary action.24 The report recommended increased state regula- tion to require health care practitioners to “demonstrate their competence in the knowledge, judgment, technical skills and interpersonal skills relevant to their jobs throughout their career.” They note that considerations of com- petence should include not only the basic and specialized knowledge and skills, but also other skills such as “capacity to admit errors.” In their view, the current system that relies on continuing education and disciplinary ac- tion after a problem has occurred is insufficient. The trend toward com- puter-based testing should facilitate greater attention to skill assessment in the future. Physician licensure tests and physician recertification are moving toward interactive, computer-based testing, and nursing is also testing a com- puterized system for initial licensure.25
The Role of Health Professional Societies and Groups
Professional societies, groups, and associations can play an important role in improving patient safety by contributing to the creation of a culture that encourages the identification and prevention of errors. Few professional societies or groups have demonstrated a visible commitment to reducing errors in health care and improving patient safety. Although it is believed that the commitment exists among their members, there has been little col- lective action. The exception most often cited is the work that has been done by anesthesiologists to improve safety and outcomes for patients.
Anesthesiology has successfully reduced anesthesia mortality rates from two deaths per 10,000 anesthetics administered to one death per 200,000– 300,000 anesthetics administered (see Chapter 2). This success was accom- plished through a combination of:
• technological changes (new monitoring equipment, standardization of existing equipment);
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS 145
• information-based strategies, including the development and adop- tion of guidelines and standards;
• application of human factors to improve performance, such as the use of simulators for training;
• formation of the Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation to bring to- gether stakeholders from different disciplines (physicians, nurses, manufac- turers) to create a focus for action; and
• having a leader who could serve as a champion for the cause.26
To explore the ways that professional societies could improve patient safety, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) convened a one-day workshop on September 9, 1999 with 14 health professionals representing medicine, nurs- ing, and pharmacy (workshop participants are included in the acknowledg- ments). These leaders are interested and involved in issues related to patient safety and are active in professional societies, although they did not partici- pate in the workshop as representatives of these societies. Four broad roles were identified that could be employed, individually or in combination, to create a culture of safety. These roles are: (1) defining standards of practice; (2) convening and collaborating among society members and with other groups; (3) encouraging research, training and education opportunities; and (4) advocating for change.
One way that professional societies contribute to standards of practice is through the promulgation and promotion of practice guidelines. A num- ber of professional groups have produced practice guidelines and defined best practices in select areas. Guidelines produced by the American College of Cardiology (ACC) and the American Heart Association Task Force of Practice Guidelines are consistently cited models. They have produced six- teen guidelines ranging from coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) to man- agement of chronic angina.27
Pharmacy has also devoted significant attention to patient safety. The American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) has published ex- tensively on safe medication practices. Reduction of medication errors has been an identified priority for a decade and is reflected through publica- tions in professional and scientific journals, educational programming, and advocacy. Included among the standards and guidelines is a widely dissemi- nated list of the top priority actions for preventing adverse drug events in hospitals.
Practice guidelines can also be written through a more interdisciplinary approach, such as the perinatal guidelines published jointly by the American
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
146 TO ERR IS HUMAN
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and the American Academy of Pediatrics. There is now a fourth edition of these guidelines. As recognition has grown that errors are caused by failures in systems, interdis- ciplinary collaboration may become increasingly necessary for redesigning complex systems of care. Participants at the workshop suggested that pro- fessional societies develop guidelines devoted specifically to patient safety and the incorporation of patient safety considerations into other guidelines.
One of the most visible activities of professional groups is their conven- ing function. Through annual conferences and specialty meetings, profes- sional groups can develop and communicate standards, values, and policy statements to membership and key opinion leaders. Meeting conclusions may also be disseminated through their own and other journal publications. There are few examples of specialty meetings or conferences where patient safety has been explicitly included on the agenda. Additionally, there are few interdisciplinary conferences devoted to issues of patient safety. Participants at the workshop proposed a national conference that would bring together all health professions and professionals from other disciplines (e.g., indus- trial engineering, human factors analysis) and other industries (e.g., airline pilots).
Clinical training and education is a key mechanism for cultural change. Colleges of medicine, nursing, pharmacy, health care administration, and their related associations should build more instruction into their curricu- lum on patient safety and its relationship to quality improvement. One of the challenges in accomplishing this is the pressure on clinical education programs to incorporate a broadening array of topics. Many believe that initial exposure to patient safety should occur early in undergraduate and graduate training programs, as well as through continuing education. Clini- cal training programs also need to ensure that teaching opportunities are safe for patients. One workshop participant told of a monitoring device used to alert staff to possible problems with the patient that was turned off be- cause it was seen as interfering with the teaching experience.
The need for more opportunities for interdisciplinary training was also identified. Most care delivered today is done by teams of people, yet training often remains focused on individual responsibilities leaving practitioners in- adequately prepared to enter complex settings. Improving patient safety also requires some understanding of systems theory in order to effectively ana- lyze the many contributing factors that influence errors. Again, the “silos” created through training and organization of care impede safety improve- ments. Instruction in safety improvement requires knowledge about work-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS 147
ing in teams, using information and information technology, quality mea- surement, and communicating with patients about errors. A background in other disciplines is also relevant, such as cognitive psychology, systems theory, and statistics.28 Principles of crew resource management used to train personnel who work together in airline cockpits might also be applicable to health care. Training should also emphasize better communications across disciplines. This is important when the members of a care team are in one physical location, such as a hospital or office setting, but becomes even more important when the care team may not be in one place, such as a team pro- viding home care.
Few professional groups have sufficient resources to devote to research support, although many have established research and education founda- tions. The need for greater collaboration in developing regional databases was noted. A key advantage of establishing these at the regional level is the ability to obtain a sufficient number of cases for meaningful analysis. The number of cases of any particular event in a single hospital or clinical setting is usually too small to be able to generalize across cases and identify a way to make system improvements. Regional data systems can increase numbers to improve analytic power and can facilitate collaboration to understand the extent and nature of errors in health care. Professional societies and groups could participate in efforts to coordinate a research agenda and the develop- ment of databases to provide information on the extent and nature of errors in health care.
Professional groups can also serve as advocates for change. Professional groups have been able to call attention to a health risk and create awareness. For example, pediatricians have been active in promoting increased immu- nization rates, the American Heart Association has promoted diet and exer- cise to prevent heart disease, and the American Medical Association (AMA) has been an outspoken opponent against smoking. Professional groups have not been as visible in advocating for patient safety and communicating such concerns to the general public and policy makers. A notable exception has been the formation of the National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF) by the AMA in 1997 (see Chapter 4). The NSPF has taken a visible role in advocating for improvements in patient safety and communicating with a broad array of audiences. Professional societies can play a role not only in informing their members about patient safety, but also in calling attention to the issue among the general public.
Implementation of activities to increase the role of health professionals in patient safety must occur at multiple levels. Although some professional
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
148 TO ERR IS HUMAN
groups influence and communicate with just their own members, other groups have the potential to influence many audiences. For example, the American Board of Medical Specialties has the potential to influence 24 professional medical societies. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education and the American Association of Colleges of Nursing have the potential to influence numerous training programs. The Associa- tion of American Medical Colleges can influence multiple medical schools and academic medical centers. There are many other similar groups that coordinate across multiple organizations. These “high leverage” groups are critical players in encouraging action among their constituent organizations. They should use their influence to promote greater awareness of patient safety and to consistently reinforce its importance.
STANDARDS FOR DRUGS AND DEVICES
The Food and Drug Administration is a major force in setting standards for medical products and monitoring their safety. FDA regulates prescrip- tion and over-the-counter drugs, medical and radiation-emitting devices, and biologics, among other things. This discussion focuses on its activities re- lated to drugs and devices. It should be noted, however, that the FDA regu- lates manufacturers, not health care organizations or professionals. There are two opportunities for FDA to ensure and enhance patient safety: during its approval process for drugs and devices, and through postmarketing sur- veillance.
FDA has regulatory authority over the naming, labeling, and packaging of drugs and medical devices. FDA approves a product when it judges that the benefits of using the product outweigh the risks for the intended popu- lation and use.29 For drugs, the approval process examines evidence of the effectiveness of the drug and the safety of the drug when used as intended. For devices, FDA looks at the safety and effectiveness of the device com- pared to devices already on the market or else looks for reasonable assur- ance of safety and effectiveness.
A major component of postmarketing surveillance is conducted through adverse event reporting.30 Reports may be submitted directly to the FDA or through MedWatch, FDA’s reporting program. For medical devices, manu- facturers are required to report deaths, serious injures, and malfunctions to FDA. User facilities (hospitals, nursing homes) are required to report deaths to both the manufacturer and FDA, and to report serious injuries to the manufacturer. For suspected adverse events associated with drugs, report-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS 149
ing is mandatory for manufacturers and voluntary for physicians, consum- ers, and others. All reports are entered into the Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS) or another database, which is used to identify problem areas or increased incidence of an event.
FDA receives approximately 235,000 reports annually for adverse drug events and approximately 80,000–85,000 reports on device problems. De- spite the extensive testing that FDA requires before drugs and devices are approved, side effects or other problems invariably show up after they have been released and used widely. Not all risks are identified premarketing be- cause study populations in premarketing trials are often too small to detect rare events, studies may not last long enough to detect some events, and study populations may be dissimilar from the general population.31 Some of these initially unknown risks can be serious or even fatal. The problem is likely to continue and possibly worsen in the future because of the number of new drugs being introduced. In 1998 alone, FDA approved 90 new drugs, 30 new molecular entities (drugs that have never been marketed in this coun- try before), 124 new or expanded uses of already approved drugs, 344 ge- neric drugs, 8 over-the-counter drugs, and 9 orphan drugs, or almost two actions every day of the year.32 Approximately 48 percent of the prescrip- tion drugs on the market today have become available only since 1990.33
Medications are also the most frequent medical intervention, with an aver- age of 11 prescriptions per person in the United States.34
FDA has three general strategies it pursues for corrective action. The first (and most commonly pursued) is negotiation with the manufacturer to make the desired changes. The extent of cooperation from the manufactur- ers can vary. In terms of drugs, names are the most difficult to change, par- ticularly once a name has been trademarked by the company (Jerry Phillips, OPDRA, personal communication, May 4, 1999). Second, FDA may take regulatory action against manufacturers to require changes. This could in- clude name changes or withdrawal of a product from the market. The final type of action that FDA can take is communication about risks, including letters to physicians, pharmacists, and other health professionals, postings on the Internet, and publication of clinical and consumer journals. FDA decisions about corrective action are made on a case-by-case basis, by con- sidering the unexpectedness and seriousness of the event, the vulnerability of the population affected, and the preventability of the event.35
Some concerns have been expressed over the responsiveness of FDA to reported problems. Concerns have related to the timeliness and effective- ness of the agency’s response or that the response to a given problem may
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
150 TO ERR IS HUMAN
not be strong enough given its seriousness. For example, five drugs were removed from the market in between September 1997 and September 1998, but almost 20 million people had been exposed to their risks before they were removed.36 Terfenadine was on the market for 12 years, even though researchers earlier identified it as causing deaths; it was removed from the market by the manufacturer only after a substitute was developed.37
There have been calls for better methods for obtaining more informa- tion about the harm caused by drugs (e.g., greater use of active surveillance systems that look for indicators of problems rather than waiting for reports to be submitted) or for the establishment of an independent drug safety review board.38 In the fall of 1998, FDA changed the process for follow-up on reported drug problems with the creation of a new Office of Post-Mar- keting Drug Risk Assessment (OPDRA). Before, incidents were reviewed by a committee, triaged, and sent back to the division that did the original review. This dispersed responsibility for review and follow-up led to vari- ability in response. Now, OPDRA will conduct an analysis of all reported events and develop recommendations that are sent to the manufacturer and the director of the FDA division that conducted the original review. The division director must report to OPDRA in 60 days on the status of the recommendations. OPDRA estimates that approximately half of the causal factors that contribute to adverse events are issues to which it can respond (e.g., labeling problems); the remainder are outside its scope (e.g., bad hand- writing) (Jerry Phillips, OPDRA, personal communication, May 4, 1999).
With regard to medical devices, in recent years, FDA has increased its requirements and guidance to manufacturers on designing devices to take into account human factors principles and user testing. Attention to human factors could improve simplicity of use, standardization of controls, and de- fault to a safe setting during failure (e.g., loss of power). For example, intra- venous infusion pumps vary markedly in their mode of operation and types of controls. Because they are expensive, hospitals do not replace old pumps when new ones become available, which results in different models being used. The lack of standardization among the models increases the likelihood of error when the pump is set up. Controls on defibrillators can also vary in position, appearance, and function on different machines, leading to errors when they are used rapidly in emergency situations. Although the increased attention to human factors principles does not affect devices already on the market, over time it is expected that manufacturers will become more accus- tomed to using human factors in the design of medical devices.
With the passage of the Safe Medical Device Act of 1990, FDA was
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS 151
granted the authority to require manufacturers of medical devices to estab- lish and follow procedures for ensuring that device design addressed the intended use of the device and its users.39 Final rules for this act became effective in June 1997. FDA has continued to emphasize to manufacturers the importance of human factors and is expected to issue a manual of engi- neering and design guidelines for manufacturers in 1999.
In terms of drugs, the use of human factors principles could reduce confusion of medications that occur because of brand names that look alike or sound alike, labels that are hard to read, and look-alike packaging. Wrong doses also occur frequently because of factors such as the lack of standard- ized terms in the display of contents. For example, contents displayed by concentration (e.g., 10 mg/mL) rather than total amount (e.g., 100 mg) can result in an overdose. There may also be inconsistent placement of warnings on a label or inconsistent use of abbreviations. Most recently, more than 100 errors have been reported in the use of Celebrex (prescribed for arthritis) and its confusion with Cerebyx (an antiseizure medication) and Celexa (an antidepressant).40 FDA does not have guidance for using human factors principles in the packaging, labeling, or naming of drugs as exists relative to medical devices.
SUMMARY
The main sources of standards for health care organizations and profes- sionals today are through licensing and accreditation processes. However, medical errors and patient safety are not an explicit focus of licensing and accreditation. Although licensing and accreditation standards do speak to the characteristics of quality improvement programs, and patient safety and error reduction may be part of these programs, many licensed and fully ac- credited organizations have yet to implement the most rudimentary systems and processes to ensure patient safety. Furthermore, the extent of variation in licensure within and across states suggests that there is no reliable assur- ance of safety to patients, even for those facilities and professionals covered under current rules.
Although current standard-setting authorities in health care are not de- voting adequate attention to patient safety issues, the committee considered and rejected the option of recommending the creation of yet another regula- tory authority. The recommendations contained in this chapter direct the existing regulatory structures to increase attention to patient safety issues. Licensing agencies and accrediting organizations have to hold health care
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
152 TO ERR IS HUMAN
organizations accountable for creating and maintaining safe environments. Professional licensing bodies should consider continuing qualifications over a lifetime of practice, not just at initial licensure. Standards for approving drugs and devices must consider safety for patients in actual use and real-life settings, not just safe production.
The actions of professional groups and group purchasers in setting stan- dards and expectations are also critical. Professional groups shape profes- sional behavior by developing practice guidelines and identifying best prac- tices and through educational, convening and advocacy activities. All could be enhanced by a sharper focus on patient safety issues. Group purchasers have the ability to consider safety issues in their contracting decisions, and to reinforce the importance of safety by providing relevant information to employees and beneficiaries.
REFERENCES
1. Institute of Medicine, Clinical Practice Guidelines, Directions for a New Program, eds. Marilyn J. Field and Kathleen N. Lohr, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1990.
2. “All About OSHA,” OSHA 2056 1995 (revised), Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor, www.osha.gov.
3. “Joint Commission Accreditation,” http://www.jcaho.org/whoweare_frm. html 4. “NCQA Accreditation,” Business and Health, 17(1):21 (January, 1999). 5. “About URAC,” http://www.urac.org 6. General Accounting Office. Private Health Insurance: Continued Erosion of Cov-
erage Linked to Cost Pressures. GAO/HEHS 97-122. Washington, DC: July 1997b. 7. Hibbard, Judith H.; Jewett, Jacquelyn J.; Legnini, Mark W., et al. Choosing a
Health Plan: Do Large Employers Use the Data. Health Affairs. 16(6):172–180, 1997. 8. Washington Business Group on Health and Watson Wyatt Worldwide. Getting
What You Pay for—Purchasing Value in Health Care. Bethesda, MD: Watson Wyatt Worldwide, 1997.
9. KPMG Peat Marwick. Health Benefits in 1997. Montvale, NJ: 1997. 10. http://www.hcfa.gov. 11. “Quality of Care Information, HCFA Contractors, Peer Review Organizations,”
http://www.hcfa.gov/qlty-56.htm, last updated July 26, 1999. 12. Timothy Cuerdon, Office of Clinical Standards and Quality, Health Care Financ-
ing Administration, Testimony to the IOM Subcommittee on Creating an External Envi- ronment for Quality, June 15, 1999.
13. “Medicare and Medicaid Survey and Certification,” http://www.hcfa.gov/medic- aid/scindex.htm
14. O’Neil, Edward H., and the Pew Health Professions Commission, San Francisco, CA: Pew Health Professions Commission, December 1998.
15. Finocchio, Leonard J.; Dower, Catherine M.; Blick, Noelle T., et al., Strengthen-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS 153
ing Consumer Protection: Priorities for Health Care Workforce Regulation, San Francisco, CA; Pew Health Professions Commission, October 1998.
16. Maintaining State-Based Licensure and Discipline: A Blueprint for Uniform and Effective Regulation of the Medical Profession, Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc., 1998. http://www.fsmb.org.
17. Sidney M. Wolfe, “Public Citizen’s Health Research Group Ranking of State Medical Boards’ Serious Disciplinary Actions in 1998,” April, 1999, http://www.citizen. org. Serious disciplinary actions include revocations, surrenders, suspensions and proba- tions/restrictions on licensure.
18. Timberg, Craig, “Virginia’s Physician Discipline Board too Slow to Act, Audit Finds,” Washington Post, June 15, 1999, p. A20.
19. Finocchio, Dower, Blick, et al., 1998. 20. Finocchio, Dower, Blick, et al., 1998. 21. “What Is ABMS?” http://www.abms.org/purpose.html. 22. Prager, Linda O. Upping the Certification Ante. American Medical News.
42(21):1, 1999. Also, American Board of Internal Medicine, Continuing Professional De- velopment. September, 1999. See also: Norcini, John J., “Computer-Based Testing Will Soon Be a Reality,” Perspective, American Board of Internal Medicine, Summer, 1999, p. 3.
23. “A Definition,” http://www.ama-assn.org/med-sci/amapsite/about/define.htm. 24. Finocchio, Dower, Blick, et al., 1998. 25. Computerized Clinical Simulation Testing (CST), National Council of State Boards
of Nursing, Inc., 1999. http://www.ncsbn.org. 26. Pierce, Ellison C. The 34th Rovenstine Lecture, 40 Years Behind the Mask: Safety
Revisited. Anesthesiology. 87(4):965–975, 1996. 27. http://www.acc.org/clinical/guidelines. 28. President’s Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in Health Care.
Quality First: Better Health Care for All Americans. Final Report to the President of the United States, March 1997.
29. Food and Drug Administration, “Managing the Risks From Medical Product Use, Creating a Risk Management Framework,” Executive Summary, Report to the FDA Com- missioner from the Task Force on Risk Management, May 1999.
30. Additional strategies include field investigations, epidemiological studies and other focused studies.
31. Food and Drug Administration, “Managing the Risks From Medical Product Use, Creating a Risk Management Framework,” Report to the FDA Commissioner from the Task Force on Risk Management, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, May 1999.
32. Food and Drug Administration, “Improving Public Health Through Human Drugs,” CDER 1998 Report to the Nation, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, USDHHS.
33. Shatin, Deborah; Gardner, Jacqueline; Stergachis, Andy; letter. JAMA. 281(4): 319–320, 1999.
34. Friedman, Michael A.; Woodcock, Janet; Lumpkin, Murray M., et al. The Safety of Newly Approved Medicines, Do Recent Market Removals Mean There Is a Problem? JAMA. 281(18):1728–1934, 1999.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
154 TO ERR IS HUMAN
35. Food and Drug Administration. Managing the Risks From Medical Product Use, Creating a Risk Management Framework. Report to the FDA Commissioner from the Task Force on Risk Management, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, May 1999.
36. Friedman, Woodcock, Lumpkin, et al, 1999. Also Wood, Alastair J.J. The Safety of New Medicines. JAMA. 281(18):1753–1754, 1999.
37. Moore, Thomas J; Psaty, Bruce M; Furberg, Curt D. Time to Act on Drug Safety. JAMA, 279(19):1571–1573, 1998.
38. Moore, Psaty, and Furberg, 1998. See also Wood, Alastair J.J. and Woosely, Raymond. Making Medicine Safer, The Need for an Independent Drug Safety Review Board. N Engl J Med. 339(25):1851–1853, 1998.
39. Weinger, Matthew; Pantiskas, Carl; Wiklund, Michael, et al. Incorporating Hu- man Factors Into the Design of Medical Devices. JAMA. 280(17):1484, 1998.
40. Look Alike/Sound Alike Drug Names, Ambiguous or Look-Alike Labeling and Packaging. ISMP Quarterly Action Agenda: April–June, 1999, ISMP Medication Safety Alert, July 14, 1999. Institute for Safe Medication Practices, Pennsylvania.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
155
8 Creating
Safety Systems in Health Care Organizations
Unsafe acts are like mosquitoes. You can try to swat them one at a time, but there will always be others to take their place. The only effective remedy is to drain the swamps in which they breed. In the case of errors and violations, the “swamps” are equipment designs that promote operator error, bad communications, high workloads, budgetary and commercial pressures, procedures that necessitate their violation in order to get the job done, inadequate organization, missing barriers, and safeguards . . . the list is potentially long but all of these latent factors are, in theory, detectable and correctable before a mishap occurs.1
S afety systems in health care organizations seek to prevent harm to patients, their families and friends, health care professionals, con- tract-service workers, volunteers, and the many other individuals
whose activities bring them into a health care setting. Safety is one aspect of quality, where quality includes not only avoiding preventable harm, but also making appropriate care available—providing effective services to those who could benefit from them and not providing ineffective or harmful services.2
As defined in Chapter 3, patient safety is freedom from accidental injury. This definition and this report intentionally view safety from the perspective of the patient. Accordingly, this chapter focuses specifically on patient safety. The committee believes, however, that a safer environment for patients would also be a safer environment for workers and vice versa, because both
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
156 TO ERR IS HUMAN
are tied to many of the same underlying cultural and systemic issues. As cases in point, hazards to health care workers because of lapses in infection control, fatigue, or faulty equipment may result in injury not only to workers but also to others in the institution.
This chapter introduces what has been learned from other high-risk in- dustries about improving safety. It then discusses key concepts for designing systems and their application in health care. This is followed by a discussion of five principles to guide health care organizations in designing and imple- menting patient safety programs. Lastly, the chapter discusses a critical area of safety, namely medication safety and illustrates the principles with strate- gies that health care organizations can use to improve medication safety.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The committee is convinced that there are numerous actions based on both good evidence and principles of safe design that health care organiza- tions can take now or as soon as possible to substantially improve patient safety. Specifically, the committee makes two overarching recommendations: the first concerns leadership and the creation of safety systems in health care settings; the second concerns the implementation of known medication safety practices.
RECOMMENDATION 8.1 Health care organizations and the pro- fessionals affiliated with them should make continually improved pa- tient safety a declared and serious aim by establishing patient safety programs with a defined executive responsibility. Patient safety pro- grams should: (1) provide strong, clear, and visible attention to safety; implement nonpunitive systems for reporting and analyzing errors within their organizations; (2) incorporate well-understood safety principles, such as, standardizing and simplifying equipment, sup- plies, and processes; and (3) establish interdisciplinary team training programs, such as simulation, that incorporate proven methods of team management.
Chief executive officers and boards of trustees must make a serious and ongoing commitment to creating safe systems of care. Other high-risk indus- tries have found that improvements in safety do not occur unless there is commitment by top management and an overt, clearly defined, and continu- ing effort on the part of all personnel and managers. Like any other pro- gram, a meaningful safety program should include senior-level leadership,
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 157
defined program objectives, plans, personnel, and budget, and should be monitored by regular progress reports to the executive committee and board of directors.
According to Cook,3 Safety is a characteristic of systems and not of their components. Safety is an emergent property of systems. In order for this prop- erty to arise, health care organizations must develop a systems orientation to patient safety, rather than an orientation that finds and attaches blame to individuals. It would be hard to overestimate the underlying, critical impor- tance of developing such a culture of safety to any efforts that are made to reduce error. The most important barrier to improving patient safety is lack of awareness of the extent to which errors occur daily in all health care settings and organizations. This lack of awareness exists because the vast majority of errors are not reported, and they are not reported because per- sonnel fear they will be punished.
Health care organizations should establish nonpunitive environments and systems for reporting errors and accidents within their organizations. Just as important, they should develop and maintain an ongoing process for the discovery, clarification, and incorporation of basic principles and inno- vations for safe design and should use this knowledge in understanding the reasons for hazardous conditions and ways to reduce these vulnerabilities. To accomplish these tasks requires that health care organizations provide resources to monitor and evaluate errors and to implement methods to re- duce them.
Organizations should incorporate well-known design principles in their work environment. For example, standardization and simplification are two fundamental human factors principles that are widely used in safe industries and widely ignored in health care.
They should also establish interdisciplinary team training programs— including the use of simulation for trainees and experienced practitioners for personnel in areas such as the emergency department, intensive care unit, and operating room; and incorporating proven methods of managing work in teams as exemplified in aviation (where it is known as crew resource management).
RECOMMENDATION 8.2 Health care organizations should imple- ment proven medication safety practices.
A number of practices have been shown to reduce errors in the medica- tion process and to exemplify known methods for improving safety. The committee believes they warrant strong consideration by health care organi-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
158 TO ERR IS HUMAN
zations including hospitals, long-term-care facilities, ambulatory settings, and other health care delivery sites, as well as outpatient and community pharmacies. These methods include: reducing reliance on memory; simplifi- cation; standardization; use of constraints and forcing functions; the wise use of protocols and checklists; decreasing reliance on vigilance, handoffs, and multiple data entry; and differentiating among products to eliminate look-alike and sound-alike products.
INTRODUCTION
Errors occur in all industries. Some industrial accidents involve one or a few workers. Others affect entire local populations or ecosystems. In health care, events are well publicized when they appear to be particularly egre- gious—for example, wrong-site surgery or the death of a patient during what is thought to be a routine, low-risk procedure. Generally, however, accidents are not well publicized; indeed, they may not be known even to the patient or to the family. Because the adverse effects may be separated in time or space from the occurrence, they may not even be recognized by the health care workers involved in the patient’s care.
Nevertheless, we know that errors are ubiquitous in all health care set- tings.4 Harms range from high-visibility cases to those that are minimal but require additional treatment and time for the patient to recuperate or result in a patient’s failure to receive the benefit of appropriate therapy. In aggre- gate, they represent a huge burden of harm and cost to the American people as described in Chapter 2.
To date, however, those involved in health care management and deliv- ery have not had specific, clear, high-level incentives to apply what has been learned in other industries about ways to prevent error and reduce harm. Consequently, the development of safety systems, broadly understood, has not been a serious and widely adopted priority within health care organiza- tions. This report calls on organizations and on individual practitioners to address patient safety.
Health care is composed of a large set of interacting systems—para- medic, emergency, ambulatory, inpatient care, and home health care; testing and imaging laboratories; pharmacies; and so forth—that are connected in loosely coupled but intricate networks of individuals, teams, procedures, regulations, communications, equipment, and devices that function with dif- fused management in a variable and uncertain environment.5 Physicians in community practice may be so tenuously connected that they do not even
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 159
view themselves as part of a system of care. They may see the hospitals in which they are attendings as platforms for their work. In these and many other ways, the distinct cultures of medicine (and other health professions) add to the idiosyncrasy of health care among high-risk industries.
Nevertheless, experience in other high-risk industries has provided well- understood illustrations that can be used in improving health care safety. Studies of actual accidents, incident-reporting systems, and research on hu- man factors (i.e., the interface of human beings and machines and their per- formance in complex working environments) have contributed to our grow- ing understanding about how to prevent, detect, and recover from accidents. This has occurred because, despite their differences from health care, all systems have common characteristics that include the use of technologies, the users of these technologies, and an interface between the users and the technologies.6 The users of technology bring certain characteristics to a task such as the quality of their knowledge and training, level of fatigue, and careful or careless habits. They also bring characteristics that are common to everyone, including difficulty recalling material and making occasional errors.
Safety Systems in High-Risk Industries
The experience in three high-risk industries—chemical and material manufacturing and defense—provides examples of the information and sys- tems that can contribute to improved safety and of the safety achievements that are possible. Claims that health care is unique and therefore not suscep- tible to a transfer of learning from other industries are not supportable. Rather, the experiences of other industries provide invaluable insight about how to begin the process of improving the safety of health care by learning how to prevent, detect, recover, and learn from accidents.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company has one of the lowest rates of occupational injury of any company, substantiation of an 11-point safety philosophy that includes the tenets that all injuries are preventable; that man- agement is responsible and accountable for preventing injury; that safety must be integrated as a core business and personal value; and that deficien- cies must be corrected promptly. In 1994, Conoco Refining, a subsidiary, reported only 1.92 work-loss days per 200,000 hours of exposure. In 1998,
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
160 TO ERR IS HUMAN
this rate was further reduced to 0.39. Some of DuPont’s plants with more than 2,000 employees have operated for more than 10 years without a lost- time injury, and one plant producing glycolic acid celebrated 50 years with- out a lost workday.7 DuPont credits its safety record, at least in part, to its implementation of a nonpunitive system to encourage employees to report near-miss incidents without fear of sanctions or disciplinary measures and its objective to create an all-pervasive, ever-present awareness of the need to do things safely.8,9
Alcoa, Inc.
Another industry example is Alcoa, which is involved in mining, refin- ing, smelting, fabricating, and recycling aluminum and other materials. Alcoa uses a worldwide on-line safety data system to track incidents, analyze their causes, and share preventive actions throughout all of its holdings. One of its principles is that all incidents, including illnesses, injuries, spills, and ex- cursions, can be prevented whether they are immediate, latent, or cumula- tive. Although Alcoa reduced its international lost work day rate per 200,000 hours worked from 1.87 in 1987 to 0.42 in 1997, it has recently gone even further and announced a plan to eliminate fatalities and reduce the average injury rate by 50 percent by the end of the year 2000.10
Several aspects of these two examples are striking. In comparison to the health care industry, DuPont, Alcoa, and others systematically collect and analyze data about accidents. They have been tracking their own perfor- mance over time and are able to compare themselves to others in their in- dustries. They are willing to publish their results as information to which stockholders and employees are entitled and as a source of pride, and their efforts have achieved extremely low and continuously decreasing levels of injury. The importance of a strong culture of safety, as nurtured by both DuPont and Alcoa, is viewed by many in the safety field as being the most critical underlying feature of their accomplishments.
U.S. Navy: Aircraft Carriers
People are quick to point out that health care is very different from a manufacturing process, mostly because of the huge variability in patients and circumstances, the need to adapt processes quickly, the rapidly chang- ing knowledge base, and the importance of highly trained professionals who must use expert judgment in dynamic settings. Though not a biological sys-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 161
tem, the performance of crews and flight personnel on aircraft carriers pro- vides an example that has features that are closer to those in health care environments than manufacturing.
On an aircraft carrier, fueling aircraft and loading munitions are ex- amples of the risks posed when performing incompatible activities in close proximity. On the flight deck, 100 to 200 people fuel, load munitions, and maintain aircraft that take off and are recovered at 48- to 60-second inter- vals. The ability to keep these activities separate requires considerable orga- nizational skill and extensive ongoing training to avoid serious injury to flight and nonflight personnel, the aircraft, and the ship. Despite extremely dan- gerous working conditions and restricted space, the Navy’s “crunch rate” aboard aircraft carriers in 1989 was only 1 per 8,000 moves which makes it a very highly reliable, but complex, social organization.*
Students of accident theory emphasize how the interactive complexity of an organization using hazardous technologies seems to defy efforts of system designers and operators to prevent accidents and ensure reliability. In part, this is because individuals are fallible and in part because unlikely and rare (and thus unanticipated) failures in one area are linked in complex systems and may have surprising effects in other systems—the tighter the “coupling,” generally, the more likely that failure in one part will affect the reliability of the whole system. Nevertheless, even in such systems, great consistency is achievable using four strategies in particular: the prioritization of safety as a goal; high levels of redundancy, the development of a safety culture that involves continuous operational training, and high-level organi- zational learning.11
Weick and Roberts12 have studied peacetime flight operations on air- craft carriers as an example of organizational performance requiring nearly continuous operational reliability despite complex patterns of interrelated activities among many people. These activities cannot be fully mapped out beforehand because of changes in weather (e.g., wind direction and strength), sea conditions, time of day and visibility, returning aircraft arriv- als, and so forth. Yet, surprisingly, generally mapped out sequences can be carried out with very high reliability in novel situations using improvisation and adaptation and personnel who are highly trained but not highly edu- cated.
*A crunch occurs when two aircraft touch while being moved, either on the flight or hangar deck, even if damage is averted.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
162 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Naval commanders stress the high priority of safety. They understand the importance of a safety culture and use redundancy (both technical and personnel) and continuous training to prepare for the unexpected. The Navy also understands the need for direct communication and adaptability. Be- cause errors can arise from a lack of direct communication, the ship’s con- trol tower communicates directly with each division over multiple channels.
As in health care, it is not possible in such dynamic settings to anticipate and write a rule for every circumstance. Once-rigid orders that prescribed how to perform each operation have been replaced by more flexible, less hierarchical methods. For example, although the captain’s commands usu- ally take precedence, junior officers can, and do, change these priorities when they believe that following an order will risk the crew’s safety. Such an ex- ample demonstrates that even in technologically sophisticated, hazardous, and unpredictable environments it is possible to foster real-time problem solving and to institute safety systems that incorporate a knowledge of hu- man factors.
In summary, efforts such as those described in the three examples have resulted neither in stifled innovation nor loss of competitive benefit; nor have they resulted in unmanageable legal consequences. Rather, they are a source of corporate and employee pride. Characteristics that distinguish suc- cessful efforts in other industries include the ability to collect data on errors and incidents within the organization in order to identify opportunities for improvement and to track progress. The companies make these data avail- able to outsiders. Other notable features of these efforts include the impor- tance of leadership and the development of a safety culture, the use of so- phisticated methods for the analysis of complex processes, and a striving for balance among standardization where appropriate, yet giving individuals the freedom to solve problems creatively.
KEY SAFETY DESIGN CONCEPTS
Designing safe systems requires an understanding of the sources of er- rors and how to use safety design concepts to minimize these errors or allow detection before harm occurs. This field is described in greater detail in Chapter 3 which includes an error taxonomy first proposed by Rasmussen13
and elaborated by Reason14 to distinguish among errors arising from (1) skill-based slips and lapses; (2) rule-based errors; and (3) knowledge-based mistakes.
Leape has simplified this taxonomy to describe what he calls “the patho- physiology of error.” He differentiates between the cognitive mechanisms
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 163
used when people are engaging in well-known, oft-repeated processes and their cognitive processes when problem solving. The former are handled rapidly, effortlessly, in parallel with other tasks, and with little direct atten- tion. Errors may occur because of interruptions, fatigue, time pressure, an- ger, anxiety, fear, or boredom. Errors of this sort are expectable, but condi- tions of work can make them less likely. For example, work activities should not rely on weak aspects of human cognition such as short-term memory. Safe design, therefore, avoids reliance on memory.
Problem-solving processes, by contrast, are slower, are done sequen- tially (rather than in parallel with other tasks), are perceived as more diffi- cult, and require conscious attention. Errors are due to misinterpretation of the problem that must be solved, lack of knowledge to bring to bear, and habits of thought that cause us to see what we expect to see. Attention to safe design includes simplification of processes so that users who are unfa- miliar with them can understand quickly how to proceed, training that simu- lates problems, and practice in recovery from these problems.
As described in Chapter 3, instances of patient harm are usually attrib- uted to individuals “at the sharp end” who make the visible error. Their prevention, however, requires systems that are designed for safety—that is, systems in which the sources of human error have been systematically recog- nized and minimized.15,16
In recent years, students of system design have looked for ways to avoid error using what has been called by Donald Norman17 “user-centered de- sign.” This chapter draws on six strategies that Norman outlines. They are directed at the design of individual devices so that they can be used reliably and safely for their intended purposes. Although these strategies are aimed at the human–machine interface, they can also be usefully applied to pro- cesses of care.
The first strategy is to make things visible—including the conceptual model of the system—so that the user can determine what actions are pos- sible at any moment—for example, how to turn off a piece of equipment, how to change settings, and what is likely to happen if a step in a process is skipped. The second strategy is to simplify the structure of tasks so as to minimize the load on working memory, planning, or problem solving.
A third strategy is what Norman calls the use of affordances and natural mappings. An affordance is a characteristic of equipment or workspace that communicates how it is to be used, such as a push bar on an outward open- ing door that indicates where to push. Another example is a telephone hand- set that is uncomfortable to hold in any position but the correct one.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
164 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Natural mapping refers to the relationship between a control and its movement; for example, in steering a car to the right, one turns the wheel right. Natural mapping takes advantage of physical analogies and cultural knowledge to help users understand how to control devices. Other examples of natural mapping are arranging light switches in the same pattern as lights in a lecture room; arranging knobs to match the arrangement of burners on a stove; or using louder sound, an increasingly brighter indicator light, or a wedge shape to indicate a greater amount.
A fourth important strategy is the use of constraints or “forcing func- tions” to guide the user to the next appropriate action or decision. A con- straint makes it hard to do the wrong thing; a forcing function makes it impossible. A classic example of a forcing function is that one cannot start a car that is in gear.
Norman’s fifth strategy is to assume that errors will occur and to design and plan for recovery by making it easy to reverse operations and hard to carry out nonreversible ones. An example is the Windows computer oper- ating system that asks if the user really intends to delete a file, and if so, puts it in a “recycle” folder so that it can still be retrieved.
Finally, Norman advises that if applying the earlier strategies does not achieve the desired results, designers should standardize actions, outcomes, layouts, and displays. An example of standardization is the use of protocols for chemotherapy. An example of simplification is reducing the number of dose strengths of morphine in stock.
Safety systems can be both local and organization wide. Local systems are implemented at the level of a small work group—a department, a unit, or a team of health care practitioners. Such local safety systems should be supported by, and consistent with, organization-wide safety systems.
Anesthesiology is an example of a local, but complex, high-risk, dy- namic patient care system in which there has been notably reduced error. Responding to rising malpractice premiums in the mid-1980s, anesthesiolo- gists confronted the safety issues presented by the need for continuing vigi- lance during long operations but punctuated by the need for rapid problem evaluation and action. They were faced with a heterogeneity of design in anesthesia devices; fatigue and sleep deprivation; and competing institu- tional, professional, and patient care priorities. By a combination of techno- logical advances (most notably the pulse oximeter), standardization of equip- ment, and changes in training, they were able to bring about major, sustained, widespread reduction in morbidity and mortality attributable to the admin- istration of anesthesia.18
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 165
Organization-wide systems, on the other hand, are implemented and monitored at the level of a health care organization. These include programs and processes that cross departmental lines and units. In hospitals, infection control and medication administration are examples of organization-wide systems that encompass externally imposed regulations, institutional poli- cies and procedures, and the actions of individuals who must provide poten- tially toxic materials at the right time to the right patient.
PRINCIPLES FOR THE DESIGN OF SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS
Hospitals and other institutions have long-standing efforts to ensure patient safety in a variety of areas. Appendix E provides an overview of some of these efforts in hospitals. Some have been very effective in certain units or certain hospitals. These activities have not, however, succeeded in eliminating error or injury, and they have not been part of national or even institution-wide, high-priority efforts.
Compared to hospital care, out-of-hospital care—whether in institu- tions, homes, medical offices or other settings, both the knowledge of the kind and magnitude of errors and the development of safety systems are rudimentary. Safety tends to be addressed narrowly by reliance on education and training, policies, and procedures. There are undoubtedly many reasons for the lack of attention to safety including: small staff size, lack of technical knowledge of effective ways to improve quality or an infrastructure to sup- port deploying this knowledge; lack of recognition of error (because the harm is removed in time or space from the error and because individuals are unharmed); lack of data systems to track and learn from error (most of the adverse drug events studies use emergency visits or hospital admissions to establish a denominator); the speed of change and the introduction of new technologies; and clearly, the same cultural barriers that exist in hospi- tals—namely, the high premium placed on medical autonomy and perfec- tion and a historical lack of interprofessional cooperation and effective communication.
With the rise in outpatient and office-based surgery, attention is turning to anesthesia safety in settings such as private physician offices, dental, and podiatry offices. For example, guidelines for patient assessment, sedation, monitoring, personnel, emergency care, discharge evaluation, maintenance of equipment, infection control, and the like have been developed by an ad hoc committee for New York State practitioners.19
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
166 TO ERR IS HUMAN
After reviewing what has been learned from other high-risk industries as well as the evidence of practices that can improve health care safety, the committee has identified a set of five principles that it believes can be use- fully applied to the design of safe health care, whether in a small group practice, a hospital, or a large health care system. These principles include: (1) providing leadership; (2) respect for human limits in the design process; (3) promoting effective team functioning; (4) anticipating the unexpected; and (5) creating a learning environment.
Principle 1. Provide Leadership
• Make patient safety a priority corporate objective. • Make patient safety everyone’s responsibility. • Make clear assignments for and expectation of safety oversight. • Provide human and financial resources for error analysis and systems
redesign. • Develop effective mechanisms for identifying and dealing with un-
safe practitioners.
Make Patient Safety a Priority Corporate Objective
The health care organization must develop a culture of safety such that an organization’s design processes and workforce are focused on a clear goal—dramatic improvement in the reliability and safety of the care process. The committee believes safety must be an explicit organizational goal that is demonstrated by clear organizational leadership and professional support as seen by the involvement of governing boards, management, and clinical lead- ership. This process begins when boards of directors demonstrate their com- mitment to this objective by regular, close oversight of the safety of the insti- tutions they shepherd.
Reviews of progress in reaching goals and system design should be re- peated, detailed, quantitative, and demanding. Ways to implement this at the executive level include frequent reports highlighting safety improvement and staff involvement, regular reviews of safety systems, “walk-throughs” to evaluate hazardous areas and designs, incorporation of safety improvement goals into annual business plans, and providing support for sensible forms of simplification.
Recommendations 5.1 and 7.1 also address institutional accountability for safety. Recommendation 5.1 calls for mandatory reporting of serious ad- verse events by health care organizations. Recommendation 7.1 urges regu-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 167
lators to focus greater attention on patient safety by requiring health care organizations to implement meaningful patient safety programs with defined executive responsibility and for public and private purchasers to provide incentives to health care organizations to demonstrate continuous improve- ment in patient safety.
Make Patient Safety Everyone’s Responsibility
Messages about safety must signal that it is a serious priority of the insti- tution, that there will be increased analysis of system issues with awareness of their complexity, and that they are endorsed by nonpunitive solutions encouraging the involvement of the entire staff. The messages must be well conceived, repeated, and consistent across health care systems, and should stress that safety problems are quality problems. Establishing and clearly conveying such aims are essential in creating safety systems.
All organizations must allocate resources to both production and safety. Although compatible in the long run, they may not be in the short run, which often results in considerable short-run tension. Health care institu- tions must be both accountable to the public for safety and able to address error and improve their performance without unreasonable fear of the threat of civil liability. This, too, creates tension between ensuring the transparency that allows institutions to be viewed publicly as trustworthy and the confi- dence that their workers have in identifying and addressing error without fear of formal or informal reprisal.
The committee recommends that health care professionals as well as health care organizations make safety a specific aim. Many, if not most, phy- sicians in community practice view organizations such as hospitals primarily as platforms for their work and do not see themselves as being part of these larger organizations. Nevertheless, their participation in the safety efforts of these organizations is crucial. Health care practitioners should seek to affili- ate themselves with organizations that embrace such aims, whether the orga- nizations are hospitals, managed care organizations, medical societies, medi- cal practice groups, or other entities. Rather than treating each error and hazard as a unique, surprising, separate, and sometimes tragic event, they should view the entire organization as a safety system and the search for improved safety and its associated design principles as a lifelong, shared journey.20 Health professionals should also participate in new efforts that may be undertaken by groups such as a medical practice and the profes- sional groups to which they belong.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
168 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Make Clear Assignments and Set Expectations for Safety
Health care organizations should establish meaningful patient safety programs with defined executive responsibility that supports strong, clear, visible attention to safety. Most hospitals have safety programs for workers as required by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), but few have patient safety programs. The committee emphasizes that by health care organizations, it intends such safety programs to be established not only by hospitals, but also by other organizations, including managed care organizations and the delivery sites with which they contract. Other industries have found that improvements in safety do not occur unless there are both a commitment by top management and an overt, clearly defined, and continuing effort on the part of all personnel, workers, and managers. As with any other program, a meaningful safety program should include senior-level leadership, defined program objectives, and plans; personnel; budget; collecting and analyzing data; and monitoring by regular progress reports to the executive committee and board of directors. Although safety can never be delegated, there should be clear accountability for safety, a budget, a defined program, and regular reporting to the board.
Provide Human and Financial Resources for Error Analysis and Systems Redesign
Responsibility for management and improvement in risky systems (e.g., medication) as a whole should be clearly located in individuals or cross- functional, cross-departmental teams given the time to discharge this duty. For example, individuals or departments “own” pieces of the medication system, but as a rule, no one manages the medication system as a whole. Oversight of a hospital’s medication system as a whole, including its safety and improvement, might be placed under a single clinician, with 50 percent or more of his or her time devoted to this role.
In managed care organizations, quality improvement activities, whether or not developed by accreditation bodies, should focus on patient safety activities and an expectation of major improvements in safety. Although data from ambulatory settings are very limited, the committee believes that such improvement could be on the order of a 50 percent reduction in errors in hospital environments and could be greatly reduced in outpatient settings.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 169
Develop Effective Mechanisms for Identifying and Dealing with Unsafe Practitioners
Although almost all accidents result from human error, it is now recog- nized that these errors are usually induced by faulty systems that “set people up” to fail. Correction of these systems failures is the key to safe perfor- mance of individuals. Systems design—how an organization works, its pro- cesses and procedures—is an institutional responsibility. Only the institu- tion can redesign its systems for safety; the great majority of effort in improving safety should focus on safe systems, and the health care organiza- tion itself should be held responsible for safety.
The committee recognizes, however, that some individuals may be in- competent, impaired, uncaring, or may even have criminal intent. The pub- lic needs dependable assurance that such individuals will be dealt with ef- fectively and prevented from harming patients. Although these represent a small proportion of health care workers, they are unlikely to be amenable to the kinds of approaches described in detail in this chapter. Registration boards and licensure discipline is appropriately reserved for those rare indi- viduals identified by organizations as a threat to patient safety, whom orga- nizations are already required by state law to report.
Historically, the health system has not had effective ways of dealing with dangerous, reckless, or incompetent individuals and ensuring they do not harm patients. Although the health professions have a long history of work in this area, current systems do not, as a whole, work reliably or promptly. The lack of timeliness has been a special problem. Numerous reasons have been advanced for the lack of more timely and effective response by profes- sions and institutions. Requirements posed by legal due process can be very slow and uncertain; the need for, but difficulty in arranging, excellent super- vision has stymied efforts at retraining; and matching individual needs to adult learning principles and retraining that is tailored to specific deficits has been problematic. With this acknowledged, the committee believes that health care organizations should use and rely on proficiency-based credentialing and privileging to identify, retrain, remove, or redirect physi- cians, nurses, pharmacists, or others who cannot competently perform their responsibilities. With effective safety systems in place, the committee be- lieves it will be easier for those within organizations to identify and act on information about such individuals. If these systems are working properly, unsafe professionals will be identified and dealt with before they cause seri- ous patient injury.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
170 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Principle 2. Respect Human Limits in Process Design
• Design jobs for safety. • Avoid reliance on memory. • Use constraints and forcing functions. • Avoid reliance on vigilance. • Simplify key processes. • Standardize work processes.
Human beings have many intellectual strengths, such as their large memory capacity; a large repertory of responses; flexibility in applying these responses to information inputs; and an ability to react creatively and effec- tively to the unexpected. However, human beings also have well-known limi- tations, including difficulty in attending carefully to several things at once, difficulty in recalling detailed information quickly, and generally poor com- putational ability.21 Respecting human abilities involves recognizing the strengths of human beings as problem solvers, but minimizing reliance on weaker traits. Several strategies are particularly important when considering such human factors: designing jobs for safety; avoiding reliance on memory and vigilance; using constraints and forcing functions; and simplifying and standardizing key processes.
Design Jobs for Safety
Designing jobs with attention to human factors means attending to the effect of work hours, workloads, staffing ratios, sources of distraction, and an inversion in assigned shifts (which affects worker’s circadian rhythms) and their relationship to fatigue, alertness, and sleep deprivation. Designing jobs to minimize distraction may, for example, mean setting aside times, places, or personnel for specific tasks such as calculating doses or mixing intravenous solutions. Designing jobs for safety also means addressing staff training needs and anticipating harm that may accompany downsizing, staff turnover, and the use of part-time workers and “floats” who may be unfa- miliar with equipment and processes in a given patient care unit. To the extent that these barriers presented by departmental affiliation and disci- plinary training prevent caregivers from working cooperatively and develop- ing new safety systems, job design requires attention not only to the work of the individual but also to the work and training of multidisciplinary teams.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 171
Avoid Reliance on Memory
Health care organizations should use protocols and checklists wisely and whenever appropriate. Examples of the sensible design and use of pro- tocols and checklists are to ensure their routine updating and constructing checklists so that the usual state is answered as yes. Protocols for the use of heparin and insulin, for example, have been developed by many hospitals.22
An Institute of Medicine report on the development of clinical guidelines suggests features for assessing guidelines that address their substance and process of development. Examples of attributes concerning the substance of guidelines are their validity and clinical applicability. Examples of the pro- cess of development include its clarity and documentation of the strength of the evidence.23
For medications, ways to reduce reliance on memory are the use of drug– drug interaction checking software and dosing cards (e.g., laminated cards that can be posted at nursing stations or carried in the pocket) that include standard order times, doses of antibiotics, formulas for calculating pediatric doses, and common chemotherapy protocols.24
Caution about using protocols wisely derives from the need to general- ize and simplify, but to recognize that not all steps of a protocol may be appropriate. Rapid increases in knowledge and changing technology mean that a system for regular updating of protocols should be built into their production.
Use Constraints and Forcing Functions
Constraints and forcing functions are employed to guide the user to the next appropriate action or decision and to structure critical tasks so that errors cannot be made. They are important in designing defaults for devices and for processes such as diagnostic and therapeutic ordering. When a de- vice fails, it should always default to the safest mode; for example, an infu- sion pump should default to shutoff, rather than free flow.
Examples of the use of constraints in ordering medications are phar- macy computers that will not fill an order unless allergy information, patient weight, and patient height are entered. Another forcing function is the use of special luer locks for syringes and indwelling lines that have to be matched before fluid can be infused. Removal of concentrated potassium chloride from patient floor stock is a (negative) forcing function.25 Less restrictive, but user-oriented approaches to design are the use of affordances and natu- ral mappings.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
172 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Avoid Reliance on Vigilance
Human factors research has taught us that individuals cannot remain vigilant for long periods during which little happens that requires their ac- tion, and it is unreasonable to expect them to do so. Health care has many examples of automation used to reduce reliance on vigilance: using robotic dispensing systems in the pharmacy and infusion pumps that regulate the flow of intravenous fluids. Although automation is intended to reduce the need for vigilance, there are also pitfalls in relying on automation if a user learns to ignore alarms that are often wrong or becomes inattentive or inex- pert in a given process, or if the effects of errors remain invisible until it is too late to correct them. Well-designed pumps give information about the reason for an alarm, have moderate sensitivity, and prevent free flow when the unit is turned off or fails.
Other approaches for accommodating the need for vigilance have been developed. These include providing checklists and requiring their use at regular intervals, limiting long shifts, and rotating staff who must perform repetitive functions.26
Simplify Key Processes
Simplifying key processes can minimize problem solving and greatly re- duce the likelihood of error. Simplifying includes reducing the number of handoffs required for a process to be completed (e.g., decreasing multiple order and data entry). Examples of processes that can usually be simplified are: writing an order, then transcribing and entering it in a computer, or having several people record and enter the same data in different databases. Other examples of simplification include limiting the choice of drugs avail- able in the pharmacy, limiting the number of dose strengths, maintaining an inventory of frequently prepared drugs, reducing the number of times per day a drug is administered, keeping a single medication administration record, automating dispensing, and purchasing easy-to-use and maintain equipment.27
Standardize Work Processes
Standardization reduces reliance on memory. It also allows newcomers who are unfamiliar with a given process or device to use it safely. In general, standardizing device displays (e.g., readout units), operations (e.g., location of the on–off switch), and doses is important to reduce the likelihood of
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 173
error. Examples of standardizing include not stocking look-alike products; the use of standard order forms, administration times, prescribing conven- tions; protocols for complex medication administration; reducing the num- bers of available dose strengths and the times of drug administration, place- ment of supplies and medications; and types of equipment.28
Sometimes devices or medications cannot be standardized. When varia- tion is unavoidable, the principle followed should be to differentiate clearly. An example is to identify look-alike, but different, strengths of a narcotic by labeling the higher concentration with bright orange tape.
Principle 3. Promote Effective Team Functioning
• Train in teams those who are expected to work in teams. • Include the patient in safety design and the process of care.
Train in Teams Those Who Are Expected to Work in Teams
People work together in small groups throughout health care, whether in a multispecialty group practice, in interdisciplinary teams as- sembled for the care of a specific clinical condition (e.g., teams that care for children with congenital problems, oncology teams, end-of-life care), in op- erating rooms, and in ICUs. However, members of the team are typically trained in separate disciplines and educational programs. They may not appreciate each other’s strengths or recognize weaknesses except in crises, and they may not have been trained together to use new or well-established technologies.
The committee believes that health care organizations should estab- lish team training programs for personnel in critical care areas (e.g., the emer- gency department, intensive care unit, operating room) using proven meth- ods such as the crew resource management techniques employed in aviation, including simulation. People make fewer errors when they work in teams. When processes are planned and standardized, each member knows his or her responsibilities as well as those of teammates, and members “look out” for one another, noticing errors before they cause an accident. In an effec- tive interdisciplinary team, members come to trust one another’s judgments and attend to one another’s safety concerns.
The risk associated with a move to adopt such training from fields such as aviation is in borrowing these training technologies too literally. Although the team issues associated with performance in aviation and medicine have
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
174 TO ERR IS HUMAN
strong parallels in medical settings, effective training must be based not on adopting the training technologies too literally but on adapting them to the practices and personnel in the new setting.
Include the Patient in Safety Design and the Process of Care
The members of a team are more than the health care practitioners. A team includes the practitioners, patients, and technologies used for the care of these patients. Whenever possible, patients should be a part of the care process. This includes attention to their preferences and values, their own knowledge of their condition, and the kinds of treatments (including medi- cations) they are receiving. Patients should also have information about the technologies that are used in their care, whether for testing, as an adjunct to therapy, or to provide patient information. Examples of ways to share such information with patients include reviewing with patients a list of their medi- cations, doses, and times to take them; how long to take them; and precau- tions about interactions with alternative therapies or with alcohol, possible side effects, and any activities that should be avoided such as driving or the use of machinery. Patients should also receive a clearly written list of their medications and instructions for use that they can keep and share with other clinicians.29
Principle 4. Anticipate the Unexpected
• Adopt a proactive approach: examine processes of care for threats to safety and redesign them before accidents occur.
• Design for recovery. • Improve access to accurate, timely information.
Adopt a Proactive Approach: Examine Processes of Care for Threats to Safety and Redesign Them Before Accidents Occur
Technology is ubiquitous in acute care, long-term care, ambulatory sur- gical centers, and home care. The value of automating repetitive, time-con- suming, and error-prone tasks has long been understood and embraced in health care. The increasing use of technologies goes well beyond bedside or operating room devices. It includes emerging technologies that range from molecular, cellular, genetic, and pharmaceutical interventions; to patient- administered technologies (e.g., prescribed medications, monitors, patient-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 175
controlled analgesia); to robotic and remote technologies such as remote ICU and telemedicine, Internet-based systems, and expert systems.30–33
At the same time, the human–machine interface is a focus of much pre- ventive effort. Indeed, many technologies are engineered not only for safe operation in the care process, but specifically for the purpose of preventing error. Such technologies include automated order entry systems; pharmacy software to alert about drug interactions; and decision support systems such as reminders, alerts, and expert systems.
Health care organizations should expect any new technology to intro- duce new sources of error and should adopt the custom of automating cau- tiously, alert to the possibility of unintended harm. Despite the best inten- tions of designers, the committee emphasizes that ALL technology introduces new errors, even when its sole purpose is to prevent errors. Therefore as change occurs, health systems should anticipate trouble. Indeed, Cook emphasizes that future failures cannot be forestalled by providing simply another layer of defense against failure.34 Rather, safe equipment design and use depend on a chain of involvement and commitment that begins with the manufac- turer and continues with careful attention to the vulnerabilities of a new device or system. Prevention requires the continuous redesign and imple- mentation of safe systems to make error increasingly less likely, for example:
• using order entry systems that provide real-time alerts if a medication order is out of range for weight or age, or is contraindicated;
• using bar coding for positive identification and detection of misidentified patients, records, and so forth;
• using “hear back” for oral orders and instructions—for example, hav- ing a pharmacist repeat a phoned-in prescription to the caller; and
• monitoring vital signs, blood levels, and other laboratory values for patients receiving hazardous drugs.
Double-checking for particularly vulnerable parts of the system is an- other approach to preventing patient injury. One approach could be the use of tiger teams. The military phrase tiger team originated with a group whose purpose is to penetrate security and test security measures. Professional ti- ger teams are now used to test corporate systems for vulnerability, particu- larly to hackers. The idea of using teams with sophisticated knowledge of technical systems to test and anticipate the ways health systems can go wrong could well be adopted by health care organizations.
Patient safety, as well as business outcomes, should be anticipated when
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
176 TO ERR IS HUMAN
reorganization, mergers, and other organization-wide changes in staffing, responsibilities, work loads, and relationship among caregivers result in new patterns of care. Such major changes often have safety implications that can be anticipated and tracked.
Design for Recovery
Prevention is one way to reduce error, but once the error rate and the transmission of the error to patients become very small, incremental gains are increasingly difficult to achieve. Another approach is to work on the processes of recovery when an error occurs. Designing for recovery means making errors visible, making it easy to reverse operations and hard to carry out nonreversible ones, duplicating critical functions or equipment as neces- sary to detect error, and intercepting error before harm occurs. Although errors cannot be reduced to zero, we should strive to reduce to zero the instances in which error harms a patient. A reliable system has procedures and attributes that make errors visible to those working in the system so that they can be corrected before causing harm.
Examples of procedures to mitigate injury are
• keeping antidotes for high-risk drugs up-to-date and easily accessible; • having procedures in place for responding quickly to adverse events,
such that these processes are standardized across units and personnel are provided with drills to familiarize them with the procedures and the actions each person should take;
• equipment that defaults to the least harmful mode in a crisis; and • simulation training.
Another example of ways to prevent and to mitigate harm is simulation training. Simulation is a training and feedback method in which learners practice tasks and processes in lifelike circumstances using models or virtual reality, with feedback from observers, other team members, and video cam- eras to assist improvement of skills.35 Simulation for modeling crisis man- agement (e.g., when a patient goes into anaphylactic shock or a piece of equipment fails) is sometimes called “crew resource management,” an anal- ogy with airline cockpit crew simulation.36–41 Such an approach carries for- ward the tradition of disaster drills in which organizations have long partici- pated. In such simulation, small groups that work together—whether in the
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 177
operating room, intensive care unit, or emergency department—learn to re- spond to a crisis in an efficient, effective, and coordinated manner.
In the case of the operating room (OR) this means attempting to de- velop simulation that involves all key players (e.g., anesthesia, surgery, nurs- ing) because many problems occur at the interface between disciplines.42
Although a full OR simulator has been in operation for some years at the University of Basel (Switzerland), the range of surgical procedures that can be simulated is limited. It will be a great challenge to develop simulation technology and simulators that will allow full, interdisciplinary teams to prac- tice interpersonal and technical skills in a non-jeopardy environment where they can receive meaningful feedback and reinforcement.
Improve Access to Accurate, Timely Information
Information about the patient, medications, and other therapies should be available at the point of patient care, whether they are routinely or rarely used. Examples of ways to make such information available are the following
• Have a pharmacist available on nursing units and on rounds. • Use computerized lab data that alert clinicians to abnormal lab val-
ues. • Place lab reports and medication administration records at the
patient’s bedside. • Place protocols in the patient’s chart. • Color-code wristbands to alert of allergies. • Track errors and near misses and report them regularly. • Accelerate laboratory turn around time.
Organizations can improve up-to-date access to information about in- frequently used drugs by distributing newsletters and drug summary sheets; and ensuring access to Internet-based web sites, the Physicians Desk Refer- ence, formularies, and other resources for ordering, dispensing, and admin- istering medications.
Clearly, any discussion of the availability of accurate, timely information for patient care must stress the need for electronic databases and interfaces to allow them to be fully integrated, and the committee underscores the need for data standards and the development of integrated computer-based databases and knowledge servers.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
178 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Health care organizations should join other groups in contributing to the development of standardized data sets for patient records. Uniform stan- dards for connectivity, terminology, and data sharing are critical if the cre- ation and maintenance of health care databases are to be efficient and their information is to be accurate and complete. National standards for the pro- tection of data confidentiality are also needed. The committee urges that health care organizations join payers, vendors, quasi-public standard-setting bodies (such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and American National Standards Institute (ANSI)), federal agencies, and advisory groups in working to facilitate standards-setting efforts and other- wise become full participants in the multidisciplinary effort that is now under way.
Despite the computer-based patient record being “almost here” for 45 years, it has still not arrived. Its advantages are clear: computer-based pa- tient records and other systems give physicians and other authorized per- sonnel the ability to access patient data without delay at any time in any place (e.g., in an emergency or when the patient is away from home); ensure that services are obtained and track outcomes of treatment; and aggregate data from large numbers of patients, both to measure outcomes of treat- ment; and to promptly recognize complications of new drugs, devices, and treatments.43
The committee also believes that organizations, individually and in col- laboration, must commit to using information technology to manage their knowledge bases and processes of care. Doing so will require the integration of systems that are patient specific, allow population-based analyses, and systems that manage the case process through reminder, decision support, and guidance grounded in evidence-based knowledge.
Principle 5. Create a Learning Environment
• Use simulations whenever possible. • Encourage reporting of errors and hazardous conditions. • Ensure no reprisals for reporting of errors. • Develop a working culture in which communication flows freely re-
gardless of authority gradient. • Implement mechanisms of feedback and learning from error.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 179
Use Simulations Whenever Possible
As described under Principle 4, health care organizations and teaching institutions should participate in the development and use of simulation for training novice practitioners, problem solving, and crisis management, espe- cially when new and potentially hazardous procedures and equipment are introduced. Crew resource management techniques, combined with simula- tion, have substantially improved aviation safety and can be modified for health care use. Early successful experience in emergency department and operating room use indicates they should be more widely applied.44
As noted, health care—particularly in dynamic setting such as operating rooms and emergency departments—involves tightly coupled systems. For this reason, crew resource management can be very valuable in reducing (though probably not eliminating) error. For such programs to achieve their potential, however, requires a thorough understanding of the nature of team interactions, the etiology and frequency of errors, and the cultures of each organization into which they are introduced.
Encourage Reporting of Errors and Hazardous Conditions
The culture of a health care organization plays a critical role in how well errors are detected and handled. Medical training and the culture instilled during this training have considerable strengths—emphasizing autonomy of action and personal responsibility. It has also led to a culture of hierarchy and authority in decision making and to a belief that mistakes should not be made. If they do occur, mistakes are typically treated as a personal and pro- fessional failure.45 Because medical training is typically isolated from the training of other health professionals, people have not learned to work to- gether to share authority and collaborate in problem solving. Attempting to change such a culture to accept error as normal is difficult, and accepting the occurrence of error as an opportunity to learn and improve safety is perhaps even more difficult. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, it requires at a minimum that members of the organization believe that safety is really a priority in their organization, that reporting will really be nonpunitive, and that improving patient safety requires fixing the system, not fixing blame. It will almost surely require changes in the way health care professionals are trained in terms not only of their own professional work, but also of how they learn to work together.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
180 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Ensure No Reprisals for Reporting of Errors
Health care organizations should establish nonpunitive environments and systems for reporting errors and accidents. The most important barrier to improving patient safety is lack of awareness of the extent to which errors occur daily in all health care organizations. It is difficult to remedy problems that you do not know exist. This lack of awareness occurs because in most cases, errors are not reported.
Studies have shown that typically less than five percent of known errors are reported, and many are unknown.46 When punishment is eliminated, reporting soars.
Important characteristics of reporting systems within organizations in- clude that they be voluntary, have minimal restrictions on acceptable con- tent, include descriptive accounts and stories (i.e., not be a simple checklist), be confidential, and be accessible for contributions from all clinical and administrative staff. Once submitted, they should be de-identified by re- porter and analyzed by experts. Finally, staff should be given timely feed- back on the results and how problems will be addressed.47
Develop a Working Culture in Which Communication Flows Freely Regardless of Authority Gradient
Organizations also have to foster a management style in dealing with error that supports voluntary reporting and analysis of errors so there are no reprisals and no impediments to information flowing freely against a power gradient.
Techniques for such communication can be taught. Military and civilian aviation has taught senior pilots to respect and listen to junior colleagues, and that copilots and junior officers have the responsibility to communicate clearly their concerns about safety. Superiors have the responsibility to reply to these concerns according to the “two-challenge rule.” This rule states that if a pilot is clearly challenged twice about an unsafe situation during a flight without a satisfactory reply, the subordinate is empowered to take over the controls. During military briefings and debriefings, attendees are also ex- pected to express their concerns about safety aspects of an operation.
Bringing about such change in communication patterns within the health care environment, particularly in teaching environments, is without question a major undertaking that begins at least with medical residency training and nursing training. For the leaders of health care teams, it re- quires learning leadership behavior that encourages and expects all mem-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 181
bers of the team to internalize the need to be alert to threats to patient safety and to feel that their contributions and concerns are respected.
Implement Mechanisms of Feedback and Learning from Error
In order to learn from error, health care organizations will have to estab- lish and maintain environments and systems for analyzing errors and acci- dents so that the redesign of processes is informed rather than an act of tampering. There are five important phases to improving safety. The first is the reporting of events in sufficiently rich detail to create a “story” about what occurred. The second is understanding the story in order to make its meaning clear. The third is to develop recommendations for improvement. The fourth is implementation, and the fifth is tracking the changes to learn what new safety problems may have been introduced.
Organizations should develop and maintain an ongoing process for the discovery, clarification, and incorporation of basic principles and innova- tions for safe design, and should use this knowledge to understand the rea- sons for hazardous conditions and ways to reduce these vulnerabilities. Or- ganizations require sound, scientifically grounded theories about error and safety. They should draw on the health care industry, other industries, and research on human factors and engineering, organizational and social psy- chology, and cognitive psychology for useful ideas. Analysis of events lead- ing to error should draw on this knowledge base. Organizational expertise may have to be augmented by external technical assistance, especially in small institutions without the resources to support such activities and exper- tise internally. Such assistance might come from academically based research centers, trade associations, and professional groups.
Research and analysis are not luxuries in the operation of safety systems. They are essential steps in the effective redesign of systems because analysis provides the information needed for effective prevention. As safety research in other fields has taught us, when a major event occurs that results in pa- tient harm or death, both active and latent errors were present. Investigation of active errors has focused on the individuals present and the circumstances immediately surrounding the event. However, such an explanation is often not only premature and uninformed, but it is usually unhelpful in prevent- ing future events. Understanding the latent errors whose adverse conse- quences may lie dormant within the system requires considerable technical and systems knowledge about technical work and the way organizational
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
182 TO ERR IS HUMAN
factors play out in this technical work. It also requires understanding the roles of resource limitations, conflicts, uncertainty, and complexity.
Two other ways in which organizations can improve their performance through shared learning are by benchmarking and collaboration. Benchmarking is a way to compare oneself or one’s organization against the “best in class.” While learning about and finding ways to implement the best practices they can identify, organizations can implement sets of practical, time-series measures that can help them learn whether the steps they have taken are improving safety.48 Organizations can also collaborate with other facilities, even within their market areas, to understand patterns of error and new approaches to prevention. For example, the New England Cardiovas- cular Project, the Vermont-Oxford Neonatal Network, and multisite re- search on the organization and delivery of care in intensive care units have demonstrated the gains that are possible from such collaborative work.49,50
The committee strongly encourages organizations to participate in vol- untary reporting systems. Chapter 5 provides descriptions of some volun- tary reporting systems available in the health care industry, and the commit- tee has recommended that voluntary reporting initiatives be encouraged and expanded.
MEDICATION SAFETY
As described in Chapter 2, a good deal of research has identified medi- cation error as a substantial source of preventable error in hospitals. In addi- tion, organizations and researchers have paid considerable attention to meth- ods of preventing such errors, and there is reasonable agreement about useful approaches. For this reason, the remainder of this chapter focuses on medi- cation administration to illustrate how the principles for creating safety sys- tems might be applied, including the need for a systems approach. It focuses on hospitals because most of the research in this area and virtually all the data are hospital-based but recognizes that many of the strategies apply to ambulatory and other settings as well.
Errors increase with complexity. Complexity in the medication system arises from several sources; including the extensive knowledge and informa- tion that are necessary to correctly prescribe a medication regimen for a particular patient; the intermingling of medications of varying hazard in the pharmacy, during transport, and on the patient care units; and the multiple tasks performed by nurses, of which medication preparation and adminis- tration are but a few. Because the burden of harm to patients is great, the
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 183
cost to society is large, and knowledge of how to prevent the most common kinds of errors is well known, the committee singles out medication safety as a high priority area for all health care organizations.
A number of practices have been shown to reduce errors in the medica- tion process and should be in place in all hospitals and other health care organizations in which they are appropriate.51–53
Selected Strategies to Improve Medication Safety
• Adopt a system-oriented approach to medication error reduction. • Implement standard processes for medication doses, dose timing, and
dose scales in a given patient care unit. • Standardize prescription writing and prescribing rules. • Limit the number of different kinds of common equipment. • Implement physician order entry. • Use pharmaceutical software. • Implement unit dosing. • Have the central pharmacy supply high-risk intravenous medications. • Use special procedures and written protocols for the use of high-risk
medications. • Do not store concentrated solutions of hazardous medications on
patient care units. • Ensure the availability of pharmaceutical decision support. • Include a pharmacist during rounds of patient care units. • Make relevant patient information available at the point of patient
care. • Improve patients’ knowledge about their treatment.
Several organizations have recently focused attention on medication safety, and a number have compiled recommendations for safe medication practices, particularly in the inpatient environment. Most recently, these in- clude the National Patient Safety Partnership,54 the Massachusetts Coali- tion for the Prevention of Medical Errors (1999),55 the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (1998),56 the National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCCMERP); and the Ameri- can Society for Health-System Pharmacists.57
As illustrated in Table 8.1, most of the groups’ recommendations are consistent with one another. Although each has been implemented by a large number of hospitals, none has been universally adopted, and some are not in
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
184 TO ERR IS HUMAN
TABLE 8-1 Comparison of Institute of Medicine (IOM) Strategies Regarding Medication Practices and Recommendations from Other Organizations
National Coordinating American Society of Council for Medication Error
IOM Strategy Health-System Pharmacists Reporting and Prevention
Implement standard processes for medication doses, dose timing, and dose scales in a given patient care unit
Standardize prescription All prescription orders should writing and prescribing be written using the metric rules system except for therapies
that use standard units. The term “units” should be spelled out. A leading zero should always precede a decimal expression of less than one. Prescribers should avoid use of abbreviations
Limit the number of different kinds of common equipment
Implement physician Establish processes in Prescribers should move to a order entry which prescribers enter direct, computerized order
medication orders directly entry system into computer systems
Use pharmaceutical software
Implement unit dosing Use unit dose medication The medication order should distribution and pharmacy- include drug name, exact based intravenous metric weight or concentration, medication admixture and dosage form systems
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 185
Massachusetts Coalition Institute for National Patient for the Prevention of Healthcare Improvement Safety Partnership Medical Errors
Reduce reliance on Standardize drug memory; simplify; packaging, labeling, standardize storage
Differentiate: eliminate Avoid abbreviations look-alikes and sound-alikes
Decrease multiple entry Computerize drug order Implement computerized entry prescriber order entry
systems when technically and financially feasible in light of a hospital’s existing resources and technological development.
Encourage pharmacy system software vendors to incorporate an adequate set of checks into computerized hospital pharmacy systems
Use “unit dose” drug Maintain unit-dose systems (packaged and distribution systems (either labeled in standard patient manufacturer prepared or doses) repackaged by pharmacy)
for all non-emergency medications.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
186 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Central pharmacy should supply high-risk intravenous medications
Use special procedures and written protocols for the use of high-risk medications
Do not store concentrated solutions of hazardous medications on patient care units
Ensure the availability of All medication orders before pharmaceutical decision a first dose should be support routinely reviewed by a
pharmacist and all staff should seek resolution whenever there is a question of safety
Include a pharmacist Assign pharmacists to work during rounds of patient in patient care areas in care units direct collaboration with
prescribers and those administering medications
TABLE 8-1 Continued
National Coordinating American Society of Council for Medication Error
IOM Strategy Health-System Pharmacists Reporting and Prevention
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 187
Use pharmacy-based IV Institute pharmacy-based IV and drug mixing programs admixture systems
Use protocols and Limit access to high hazard Develop special procedures checklists wisely drugs and use protocols for high-risk drugs using a
for high hazard drugs. multi-disciplinary approach. Including written guidelines, checklists, pre-printed orders, double-checks, special packaging, special labeling, and education
Remove concentrated potassium chloride (KCl) vials from nursing units and patient care areas. Stock only diluted premixed IV solutions on units.
Have a pharmacist available on-call after hours of pharmacy operation.
Information on new drugs, infrequently used drugs, and non-formulary drugs should be made easily accessible to clinicians prior to ordering, dispensing, and administering medications
Massachusetts Coalition Institute for National Patient for the Prevention of Healthcare Improvement Safety Partnership Medical Errors
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
188 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Make relevant patient Evaluate the use of machine- Prescribers should include information available at readable coding (e.g., bar the age and when appropriate, the point of patient care coding) in their medication- the weight of the patient on
use processes the prescription or medication order
Adopt a system-oriented Approach medication errors approach to medication as system failures and seek error reduction system solutions to preventing
them
Improve patient’s knowledge Prescription orders should about their treatment include a brief notation of
purpose unless considered inappropriate
Prescribers should not use vague instructions such as “Take as directed” as the sole direction for use
Develop better systems for monitoring and reporting adverse drug events
TABLE 8-1 Continued
National Coordinating American Society of Council for Medication Error
IOM Strategy Health-System Pharmacists Reporting and Prevention
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 189
Improve access to Put allergies and Consider the use of machine- information medications on patient readable coding (i.e., bar
records coding) in the medication Require machine-readable administration process
labeling (bar coding) Encourage the use of computer-generated or electronic medication administration records (MAR)
Increase feedback; train for Adopt a systems-oriented teamwork; drive out fear; approach to medication obtain leadership error reduction; promote a commitment; improve direct non-punitive atmosphere for communication reporting of errors which
values the sharing of information
Improve access to Educate patients Educate patients in the information Patients should tell physicians hospital, at discharge, and in
about all medications they ambulatory settings about are taking and ask for the safe and accurate use of information in terms they their medications understand before accepting medications
Organize the work environment for safety
Massachusetts Coalition Institute for National Patient for the Prevention of Healthcare Improvement Safety Partnership Medical Errors
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
190 TO ERR IS HUMAN
place in even a majority of hospitals. Based on evidence and drawing on the principles described in this chapter, this IOM committee joins other groups in calling for implementation of proven medication safety practices as de- scribed below.
Adopt a System-Oriented Approach to Medication Error Reduction
Throughout this chapter, emphasis is put on the development of a system-oriented approach that prevents and identifies errors and minimizes patient harm from errors that do occur. It involves a cycle of anticipating problems, for example with changes in staffing or the introduction of new technologies, adopting the five principles described, tracking and analyzing data as errors and near misses occur, and using those data to modify pro- cesses to prevent further occurrences. None of these steps is useful alone. When taken together with strong executive leadership in a nonpunitive en- vironment and with appropriate resources, they become extremely powerful in improving safety.
Implement Standard Processes for Medication Doses, Dose Timing, and Dose Scales in a Given Patient Care Unit
One of the most powerful means of preventing errors of all kinds is to standardize processes. If doses, times, and scales are standardized, it is easier for personnel to remember them, check them, and cross-check teammates who are administering the medications.
Standardize Prescription Writing and Prescribing Rules
A host of common shortcuts in prescribing have frequently been found to cause errors. Abbreviations are the major offender because they can have more than one meaning. Other “traps” include the use of “q” ( as in qid, qod, qd, qh), which is easily misread, and the use of the letter “u” for “unit.” Failure to specify all of the elements of an order (form, dose, frequency, route) also leads to errors. Putting such information in computerized order entry forms can help eliminate such errors.
Limit the Number of Different Kinds of Common Equipment
Simplification—reducing the number of options—is almost as effec- tive as standardization in reducing medication errors. Just as with limiting
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 191
medications to one dose decreases the chance of error, limiting the types of equipment (e.g., infusion pumps) available on a single patient care unit will improve safety. Unless all such equipment has the same method of setup and operation, having several different types of infusion pumps and defibrillators increases the likelihood of misuse, sometimes with disastrous consequences.
Implement Physician Order Entry
Having physicians enter and transmit medication orders on-line (com- puterized physician order entry) is a powerful method for preventing medi- cation errors due to misinterpretation of hand-written orders. It can ensure that the dose, form, and timing are correct and can also check for potential drug–drug or drug–allergy interactions and patient conditions such as renal function. In one before-and-after comparison,58 nonintercepted serious medication errors decreased by more than half (from 10.7 to 4.86 events per 1,000 patient-days).
Direct order entry reduces errors at all stages of the medication process, not just in prescribing60 and it has been recommended by National Patient Safety Partnership, a coalition of health care organizations.*
One study estimated cost savings attributable to preventable adverse drug events (ADEs) at more than $4,000 per event. Direct savings from reduction of ADEs were estimated to be more than $500,000 annually at one teaching hospital, with an overall savings from all decision support in- terventions related to order entry of between $5 to 10 million per year.61 A computerized system costing $1 to 2 million could pay for itself in three to five years, while preventing injury to hundreds of patients each year.
Until computerized order entry is implemented, much of the safety ben- efit may be realized by manual systems that use standard order forms for highly prevalent circumstances, (e.g., myocardial infarction, use of heparin) if the forms are used as completed by clinicians and not transcribed.
Computerized order entry can be a valuable safety adjunct for labora- tory and radiology ordering as well as for medication and to achieve the
*Member organizations include the American Hospital Association, American Medical As- sociation, American Nurses Association, Association of American Medical Colleges, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Food and Drug Administration, Health Care Financing Administration, Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Institute for Healthcare Improvement, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, National Patient Safety Foundation, Department of Defense (Health Affairs), and Department of Veter- ans Affairs.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
192 TO ERR IS HUMAN
most benefit, should be linked with these databases. Such systems should provide relevant information about the patient and his or her medications to anyone who needs them. Bates et al.62 report on the ability of computerized information systems to identify and prevent adverse events using three hier- archical levels of clinical information. Using only what they call Level 1 in- formation (demographic information, results of diagnostic tests, and current medications), 53 percent of adverse events were judged identifiable. Using Level 2 (as well as Level 1) information (physician order entry), 58 percent were judged identifiable. Using Level 3 (as well as Levels 1 and 2) informa- tion that included additional clinical data such as automated problem lists, the authors judged that 89 percent of adverse events were identifiable. In this study a small but significant number of adverse events (5, 13, and 23 percent, respectively) were judged preventable by using such techniques as guided-dose, drug–laboratory, and drug–patient characteristic software al- gorithms.
As with any new technology, implementing any of these practices re- quires attention to the user–system interface to minimize the introduction of new problems. It is helpful if these systems have a clearly designated “pro- cess manager.” It is also important to remember that on-line computer entry does not eliminate all errors associated with prescribing drugs. For example, if allergic reactions to a medication are not entered in the database for a given patient, the order entry system cannot alert the prescriber when the same medication (or one in the same class) is prescribed. Other errors such as transcription errors can remain if they are within an expected range.
Use Pharmaceutical Software
Pharmacies in health care organizations should routinely use reliable computer software programs designed to check all prescriptions for dupli- cate drug therapies; potential drug–drug and drug–allergy interactions; and out-of-range doses, timing, and routes of administration.
Software is available that permits pharmacists to check each new pre- scription at a minimum for dose, interactions with other medications the patient is taking, and allergies. Although not as sophisticated as computer- ized physician order entry, until the latter is in place, pharmacy computer- ized checking can be an efficient way to intercept prescribing errors. The committee cautions, however, that many pharmacy computer systems today are of limited reliability when used to detect and correct prescription errors, most notably serious drug interactions.63 At a minimum, such systems should screen for duplicate prescriptions, patient allergies, potential drug–
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 193
drug interactions, out-of-range doses for patient weight or age, and drug– lab interactions. Because such pharmacy software may not be programmed to detect all, or even most, dangers, pharmacists and other personnel should not rely on these systems exclusively nor, on the other hand, habitually over- ride alerts.
Implement Unit Dosing
If medications are not packaged in single doses by the manufacturer, they should be prepared in unit doses by the central pharmacy. Unit dos- ing—the preparation of each dose of each medication by the pharmacy— reduces handling as well as the chance of calculation and mixing errors. Unit dosing can reduce errors by eliminating the need for calculation, measure- ment, preparation, and handling on the nursing unit and by providing a fully labeled package that stays with the medication up to its point of use.
Unit dosing was a major systems change that significantly reduced dos- ing errors when it was introduced nearly 20 years ago. Unit dosing has been recommended by the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, JCAHO, NPSF, and the MHA in their “Best Practice Recommendations.” As a cost-cutting measure, unfortunately some hospitals have recently re- turned to bulk dosing, which means that an increase in dosing errors is bound to occur.
Have the Central Pharmacy Supply High-Risk Intravenous Medications
Having the pharmacy place additives in IV solutions or purchasing them already mixed, rather than having nurses prepare IV solutions on patient care units, reduces the chance of calculation and mixing errors. For example, one study showed that the error rate in mixing of IV drugs is 20 percent by nurses; 9 percent by pharmacies, and 0.3 percent by manufacturers. This recommendation is supported by the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, the Institute for Safe Medication Practices, and the experience reported by Bates et al.64
Use Special Procedures and Written Protocols for the Use of High-Risk Medications
A relatively small number of medications carry a risk of death or serious injury when given in excessive dose. However, these include several of the
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
194 TO ERR IS HUMAN
most powerful and useful medications in the therapeutic armamentarium. Examples are heparin, warfarin, insulin, lidocaine, magnesium, muscle re- laxants, chemotherapeutic agents, and potassium chloride (see below), dex- trose injections, narcotics, adrenergic agents, theophylline, and immuno- globin.65,66 Both to alert personnel to be especially careful and to ensure that dosing is appropriate, special protocols and processes should be used for these “high-alert” drugs. Such protocols might include written and com- puterized guidelines, checklists, preprinted orders, double-checks, special packaging, and labeling.
Do Not Store Concentrated Potassium Chloride Solutions on Patient Care Units
Concentrated potassium chloride (KCl) is the most potentially lethal chemical used in medicine. It is widely used as an additive to intravenous solutions to replace potassium loss in critically ill patients. Each year, fatal accidents occur when concentrated KCl is injected because it is confused with another medication. Because KCl is never intentionally used undiluted, there is no need to have the concentrated form stocked on the patient care unit. Appropriately diluted solutions of KCl can be prepared by the phar- macy and stored on the unit for use.
After enacting its sentinel event reporting system, JCAHO found that eight of ten incidents of patient death resulting from administration of KCl were the result of the infusion of KCl that was available as a floor stock item.67 This has also been reported as a frequent cause of adverse events by the U.S. Pharmacopoeia (USP) Medication Errors Reporting Program.68
Ensure the Availability of Pharmaceutical Decision Support
Because of the immense variety and complexity of medications now available, it is impossible for nurses or doctors to keep up with all of the information required for safe medication use. The pharmacist has become an essential resource in modern hospital practice. Thus, access to his or her expertise must be possible at all times.69,70 Health care organizations would greatly benefit from pharmaceutical decision support. When possible, medi- cations should be dispensed by pharmacists or with the assistance of phar- macists. In addition, a substantial number of errors are made when nurses or other nonpharmacist personnel enter pharmacies during off hours to ob- tain drugs. Although small hospitals cannot afford and do not need to have a
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 195
pharmacist physically present at all times, all hospitals must have access to pharmaceutical decision support, and systems for dispensing medications should be designed and approved by pharmacists.
Include a Pharmacist During Rounds of Patient Care Units
As the major resource for drug information, pharmacists are much more valuable to the patient care team if they are physically present at the time decisions are being made and orders are being written. For example, in teaching hospitals, medical staff may conduct “rounds” with residents and other staff. Pharmacists should actively participate in this process and be present on the patient care unit when appropriate. Such participation is usually well received by nurses and doctors, and it has been shown to signifi- cantly reduce serious medication errors. Leape et al.71 measured the effect of pharmacist participation on medical rounds in the intensive care unit. They found that in one large, urban, teaching hospital the rate of prevent- able adverse drug events related to prescribing decreased significantly—66 percent—from 10.4 per 1,000 patient-days before the intervention to 3.5 after the intervention; the rate in the control group was unchanged.
Make Relevant Patient Information Available at the Point of Patient Care
Many organizations have implemented ways to make information about patients available at the point of patient care as well as ways to ensure that patients are correctly identified and treated. With medication administra- tion, some inexpensive but useful strategies include the use of colored wrist- bands (or their equivalent) as a way to alert medical staff of medication allergies. Colored wristbands or their functional equivalent can alert person- nel who encounter a patient anywhere in a hospital to check for an allergy before administering a medication. Using computer-generated MARs, can minimize transcription errors and legibility problems as well as provide flow charts for patient care.
Improper doses, mix-ups of drugs or patients, and inaccurate records are common causes of medication errors in daily hospital practice. Bar cod- ing (or an electronic equivalent) is an effective remedy.72 It is a simple way to ensure that the identity and dose of the drug are as prescribed, that it is being given to the right patient, and that all of the steps in the dispensing and administration processes are checked for timeliness and accuracy. Bar
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
196 TO ERR IS HUMAN
coding can be used not only by drug manufacturers, but also by hospitals to ensure that patients and their records match. The Colmercy-O’Neil VA Medical Center in Topeka, Kansas, reports, for example, a 70 percent re- duction in medication error rates between September, 1995 and April, 1998 by using a system that included bar coding of each does, use of a hand-held laser bar code scanner, and a radio computer link.73
Improve Patients’ Knowledge About Their Treatment
A major unused resource in most hospitals, clinics, and practices is the patient. Not only do patients have a right to know the medications they are receiving, the reasons for them, their expected effects and possible compli- cations, they also should know what the pills or injections look like and how often they are to receive them. Patients should be involved in reviewing and confirming allergy information in their records.
Practitioners and staff in health care organizations should take steps to ensure that, whenever possible, patients know which medications they are receiving, the appearance of these medications, and their possible side ef- fects.74 They should be encouraged to notify their doctors or staff of dis- crepancies in medication administration or the occurrence of side effects. If they are encouraged to take this responsibility, they can be a final “fail-safe” step.
At the time of hospital discharge, patients should also be given both verbal and written information about the safe and effective use of their medi- cations in terms and in a language they can understand.
Patient partnering is not a substitute for nursing responsibility to give the proper medication properly or for physicians to inform their patients, but because no one is perfect, it provides an opportunity to intercept the rare but predictable error. In addition to patients’ informing their health care practitioner about their current medications, allergies, and previous adverse drug experiences, the National Patient Safety Partnership has rec- ommended that patients ask the following questions before accepting a newly prescribed medication:75
• Is this the drug my doctor (or other health care provider) ordered? What are the trade and generic names of the medication?
• What is the drug for? What is it supposed to do? • How and when am I supposed to take it and for how long? • What are the likely side effects? What do I do if they occur?
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 197
• Is this new medication safe to take with other over-the-counter or prescription medication or with dietary supplements that I am already tak- ing? What food, drink, activities, dietary supplements, or other medication should be avoided while taking this medication?
SUMMARY
This chapter has proposed numerous actions based on both good evi- dence and principles of safe design that health care organizations could take now or as soon as possible to substantially improve patient safety. These principles include (1) providing leadership; (2) respecting human limits in process design; (3) promoting effective team functioning; (4) anticipating the unexpected; and (5) creating a learning environment.
The committee’s recommendations call for health care organizations and health care professionals to make continually improved patient safety a spe- cific, declared, and serious aim by establishing patient safety programs with defined executive responsibility. The committee also calls for the immediate creation of safety systems that incorporate principles such as (1) standardiz- ing and simplifying equipment, supplies, and processes; (2) establishing team training programs; and (3) implementing nonpunitive systems for reporting and analyzing errors and accidents within organizations. Finally, drawing on these principles and on strong evidence, the committee calls on health care organizations to implement proven medication safety practices.
REFERENCES
1. Reason, James T. Forward to Human Error in Medicine, Marilyn Sue Bogner, ed. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994, p. xiv. Though ecologically unsound, the analogy is apt.
2. Chassin, Mark R.; Galvin, Robert W., and the National Roundtable on Health Care Quality. The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality. Institute of Medicine National Roundtable on Health Care Quality. JAMA. 280:1000–1005, 1998.
3. Cook, Richard I. Two Years Before the Mast: Learning How to Learn About Patient Safety. Invited presentation. “Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing Errors in Health Care,” Rancho Mirage, CA, November 8–10, 1998.
4. Senders, John. “Medical Devices, Medical Errors and Medical Accidents,” in Hu- man Error in Medicine, Marilyn Sue Bogner, ed. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Asso- ciates, 1994.
5. Van Cott, Harold. “Human Errors: Their Causes and Reduction,” in Human Er- ror in Medicine, Marilyn Sue Bogner, ed., Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994.
6. Van Cott, 1994.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
198 TO ERR IS HUMAN
7. MacCormack, George. Zeroing in on Safety Excellence—It’s Good Business. http://www.dupont.com/safety/esn97-1/zeroin.html 5/27/99.
8. DuPont Safety Resources. Safety Pays Big Dividends for Swiss Federal Railways. http://www.dupont.com/safety/ss/swissrail22.html 5/3/99.
9. From “Executive Safety News” DuPont Safety Resources. http:// www.dupont.com/safety/esn98-3.html 5/3/99.
10. Alcoa. Alcoa Environment, Health and Safety Annual Report. 1997. 11. Sagan, Scott D. The Limits of Safety. Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weap-
ons. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. 12. Weick, Karl E. and Roberts, Karlene H. Collective Mind in Organizations: Heed-
ful Interrelating on Flight Decks. Administrative Science Quarterly. 38:357–381, 1993. 13. Rasmussen, Jens. Skills, rules, Knowledge: Signals, Signs, and Symbols and Other
Distinctions in Human Performance Models. IEEE Transactions: Systems, Man & Cyber- netics (SMC-13): 257–267, 1983.
14. Reason, James. Human Error. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 15. Moray, Nevill. “Error Reduction as a Systems Problem,” in Human Error in Medi-
cine, ed., Marilyn Sue Bogner, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994. 16. Van Cott, 1994. 17. Norman, Donald A. The Design of Everyday Things. NY: Doubleday/Currency,
1988. 18. Gaba, David; Howard, Steven K., and Fish, Kevin J. Crisis Management in Anes-
thesiology. NY: Churchill-Livingstone, 1994. 19. Committee on Quality Assurance in Office-Based Surgery. A Report to New York
State Public Health Council and New York State Department of Health, June, 1999. 20. Berwick, Donald M. “Taking Action to Improve Safety: How to Increase the
Odds of Success,” Keynote Address, Second Annenberg Conference, Rancho Mirage, CA, November 8, 1998.
21. Haberstroh, Charles H. “Organization, Design and Systems Analysis,” in Hand- book of Organizations, J.J. March, ed. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965.
22. Leape, Lucian L.; Kabcenell, Andrea; Berwick, Donald M., et al. Reducing Ad- verse Drug Events. Boston: Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 1998.
23. Institute of Medicine. Guidelines for Clinical Practice. From Development to Use. Marilyn J. Field and Kathleen N. Lohr, eds. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992.
24. Leape, et al., 1998. 25. Leape, et al., 1998. 26. Leape, et al., 1998. 27. Leape, et al., 1998. 28. Leape, et al., 1998. 29. Hwang, Mi Y. JAMA Patient Page. Take Your Medications as Prescribed. JAMA.
282:298, 1999. 30. Blumenthal, David. The Future of Quality Measurement and Management in a
Transforming Health Care System. JAMA. 278:1622–1625, 1997. 31. Sheridan, Thomas B. and Thompson, James M. “People Versus Computers in
Medicine,” in Human Error in Medicine, Marilyn Sue Bogner, ed., Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 199
32. Hyman, William A. “Errors in the Use of Medical Equipment,” in Human Error in Medicine, Marilyn Sue Bogner, ed., Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994.
33. Senders, John W. “Medical Devices, Medical Errors, and Medical Accidents,” in Human Error in Medicine, Marilyn Sue Bogner, ed., Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1994.
34. Cook, Richard I. Two Years Before the Mast: Learning How to Learn About Patient Safety. “Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing Errors in Health Care,” Rancho Mirage, CA, November 8–10, 1998.
35. Leape, et al., 1998. 36. Helmreich, Robert L.; Chidester, Thomas R.; Foushee, H. Clayton, et al. How
Effective is Cockpit Resource Managmeent Training? Flight Safety Digest. May:1–17, 1990.
37. Chopra,V.; Gesink, Birthe J.; deJong, Jan, et al. Does Training on an Anaesthesia Simulator Lead to Improvement in Performance? Br J Anaesthesia. 293–297, 1994.
38. Denson, James S. and Abrahamson, Stephen. A Computer-Controlled Patient Simulator. JAMA. 208:504–508, 1969.
39. Howard, Steven K.; Gaba, David, D.; Fish, Kevin J., et al. Anesthesia Crisis Re- source Management Training: Teaching Anesthesiologists to Handle Critical Incidents. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine. 63:763–769, 1992.
40. Spence, Alastair. A. The Expanding Role of Simulators in Risk Management. Br J Anaesthesia. 78:633–634, 1997.
41. Inaccurate Reporting of Simulated Critical Anaesthetic Incidents. Br J Anaesthe- sia. 78:637–641, 1997.
42. Helmreich, Robert L. and Davies, Jan M. Anaesthetic Simulation and Lessons to be Learned from Aviation. [Editorial]. Canadian Journal of Anaesthesia. 44:907–912, 1997.
43. Institute of Medicine. The Computer-Based Patient Record. An Essential Technol- ogy for Health Care. Revised Edition. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997.
44. Tuggy, Michael L. Virtual Reality Flexible Sigmoidoscopy Simulator Training: Im- pact on Resident Performance. J Am Board Fam Pract. 11:426–433, 1998.
45. Leape, Lucian, L.; Woods, David D.; Hatlie, Martin, J., et al. Promoting Patient Safety and Preventing Medical Error. JAMA. 280:1444–1447, 1998.
46. Leape, Lucian L. Error in Medicine. JAMA 272:1851–1857, 1994. 47. Kizer, Kenneth W. VHA’s Patient Safety Improvement Initiative, presentation to
the National Health Policy Forum, Washington, D.C., May 14, 1999. 48. Nolan, Thomas. Presentation, IHI Conference, Orlando, FL, December, 1998. 49. Zimmerman, Jack E.; Shortell, Stephen M., et al. Improving Intensive Care: Ob-
servations Based on Organizational Case Studies in Nine Intensive Care Units: A Pro- spective, Multicenter Study. Crit Care Med. 21:1443–1451, 1993.
50. Shortell, Stephen M.; Zimmerman, Jack E.; Gillies, Robin R., et al. Continuously Improving Patient Care: Practical Lessons and an Assessment Tool From the National ICU Study. QRB Qual Rev Bull. 18:150–155, 1992.
51. Manasse, Henri R. Jr. Toward Defining and Applying a Higher Standard of Qual- ity for Medication Use in the United States. Am J Health System Pharm. 55:374–379, 1995.
52. Lesar, Timothy S.; Briceland, Laurie; and Stein, Daniel S. Factors Related to Er- rors in Medication Prescribing. JAMA. 277:312–317, 1997.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
200 TO ERR IS HUMAN
53. Avorn, Jerry. Putting Adverse Drug Events into Perspective. JAMA. 277:341– 342, 1997.
54. Healthcare Leaders Urge Adoption of Methods to Reduce Adverse Drug Events. News Release. National Patient Safety Partnership, May 12, 1999.
55. Massachusetts Hospital Association (Massachusetts Coalition for the Prevention of Medical Errors). “MHA Best Practice Recommendations to Reduce Medication Er- rors,” Kirle, Leslie E.; Conway, James; Peto, Randolph, et al. http://www.mhalink.org/ mcpme/recommend.htm.
56. Leape, et al., 1998. 57. Consensus Statement. American Society of Health-system Pharmacists. Top-Pri-
ority Actions for Preventing Adverse Drug Events in Hospitals. Recommendations of an Expert Panel. Am J Health System Pharm. 53:747–751, 1996.
58. Bates, David W.; Leape, Lucian L.; Cullen, David J., et al. Effect of Computerized Physician Order Entry and a Team Intervention on Prevention of Serious Medical Error. JAMA. 280:1311–1316, 1998.
59. Bates, 1998. 60. Evans, R. Scott; Pestotnik, Stanley L.; Classen, David C., et al. A Computer-As-
sisted Management Program for Antibiotics and Other Anti-Infective Agents. N Engl J Med. 338(4):232–238, 1997. See also: Schiff, Gordon D.; and Rucker, T. Donald. Com- puterized Prescribing: Building the Electronic Infrastructure for Better Medication Us- age. JAMA. 279:1024–1029, 1998.
61. Bates, David W.; Spell, Nathan, Cullen; David J., et al. The Costs of Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients. JAMA. 227:307–311, 1997.
62. Bates, David W.; O’Neil, Anne C.; Boyle, Deborah, et. al. Potential Identifiablity and Preventability of Adverse Events Using Information Systems. J American Informatics Assoc. 5:404–411, 1994.
63. Institute for Safe Medication Practices. Over-reliance on Pharmacy Computer Systems May Place Patients at Great Risk. http://www.ismp.org/ISMP/MSAarticles/ Computer2.html 6/01/99.
64. Bates, David W.; Cullen, David J.; Laird, Nan, et al. Incidence of Adverse Drug Events and Potential Adverse Drug Events. JAMA. 274:29–34, 1995.
65. Leape, Lucian L.; Kabcenell, Andrea; Berwick, Donald M., et al. Reducing Ad- verse Drug Events. Boston: Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 1998.
66. Cohen, Michael; Anderson, Richard W.; Attilio, Robert M., et al. Preventing Medi- cation Errors in Cancer Chemotherapy. Am J Health System Pharm. 53:737–746, 1996.
67. Sentinel Event Alert. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Or- ganizations, Oakbrook Terrace, IL: JCAHO, 1998.
68. Cohen, Michael. Important Error Prevention Advisory. Hosp Pharmacists. 32:489– 491, 1997.
69. ASHP Guidelines on Preventing Medication Errors in Hospitals. Am J Hospital Pharmacists. 50:305–314, 1993.
70. Crawford, Stephanie Y. Systems Factors in the Reporting of Serious Medication Errors. Presentation at Annenburg Conference, Rancho Mirage, CA, November 8, 1998.
71. Leape, Lucian L.; Cullen, David J.; Clapp, Margaret D., et al. Pharmacist Partici- pation on Physician Rounds and Adverse Drug Events in the Intensive Care Unit. JAMA.. 282(3):267–270, 1999.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
CREATING SAFETY SYSTEMS IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 201
72. Top Priority Actions for Preventing Adverse Drug Events in Hospitals. Recom- mendations of an Expert Panel. Am J Health System Pharm. 53:747–751, 1996.
73. Gebhart, Fred. VA Facility Slashes Drug Errors Via Bar-Coding. Drug Topics. 1:44, 1999.
74. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. 1998 Hospital Accreditation Standards. Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint Commission, 1998.
75. Healthcare Leaders Urge Adoption of Methods to Reduce Adverse Drug Events. News Release. National Patient Safety Partnership, May 12, 1999.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Appendixes
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
205
A Background and
Methodology
This report on patient safety is part of a larger study examining the quality of health care in America. The Quality of Health Care in America project was initiated by the Institute of Medicine in June
1998, with the charge of developing a strategy that will result in a threshold improvement in quality over the next ten years. Specifically, the committee is charged with the following tasks:
• review and synthesis of findings in the literature pertaining to the quality of care provided in the health care system;
• development of a communications strategy for raising the awareness of the general public and key stakeholders of quality-of-care concerns and opportunities for improvement;
• articulation of a policy framework that will provide positive incen- tives to improve quality and foster accountability;
• identification of key characteristics and factors that enable or encour- age providers, health care organizations, health plans, and communities to continuously improve the quality of care; and
• development of a research agenda in areas of continued uncertainty.
A growing body of rigorous research has documented serious and wide- spread quality problems in American medicine. The burden of harm con-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
206 TO ERR IS HUMAN
veyed by the collective impact of all of our health care quality problems requires the urgent attention of all stakeholders—the health professions, health policy makers, consumer advocates, and purchasers of care. The chal- lenge is to bring the full potential benefit of effective health care to all Ameri- cans while avoiding unnecessary and harmful interventions and eliminating preventable complications of care. Meeting this challenge demands a readi- ness to think in radically new ways about how to deliver health care services and how to assess and improve their quality. Yet neither business leaders, medical leaders, policy makers, nor the public has a clear picture about whether different forms of financing and delivery of care have affected the quality of care and how best to structure financing, oversight, and delivery of care to improve quality.
The methods used for this study included a review of available litera- ture, a commissioned paper, public testimony, a telephone survey, and input from targeted groups on specific issues. A review of the literature relied on published articles focusing on areas of quality, medical errors, patient safety, aviation safety, worker safety, and pharmaceutical safety. Working papers and web sites were also consulted, generally provided by organizations in- volved in patient safety, accreditation, and existing error reporting systems.
A paper was commissioned on the legal issues raised in protecting data and reporters in error reporting systems that are external to a health care organization. This paper was completed for the committee by Randall Bovbjerg, J.D., and David Shapiro, M.D., J.D. It formed the basis for Chap- ter 6 of this report.
The content of this report was discussed at seven meetings of two differ- ent subcommittees. It was on the agenda at four meetings of the Subcom- mittee on Creating an External Environment for Quality and three meetings of the Subcommittee on Creating the 21st Century Health System. It was also on the agenda at three meetings of the Committee on Quality of Health Care in America. The public testimony provided follows:
Subcommittee on Creating an External Environment for Quality
November 2, 1998 Martin Hatlie, National Patient Safety Foundation
Michael Cohen, Institute for Safe Medication Practices
Ronald Goldman, Veterans Health Administration
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX A 207
January 29, 1999 Charles Billings, M.D., Ohio State University (designer of the Aviation Safety Reporting System)
June 15, 1999 Tim Cuerdon, Health Care Financing Administration
Margaret VanAmringe, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations
Marge Keyes, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
Joint Meeting of Both Subcommittees
June 16, 1999 Kenneth Kizer, M.D., Undersecretary of Health, Veterans Health Administration
A short telephone survey was conducted between February 24 and May 5, 1999 of a number of states having error reporting systems that affect hos- pitals. The list of states was obtained from the Joint Commission on Ac- creditation of Healthcare Organizations. A nonrepresentative sample was chosen to obtain additional information on their programs, focusing mainly on the largest states. The respondent was the individual at the state health department with administrative responsibility over the reporting program. Information was collected on the definition of a reportable event, which organizations submit reports, the number of reports submitted in the most recent year available, the year the reporting program was implemented, who has access to the information reported, and what is done with the informa- tion obtained (e.g., organization follow-up on specific events, compilation of data and trending over time). All respondents were given an opportunity to review the information on their states and make any corrections or clarifi- cations.
Finally, input was obtained through two group meetings with specific key audiences. The first meeting was a 90-minute discussion held on August 2, 1999, at the 12th Annual Conference of the National Academy for State Health Policy in Cincinnati, Ohio. This meeting was attended by 19 people, all of whom had responsibilities associated with quality-of-care issues, some related to state error reporting programs. Open discussion was held on roles that states can play in ensuring adequate oversight of quality-of-care and patient safety, and what would be helpful to the states to increase their ef- forts in safety oversight.
The second meeting was a one-day roundtable discussion held on Sep-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
208 TO ERR IS HUMAN
tember 9, 1999, with health professionals active in their professional societ- ies and associations through support from The Commonwealth Fund. This meeting was attended by 14 people representing medicine, nursing, and pharmacy. This open discussion covered issues related to the extent to which the health and medical community is aware of quality and safety concerns, specific actions that professional societies and groups can take to improve patient safety, and barriers that impede these actions from moving forward.
OTHER IOM WORK ON QUALITY
This quality initiative represents a continuing IOM interest in quality of health care. Several other quality-of-care projects have been undertaken in recent years.
America’s Health in Transition: Protecting and Improving the Quality of Health and Health Care (IOM-wide special initiative)
The Special Initiative on Health Care Quality was created in 1996 to examine how to maintain and improve the health and well-being of the popu- lation and the quality of care that the public receives as the health care sys- tem restructures. This special initiative is evaluating quality assessment and improvement tools and their uses, and promoting the application of appro- priate tools at all levels of health care, in all organizations, for the entire population. The initiative will also inform consumers, policy makers, pro- viders, and others of key opportunities and obstacles to achieving better health outcomes for individuals and populations, and will provide them with information and tools to enable them to make better decisions and choices about health and health care.
National Roundtable on Health Care Quality
The National Roundtable on Health Care Quality was created to exam- ine continual changes in health care and the implications of these changes for the quality of health and health care in this nation. The Roundtable con- vened nationally prominent representatives of the private and public sectors (regional, state, and federal); academia; patients; and the health media to analyze unfolding issues concerning health care quality. This initiative pro- duced three reports: The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care Quality, Mea-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX A 209
suring the Quality of Health Care, and Collaboration Among Competing Man- aged Care Organizations for Quality Improvement.
Ensuring the Quality of Cancer Care
The National Cancer Policy Board undertook a comprehensive review of the quality of cancer care provided in the United States. The report, pub- lished in June 1999, delineates essential elements needed to improve quality in cancer care. The report provides an overview of the present cancer care system, moving from detection and early treatment to care at the end of life. Major obstacles impeding patient access to quality cancer care are identi- fied. The report offers a model of an ideal cancer care delivery system and provides examples of the problems that limit early detection, accurate diag- nosis, optimal treatment, and responsive supportive care. Recommendations to improve the quality of cancer care are offered for consideration by Con- gress, public and private health care purchasers, individual consumers, pro- viders and researchers.
Improving Quality in Long-Term Care
The Committee on Improving Quality in Long-Term Care was convened to examine the means for assessing, overseeing, and improving the quality of long-term care in different settings and the practical and policy challenges of achieving a consistent quality of care regardless of where care is received. This study built on a 1986 report, Improving the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes, which initiated changes that significantly altered where long-term care is received and by whom. The most recent study examines the full range of long-term care settings and services, including nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and community-based home health care.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
210
B Glossary and
Acronyms
GLOSSARY
Accident—An event that involves damage to a defined system that disrupts the ongoing or future output of the system.1
Active error—An error that occurs at the level of the frontline operator and whose effects are felt almost immediately.2
Adverse event—An injury resulting from a medical intervention.3
Bad outcome—Failure to achieve a desired outcome of care.
Error—Failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim; the accumulation of errors results in accidents.
Health care organization—Entity that provides, coordinates, and/or insures health and medical services for people.
Human factors—Study of the interrelationships between humans, the tools they use, and the environment in which they live and work.4
Latent error—Errors in the design, organization, training, or maintenance that lead to operator errors and whose effects typically lie dormant in the system for lengthy periods of time.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX B 211
Medical technology—Techniques, drugs, equipment, and procedures used by health care professionals in delivering medical care to individuals and the systems within which such care is delivered.5
Micro-system—Organizational unit built around the definition of repeatable core service competencies. Elements of a micro-system include (1) a core team of health care professionals, (2) a defined population of patients, (3) carefully designed work processes, and (4) an environment capable of linking information on all aspects of work and patient or population outcomes to support ongoing evaluation of performance.
Patient safety—Freedom from accidental injury; ensuring patient safety involves the establishment of operational systems and processes that minimize the likelihood of errors and maximizes the likelihood of intercepting them when they occur.
Quality of care—Degree to which health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge.6
Standard—A minimum level of acceptable performance or results or excellent levels of performance or the range of acceptable performance or results.7
The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) defines six types of standards:
1. Standard test methods—a procedure for identifying, measuring, and evaluating a material, product or system.
2. Standard specification—a statement of a set of requirements to be satisfied and the procedures for determining whether each of the requirements is satisfied.
3. Standard practice—a procedure for performing one or more specific operations or functions.
4. Standard terminology—a document comprising terms, definitions, des- criptions, explanations, abbreviations, or acronyms.
5. Standard guide—a series of options or instructions that do not re- commend a specific course of action.
6. Standard classification—a systematic arrangement or division of pro- ducts, systems, or services into groups based on similar characteristics.8
System—Set of interdependent elements interacting to achieve a common aim. These elements may be both human and nonhuman (equipment, technologies, etc.).
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
212 TO ERR IS HUMAN
ACRONYMS
ABMS American Board of Medical Specialties ADE adverse drug event AERS Adverse Event Reporting System AHRQ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality AMA American Medical Association AMAP American Medical Accreditation Program ASHP American Society of Health-System Pharmacists ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
CABG coronary artery bypass graft CAHPS Consumer Assessment of Health Plans CDC Centers for Disease Control CEO chief executive officer CERT Centers for Education and Research in Therapeutics
DRG diagnosis-related group
FAA Federal Aviation Administration FDA Food and Drug Administration
HCFA Health Care Financing Administration HEDIS Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 HMO health maintenance organization HRSA Health Resources and Services Administration
ICU intensive care unit ISMP Institute for Safe Medication Practices IV intravenous
JCAHO Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
MAR Medical Administration Record MER Medical Error Reporting (system) MERS-TM Medical Event-Reporting System for Transfusion Medicine M&M morbidity and mortality
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX B 213
NCC-MERP National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention
NCQA National Committee for Quality Assurance NIH National Institutes of Health NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health NORA National Occupational Research Agenda NPSF National Patient Safety Foundation NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
OPDRA Office of Post-Marketing Drug Risk Assessment OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PICU pediatric intensive care unit POS point of service PPO preferred provider organization PRO peer review organization
QIO Quality Improvement Organization QuIC Quality Interagency Coordinating Committee
USP U.S. Pharmacopeia
VHA Veterans Health Administration
REFERENCES
1. Perrow, Charles. Normal Accidents. New York: Basic Books; 1984. 2. Reason, James T. Human Error. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press;
1990. 3. Bates, David W.; Spell, Nathan; Cullen, David J., et al. The Costs of Adverse
Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients. JAMA. 277:307–311, 1997. 4. Weinger, Matthew B.; Pantiskas, Carl; Wiklund, Michael, et al. Incorporating
Human Factors into the Design of Medical Devices. JAMA. 280(17):1484, 1998. 5. Institute of Medicine. Assessing Medical Technologies. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press; 1985. 6. Institute of Medicine. Medicare: A Strategy for Quality Assurance, Volume II.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press; 1990. 7. Institute of Medicine, 1990. 8. American Society for Testing and Materials, www.astm.org/FAQ/3.html.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
215
C Literature Summary
This Appendix summarizes the literature described in Chapter 2. The references cited are at the end of Chapter 2.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
216 TO ERR IS HUMAN
TABLE C-1 Literature Summary
Reference Sample Description Data Source
General studies of errors and adverse events Thomas et al., Randomly sampled 15,000 Chart review by trained nurses
forthcoming 2000 nonpsychiatric 1992 and board-certified family discharges from a practitioners and internists. representative sample of hospitals in Utah and Colorado.
Bhasale et al., 1998 A non-random sample of General practitioner-reported Analysing potential harm 324 general practitioners free-text descriptions of
in Australian general reporting incidents incidents and answered practice between October 1993 fixed-response questions.
and June 1995.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 217
Continued
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
Adverse events occurred in Adverse event—“an injury 46.1% of adverse events 2.9% ± 0.2 of caused by medical (22.3% negligent) were hospitalizations in each management (rather than attributable to surgeons and state. 32.6% ± 4 of the disease process) that 23.2% (44.9% negligent) adverse events were due resulted in either a were attributable to to negligence in Utah and prolonged hospital stay internists. 27.4 ± 2.4 were due to or disability at discharge.” negligence in Colorado. Negligence was defined as Death occurred in 6.6% “care that fell below the ± 1.2 of adverse events and standard expected of 8.8% ± 2.5 of negligent physicians in their adverse events. The leading community.” cause of nonoperative adverse events were adverse drug events (19.3% of all adverse events; 35.1% were negligent). Operative events comprised 44.9% of all adverse events and 16.9% were negligent.
805 incidents were reported. Incident—“an unintended Pharmacological management 76% were preventable and event, no matter how related to 51 per 100 27% had potential for severe seemingly trivial or incidents. Poor harm. commonplace, that could communication between
have harmed or did harm patients and healthcare a patient.” professionals and actions of
others contributed to 23 per 100 incidents each. Errors in judgment contributed to 22 per 100 incidents.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
218 TO ERR IS HUMAN
General studies of errors and adverse events (continued) Leape et al., 1993 Record review of 1,133 Harvard Medical Practice Preventing medical injury patients who suffered from Study.
an adverse event (AE).
McGuire et al., 1992 44,603 consecutive major Resident reports giving name Measuring and managing operations performed at and procedure of each
quality of surgery a large medical center patient who suffered any from 1977 to 1990. complication. In a monthly
conference, representatives of all specialties determined by consensus the category of each complication (inevitable, inherent risk, error, hospital deficit, coincidence, unknown).
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 219
Continued
70% of adverse events were AE—per Leape (1991), The most common types of found to be preventable, AE is defined as “an preventable errors were 24% unpreventable, and unintended injury that technical errors (44%), 6% potentially preventable. was caused by medical errors in diagnosis (17%),
management and that failures to prevent injury resulted in measurable (12%), and errors in the use disability.” of a drug (10%).
Preventable AE—an AE Approximately 20% of resulting from an error. technical errors, 71% of
Unpreventable AE—an AE diagnostic errors, 50% of resulting from a preventative errors, and complication that cannot 37% of errors in the use of a be prevented at the drug were judged to be current state of knowledge. negligent.
Potentially preventable AE—an AE where no error was identified but it is widely recognized that a high incidence of this type of complication reflects low standards of care or technical expertise.
2,428 patients (5.4%) suffered 2,797 complications (6.3%). 49% of these complications were attributable to error. 749 patients (1.7%) died during the same hospitalization. 7.5% of these deaths were attributable to error.
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
220 TO ERR IS HUMAN
General studies of errors and adverse events (continued) Bedell et al., 1991 203 patients who suffered At least one of the authors Incidence and characteristics from cardiac arrest at a evaluated patients who
of preventable iatrogenic teaching hospital during underwent CPR within 24 cardiac arrests 1981. hours of arrest. Information
from the medical record was also used.
Leape et al., 1991 30,195 randomly selected Hospital records. The nature of adverse events records in 51 hospitals in
in hospitalized patients New York state (1984).
DuBois et al., 1988 182 deaths from 12 Investigators prepared a Preventable Deaths hospitals for 3 conditions dictated summary of each
(cerebrovascular accident, patient’s hospital course. pneumonia, or myocardial Panels of 3 physicians for infarction) each condition then
independently reviewed each summary and independently judged whether the death was preventable.
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 221
Continued
28 (14%) of arrests followed Iatrogenic cardiac arrest— The most common causes of an iatrogenic complication. “an arrest that resulted potentially preventable 17 (61%) of the 28 patients from a therapy or arrest were medication died. All 4 reviewers procedure or from a errors and toxic effects considered 18 (64%) of the clearly identified error of (44%), and suboptimal iatrogenic arrests to have omission.” response by physicians to been preventable. clinical signs and symptoms
(28%).
1,133 adverse events (AEs) AE—“an unintended injury Drug complications were the occurred in 30,195 patients. that was caused by medical most common type of
management and that adverse event (19%), resulted in measurable followed by wound disability.” infections (14%) and
technical complications (13%). 58% of the adverse advents were errors in management, among which nearly half were attributable to negligence.
The physicians unanimously Preventable deaths from agreed that 14% of the myocardial infarction deaths could have been reflected errors in prevented. 2 out of the 3 management, from physicians found that 27% cerebrovascular accident might have been prevented. reflected errors in
diagnosis, and from pneumonia reflected errors in management and diagnosis.
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
222 TO ERR IS HUMAN
General studies of errors and adverse events (continued) Steel et al., 1981 815 consecutive patients on Record review, clinical Iatrogenic illness on a a university hospital’s personnel interviews, and
general medical service general medical service information from utilization- at a university hospital during a 5-month period review coordinators.
in 1979.
Cooper et al., 1978 47 interviews regarding Interviewees selected at Preventable anesthesia preventable mishaps random from a list of
mishaps between September 1975 departmental members. and April 1977 including staff and resident anesthesiologists from a large urban teaching hospital.
Dripps et al., 1961 Records of 33,224 patients Patient records The role of anesthesia in anesthetized in a
surgical mortality 10-year period.
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 223
Continued
36% of patients had an Iatrogenic illness—“any iatrogenic illness. 9% of illness that resulted from a the patients had an diagnostic procedure or iatrogenic illness that from any form of therapy.” threatened life or produced In addition, the authors considerable disability while, included harmful in another 2%, the illness occurrences (e.g., injuries was believed to contribute from a fall or decubitus to the death of the patient. ulcers) that were not natural
consequences of the patient’s disease.
359 preventable critical Critical incident—a mishap 82% of the preventable incidents were identified that “was clearly an incidents reported involved and coded. occurrence that could have human error and 14%
led (if not discovered or involved equipment error. corrected in time) or did lead to an undesirable outcome, ranging from increased length of hospital stay to death or permanent disability.”
12 of the 18,737 patients who received spinal anesthesia died from causes definitely related to the anesthetic (1:1,560). 27 of the 14,487 patients who received general anesthesia supplemented with a muscle relaxant died from causes directly related to the anesthetic (1:536).
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
224 TO ERR IS HUMAN
General studies of errors and adverse events (continued) Beecher and Todd, 1954 All deaths from January 1 team, consisting of an A study of the deaths 1, 1948, through December anesthesiologist, a surgeon,
associated with 31, 1952, occurring on and a secretary, worked in anesthesia and surgery the surgical services of each of the 10 hospitals and based on a study of 10 university hospitals. appraised the causes of all 599,548 anesthesias in deaths on the surgical services. ten institutions
Medication-related studies Knox, 1999 Analysis of medication Prescription errors tied to errors by 51
lack of advice Massachusetts Globe article pharmacists.
Leape, 1999 75 patients randomly Review of medical records and Pharmacist participation on selected from each of 3 pharmacist recommendations.
physician rounds and groups: all admissions to adverse drug events in the study unit (2 medical the intensive care unit ICUs at Massachusetts
General Hospital) from February 1, 1993, through July 31, 1993 (baseline), and all admissions to the study unit (postintervention) and control unit from October 1, 1994, through July 7, 1995. 50 patients were also selected at random from the control unit during the baseline period.
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 225
7,977 of the 599,548 patients who received anesthesia died. Gross errors in anesthetic management occurred in 29 of the 384 (7.6%) deaths caused by anesthesia.
88% of medication errors Pharmacists cited factors involved the wrong drug or that led to mistakes. 62% the wrong dose and 63% cited “too many telephone involved first-time calls,” 59% “unusually busy prescriptions rather than day,” 53% “too many refills. customers,” 41% “lack of
concentration,” and 32% “staff shortage.”
The rate of preventable ADE—per Bates (1993), adverse drug events (ADEs) ADE is defined as “an injury due to ordering decreased resulting from the by 66% from 10.4 per administration of a drug.” 1,000 patient days before the intervention to 3.5 per 1,000 patient days after the intervention.
The rate was essentially unchanged during the same
time periods in the control unit: 10.9 and 12.4 per 1,000 patient days.
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
Continued
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
226 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Medication-related studies (continued) Lazarou, 1998 39 prospective studies 4 electronic databases were Incidence of adverse drug from U.S. hospitals. searched for articles between
reactions in hospitalized 1966 and 1996. patients
Wilson et al., 1998 682 children admitted to a Standardized incident report Medication errors in Congenital Heart Disease forms filled out by doctors,
paediatric practice Center at a teaching nurses, and pharmacists. hospital in the United Kingdom.
Andrews et al., 1997 1,047 patients admitted to Ethnographers trained in An alternative strategy for 3 units at a large, tertiary qualitative observational
studying adverse drug care, urban teaching research recorded all adverse events hospital affiliated with a events discussed while
university medical school. attending day-shift, weekday, regularly scheduled attending rounds, residents’ work rounds, nursing shift changes, case conferences, and other scheduled meetings.
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 227
The overall incidence of ADR—“According to the serious adverse drug World Health Organization reactions (ADRs) in definition, this is any hospitalized patients was noxious, unintended, and 6.7% and of fatal ADRs was undesired effect of a drug, 0.32%. In 1994, an which occurs at doses in estimated 2,216,000 humans for prophylaxis, hospitalized patients diagnosis, or therapy. This experienced serious ADRs definition excludes and 106,000 had fatal ADRs, therapeutic failures, making these reactions the intentional and accidental fourth and sixth leading poisonings (i.e., overdose), causes of death. and drug abuse. Also, this
does not include adverse events due to errors in drug administration or noncompliance (taking more or less of a drug than the prescribed amount).”
441 medical errors were Medication error—“a Doctors accounted for 72% of reported. Prescription mistake made at any stage the errors, nurses for 22%, errors accounted for 68% in the provision of a pharmacy staff for 5%, and of all reported errors, pharmaceutical product to doctor/nurse combination administration errors for a patient.” for 1% 25%, and supply errors for 7%.
An adverse event occurred Adverse event—a situation Individuals caused 37.8% of in 480 of the 1,047 patients “in which an inappropriate adverse events while 15.6% (45.8%). 185 of the patients decision was made when, of the events had interactive (17.7%) had at least one at the time, an appropriate causes and 9.8% were due serious event. The likelihood alternative could have been to administrative decisions. of experiencing an adverse chosen.” event increased approximately 6% for each day of a hospital stay. Only 1.2% of the patients experiencing serious events made claims to compensation.
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
Continued
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
228 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Medication-related studies (continued) Classen et al., 1997 Matched case-control Nursing acuity system and Adverse drug events in study of all patients primary discharge DRG.
hospitalized patients admitted to LDS Hospital (a tertiary care institution) from January 1, 1990, to December 31, 1993, and who had confirmed adverse drug events (ADEs). Controls and cases were matched on age, sex, acuity, year of admission, and primary discharge diagnosis related group (DRG).
Cullen et al., 1997 Prospective cohort study Stimulated self-report by Preventable adverse drug of 4,031 adult admissions nurses and pharmacists and
events in hospitalized to a stratified, random daily review of all charts by patients sample of 11 medical and nurse investigators. 2
surgical units (including 2 independent reviewers medical and 3 surgical classified the incidents. ICUs and 4 medical and 2 surgical general care units) in 2 tertiary care hospitals over a 6-month period.
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 229
ADEs complicated 2.43 per ADE—an event that is 100 admissions. The “noxious and unintended occurrence of an ADE was and occurs at doses used associated with an in humans for prophylaxis, increased length of stay of diagnosis, therapy, or 1.91 days and an increased modification of cost of $2,262. The physiologic functions.” increased risk of death among patients experiencing an ADE was 1.88. Almost 50% of all ADEs are potentially preventable.
The rate of preventable ADE—“an injury resulting adverse drug events (ADEs) from medical intervention and potential ADEs in ICUs related to a drug.” was 19 events per 1,000 Potential adverse drug event— patient days. This was an incident “with potential nearly twice the rate of for injury related to the non-ICUs, but, when use of a drug.” adjusted for the number of drugs used in the previous 24 hours or ordered since admission, there were no differences in rates between ICUs and non-ICUs.
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
Continued
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
230 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Medication-related studies (continued) Lesar et al., 1997 Every third prescribing Retrospective evaluation by a Factors related to errors in error detected and averted physician and 2 pharmacists.
medication prescribing by pharmacists in a 631- bed tertiary care teaching hospital between July 1, 1994, and June 30, 1995.
Schneitman-McIntire Records of 62,216 patients Patient records and pharmacist et al., 1996 who visited the emergency interviews with patients.
Medication misadventures department of a California resulting in emergency HMO between August department visits at an 1992 and August 1993 HMO medical center .
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 231
2,103 errors thought to have The most common factors potential clinical importance associated with errors were were detected, and the decline in renal or hepatic overall rate of errors was function requiring alteration 3.99 errors per 1,000 of drug therapy (13.9%), medication orders. patient history of allergy to
the same medication class (12.1%), using the wrong drug name, dosage, form, or abbreviation (11.4% for both brand and generic name orders), incorrect dosage calculations (11.1%), and atypical or unusual and critical dosage frequency considerations (10.8%). The most common group factors associated with errors were those related to knowledge and the application of knowledge regarding drug therapy (30%); knowledge and use of knowledge regarding patient factors that affect drug therapy (29.2%); use of calculations, decimal points, or unit and rate expression factors (17.5%); and nomenclature factors, such as incorrect drug name, dosage form, or abbreviation (13.4%).
1,074 or 1.7% of the Misadventures “included emergency department visits noncompliance and were due to medication inappropriate prescribing misadventures. Of the 1,074 but excluded intentional misadventures, 152 (14.1%) overdoses and resulted in hospital substance abuse.” admissions.
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
Continued
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
232 TO ERR IS HUMAN
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
Medication-related studies (continued) Bates et al., A cohort of 379 consecutive Self-report by pharmacists,
J Gen Intern Med, 1995 admissions during a 51-day nurse review of all patient Relationship between period in three medical charts, and review of all
medication errors and units of an urban tertiary medication sheets. 2 adverse drug events care hospital. independent reviewers
classified the incidents.
Bates et al., JAMA, 1995 4,031 adult admissions to a Stimulated self-reports by Incidence of adverse drug stratified random sample nurses and pharmacists and
events and potential of 11 medical and surgical daily chart review. 2 adverse drug events units in Brigham and independent reviewers
Women’s Hospital (726 classified the incidents. beds) and Massachusetts General Hospital (846 beds) in Boston over a 6-month period between February and July 1993.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 233
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
10,070 medication orders ADE—an injury “resulting were written, and 530 from medical interventions medication errors were related to a drug.” identified (5.3 errors/100 Potential ADE—a medication orders). 25 adverse drug error “with potential for events (ADEs) and 35 injury but in which no potential ADEs were found. injury occur-red.” 20% of the ADEs were Medication error—an error associated with medication “in the process of ordering errors; all were judged or delivering a medication, preventable. 5 of 530 regardless of whether an (0.9%) medication errors injury occurred or the resulted in ADEs. potential for injury was
Physician computer order present.” entry could have prevented 86% of potential ADEs, 84% of non-missing dose medication errors, and 60% of preventable ADEs.
247 adverse drug events ADE—“an injury resulting 56% of preventable ADEs (ADEs) and 194 potential from medical intervention occurred at the ordering ADEs were identified. related to a drug.” stage, 34% at Extrapolated event rates Potential ADE—an incident administration, 6% during were 6.5 ADEs and 5.5 “with potential for injury transcription, and 4% potential ADEs per 1,000 related to a drug.” during dispensing. nonobstetrical admissions, for mean numbers per hospital per year of approximately 1,900 ADEs and 1,600 potential ADEs. 1% of all ADEs were fatal, 12% life-threatening, 30% serious, and 57% significant. 28% of all ADEs were judged preventable.
Continued
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
234 TO ERR IS HUMAN
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
Medication-related studies (continued) Cullen et al., 1995 All patients admitted to five Consensus voting by senior The incident reporting patient care units in an hospital administrators,
system does not detect academic tertiary care nursing leaders, and staff adverse drug events hospital between February nurses.
and July 1993.
Leape et al., 1995 All nonobstetric adult Reports from each unit Systems analysis of admissions to 11 medical solicited daily by trained
adverse drug events and surgical units in 2 nurse investigators and tertiary care hospitals in the peer interviews. 2 period between February independent reviewers and July 1993. classified the incidents.
Willcox et al., 1994 6,171 adults from a cross- 1987 National Medical Inappropriate drug sectional survey of a Expenditure Survey.
prescribing for the national probability sample community dwelling of individuals aged 65 elderly or older.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 235
Results Definition(S) Causes/Types of Error
Incident reports were ADE—“an injury resulting submitted to the hospital’s from the use of a drug.” quality assurance program or called into the pharmacy hotline for 3 of the 54 people experiencing adverse drug events (ADEs). 15 (28%) of the ADEs were preventable and 26 (48%) were serious or life- threatening.
334 errors were detected Potential ADEs—“errors 16 major system failures were as the causes of 264 that have the capacity to identified as the causes of preventable adverse drug cause injury, but fail to do the errors, of which the events (ADEs) and potential so, either by chance or most common was ADEs. because they are dissemination of drug
intercepted.” knowledge (29% of 334 errors). 7 systems failures accounted for 78% of errors.
23.5% of people aged 65 Contraindicated drugs include: years or older, or 6.64 1) chlordiazepoxide million Americans, received 2) diazepam at least 1 of the 20 contra- 3) flurazepam indicated drugs in 1987. 4) meprobamate 20.4% received two or 5) pentobarbital more such drugs. 6) secobarbital
7) amitriptyline 8) indomethacin 9) phenylbutazone 10) chlorpropamide 11) propoxyphene 12) pentazocine 13) cyclandelate 14) isoxsuprine 15) dipyridamole 16) cyclobenzaprine 17) orphenidrat 18) methocarbamol 19) carisoprodol 20) trimethobenzamide
Continued
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
236 TO ERR IS HUMAN
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
Medication-related studies (continued) Bates et al., 1993 All patients admitted to 2 Records entered into logs in Incidence and preventability medical, 2 surgical, and each unit and satellite
of adverse drug events 2 obstetric general care pharmacies by nurses and in hospitalized adults units and 1 coronary pharmacists, reports solicited
intensive care unit over a by a research nurse twice 37-day period in an urban daily on each unit, and chart tertiary care hospital. review by the nurse.
Einarson, 1993 English–language studies Manual and computerized Drug-related hospital of humans admitted to the literature searches using
admissions hospital because of adverse MEDLINE, Index Medicus, drug reactions (ADRs) and International resulting from a patient’s Pharmaceutical Abstracts noncompliance or as databases unintentionally inappropriate drug use.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 237
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
73 drug-related incidents ADE—“an injury resulting Physicians caused 72% of the occurred in 2,967 patient from the administration of a incidents, with the days. 27 incidents were drug.” remainder divided evenly judged adverse drug Potential ADE—an incident between nursing, pharmacy, events (ADEs), 34 potential “with a potential for injury and clerical personnel. ADEs, and 12 problem related to a drug . . . [and an orders. 5 of the 27 ADEs incident] in which a were life-threatening, 9 potentially harmful order was were serious, and 13 were written but intercepted before significant. 15 of the 27 the patient actually received ADEs (57%) were judged the drug.” definitely or probably Problem order—“an incident preventable. in which a drug-related error
was made, but was judged not to have the potential for injury.”
Between 1996 and 1989, ADR—“any unintended or 11 reports indicated that adverse drug reaction undesired consequence noncompliance induced (ADR) rates from 49 of drug therapy.” 22.7% of ADR hospitals or groups of Noncompliance—“any hospitalizations. hospitals in international deviation from the regimen settings were published in written (and intended) by the 37 articles. Drug-induced prescriber.” hospitalizations account for approximately 5% of all admissions. Reported admissions caused by ADRs ranged from 0.2% to 21.7%, with a median of 4.9% and a mean of 5.5%. 3.7% of patients admitted for ADRs died.
Continued
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
238 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Medication-related studies (continued) Brennan et al., 1991 30,195 randomly selected Hospital records. Incidence of adverse records in 51 hospitals in
events and negligence New York state (1984). in hospitalized patients
Classen et al., 1991 36,653 hospitalized patients Integrated hospital information Computerized surveillance in the LDS Hospital, Salt system and pharmacist
of adverse drug events Lake City between May 1, review of medical records. in hospital patients 1989, and October 31, 1990.
Beers et al., 1990 424 randomly selected adults Complete emergency Potential adverse drug who visited the emergency department record on
interactions in the room at a university- every patient. emergency room affiliated hospital. All
subjects were discharged without hospital admission.
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 239
Adverse events (AEs) AE—“an injury that was occurred in 3.7% of the caused by medical hospitalizations. Although mismanagement (rather than 70.5% gave rise to the underlying disease) and disabilities lasting less than that prolonged the 6 months, 2.6% of the hospitalization, produced a adverse events caused disability at the time of permanently disabling discharge, or both.” injuries and 13.6% resulted in death.
731 verified adverse drug ADE—an event that is events (ADEs) occurred in “noxious and unintended 648 patients. 701 ADEs and occurs at doses used were classified as moderate in man for prophylaxis, or severe. Physicians, diagnosis, therapy, or pharmacists, and nurses modification of physiologic voluntarily reported 92 of functions.” “Therapeutic the 731 ADEs detected failures, poisonings, and using the automated intentional overdoses” system. The remaining 631 were excluded. were detected from automated signals, the most common of which were diphenhydramine hydrochloride and naloxone hydrochloride use, high serum drug levels, leukopenia, and the use of phytonadione and antidiarrheals.
47% of visits led to added “Drug interactions are an medication. In 10% of the aspect of the inappropriate visits in which at least one use of medication that medication was added, a may endanger patients and new medication added a that may be avoided by potential adverse more careful prescribing.” interaction.
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
Continued
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
240 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Medication-related studies (continued) Hallas et al., 1990 366 consecutive patients Written and verbal histories Drug related admissions to admitted to the cardiology and blood samples.
a cardiology department department at Odense University Hospital, Denmark, during a 2-month period (May–June 1988).
Lesar et al., 1990 289,411 medication orders Medication orders reviewed by Medication prescribing written between January a centralized staff of
errors in a teaching 1, 1987, and December pharmacists and the hospital 31, 1987, in a tertiary care prescribing physicians.
teaching hospital.
Sullivan et al., 1990 7 studies and 2,942 Meta-analytic literature review. Noncompliance with admissions with
medication regimens comparable methodologies and subsequent and evaluation regarding hospitalizations the extent and direct cost of
hospital admissions related to drug therapy noncompliance.
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 241
“Definite” or “probable” drug ADR—“any unintended and Of the 15 admissions, 5 were events accounted for 15 undesirable effect of a considered to be due to a admissions, or a 4.1% drug.” prescription error. drug-related hospitalization DTF—“lack of therapeutic rate. 11 were due to adverse effect that could be linked drug reactions (ADRs) and causally to either too low 4 to dose-related therapeutic a prescribed dose, failures (DTFs). Of these 15 noncompliance, recent dose admissions, 5 cases were reduction/discontinuation, judged to have been interaction or inadequate “definitely avoidable.” monitoring.”
905 prescribing errors were Medication errors— detected and averted, of “medication orders for the which 57.7% had a potential wrong drug, inappropriate for adverse consequences. dosage, inappropriate The overall error rate was frequency, inappropriate 3.13 errors for each 1,000 dosage form, inappropriate orders written and the rate route, inappropriate of significant errors was indication, ordering of 1.81 per 1,000 orders. unnecessary duplicate/
redundant therapy, contraindicated therapy, medications to which the patient was allergic, orders for the wrong patient, or orders missing information required for the dispensing and administration of the drug.”
5.5% of admissions can be Drug therapy noncompliance— attributed to drug therapy includes overuse, underuse, noncompliance, amounting and erratic use of drugs. to 1.94 million admissions. This represents $8.5 billion in unnecessary hospital expenditures in 1986, an estimated 1.7% of all health care expenditures that year.
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
Continued
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
242 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Medication-related studies (continued) Raju et al., 1989 2,147 patients admitted to a Written incident reports Medication errors in neonatal 17-bed NICU and 7-bed submitted by the individual
and paediatric intensive- PICU (1,224 to NICU [57%] who noticed the error. care units and 923 to PICU [43%])
at the University of Illinois Hospital from January 1985 to December 1988.
Blum et al., 1988 Orders written between Carbon copies of orders saved Medication error prevention November 1986 and by pharmacists in the
by pharmacists February 1987 at Indiana pediatric and adult facilities University Hospitals that and reviewed by the four contained potential co-authors that served as medication errors about the study monitors. which the physician had been contacted.
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 243
315 iatrogenic medication Medication error—“a dose of 60.3% of the 315 errors were errors were reported among medication that deviates attributable to nurses and the 2,147 neonatal and from the physicians’ order 29.6% to pharmacists. Only pediatric care admissions, as written in the medical 2.9% were attributable to an error rate of 1 per 6.8 record. . . . Except for error physicians (because admissions (14.7%). The of omission, the medication prescription errors detected frequency of iatrogenic dose must actually reach before drug administration injury of any sort due to a the patient . . . a wrong were not counted). medication error was 3.1%, dose (or other type of error) or 1 for each 33 intensive that is detected and care admissions. 66 errors corrected before resulted in injury, 33 were administration will not potentially serious, 32 constitute a medication caused mild injuries, and error. . . . Prescription 1 patient suffered acute errors (not dispensed and aminophylline poisoning. administered to the patient)
. . . are excluded from this definition . . .”
123,367 medication orders Order with a potential were written. Riley Hospital medication error—“if any for Children had 1,277 aspect of the order was errors out of the 48,034 not in accordance with (2.7%) orders written and information in standard University Hospital had reference text, an approved 1,012 errors out of 75,333 protocol, or dosing (1.3%) orders written. guidelines approved by the 90.4% of the overall orders pharmacy and therapeutics questioned by pharmacists committee of the hospitals.” were confirmed by the physician as being in error. 0.2% of the 2289 errors were classified as potentially lethal, 13.7% were serious, 34.2% were significant, and 51.9% were minor. The number of errors that pharmacists prevent each year approaches 9,000.
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
Continued
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
244 TO ERR IS HUMAN
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
Medication-related studies (continued) Nolan and O’Malley, 1988 21 hospital inpatient studies Review of published studies on Prescribing for the elderly, conducted in the United adverse drug reactions (ADRs).
part I States, United Kingdom, Israel, New Zealand, Switzerland, Canada, and India published between 1964 and 1981.
Folli et al., 1987 101,022 medication orders Copies of errant chart orders Medication error prevention prescribed in two children’s reviewed by a member of
by clinical pharmacists teaching hospitals (Miller the pediatric faculty or in two children’s Children’s Hospital of attending physician and by hospitals Memorial Medical Center two pediatric clinical
[MMC] and Stanford pharmacist practitioners. University Medical Center [SUMC]) during a six-month period (February through July 1985).
Perlstein et al., 1979 43 nursing, pharmacy, and Errors in drug computations medical personnel tested
during newborn for accuracy in calculating intensive care drug doses to be
administered to newborn infants. (27 registered nurses, 5 registered pharmacists, and 11 pediatricians.)
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 245
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
Rates of patients experiencing ADRs ranged from 1.5% to 43.5%. A majority of the studies documented ADR rates between 10% and 25%.
A combined total of 479 Errant medication order— The most common type of errant medication orders “An order was considered error was incorrect dosage. were identified at the two to be potentially in error if The most prevalent type of institutions. MMC and it was not in accordance error was overdosage. SUMC had similar with standard pediatric frequency of error, 4.9 and references, current 4.5 errors per 1,000 published literature, or medication orders, or 1.37 dosing guidelines approved and 1.79 per 100-patient by the pharmacy and days, respectively. Involving therapeutics committees pharmacists in the reviewing of each hospital.” of drug orders reduced the potential harm resulting from errant medication orders significantly.
The mean test score for nurses was 75.6%. 56% of the errors would have resulted in administered doses ten times greater or less than the ordered dose. The mean test score was 96% for pharmacists and none of the errors would have resulted in the administration of doses over 1% greater or less than the dose ordered. Pediatricians averaged a score of 89.1%. 38.5% of the errors would have resulted in the administration of doses ten times higher or lower than the dose ordered. Continued
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
246 TO ERR IS HUMAN
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
Medication-related studies (continued) Miller, 1977 Boston Collaborative Drug Interpretation of studies on Surveillance Program
adverse drug reactions
Burnum, 1976 1,000 adult medical patients Physician observation. Preventability of adverse drawn from a community,
drug reactions office-based practice of general internal medicine.
Jick, 1974 19,000 inpatients admitted Boston Collaborative Drug Drugs: remarkably to medical wards. Surveillance Program
nontoxic
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 247
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
Adverse drug reactions (ADRs) occur in approximately 30% of hospitalized patients and after about 5% of drug exposures. The rate per patient of life-threatening ADRs in 3% and the rate per course of drug therapy is 0.4%.
Adverse drug reactions (ADRs) 23% of the 42 ADRs were occurred in 42 of the attributable to physician individual patients. 23 error (10 out of 42; 6 (55%) were judged because of giving a drug unnecessary and potentially that was not indicated and 4 preventable. because of improper drug
administration), 17% to patient or pharmacist error, and 14% to errors shared by the physician, patient and pharmacist.
30% of hospitalized medical patients have at least 1 adverse drug reaction (ADR) while hospitalized. An estimated 3 million hospital patients have an ADR in medical units each year.
Continued
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
248 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Medication-related studies (continued) Phillips et al., 1974 All United States death Increase in U.S. Medication- certificates between 1983
error deaths between and 1993. 1983 and 1993
Talley and Laventurier, 1974 Boston Collaborative Drug Drug-induced illness Surveillance Program and
an Israeli study.
Cost Thomas et al., 1999 Medical records of 14,732 Two-stage chart review by
randomly selected 1992 trained nurses and discharges from 28 board-certified family hospitals in Utah and practitioners and internists. Colorado
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 249
In 1983, 2,876 people died Medication errors— from medication errors. By “‘accidental poisoning by 1993, this number had drugs, medicaments, and risen to 7,391, a 2.57-fold biologicals’ and have increase. Between 1983 and resulted from acknowledged 1993, outpatient errors, by patients or medication error deaths medical personnel.” rose 8.48-fold (from 172 to 1,459) and inpatient medical error deaths rose 2.37-fold (504 to 1,195).
An estimated incidence of lethal adverse drug reactions ranges from a low of 60,000 (.18% incidence) to a high of 140,000 (.44% incidence) for hospitalized patients in the U.S.
459 adverse events were Adverse event—“an injury detected, of which 265 were caused by medical preventable. Death occurred management (rather than in 6.6% of adverse events the disease process) that and 6.9% of preventable resulted in either prolonged adverse events. The total hospital stay or disability costs were $661,889,000 at time of discharge.” for adverse events and $308,382,000 for preventable adverse events.
Health care costs were $348,081,000 for all adverse events and $159,245,000 for preventable adverse events. 57% of the adverse event health care costs and 46% of the preventable adverse event costs were attributable to outpatient medical care.
Continued
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
250 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Cost (continued) Bates et al., 1997 4,108 admissions to a Stimulated self-reports by The costs of adverse drug stratified random sample nurses and pharmacists and
events in hospitalized of 11 medical and daily chart review. 2 patients surgical units in Brigham independent reviewers
and Women’s Hospital classified the incidents. (726 beds) and Massachusetts General Hospital (846 beds) in Boston over a 6-month period between February and July 1993. Cases were patients with an adverse drug event (ADE), and the control for each case was a patient on the same unit as the case with the most similar pre-event length of stay.
Bootman et al., 1997 To estimate the cost of Survey of an expert panel The health care cost of drug-related problems consisting of consultant
drug-related morbidity (DRPs) within nursing pharmacists and physicians and mortality in nursing facilities, a decision with practice experience in facilities analysis technique was nursing facilities and
used to develop a geriatric care. probability pathway model.
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 251
247 ADEs occurred among ADE—“an injury resulting 207 admissions and 60 from medical intervention were preventable. The related to a drug.” additional length of stay Potential ADE—“incidents in was 2.2 days with an ADE which an error was made and 4.6 days with a but no harm occurred.” preventable ADE. The estimated post-event costs attributable to an ADE were $2,595 for all ADEs and $4,685 for preventable ADEs. The estimated annual costs for a 700-bed teaching hospital attributable to all ADEs are $5.6 million and to preventable ADEs are $2.8 million. The national hospital costs of ADEs was estimated at $4 billion; preventable ADEs alone would cost $2 billion.
The cost of drug-related DRPs—“an event of morbidity and mortality circumstance involving a with the services of patient’s drug treatment consultant pharmacists that actually or potentially was $4 billion compared interferes with the with $7.6 billion without achievement of an optimal services of consultant outcome.” pharmacists. For every dollar spent on drugs in nursing facilities, $1.33 is consumed in the treatment of DRPs.
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
Continued
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
252 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Cost (continued) Johnson and Bootman, 1995 A probability pathway model Telephone survey of 15 Drug-related morbidity and was developed for expert practicing
mortality drug-related morbidity and pharmacists. mortality based primarily on drug-related problems (DRPs). A panel of experts gave estimates on the numbers of patients affected by DRPs and monetary value data were taken from published reports and statistical reports.
Schneider et al., 1995 109 patients at a university- Retrospective chart review. Cost of medication-related affiliated medical center
problems at a university hospital who were known hospital to have had clinical
consequences from an adverse drug reaction (ADR) or medication error.
Bloom, 1988 Retrospective analysis of all Medicaid Management Cost of treating arthritis and direct costs related to the Information System of
NSAID-related care of 527 Medicaid Washington, D.C. gastrointestinal recipients treated for side-effects arthritis with non-steroidal
anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) between December 1, 1981 and November 30, 1983.
TABLE C-1 Continued
Reference Sample Description Data Source
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX C 253
Drug-related morbidity and Drug-related problem— mortality costs an estimated “an event or circumstance $76.6 billion in the that involves a patient’s ambulatory setting in the drug treatment that United States. The panel actually, or potentially, members estimated that interferes with the 40% of patients who achievement of an receive drug therapy would optimal outcome.” have some form of DRP.
349 clinical outcomes associated with medical related problems (MRPs) (average of approximately 3 outcomes per patient) were detected. For the 1,911 ADRs and medication errors reported through the voluntary reporting system in 1994, the estimated annual cost was just under $1.5 million.
In 1983, an estimated $3.9 Gastrointestinal adverse million was spent on drug reaction—“any treating preventable claim for payment gastrointestinal adverse accompanied by a drug reactions to NSAIDs. diagnosis of peptic ulcer,
gastritis/duodenitis, other disorders of the stomach or duodenum, gastrointestinal symptoms, or a pharmacy claim for an H2-recepter antagonist, sucralfate or antacid, which occurred during the arthritis treatment study period.
Results Definition(s) Causes/Types of Error
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
254
D Characteristics of
State Adverse Event Reporting Systems
CALIFORNIA
Reportable event Occurrences such as epidemic outbreaks, poi- sonings, fires, major accidents, death from unnatural causes, or other catastrophes and unusual occurrences that threaten the wel- fare, safety, or health of patients, personnel, or visitors. Other occurrences include, but are not limited to, prevalence of communi- cable disease; infestation by parasites or vec- tors; disappearance or loss of a patient or inmate-patient; sexual acts involving pa- tients who are minors; nonconsenting adults, or persons incapable of consent; physical assaults on inmate-patients, em- ployees, or visitors; and all suspected crimi- nal activity involving inmate-patients, em- ployees, or visitors.
Who submits reports General acute care hospitals, acute psychiatric hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, immedi- ate care facilities, home health agencies, pri-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX D 255
mary care clinics, psychology clinics, psychi- atric health facilities, adult day health cen- ters, chemical dependency recovery hospi- tals, and correctional treatment centers.
Number of reports 4,337 (1998) Year initiated 1972 (approximately) Mandatory or voluntary Mandatory; must be submitted within 24
hours of the incident. Access to information Reports that do not contain confidential infor-
mation are accessible to the public. Reports that do contain confidential information can be obtained only by subpoena. The local li- censing and certification office handles all requests for copies of reports.
Use of information The state reviews the reported event and de- termines if an onsite visit is warranted. If violations of the regulations are suspected an onsite visit is conducted. If deficiencies are noted the facility must submit an accept- able plan of correction. Violation of regula- tions can also result in state or federal cita- tions. Civil penalties of up to $50 per day or enforcement actions can be imposed.
COLORADO
Reportable event All deaths arising from unexplained causes or under suspicious circumstances. Brain and spinal cord injuries. Life-threatening com- plications of anesthesia. Life-threatening transfusion errors or reactions. Burns; miss- ing persons; physical, sexual, and verbal abuse; neglect, misappropriation of prop- erty; diverted drugs; malfunction or misuse of equipment.
Who submits reports All state-licensed health care facilities. Number of reports 1,233 (1998) Year initiated 1989
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
256 TO ERR IS HUMAN
Mandatory or voluntary Mandatory under Colorado State Statute 25- 1-124(2).
Access to information The name of the facility is disclosed. Patient and personnel information is kept confiden- tial. Report summaries are posted on the Internet once the facility investigation is complete.
Use of information An advisory committee meets monthly to iden- tify patterns and issues. Summaries of the reviewed reports are sent out to the facili- ties and they have seven days to comment. The state will issue deficiencies if deemed necessary. All information is entered into a computer program for tracking. Surveyors and investigators review the information in the institution-specific database prior to conducting the regular survey and com- plaint investigations.
CONNECTICUT
Reportable event All accidents or incidents that resulted in seri- ous injury, death, or disruption of facility services.
Who submits reports Nursing homes and hospitals. Number of reports 14,783 (1996)—approximately 14,000 from
nursing homes. Year initiated 1987 Mandatory or voluntary Mandatory for nursing homes; voluntary for
hospitals. Access to information Reports disclose the name of the facility, but
no information on patients or personnel. To obtain a report, one must fill out a Freedom of Information Act form and submit the re- quest to the health department.
Use of information Information is reviewed by a nurse consultant who determines if there needs to be an in- vestigation by the health department.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX D 257
FLORIDA
Reportable event Urgent issue: life-threatening situation, epi- demic outbreak. Code 15: serious adverse event (i.e., wrongful death, brain injury, wrong limb removal, incorrect surgery).
Who submits reports Hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers. Number of reports Approximately 5,000 a year; 4,000 are urgent
issue and 1,000 are Code 15. Year initiated 1985 Mandatory or voluntary Mandatory Access to information A summary of the aggregate data collected
from reports is issued once a year. All other information is confidential and cannot be released without a subpoena.
Use of information Urgent-issue situations are considered to be outside the facility’s control; and thus no fa- cility follow-up is required. When report- ing a Code 15, an analysis of the injury and a plan of correction must be submitted by the facility within 15 days. The state’s risk management program tracks trends in the reporting.
KANSAS
Reportable event An act by a health care provider that (1) is or may be below the applicable standard of care and has a reasonable probability of causing injury to a patient or (2) may be grounds for disciplinary action by the ap- propriate licensing agency.
Who submits reports All licensed medical care facilities. Number of reports 488 (1997) Year initiated 1986 Mandatory or voluntary Mandatory Access to information All reports are confidential. All peer review in-
formation and standard of care determina- tions are protected under the risk manage- ment statutes. Only the facts of the case
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
258 TO ERR IS HUMAN
have been subpoenaed. The name of the re- porter is protected.
Use of information Each facility must establish a written plan for risk management and patient care quality assessment on a facility-wide basis. This ini- tial plan must be submitted to the health department at least 60 days prior to the li- censure date. The plan will be reviewed and the facility will be notified in writing con- cerning plan approval. The facility’s govern- ing board must review and approve the risk management plan on an annual basis. All changes must be approved by the depart- ment. Following an incident, the depart- ment will review the facility’s plan to ensure that it is adequate. Depending on the sever- ity of the incident, the department will then possibly conduct an investigation.
MASSACHUSETTS
Reportable event Injury that is life-threatening, results in death, or requires a patient to undergo significant additional diagnostic or treatment mea- sures. Medication errors. Major biomedical device or other equipment failure resulting in serious injury or having potential for seri- ous injury. Surgical errors involving the wrong patient, the wrong side of the body, the wrong organ, or the retention of a for- eign object. Blood transfusion errors. Any maternal death within 90 days of delivery or termination of a pregnancy. Death of a pa- tient by suicide.
Who submits reports All licensed health care facilities. Number of reports 10,500 (1997); 390 were from hospitals Year initiated 1986 Mandatory or voluntary Mandatory
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX D 259
Access to information Copies of reports submitted by facilities are available to the public after official action has been taken by the health department. The identity of the patient is removed. Re- ports relating to abuse, neglect, or misap- propriation are confidential and are not re- leased.
Use of information All reports are entered into a Massachusetts Health Department database and are re- viewed. This database is used to retain in- formation on the individual case and look for general patterns across cases. Depend- ing on the incident, the department can de- cide to contact the facility for more infor- mation or conduct a site visit. Deficiencies are cited if the facility is found to have not reported all relevant information.
MISSISSIPPI
Reportable event Suicide or attempted suicide, wrongful death, unexplained injuries, abuse, and interrup- tions of service at the facility.
Who submits reports All licensed health care facilities. Number of reports Not provided Year initiated 1993 Mandatory or voluntary Mandatory Access to information Actual reports are not accessible to the public;
however statements of deficiencies and plans of correction are available by request. The health department does spend a great deal of time in litigation with malpractice attorneys who are attempting to subpoena its records.
Use of information Attempts are made to identify trends in the data received, and the department’s findings are discussed with the facility.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
260 TO ERR IS HUMAN
NEW JERSEY
Reportable event Any incident that endangers the health and safety of a patient or employee and any death or injury associated with anesthetics.
Who submits reports All state licensed health certificates. Number of reports Not provided Year initiated 1986 Mandatory or voluntary Mandatory Access to information Information is disclosed only in the event that
the facility receives a citation from the state. Penalty letters revealing the name of the fa- cility and describing the incident that led to the citation are posted on the Internet. Pa- tient and personnel information is kept con- fidential.
Use of information If deemed necessary, a state inspection team is sent to investigate the facility. The team’s findings are shared with the facility, which must comply with the report’s recommen- dations or be cited with deficiencies. Then the facility must submit a plan of correction for each deficiency. The health department can impose fines, curtail admissions, ap- point a temporary manager, issue a provi- sional license, suspend a facility’s license, or close the facility.
NEW YORK
Reportable event An unintended adverse and undesirable devel- opment in an individual patient’s condition occurring in a hospital. A list of 47 occur- rences is included on a specification of re- portable events.
Who submits reports Hospitals Number of reports 15,000–20,000 reports each year Year initiated 1986 Mandatory or voluntary Mandatory
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX D 261
Access to information Narrative reports on incidents and the investi- gations conducted are protected by law, but the state can release aggregate data by hos- pital, including the number of reports sub- mitted. State actions against a facility are posted on the Internet (whether the source was the reporting system, patient complaint, or other).
Use of information The state may investigate specific incidents. If the hospital has taken action acceptable to the department, the case is closed. If the vio- lation persists, the state may issue deficien- cies or fines. The state also intends to de- velop regional error rates for benchmarking and dissemination to regional councils that are being formed.
OHIO
Reportable event Death or injury resulting from equipment mal- function or treatment of the wrong subject or wrong modality.
Who submits reports Free-standing therapy, imaging, and chemo- therapy centers
Number of reports Not provided Year initiated 1997 Mandatory or voluntary Mandatory Access to information Governed under Ohio’s public record law.
This law prohibits the collection of patient- specific information. The state will only be releasing aggregate data on the incidents re- ported. Facilities will have access only to their own information. The state plans to compile an annual report on incidents that will be available to the public.
Use of information A database is being developed to track the number of reports received and provide an indicator of which facilities should be inves-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
262 TO ERR IS HUMAN
tigated. The goal is to identify noticeable trends in types of errors. The director of health monitors compliance and can inspect any health care provider. Health care pro- viders may be required to regularly issue re- ports and undergo independent audits.
PENNSYLVANIA
Reportable event An event that seriously compromises quality assurance or patient safety, including: deaths due to injuries, suicide, or unusual circumstances; deaths due to medication er- ror; deaths due to malnutrition, dehydra- tion, or sepsis; elopements; patient abuse; rape; surgery on the wrong patient or mo- dality; hemolytic transfusion reaction; infant abduction or discharge to wrong family; fire or structural damage; unlicensed practice of a regulated profession.
Who submits reports Hospitals, nursing homes, home health agen- cies, ambulatory surgical facilities, interme- diate care facilities for persons with devel- opmental disabilities.
Number of reports Not provided Year initiated 1990 Mandatory or voluntary Mandatory Access to information All collected information is confidential. Re-
ports are often shared only with another state agency. They are not considered pub- lic material and were not intended to pro- vide information to the public. The depart- ment usually requests that courts overrule subpoenas, and in the majority of cases its request is granted.
Use of information On some occasions, the department will re- quest more information from a facility and conduct investigations. This is usually done when there is a recurrence of incidents or
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX D 263
drug misappropriation. Very few cases have resulted in a fine to a facility following an adverse event.
RHODE ISLAND
Reportable event Any incident causing or involving the follow- ing: brain injury; mental impairment; para- plegia; quadriplegia; paralysis; loss of use of limb or organ; birth injury; impairment of sight or hearing; surgery on the wrong pa- tient; subjecting a patient to any procedure that was not ordered or intended by the physician.
Who submits reports Hospitals Number of reports 134 (1998) from 15 facilities Year initiated 1994 Mandatory or voluntary Mandatory Access to information The names of personnel and patients are not
disclosed in submitted reports. All reports are confidential and are protected by law. The hospital involved is contacted when- ever the health department receives a sub- poena from an attorney. The hospital may initiate proceedings to quash the subpoena. However, if the state takes action against the facility—for example, following a site inves- tigation—then this information may be dis- closed to the public.
Use of information Reports are reviewed by department staff and filed. If deemed warranted, an investigation of the incident will be conducted. After sub- mitting a report the hospital must conduct a peer review process to determine whether the incident falls within the normal range of outcomes, given the patient’s condition. If the hospital’s findings conclude that the in-
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
264 TO ERR IS HUMAN
cident was outside the normal range, the hospital must provide the health depart- ment with the following information: an ex- planation of the circumstances surrounding the incident; an updated assessment of the effect of the incident on the patient; a sum- mary of current patient status including fol- low-up care provided and post-incident di- agnosis; and a summary of all actions taken to correct the problems identified to pre- vent recurrence and/or improve overall pa- tient care. Incidents that are determined to have fallen within a normal range of out- comes by the hospital are reviewed by the health department. In the event that the health department disagrees with the hospital’s findings, a separate investigation is conducted and peer review documents are examined.
SOUTH DAKOTA
Reportable event Unnatural deaths; missing patients or resi- dents; incidents of abuse, neglect, or misap- propriation.
Who submits reports All licensed health care facilities. Number of reports The health department has not kept track of
the exact number of reports received. The majority are submitted by nursing homes.
Year initiated 1994 Mandatory or voluntary Mandatory Access to information Reports are completely confidential, unless a
deficient practice is identified at the facility. A summary of the cited deficiency is releas- able information. As required by state law, a judicial court order must be issued before the health department will release any other information.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX D 265
Use of information Each incident report is analyzed to assess whether the facility did everything possible to avert the incident. If it did not, the facil- ity will be cited and then they must develop a plan of correction.
SOURCE: Information for this table was collected from each state health department by telephone between February 24 and May 5, 1999. Each respondent was given the oppor- tunity to review the draft and correct any errors.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
266
E Safety Activities in
Health Care Organizations
N umerous programs intended to promote patient safety can be found in hospitals, nursing homes, and other health care organi- zations. Hospitals, home health agencies, nursing homes, clinical
laboratories, ambulatory surgery centers, and other health care facilities are licensed by state departments of health, which establish the terms under which they may operate.
One way in which federal and state quality oversight requirements have historically been met is through reliance on private-sector accrediting bod- ies, termed deemed status. In most circumstances, deemed status arrange- ments allow a facility to meet government standards either through accredi- tation or directly through the government agency or through accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) or the American Osteopathic Association.
A brief review of widely implemented safety programs in health care facilities, then, is grounded in the state licensing or, more likely, the volun- tary accreditation standards of accrediting bodies such as the JCAHO. The JCAHO’s standards for hospital accreditation,1 for example, include several facility-wide safety systems intended to ensure patients’ physical safety and protection from environmental hazards and risks, accidents, and injuries in- cluding, for example, life safety; infectious disease surveillance, prevention,
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX E 267
and control; and the handling and use of blood and blood products. Other traditional approaches to learning about error and how it might be pre- vented include morbidity and mortality conferences and autopsy.
LIFE SAFETY
Life safety refers to a set of standards for the construction and operation of buildings and the protection of patients from fire and smoke. These stan- dards are based on the Life Safety Code‚ promulgated by the National Fire Prevention Association. Life safety standards that require fire alarm and de- tection systems are monitored and serviced routinely, that fire and smoke containment systems are in place, and that systems for transmitting alarms to the local fire department are functional. Facilities typically participate in fire and other disaster drills that help them identify weaknesses in their sys- tems. By analogy, many other kinds of delivery-related simulations can prob- ably help groups with differing disciplinary backgrounds learn to work co- operatively and effectively in, for example, the intensive care unit, emergency department, or operating room. The recent development of highly sophisti- cated operating room simulators has demonstrated their value both in teach- ing and for practitioners to practice recovering from crises.
INFECTIOUS DISEASE SURVEILLANCE, PREVENTION, AND CONTROL
Today, infection control covers a broad range of processes throughout the hospital. It requires epidemiological expertise and includes attention to medical devices (e.g., intravascular and alimentation devices, ventilators, equipment used for examination); the physical environment (e.g., air ducts, surfaces); surgical wound management; and carriage by employees and other health professionals.
Such infection control processes are managed by individuals who are assigned the responsibility of surveillance, reporting, and investigating out- breaks of nosocomial infections (infections acquired while in health care that are unrelated to the original condition), and putting in place and moni- toring the results of processes to prevent or reduce the risk of infectious transmission. In the best systems, data from many sources within the hospi- tal—infection control committee surveillance, length-of-stay outlier reports, operating room logs, bacteriology and pathology reports, morbidity and
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
268 TO ERR IS HUMAN
mortality (M&M) conferences and so forth—can be brought to bear to iden- tify trends and sources of infectious disease.
Despite major efforts to decrease transmission, infection control remains a challenge to health care facilities. Indeed, in some ways it is more difficult now than in the past. Like other advances in patient care, the advent of antibiotics has dramatically improved patient care, but the emergence of antibiotic resistance means that new efforts of surveillance and prevention must be implemented in order to make progress against infection, and con- tinuing efforts are needed to maintain earlier achievements.
According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), nosocomial infec- tions affect approximately 2 million patients annually in acute care facilities in the United States at an estimated direct patient care cost of approximately $3.5 billion per year (NCID/CDC&P). In long-term care facilities including nursing homes, CDC estimates that more than 1.5 million cases of nosoco- mial infection occur each year, an average of one infection per patient per year.2 Epidemiological studies have estimated that one-third of nosocomial infections can be prevented by well-organized infection control programs, yet only six to nine percent are actually prevented.
Recognition of the danger of transmission of infection in the health care setting is credited to the insight of a Viennese obstetrician Ignaz Phillip Semmelweis in 1847. Semmelweis correctly identified the cause of an epi- demic of childbed fever (puerperal sepsis) among maternity patients as origi- nating from physicians who had previously done autopsies and then trans- ferred bacteria (later found to be Streptococcus pyogenes) on their hands when they examined their patients. After Semmelweis introduced the prac- tice of hand washing with a solution of chloride of lime (an antiseptic) be- fore examination, maternal mortality decreased from 18 percent to 2.4 per- cent in the first month.3,4 According to CDC, even today, “handwashing is the single most important means of preventing the spread of infection.” Yet, repeated studies indicate that after more than 150 years of experience, lack of or improper handwashing still contributes significantly to disease trans- mission in health care settings5–11 Exhortations to personnel have not been effective, and some organizations have begun to look at system barriers to handwashing (e.g., the time required as well as the chapping and irritation caused by frequent handwashing) and ways to eliminate these problems by designing better hand hygiene processes.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX E 269
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY CONFERENCES
Morbidity and mortality (M&M) conferences began early in the twenti- eth century (1917) as a standardized case report system to investigate the reasons and responsibility for adverse outcomes of care. Mandated in 1983 by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, M&M is a weekly conference at which, under the moderation of a faculty member, medical and surgical residents and attendings present cases of all complica- tions and deaths. The value of the M&M conference is highly dependent on how the department chair uses it, but a recent national survey on attitudes and opinions of the value of M&M conferences found that 43 percent of residents and 47 percent of surgical faculty believed that the conference was an important and powerful educational tool.12 Lower rankings were given to its value in reducing error and improving care.
M&M conferences are case-by-case reviews, with an emphasis on learn- ing what might have been done differently in a given case rather than pun- ishment, but they stress the value of knowledge, skill, and alertness to antici- pate problems.13 They tend not to address systemic issues. Their value in improving the quality of care could be substantially increased if ongoing data are kept to identify repeated complications and time trends and if infor- mation from the M&M conferences is integrated with information from other available sources within the hospital.
AUTOPSY
Unexpected findings at autopsy are an excellent way to refine clinical judgment and identify misdiagnosis. Lundberg cites a 40 percent discrep- ancy between antemortem and postmortem diagnoses.14 Nevertheless, au- topsy rates have declined greatly in recent years from 50 percent in the 1940s to only 14 percent in 1985.15,16 Autopsy rates in nonteaching hospitals are now less than 9 percent.
When autopsies are completed, their value in improving care depends on reports reaching clinicians in a timely manner. Yet, many hospitals report long delays (several weeks or more) before clinicians receive autopsy re- ports. In general, rapid improvement requires shortening the cycle time be- tween investigation and feedback to caregivers and managers, and timeli- ness in autopsy reporting is representative of all data gathering activities intended for quality improvement and reduction of errors.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
270 TO ERR IS HUMAN
RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
Originating with the increase in liability risk in the mid-1970s, hospital risk management programs have long been associated with the reduction of institutional liability and financial loss control.17,18 Controlling loss has fo- cused historically on preserving the institution’s financial (and human) re- sources. Risk management includes identification of risk and education of staff, identifying and containing risk after an event, education of staff and patients, and risk transfer. Educational efforts tend to focus on such topics as review of state statutes on informed consent, presentations by the hospital’s defense counsel, and programs on medical and legal topics for physicians.
Although effort has been made to move toward “primary” risk manage- ment that would focus on preventing adverse events from occurring, risk management is still focused largely on loss control. Although incident re- porting systems are intended to include major events such as surgical mis- haps, incidents have traditionally been greatly underreported and the re- ports that are filed have involved largely slips, falls, and medication errors that may have little consequence.19,20 The American College of Surgeons estimated in 1985 that only 5–30 percent of major mishaps are reported on traditional incident forms.21 Cullen et al. (1995) found that of 54 adverse drug events identified in their study, only six percent had a corresponding incident report submitted to the hospital’s quality assurance program or the pharmacy hotline.
Although risk management committees include a member of the medi- cal staff, risk management has not been embraced at the organizational lead- ership level in its broadest sense of patient safety—protecting patients from any accidental injury. Risk managers interact when necessary with the ad- ministrator or chief executive officer, medical director or chief of staff, nurs- ing director, medical records director, and chief financial officer, but the function of improved patient safety is not, typically, represented through risk managers on the governing board’s executive committee or at corporate headquarters.
REFERENCES
1. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. 1998 Hospital Accreditation Standards. Oakbrook, IL: Joint Commission, 1998.
2. From “Hospital Infections Program.” www.cdc.gov/ncidod/publications/bro- chures/hip.htm 4/29/99. “Hospital Infections Program.”
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
APPENDIX E 271
3. “Ignaz Philipp Semmelweis.” www.knight.org/advent/cathen/1312a.htm (Catho- lic Encyclopedia) 4/29/99.
4. From “Etiology of Childbed Fever.” www.obgyn.net/women/med-chest/ med41105.htm 4/29/99.
5. Pittet, D.; Mourouga, P.; Perneger, T.V., et al. Compliance with Handwashing in a Teaching Hospital. Annals of Internal Medicine. 130:126–155, 1999.
6. Steere, A.C., and Mallison, G.F. Handwashing Practices for the Prevention of Nosocomial Infections. Annals of Internal Medicine. 83:683–690, 1975.
7. Sproat, L.J., and Inglis, T.J. A Multicentre Survey of Hand Hygiene Practices in Intensive Care Units. Journal of Hospital Infections. 26:137–148, 1994.
8. Albert, R.K., and Condie, F. Hand-washing Patterns in Medical Intensive-Care Units New England Journal of Medicine. 24:1465–1466, 1981.
9. Larson, E. Compliance with Isolation Technique. American Journal of Infection Control. 11:221–225, 1983.
10. Meengs, M.R.; Giles, B.K.; Chisholm, C.D., et al. Hand Washing Frequency in an Emergency Department. Journal of Emergency Nursing. 20:183–188, 1994.
11. Thompson, B.L.; Dwyer, D.M.; Ussery, X.T., et al. Handwashing and Glove Use in a Long-Term-Care Facility. Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology. 18:97–103, 1997
12. Harbison, S.P., and Regehr, G. Faculty and Resident Opinions Regarding the Role of Morbidity and Mortality Conference. American Journal of Surgery. 177:136–139, 1999.
13. Gawande, A. When Doctors Make Mistakes. The New Yorker. 74(41):40–52, 1999.
14. Lundberg, G.D. Low-Tech Autopsies in the Era of High-Tech Medicine. JAMA. 280:1273–1274, 1998.
15. Geller, S.A. Autopsy. Scientific American. 248(3):124–129, 132, 135–136, 1983. 16. Leads from the MMWR. Autopsy Frequency—United States, 1980–1985. JAMA.
259:2357–2362, 1988. 17. Troyer, G.T., and Salman, S.L. Handbook of Health Care Risk Management.
Rockville, MD: Aspen, 1986. 18. Monagle, J.F. Risk Management: A Guide for Health Care Professionals. Rockville,
MD: Aspen, 1985. 19. Institute of Medicine. Medicare: A Strategy for Quality Assurance, Volume II.
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1990. 20. Cullen, David J.; Bates, David W.; Small, Stephen D., et al. The Incident Report-
ing System Does Not Detect Adverse Drug Events: A Problem in Quality Assurance. Joint Commission Journal on Quality Improvement. 21:541–548, 1995.
21. Leape, Lucian, L.; Woods, David D.; Hatlie, Martin, J., et al. Promoting Patient Safety and Preventing Medical Error. JAMA. 280:1444–1447, 1998.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
273
Index
A
Access to health care, 24 Accidents, 50, 51
airline, 42 cerebrovascular, 31, 37 Challenger accident, 51, 52, 55 defined, 52, 53(n), 210 environmental influences model, 18 human error, 50 motor vehicle, 1, 26 safety defined, 4, 58 Three Mile Island, 51, 52, 55 see also Adverse events, general; Error
analysis Accountability, general, 8, 13, 101, 166,
167, 168, 205 see also Leadership; Reporting systems
Accreditation, see Licensure and accreditation
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, 269
Active errors, see Error, general Adverse events, general
classification/standardization of, 9, 10, 28-29, 88
cost of, 1-2, 7 defined, 4, 28, 29, 210 number of, 1, 26-27, 30, 32, 41, 182-
183, 191, 194-195, 248-253 sentinel events, 93-94, 104-105, 119-
120, 125, 128, 194 studies of, 1, 26, 30-32, 35-37, 40, 218-
253 see also Preventable adverse events;
Reporting systems Affordances, 163, 171-172 Agency for Health Care Research and
Quality (AHRQ), 77-78, 82, 83
Center for Patient Safety (proposed), 7-8, 69-71, 75-84, 135
Centers for Education and Research in Therapeutics, 77-78, 83
Consumer Assessment of Health Plans, 20
Aircraft carriers, 57, 160-161 Air transport, see Aviation Alaska, 142 Alcoa, Inc., 160 Allergic reactions, drugs, 33, 192
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
274 INDEX
Ambulatory health care settings, 29, 50- 51, 168
costs, 41 drug errors, 32-33, 34-35, 39 home care, 2, 29, 51, 254 reporting systems, 88, 257 training, 165
American Academy of Pediatrics, 146 American Accreditation Healthcare
Commission/URAC, 138, 139 American Board of Medical Specialties,
148 American College of Cardiology, 145 American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 145-146 American College of Surgeons, 270 American Heart Association, 145, 147 American Hospital Association
National Patient Safety Partnership, 78, 81-82, 183, 191, 196
American Medical Accreditation Program Association, 143
American Medical Association, 147 National Patient Safety Foundation, 6,
57, 70, 71, 76, 81, 147, 193 National Patient Safety Partnership,
78, 81-82, 183, 191, 196 American National Standards Institute,
178 American Nurses Association, 143
National Patient Safety Partnership, 78, 81-82, 183, 191, 196
American Nurses Credentialing Center, 143
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, 145, 183, 193
Ames Research Center, 65, 73 Anesthesia, 6, 32, 144-145, 164, 171, 222-
225 infusion pumps, 50-66 (passim) mortality, 164, 222-225
Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation, 6, 145
Antibiotics, 33, 171 Anticipating the unexpected, 52, 150,
161, 162, 166, 170, 174-176, 197 Anticoagulants, 35
Antidiarrheals, 34 Anti-inflammatory drugs, 35, 253-254 Association of American Medical
Colleges, 148 National Patient Safety Partnership,
78, 81-82, 183, 191, 196 Attitudes
fear, 22, 42, 111, 125, 127, 157, 160, 163, 167, 189
patient trust, 2 professionals, 2, 10, 23, 60, 112 public opinion, 2, 29, 42-43, 70, 167
Australia, 32, 35 Authority gradient, 178, 180-181 Automation, see Computer systems Autopsies, 269 Aviation, 60, 180
accidents, general, 53 aircraft carriers, 57, 160-161 risk level, 42 safety efforts, ix, 5, 6-7, 42, 71-73, 80 team training, 173-174 see also National Aeronautics and
Space Administration Aviation Safety Action Programs, 97 Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS),
72-73, 76, 91, 95-97, 104, 105- 106, 125, 127
B
Bar coding, 175, 188, 189, 195-196 Benchmarking, 81, 182, 259 Best practices, 18, 32, 77, 79, 145, 152,
182, 193 see also Clinical practice guidelines
Billings, Charles, 73 Budgetary issues, see Funding Bureau of Labor Statistics, 73-74, 97
C
California peer review statute, 127-128 reporting system, 254-255
Cancer, 1, 26, 209
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 275
Cardiac arrest, 31, 37, 220-221 Cardiovascular agents, 35 Center for Patient Safety (proposed), 7-8,
69-71, 75-84, 135 funding, 7-8, 70, 76, 78-79, 83-84, 106 reporting systems, 9-10, 79, 102-103,
106, 135 Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CRC), 99, 268 Centers for Education and Research in
Therapeutics (CERTS), 77-78, 83
Cerebrovascular accident, 31, 37, 220- 221, 257, 263
Challenger accident, 51, 52, 55 Checklists, 158, 171, 172, 180, 187, 194 Chemotherapy, 1, 51, 260
protocols, 164, 171, 194 Children, 79, 94, 260, 268
medication, 33-34, 38, 171, 226-227, 242-245
Clinical practice guidelines, 32, 135, 145- 146, 171
see also Best practices; Protocols Cognitive processes, 147, 162-163, 181
checklists, 158, 171, 172, 180, 187, 194
cockpit resource management, 65, 72, 147, 176-177
crew resource management, 79, 97, 147, 157, 161, 162, 173, 176, 179
memory, 54, 158, 163, 170, 171, 172, 185
problem solving, 162, 163, 172, 179 simplification, 53, 60, 157, 158, 163,
164, 166, 170, 171, 172, 185, 197
vigilance, 5, 158, 164, 170, 172 see also Protocols
Colorado hospital studies, 1, 26, 30-31, 36-37,
40, 248-249 reporting system, 92, 255-256
Commonwealth Fund, x Communication, 7, 22, 180-181
non-health sectors, 6-7 professional societies, 12
see also Feedback; Information systems; Reporting systems
Complaints, 21 Complexity, see Systems, general Computer systems, 77, 80, 177, 178
bar coding, 175, 188, 189, 195-196 drugs, 34, 39-40, 77, 80, 171, 172, 175,
183, 184-185, 191-193, 195 errors caused by complexity of, 61, 62-
63, 65 simulation training, 65, 79, 145, 163,
176-177, 178, 179 see also Databases; Internet
Confidentiality, reporting systems anonymous reporting, 95, 96, 100,
111, 124, 125-126 de-identification, 97, 111, 125, 126-
127, 128 mandatory, 8, 10, 92, 101, 255-264
(passim) patient data, general, 178 Privacy Act, 123 voluntary, 94, 95, 109-131, 256
Connecticut, 91, 256 Consumer Assessment of Health Plans,
20 Cost and cost-benefit factors, 29, 40-42,
158, 248-253 ambulatory care settings, errors, 41 Center for Patient Safety (proposed),
76 drugs and drug errors, 2, 27, 30, 32, 41,
182-183, 191, 194-195, 248-253 national, 1-3, 27, 40-42 National Medical Expenditure Survey,
38, 234-235 uninsured persons, 24 see also Funding
Court cases, see Litigation Critical incident analysis, see Human
factors Cultural factors, 4, 146
access to care, 24 organizational, culture of safety, 12-13,
14, 155-156, 159-162, 166-168, 178, 179, 189
public opinion, 2, 29, 42-43, 70, 167 see also Attitudes
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
276 INDEX
Culture of medicine, 21-22, 179 Cytotoxics, 35
D
Databases Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS), 72-73, 76, 91, 95-97, 104, 105-106, 125, 127
drugs, 34, 39-40, 77, 80, 171, 172, 175, 183, 184-185, 191-193, 195
HEDIS, 20, 139, 140 National Practitioner Data Bank, 121-
123 patient records, general, 177, 178, 236-
239 professional organizations, 147 see also Reporting systems
Death, see Mortality Default mode, 62, 171, 176 Definitional issues, 4, 22, 49
accident, 52, 53(n), 210 adverse drug event, 33 adverse event, 4, 28, 29, 210 classification/standardization of
adverse events, 9, 10, 28-29, 88 error, 28, 54, 55, 78, 210 glossary, 210-213 hindsight bias, 53 human factors, 63, 210 iatrogenic illness, 31 misuse, 19 negligence, 217 patient safety, 57, 155, 211 pharmaceutical safety, 57 reporting systems, 88, 99 safety, general, 4, 58 systems, general, 52, 211 underuse, 19
Denmark, 240-241 Department of Defense, 72, 82
U.S. Navy, 57, 160-162 Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 99, 268
Health Care Financing Administration, 19-20, 82, 139, 140-141
reporting systems,121-123 see also Agency for Health Care
Research and Quality; Food and Drug Administration
Department of Labor, see Bureau of Labor Statistics
Department of Transportation, see Federal Aviation Administration; National Transportation Safety Board
Department of Veterans Affairs National Patient Safety Partnership,
78, 81-82, 183, 191, 196 Veterans Health Administration, 80,
83, 123 Devices and equipment, 82, 184-185, 190-
191, 260 affordances, 163, 171-172 default mode, 62, 171, 176 forcing functions, 158, 164, 170, 171 home care, 63 human-machine interface, 62-63, 175 infusion pumps, 50-66 (passim), 150,
171, 172, 183, 255, 257 natural mapping, 163-164, 171 outpatient care, 165 standards and standardization, 23, 62,
144, 148-151, 156, 164, 172- 173, 197
see also Food and Drug Administration
Diagnostic errors, 36, 79 Diphenhydramine hydrochloride, 34 Disabilities, 1-2, 30, 220-221, 261 Drugs, 1, 221
allergic reactions, 33, 192 antibiotics, 33, 171 anticoagulants, 35 antidiarrheals, 34 anti-inflammatory drugs, 35, 253-254 Centers for Education and Research in
Therapeutics, 77-78, 79 chemotherapy, 1, 51, 164, 171, 194,
260
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 277
children, 33-34, 38, 171, 226-227, 242- 245
computer tracking/databases, 34, 39- 40, 77, 80, 171, 172, 175, 183, 184-185, 191-193, 195
cost of adverse effects, 2, 27, 30, 32, 41, 182-183, 191, 194-195, 248- 253
errors on, 13, 14, 27, 28, 29, 32-35, 36, 37-40, 176, 182-197, 224-248
ambulatory care settings, 32-33, 34- 35, 39
emergency departments, 35, 39, 238-239
hospital errors, general, 33-35, 38, 39-40, 41-42, 168, 171, 182-197, 224-253
mortality, 28, 32-33, 42, 227, 229, 233, 248-249
nursing homes, 42 surgery, 34, 40, 228-229; see also
Anesthesia see also “reporting systems” infra
infusion devices, 50-66 (passim), 150, 171, 172, 183, 193, 255, 257
Medication Errors Reporting (MER) program, 95, 97, 100, 125, 126- 127, 194
MedMARx, 95, 100, 126 MedWatch, 99, 123, 148-149 mortality, 28, 32-33, 42, 227, 229, 233,
248-249 naloxone hydrochloride, 34 names of, 29, 37, 136, 148, 149, 151,
184, 231 National Patient Safety Partnership,
82 nursing homes, 42 order entry systems, 33, 40, 62, 80,
172, 175, 183, 184, 185, 188- 189, 190, 191-192
organizational factors, 13, 14, 157-158, 168, 171, 172, 174, 175, 177, 182-197
packaging and labeling, 13, 64, 136, 148, 151, 185, 187, 193
bar coding, 175, 188, 189, 195-196
patient compliance, 35, 37, 39, 174, 236-237
pharmacies, 2, 27, 32, 51, 183, 186- 187, 192-193
pharmacists, 2, 13, 27, 34, 39, 145, 183, 186-187, 193, 194-195, 224-225, 230-233, 236-237, 240- 245
potassium chloride, 171, 187, 194 prescription writing, 33, 37-39, 54,
183, 184, 190, 231, 241 protocols, 6, 77, 92, 141, 158, 164,
171, 173, 177, 183, 186, 187, 193-194
chemotherapy, 164, 171, 194 reporting systems, 34, 93, 95, 98-99,
100 FDA, 93, 95, 98-99, 100, 104, 105,
123, 148-149 selected states, descriptions, 255,
257, 261 standards and standardization, 13, 14,
23, 29, 171, 183, 184-185, 190- 191
surgery, 34, 40, 228-229; see also Anesthesia
unit dosing, 183, 184-185, 193 see also Food and Drug
Administration
E
Economic factors ambulatory care, 165 incentives, 18, 19-20, 21 market-based initiatives, 6, 17, 19-20,
21 uninsured persons, 24 worker productivity losses, 2-3 see also Cost and cost-benefit factors;
Employment factors; Funding: Insurance; Purchasers
Education, see Patient education; Professional education; Public education
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, 159-160
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
278 INDEX
Elderly persons, 79, 234-235, 250-251 see also Medicare; Nursing homes
Emergency departments, 36-37, 60, 79, 165
adverse drug events, 35, 39, 238-239 Employment factors
worker productivity losses, 2-3 workload, 24, 42, 60 see also Occupational health
Equipment, see Devices and equipment Error, general
active errors, 55-56, 65-66, 181 defined, 28, 54, 55, 78, 210 latent errors, 55-56, 65, 66, 155, 181-
182 national reduction goals, 7, 70, 78 near-misses, 28, 87, 96, 101, 110, 127,
160, 177, 190 pathophysiology of error, 162-163
Error analysis, 4, 10, 32, 87, 181 active errors, 55-56, 65-66, 181 critical incident analysis, 63-64 latent errors, 55-56, 65, 66, 155, 181-
182 literature review, 21-22, 26-48, 205,
206, 215-253 naturalistic decision-making, 64 organizational factors, 8, 10, 166, 168 systems approach, 49, 50, 52-66 see also Reporting systems
Evidence-Based Practice Centers, 83
F
Fatigue, 24, 42, 60, 163 Fear, 22, 42, 111, 125, 127, 157, 160, 163,
167, 189 see also Punitive responses
Federal Aviation Administration, 72-73, 96, 125
Feedback, 58-59, 62, 143, 176, 177, 178, 181-182, 189
autopsies, 269 reporting systems, 90, 98, 99, 100, 105 see also Learning environment
Flight Safety Foundation, 72
Florida, 92, 115, 257 Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
13, 71, 79, 82 Centers for Education and Research in
Therapeutics, 77-78, 83 MedWatch, 99, 123 Office of Post-Marketing Drug Risk
Assessment (OPDRA), 149, 150 reporting systems, 93, 95, 98-99, 100,
104, 105, 123, 148-149 standards, 13, 136, 148-151
Forcing functions, 158, 164, 170, 171 Foreign countries, see specific countries Freedom of Information Act, 123 Free flow, medication, 51-66 (passim),
171, 172 Funding, 82-83
Aviation Safety Program, 83 Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS), 72-73 Center for Patient Safety (proposed),
7-8, 70, 76, 78-79, 83-84, 106 NIH, 82 NIOSH, 83 organizational safety environment,
166, 168 reporting systems, 9, 10, 72-73, 88, 89,
106 study at hand, x
H
Harvard Medical Practice Study, 5, 30 Health Care Financing Administration,
19-20, 82, 139, 140-141 Health Care Quality Improvement Act,
121-122, 129 Health insurance, see Insurance Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), 104
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs), 39, 99
Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), 20, 139, 140
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 279
Health Resources and Services Administration
National Practitioner Data Bank, 121- 123
High-reliability theory, 57 High-risk industries, 5, 13, 22, 57, 60, 80,
159-162, 166 see also Aviation; National Aeronautics
and Space Administration; Nuclear power industry
Hindsight bias, 53 Home care, 2, 29, 51, 254 Hospitals, 1, 26, 29, 165, 168
adverse events, 30-31, 36-37, 40-42, 216-223
drugs, 32, 33-35, 38, 39-40, 41-42, 168, 171, 182-197, 224-253
costs of adverse effects, 2, 27, 30, 248-253
licensure and accreditation, 71, 103, 137-139, 151, 152, 168, 266
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 71, 91, 93-94, 104-105, 116, 125, 128, 138, 193, 194, 266
reporting systems described, selected states, 255-265 (passim)
occupational safety in, 168 reporting systems, 9, 87-88, 91, 105,
124, 254-265 (passim) see also Autopsies; Emergency
departments; Infections and infection control; Intensive care units; Life Safety Code; Operating rooms; Risk management
Hours of work, see Workload Human factors, 22, 53-54, 63-66, 145,
162-166, 170-173 aviation, 72 critical incident analysis, 63-64 defined, 63, 210 fatigue, 24, 42, 60, 163 human-machine interface, 62-63, 175 infusion pumps, case study, 50-66 naturalistic decision-making, 64 vigilance, 5, 158, 164, 170, 172
see also Cognitive processes; Error, general; Error analysis; Incompetent practitioners; Organizational factors
I
Incompetent practitioners, 30, 36-37 negligent adverse events, 28, 30, 37,
114-131 organizational safety environment,
166, 169 public opinion, 42, 43 standards, 134, 142, 261 systems approach, 49 unlicensed, 261 see also Malpractice
Infections and infection control, 30, 35, 42, 165, 267-268
Infectious diseases, 267-268 Information systems, 7, 74-75, 80-81, 177-
178, 180-181, 188-189, 195-196 clinical, 3 Internet, 92, 134 performance standards, 134, 138-139 role in errors, 61, 65 see also Computer systems;
Confidentiality, reporting systems; Feedback; Media; Professional education; Public education; Reporting systems
Infusion pumps, 50-51, 55-66 (passim), 150, 171, 172, 183, 193, 255, 257
Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 183
Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP), 95, 104
Insurance, 2, 6, 139 HMOs, 39, 99 organizational performance standards,
3, 139-141 malpractice, 164 managed care, general, 168 Medicaid, 139, 141, 142, 252-253 Medicare, 39, 128, 138, 140, 141, 142
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
280 INDEX
preferred provider organizations (PPOs), 139
uninsured persons, 24 see also Purchasers
Intensive care units, 31, 79, 105, 228-229 neonatal and pediatric, 34
Interdisciplinary approaches, 14, 135-136 practice guidelines, 145-146 professional conferences, 146 see also Teams
International perspectives, see specific countries
Internet, 206 patient care, 175, 177 reporting systems, 92, 95, 258, 259 standards, 134
J
Job design, 61, 62-63, 70, 170, 171, 172- 173, 176-177
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), 71, 91, 93-94, 104- 105, 116, 125, 128, 138, 193, 194, 266
K
Kansas, reporting system, 257-258
L
Labeling, see Packaging and labeling, drugs
Latent error, 55-56, 65, 66, 155, 181-182
Leadership, 69, 138, 156-157, 162, 166, 167, 168, 180-181, 197
authority gradient, 178, 180-181 committee recommendations, 6,
14, 69 see also Center for Patient Safety
(proposed)
Learning environment, 8, 23, 57, 62, 166, 178-182, 197
team training, 14, 79, 156, 170, 173- 174, 176-177, 179, 189, 197
see also Professional education Legal issues, 23
negligent adverse event, 28, 30, 37 see also Confidentiality, reporting
systems; Liability issues; Litigation; Malpractice
Legislation, in force Agency for Health Care Research and
Quality, 78 Freedom of Information Act, 123 Health Care Quality Improvement
Act, 121-122, 129 Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), 104
model of environmental factors, 17, 18, 19, 21
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 73, 136
Privacy Act, 123 Safe Medical Device Act, 150-151 state reporting systems, 113-121, 254-
265 (passim) see also Regulatory issues
Legislation, proposed, x, 6 Center for Patient Safety (proposed),
7-8, 69-71 peer review, 10, 111 reporting, 104, 111-112, 128
Leukopenia, 34 Liability issues, 3, 10, 22, 43, 167
enterprise liability and no-fault compensation, 111
model of environmental factors, 19 see also Litigation; Malpractice
Licensure and accreditation, 19, 23, 71, 79, 133, 134, 135
organizations, 71, 103, 137-139, 151, 152, 168, 266
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 71, 91, 93-94, 104-105, 116, 125, 128, 138, 193, 194, 266
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 281
reporting systems described, selected states, 255-265 (passim)
professionals, 3, 10-12, 134, 141-144, 151-152
malpractice, 12, 43, 113-117, 142, 169, 262
unlicensed, 261 reporting systems, 91, 93-94, 103, 255-
265 (passim) Life Safety Code, 267 Litigation
mandatory reporting, 262 voluntary reporting, 23, 109-131
Long-term care, 209 see also Nursing homes
Louisiana, 142
M
Malpractice, 12, 43, 113-117, 142, 164, 169, 262
see also Incompetent practitioners; Litigation
Managed care, 168 HMOs, 39, 99 PPOs, 139
Massachusetts, 39, 183, 224-225, 232-233, 246-251
reporting system, 258-259 Media, 20, 43
specific incidents, 1, 3, 51 Medicaid, 139, 141, 142, 252-253 Medical devices and equipment, see
Devices and equipment Medicare, 39, 128, 138, 140, 141, 142 Medication and medication safety, see
Drugs Medication Errors Reporting (MER)
program, 95, 97, 100, 125, 126- 127, 194
MedMARx, 95, 100, 126 MedWatch, 99, 123, 148-149 Memory, 54, 158, 163, 170, 171, 172, 185
checklists, 158, 171, 172, 180, 187, 194 simplification, 53, 60, 157, 158, 163,
164, 166, 170, 171, 172, 185, 197 see also Protocols
Mississippi, reporting system, 259 Models and modeling
environmental influences on quality, 17-21
reporting hierarchy, 101 Mortality, x, 30, 31-32, 37, 221-223, 248-
249, 269 airline fatality rates, 5 anesthesia, 164, 222-225 drug errors, 28, 32-33, 42, 227, 229,
233, 248-249 infectious disease, 267-268 national, 1-2, 26, 27, 31, 248-249 reporting systems, 93, 96, 98, 101, 257,
258, 260, 262, 264 suicide, 35, 94, 257, 260, 262
Motivation, see Attitudes Multidisciplinary approaches, see
Interdisciplinary approaches
N
Naloxone hydrochloride, 34 National Academy for State Health
Policy, x, 92-93 National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 72, 96 Ames Research Center, 65, 73 Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS), 72-73, 76, 91, 95-97, 104, 105-106, 125, 127
Challenger accident, 51, 52, 55 National Cancer Policy Board, 209 National Committee for Quality
Assurance, 20, 138, 139 National Coordinating Council for
Medication Error Reporting and Prevention, 183
National Fire Prevention Association, 267 National Forum for Health Care Quality
Measurement and Reporting, 9, 10, 88, 89, 101, 103-104
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 73, 74, 82
National Institute of Standards and Technology, 178
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
282 INDEX
National Institutes of Health (NIH), 74, 77
National Medical Expenditure Survey, 38, 234-235
National Occupational Research Agenda, 74
National Patient Safety Foundation, 6, 57, 70, 71, 76, 81, 147, 193
National Patient Safety Partnership, 78, 81-82, 183, 191, 196
National Practitioner Data Bank, 121-123 National Roundtable on Health Care
Quality, 208-209 National Transportation Safety Board, 72,
76, 96 Naturalistic decision-making, 64 Natural mapping, 163-164, 171 Navy, see U.S. Navy Near-misses, 28, 87, 96, 101, 110, 127,
160, 177, 190; see also Errors, general
New Jersey, reporting system, 260 New York State
hospital studies, 1, 26, 30, 220-221, 238-239
outpatient surgery, 165 reporting system, 92, 124, 260-261
Norman, Donald, 163 Nuclear power industry, 60
Three Mile Island, 51, 52, 55 Nurses
error studies, 216-217, 228-229, 232- 237, 243-245
infusion pumps, 50-51, 56 organizational accreditation, 138 professional accreditation, 143-144 reporting, 34, 256
Nursing homes, 2, 91, 209, 250-251, 254, 256
drug errors, 42
O
Occupational health, 6-7, 24, 27, 73-74, 80, 159-162, 168
HEDIS, 20, 139, 140
National Occupational Research Agenda, 74
NIOSH, 73, 74, 82 patient safety and, 155-156 worker productivity losses, 2-3 workload, 24, 42, 60
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 73, 136
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 73-74, 76, 90, 91, 97-98
Office of Post-Marketing Drug Risk Assessment (OPDRA), 149, 150
Ohio, 261-262 Oklahoma, 128 Operating rooms, 31, 36, 50, 52, 56, 79,
157 Order entry systems, 33, 40, 62, 80, 172,
175, 183, 184-185, 188-189, 190, 191-192
Organizational factors, 3, 6-7, 13-14, 17, 22, 23, 60, 155-201, 266-271
access to health care, 24 accountability, 8, 13, 101, 166, 167,
168, 205 authority gradient, 178, 180-181 culture of medicine, 21-22, 179 culture of safety, 12-13, 14, 155-156,
159-162, 166-168, 178, 179, 189 design for recovery, 176-177 drugs, 13, 14, 157-158, 168, 171, 172,
174, 175, 177, 182-197 error analysis, 8, 10, 166, 168 high reliability theory, 57 job design, 61, 62-63, 70, 170, 171,
172-173, 176-177 licensure and accreditation, 71, 103,
137-139, 151, 152, 168, 266 Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations, 71, 91, 93-94, 104-105, 116, 125, 128, 138, 193, 194, 266
reporting systems described, selected states, 255-265 (passim)
peer review, 10, 111, 112, 119-121, 126-128, 140-141, 143, 234-235, 263-264
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 283
performance standards, 3, 14, 23, 132- 134, 136-141, 143-144, 157, 162, 166, 172-173, 254-265
professional organizations, 6, 12, 20, 79, 135-136, 144-148, 152, 167, 181, 183-184; see also specific organizations
reporting systems, 9, 87-88, 91, 105, 124, 156, 160, 166, 254-265
staffing, 138, 165, 166, 167, 170, 172, 175-176, 190
see also Center for Patient Safety (proposed); Interdisciplinary approaches; Leadership; Staffing; Systems, general; Teams
Oryx system, 138-139 Outpatient treatment, see Ambulatory
health care settings
P
Packaging and labeling, drugs, 13, 64, 136, 148, 151, 185, 187, 193
bar coding, 175, 188, 189, 195-196 see also Food and Drug
Administration Pathophysiology of error, 162-163 Patient education, 183, 188-189, 196-197 Patient safety, definition of, 57, 155, 211 Patients, role in reducing errors, 174
drug therapy, 35, 37, 39, 174, 236-237 Peer review, 234-235
organizations, 140-141 professional performance standards,
143; see also American Medical Accreditation Program Association
reporting systems, 10, 111, 112, 119- 121, 126-128, 263-264
Pennsylvania, 262-263 Perrow, Charles, 51-52, 57, 60 Pew Health Professions Commission, 144 Pharmaceuticals, see Drugs Pharmacies, 2, 27, 32, 51, 183, 186-187,
192-193
Pharmacists, 2, 13, 27, 39, 145, 183, 186- 187, 193, 194-195, 224-225, 230-233, 236-237, 240-245
reporting, 34 Physician order entry, see Order entry
systems Physicians Desk Reference, 177 Phytonadione, 34 Pneumonia, 31, 220-221 Point-of-service plans, 139 Potassium chloride, 171, 187, 194 Practice guidelines, see Clinical practice
guidelines Preferred provider organizations (PPOs),
139 Prescription writing, 33, 37-39, 54, 183,
184, 190, 231, 241 Preventable adverse events, 4, 5, 7, 35-37,
39, 41, 182, 191 children, 34 defined, 28 studies of, 1-2, 26, 27, 30-31, 216-225,
228-229, 234-237, 246-249 Preventive interventions
design for recovery, 176-177 errors in, 36
Privacy, see Confidentiality, reporting systems
Privacy Act, 123 Problem solving, 162, 163, 172, 179
simplification, 53, 60, 157, 158, 163, 164, 166, 170, 171, 172, 185, 197
Professional education, 12, 15, 57, 60, 134, 146-147, 161
ambulatory care, 165 Center for Patient Safety (proposed),
70, 76, 79, 82 culture of medicine, 179 curricula on patient safety, 12, 134,
146-147 National Patient Safety Foundation,
71 reporting systems, 99 simulation training, 65, 79, 145, 163,
176-177, 178, 179 standards, 12, 142-143
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
284 INDEX
team training, 14, 79, 146, 156, 170, 173-174, 176-177, 179, 189, 197
see also Feedback; Learning environment; Licensure and accreditation
Professional organizations, 6, 12, 20, 79, 135-136, 144-148, 152, 167, 181, 183-184
see also specific organizations Protocols, 6, 77, 92, 141, 158, 171, 173,
177, 183, 186, 187, 193-194 checklists, 158, 171, 172, 180, 187, 194 chemotherapy, 164, 171, 194 clinical practice guidelines, 32, 135,
145-146, 171 Public education, 15
Center for Patient Safety (proposed), 70, 76, 79, 82
committee mission, xi, 205 patient education, 183, 188-189, 196-
197 see also Media
Public opinion, 2, 29, 42-43, 70, 167 Punitive responses, 56, 157, 180, 197 Purchasers, 2, 3, 6, 11, 19-20, 23, 79, 152,
167, 206 organizational performance standards,
3, 139-141 reporting systems, 89 see also Health Care Financing
Administration; Insurance
Q
Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs), 123; see also Peer review, organizations
Quality Interagency Coordinating Committee, 78
R
Reason, James, 4, 52, 54, 58, 60, 162 Redundancy, 57, 60, 158, 161-162
Regulatory issues, x, 6, 17, 18, 75 committee recommendations, 10-11 mandatory reporting systems, 6, 8, 9,
10, 79, 86, 87-88, 90, 91-93, 97- 98, 102-104, 166
confidentiality, 8, 10, 92, 101, 255- 264 (passim)
descriptions, selected states, 255- 265
model of environmental factors, 17, 18, 19, 20-21
see also Food and Drug Administration; Licensure and accreditation; Standards and standardization
Reporting systems, 8-9, 14, 22-23, 32, 86- 131, 270
ambulatory care settings, 88, 257 anesthesia errors, 255, 256, 258 Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS), 72-73, 76, 91, 95-97, 104, 105-106, 125, 127
autopsies, 269 best practices, 9, 88, 93, 102-103 Center for Patient Safety (proposed),
9-10, 79, 102-103, 106, 135 confidentiality, 8, 10, 92, 94, 95, 96,
97, 100, 101, 109-131 anonymous reporting, 95, 96, 100,
111, 124, 125-126 de-identification, 97, 111, 125, 126-
127, 128 descriptions, selected states, 255-
265 (passim) mandatory systems, 8, 10, 92, 101,
255-264 (passim) voluntary systems, 94, 95, 109-131,
256 DHHS, 9, 73-74, 88, 121-123 drug errors, 34, 93, 95, 98-99, 100
FDA, 93, 95, 98-99, 100, 104, 105, 123, 148-149
selected states, descriptions, 255, 257, 261
external, 8, 91-93
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 285
feedback, 90, 98, 99, 100, 105 Internet, 92, 95, 258, 259 JCAHO, 91, 93-94, 104-105, 116, 125,
128 legislation,
in force, 113-121, 254-265 (passim) proposed, 104, 111-112, 128
licensure and accreditation, 91, 93-94, 103, 255-265 (passim)
mandatory, 6, 8, 9, 10, 79, 86, 87-88, 90, 91-93, 97-98, 102-104, 166
confidentiality, 8, 10, 92, 101, 255- 264 (passim)
descriptions, selected states, 255- 265
Medication Errors Reporting (MER) program, 95, 97, 100, 125, 126- 127, 194
MedMARx, 95, 100, 126 MedWatch, 99, 123, 148-149 mortality, 93, 96, 98, 101, 257, 258,
260, 262, 264 National Forum for Health Care
Quality Measurement and Reporting, 9, 10, 88, 89, 101, 103-104
National Practitioner Data Bank, 121- 123
nationwide, 9, 10, 87-88, 89, 101, 103- 106, 121-123
near misses, 87, 96, 101, 110, 127, 160 nurses, 34, 256 occupational health, 73-74 organizational factors, 9, 87-88, 91,
105, 124, 156, 160, 166, 254-265 peer review, 10, 111, 112, 119-121,
126-127 punitive responses for reporting
failures, 255, 258 sentinel events, 93-94, 104-105, 119-
120, 125, 128, 194 standards and standardization, 9, 28-
29, 73, 88-89, 99, 101-102, 104 state reporting systems, 254-265 surgery, 257, 263
voluntary, 8, 9-10, 23, 41-42, 79, 87, 89-90, 93-97, 98, 99, 102, 104- 106, 178, 179-180, 182, 188-189
confidentiality, 94, 95, 109-131, 256 litigation, 23, 109-131
Rhode Island, reporting system, 263-264 Risk management, general, 57, 58-59, 112,
137, 149, 270 see also High-risk industries
S
Safe Medical Device Act, 150-151 Sentinel events, 93-94, 104-105, 119-120,
125, 128, 194 Simplification, 53, 60, 157, 158, 163, 164,
166, 170, 171, 172, 185, 197 see also Protocols
Simulation training, 65, 79, 145, 163, 176- 177, 178, 179
Software, see Computer systems South Dakota, reporting system, 264-265 Special Initiative on Health Care Quality,
208 Specialists and specialization, 3, 12, 20,
36, 58-59, 80, 142-143, 146, 148, 173
see also Anesthesia; Emergency departments; Intensive care units; Surgery; Teams
Staffing, 138, 166, 167, 170, 172, 175-176, 190
ambulatory care, 165 Standards and standardization, 6, 9
adverse events taxonomies, 9, 10, 28- 29, 88
best practices, 9, 18, 32, 77, 79, 88, 93, 102-103, 145, 152, 182, 193
design for recovery, 176 devices and equipment, 23, 62, 144,
148-151, 156, 164, 172-173, 197 drugs, 13, 14, 23, 29, 171, 183, 184-
185, 190-191 environmental influences model, 19
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
286 INDEX
information systems, 134, 138-139 insurance, organizational performance,
3, 139-141 Life Safety Code, 267 organizational, 3, 14, 23, 132-134, 136-
141, 143-144, 157, 162, 166, 172-173, 254-265
patient records, 178 performance, 10-12, 132-154 professional, 23, 132, 133, 134-136,
141-148 professional education, 12, 142-143 reporting systems, 9, 28-29, 73, 88-89,
99, 101-102, 104 classification/standardization of, 9,
10, 28-29, 88 see also Clinical practice guidelines;
Food and Drug Administration; Licensure and accreditation; Protocols
State government, x, 5 hospital studies, 1, 26, 30-31, 36-37,
40, 238-239, 248-249 reporting systems, 9, 79, 87-88, 91-93,
94, 102-103, 111, 113-114, 118, 119, 123, 124, 126-127
descriptions, selected states, 254- 265
see also Licensure and accreditation; specific states
State-level data, 1, 26, 30-31, 36-37, 40 see also specific states
Suicide, 35, 94, 257, 260, 262 Surgery, 2, 35, 79, 218-219, 232-233, 269,
270 complexity, 36 drug errors, 34, 40, 228-229; see also
Anesthesia infusion pumps, 50-66 (passim), 150,
171, 172 operating rooms, 31, 36, 50, 52, 56, 79,
157 outpatient, 2, 165 postsurgical complications, 31-32 reporting systems, 257, 263
Switzerland, 177
Systems, general, 49, 50, 56-66, 71, 157, 158, 188-189, 190
aviation, 71-72 complex systems, 2, 36, 39, 53, 58-60,
61, 62-63, 65, 182-183 critical incident analysis, 63-64 defined, 52, 211 drugs, 182-183 redundancy, 57, 60, 158, 161-162 tightly coupled systems, 58-60, 161,
179 see also Error analysis; Feedback;
Models and modeling; Organizational factors; Teams
T
Teams crew resource management, 79, 97,
147, 157, 161, 162, 173, 176, 179
patient as part of, 174 risk management, 270 technology as part of, 62-63 training in, 14, 79, 156, 170, 173-174,
176-177, 179, 189, 197 working in, 37, 50, 51, 56-57, 59, 60,
62-63, 64, 146-147, 166, 170, 197
Technological factors, 61-62, 80, 144, 159 anticipating new errors, 174-175 complexity, 36, 61, 62-63, 65 human-machine interface, 62-63, 175 professional licensing and, 135 protocols, updating of, 171 see also Computer systems; Devices
and equipment; High-risk industries; Information systems
Texas, 126-127 Three Mile Island, 51, 52, 55 Tiger teams, 175 Time-series measures, 182
see also Benchmarking Training, see Professional education
To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
INDEX 287
U
Unit dosing, 183, 184-185, 193 United Kingdom, 32, 38-39, 226-227,
244-245 University of Southern California, 72 User-centered design, 62, 78, 89, 150,
159, 163, 164, 171, 192 User Liaison Program, 78 U.S. Navy, 160-162 U.S. Pharmacopeia, 95, 104, 194
Medication Errors Reporting (MER) program, 95, 97, 100, 125, 126- 127, 194
Utah, hospital studies, 1, 26, 30-31, 36-37, 40, 238-239, 248-249
V
Veterans Health Administration, 80, 83, 123
Vigilance, 5, 158, 164, 170, 172 Virginia, 142
W
Workload, 24, 42, 60 World Wide Web, see Internet Wristbands, 177, 195
Y
Y2K issues, 82
- Front Matter
- Reviewers
- Preface
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Contents
- Executive Summary
- 1 A Comprehensive Approach to Improving Patient Safety
- 2 Errors in Health Care: A Leading Cause of Death and Injury
- 3 Why Do Errors Happen?
- 4 Building Leadership and Knowledge for Patient Safety
- 5 Error Reporting Systems
- 6 Protecting Voluntary Reporting Systems from Legal Discovery
- 7 Setting Performance Standards and Expectations for Patient Safety
- 8 Creating Safety Systems in Health Care Organizations
- A Background and Methodology
- B Glossary and Acronyms
- C Literature Summary
- D Characteristics of State Adverse Event Reporting Systems
- E Safety Activities in Health Care Organizations
- Index